The Journal

OF

PHILOLOGY.

EDITED BY

W. ALDIS WRIGHT, M.A.

INGRAM BYWATER, M.A.

AND

HENRY JACKSON, LITT. D.

VOL. XIV.

London and Cambridge:
MACMILLAN AND CO.
DEIGHTON, BELL AND CO. CAMBRIDGE.
1885

17218

Cambridge:
PRINTED BY C. J. CLAY, M.A. AND SON,
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS.

CONTENTS.

No. XXVII.

	PAGE
Genesis XLIX. 10: an Exegetical Study. S. R. Driver . .	1
Notes in Latin Lexicography. H. Nettleship	29
Notes on the Epinal Glossary. H. Nettleship	34
Aristotelia II. I. Bywater	40
Critical Notes, chiefly on the Menaechmi of Plautus. J. H. Onions	53
Adversaria. R. Ellis	78
New Suggestions on the Ibis. R. Ellis	93
H. A. J. Munro. W. H. Thompson	107
1 Maccabees III. 48. A. F. Kirkpatrick	111
On the Forms of Divination and Magic enumerated in Deut. XVIII. 10, 11. W. Robertson Smith	113
Note on Matt. XXVII. 27—30. J. E. B. Mayor	129
Miscellanea. F. Haverfield	132
On certain Difficulties with Regard to the Greek Tetralogy. A. T. S. Goodrick	133

No. XXVIII.

PAGE

The Prytaneum, the Temple of Vesta, the Vestals, Perpetual Fires. J. G. Frazer 145

Plato's Later Theory of Ideas. V. The *Sophist*. Henry Jackson . 173

Ἔπειν and Ἔπεσθαι. Walter Leaf 231

On Three Corrupt Passages in Catullus. J. Mowat . . . 252

The Season and Extent of the Travels of Herodotos in Egypt. A. H. Sayce 257

Lexicographical Notes. F. Haverfield 287

Propertius I. xxi. J. P. Postgate 289

THE JOURNAL

OF

PHILOLOGY.

GENESIS XLIX. 10: AN EXEGETICAL STUDY.

THE following is an attempt to throw light upon a difficult and controverted passage, partly by the study of its exegesis historically, partly by the endeavour to determine more precisely than has generally been done the limits to which uncertainty extends. In the selection of extracts, completeness, it may be remarked, has not been aimed at, in particular professedly polemical treatises have been, as a rule, purposely left out of sight; at the same time the extracts presented will, it is believed, be found to be fairly representative of the currents of interpretation prevalent in either Jewish or Christian circles, until the 14th or 15th century. As the best means of conveying a vivid and distinct impression of their individual character and aim, the authorities cited have usually been permitted to speak for themselves, notes and references being added only where they appeared necessary for the purpose of enabling an ordinary reader to understand the nature of a quotation or the drift of the reasoning[1]. The chronological arrangement adopted has

[1] For the general exegesis of the Blessing on Judah, the reader is referred to the commentaries. The most recent, and useful, is that of Dillmann (1883), who gives references to the special monographs upon 'Shiloh'. *V.*

the further advantage of exhibiting in a clear light the various phases through which the exegesis of the passage passed, and the influence exercised by each upon those which followed it.

It may be as well at the outset to state the difficulty which attaches to the familiar rendering of the A. V. *until Shiloh come.* The difficulty is really a philological one. As pointed by the Massorites, the termination ה– must either represent the suffix of the 3rd pers. masc., or stamp the word as a proper name: comp. יתרו, עדו, דודו, שלמה; מגדו, ירחו (also יְרֵחֹה 1 K. xvi. 34), גלה, שוכה Josh. xv. 48[1]. Elsewhere, to be sure, שילה (or שילו) denotes the place Shiloh: but, as the examples shew, the form might with equal propriety designate a person. If so, however, in a passage like the present, the name must be significant; and its signification must, moreover, be obvious. Now the root with which שילה *seems* to be connected is שלה *to be quiet* or *at ease:* but here a difficulty at once arises in connexion with the form. The only exact parallel is the name of the place גִּלֹּה: but it is not possible to derive either שִׁלֹּה or גִּלֹּה from a verb ל״ה (as if they were of the form כִּישׁוֹר, קִיטוֹר, שִׁלֹּחַ), for these would by analogy give שִׁילוֹי, גִּילוֹי, whereas the gentile names שִׁילֹנִי, גִּילֹנִי (2 S. xv. 12; 1 K. xi. 29) shew that in fact גִּלֹּה and שִׁלֹּה are apocopated from שִׁילֹן, גִּילֹן (cf. מְגִדּוֹ by the side of מְגִדּוֹן Zech. xii. 11, and אֲבַדֹּה Pr. xxvii. 20 by the side of the usual אֲבַדּוֹן), which would point naturally to roots *שול (or שיל) and *גול (or גיל)[2].

10 is discussed with great fulness by Gustav Baur, *Gesch. der Alttest. Weissagung* (1861), p. 227—290: but most exhaustively in a monograph of Chr. Werliin, *De laudibus Judae* (Havniae, 1838), which includes for instance copious illustrations of Patristic exegesis. The present article, however, pursues in the main an independent line.

[1] Olshausen, § 215[g].

[2] Cf. חיכון, חיצון, also קישון if this be rightly connected with قاس *incurvus fuit.* The true etymology of Hebrew proper names is not unfrequently uncertain or obscure (e.g. עדלם): but Hitzig, *Biblische Theologie* (1880), p. 152 was perhaps right in connecting שיל, the presumable root of שילה, with سال *fluxit,* whence سيل *torrens* (Cor. 34, 15).

Derivatives in יֹן– from verbs ל״ה are numerous (Olsh. § 215[d]), and the forms are regularly עָוֹן, חִזָּיוֹן, אֲבִיּוֹן. The only exceptions are קִיצוֹן (perhaps formed on a false analogy with תִּיכוֹן, חֵיצוֹן); and הֵרוֹן Gen. iii. 16, אֵיתוֹן Ez. xl. 15 Qri, if the reading in these passages be correct. But איתון and קיצון both retain the יָ–; and there is thus *no* analogy in Hebrew for a word of the form שִׁלֹה derived from a root שָׁלָה[1]. Even, however, were this difficulty to be overcome, a derivative from שלה would hardly afford an appropriate title for the Messiah; שלה is not a full and significant word like שלם (Zech. ix. 10): at most it denotes *mere* rest (Ps. cxxii. 6, 7), and is often associated with the idea of careless, worldly ease (e.g. Job xii. 6; Ez. xvi. 49). The rendering *Peaceful one*, or *Peace-bringer*, reads more into the word than, as a derivative of שלה, it would fairly express. As regards both form and meaning, therefore, the personal sense attached to the word in A. V. labours under grave difficulties.

Let us consider the exegesis of the passage historically. It is remarkable that no ancient version, and indeed no known authority for several centuries after the Christian era, implies the Massoretic reading, or sees in the passage a proper name. It is true that it was generally interpreted in antiquity of the Messianic or ideal future of Israel: but this sense was reached in virtue of the general context of the passage, and not through a proper name *Shiloh*.

If we disregard the *plena scriptio*, which has generally little claim to originality[2], and is here not found in many MSS., and

[1] The argument in the text is substantially that of Tuch (*ad loc.*), which is admitted to be conclusive even by Hengstenberg (*Christology* i. 68 f.), though he endeavours, by the arbitrary supposition that proper names are used in scripture 'in a more comprehensive sense' than in ordinary life, to destroy the force of the admission. But other symbolical names (e.g. עמנואל, י״י צדקנו, עיר ההרם, שר שלום, שמה) are formed legitimately, in accordance with the recognized principles of the language: and it is difficult to understand why an exception should be postulated in the case of שלה.

[2] It does not appear on the Moabite stone, and the renderings of LXX. continually presuppose the absence of י and ו (e.g. Ps. v. *title* ὑπὲρ τῆς κλη-

the Massoretic punctuation, and read שִׁלֹה, we obtain a poetical equivalent of אשר לו (2 K. vi. 11 מִי מִשֶּׁלָּנוּ *who of ours?* Cant. i. 7, etc.), and the sentence may be construed (1) *until there come that which* (or *he who*) *is his:* (2) *until there come he to whom* (or *he whose*) *is...*, the sentence in the latter case being without a subject, and requiring either a word, such as הוא or יהיה, referring to שבט, or some expression denoting *dominion*. This punctuation is the clue to the versions; the traditional reading reaching back to the date of LXX., if not earlier, is שִׁלֹה. The suffix of 3rd pers. masc. written with ה does not occur elsewhere with ל: but this would not be fatal to its originality in an old piece: בה occurs once only (Jer. xvii. 24): and we have עירה, סוּתה in *v.* 11. The *v.*, it may be premised, is not anywhere quoted or referred to in the N. T.: in the O. T., if there be an allusion to it, it favours the punctuation שִׁלֹה, Ez. xxi. 32 עד בא אשר לו המשפט.

1. LXX. (and THEODOTION): *οὐκ ἐκλείψει ἄρχων ἐξ Ἰούδα καὶ ἡγούμενος ἐκ τῶν μηρῶν αὐτοῦ ἕως ἐὰν ἔλθῃ τὰ ἀποκείμενα αὐτῷ, καὶ αὐτὸς προσδοκία ἐθνῶν.*

For *τὰ ἀποκ. αὐτῷ* several MSS. have *ᾧ ἀπόκειται*, a few also *ὃ ἀπόκειται αὐτῷ*, or *ὃ ἀπόκειται*[1]: but *τὰ ἀποκ. αὐτῷ* is the true Septuagintal reading, and is a legitimate, though paraphrastic, rendering of שִׁלֹה. Both *ᾧ ἀπόκ.* and *τὰ ἀποκ. αὐτῷ* are however largely represented in the writings of the Fathers[2]: the former lends itself so readily to Christian exe-

ρονομούσης = הַנַּחֲלֶת: lviii. 12 *κρίνων αὐτοὺς* = שְׁפָטָם).

[1] Comp. Credner, *Beiträge zur Einleitung in die Bibl. Schriften*, ii. (1838), p. 52—4.

[2] We find, for instance, *τὰ ἀποκ. αὐτῷ* in Justin *Tryph.* 52; Origen (Lommatzsch) ii. 47, viii. 291 (*quae reposita sunt ei*), xvlii. 98 f. (*c. Cels.* § 53); Athan. i. 81 (*de Inc. Verbi* § 40); Basil. i. 550 d; Euseb. *Ecl. Proph.* i. c. 8. *ᾧ ἀπόκ.* occurs in Justin *Apol.* i. 32 (supplying shortly after *τὸ βασίλειον*: comp. Onkelos, &c.), 54 (cod. Reg. both times δ): Ignat. *Philad.* (interpolated) c. 9 (p. 240[21] Zahn); Iren. iv. 23 (10, 2) *cui repositum est*; Orig. i. 48, iv. 279 (*cui reposita*), viii. 291 (*is cui repositum est* named as found in other copies), xii. 391, xiii. 189, 212, xxi. 411 (*ille cui*), 413, Euseb. *H. E.* i. 8. (Principally from Holmes and Parsons.)

gesis that the preference shewn to it is not surprising. As early as the middle of the 2nd century it was disputed, as we learn from Justin (*Tryph.* 120[1]), which was the original reading of LXX.: the Jews asserted the latter, Justin contended for the former; neither side (so far as appears) arguing upon other than *à priori* grounds.

The rend. ἐκ τῶν μηρῶν αὐτοῦ for מבין רגליו is to be explained from Dt. xxviii. 57 Heb. and LXX., a passage which, as we shall see, influenced also in other respects the exegesis of Gen. xlix. 10.

προσδοκία appears to connect יקהת with קוה, תקוה: but the sense *obedience*, given already in Onkelos, is corroborated by the Arabic, and agrees with Pr. xxx. 17, the only other place in which the word occurs.

2. AQUILA: ...καὶ αὐτῷ σύστημα λαῶν.

The explanation of יקהת by *gathering* appears to be a traditional one: it will appear again in Tanchuma.

3. PESHIṬṬÂ: ܠܐ ܢܣܒ ܡܫܠܛܢܘܬܐ ܕܝܠܗ ܘܠܘܬܗ ܢܫܟܚ ܥܡܡܐ ܘܠܗ ܢܗܘܘܢ ܟܢܫܝ ܥܡܡܐ.

In the existing text there is nothing to explain the feminine ـتا. It has been thought possible that the original form of the text is preserved by APHRAATES (fl. 330—50), who cites the *v.* thus[2]:

ܠܐ ܢܣܒ ܡܫܠܛܢܘܬܐ ܕܝܠܗ ܘܠܘܬܗ ܕܝ ܢܫܟܚ ܥܡܡܐ ܘܠܗ ܢܗܘܘܢ ܟܢܫܝ ܥܡܡܐ.

At any rate, Aphraates, reading '*whose* is the kingdom', is an

[1] Justin here, as elsewhere (*Tryph.* c. 71—73) charges the Jews with altering or expunging passages supposed to refer to Christ. The charge, though made doubtless in good faith, is now known to be unfounded: the MSS. which Justin used must have contained interpolations made by Christian hands. Against the opinion that ᾧ ἀπόκ. is the rend. of Aq. Symm. see the note in Field's *Hexapla*.

[2] Ed. Wright, p. 320 (the partial quotations, p. 29, 340, 374 agree). Comp. Sasse, *Prolegomena in Aphraatis Sermones homileticos* (1878), p. 36.

independent witness of the early prevalence of the interpretation which we shall shortly find represented in Onkelos[1].

Ephrem Syrus (d. 373) explains similarly, *'until he shall come whose* is the kingdom', the rest of his citation (i. 107 F—108 D) agreeing verbally with Pesh.[2]

4. Clem. Hom. 3, 49: ἕως ἂν ἔλθῃ οὗ ἔστιν.

3 and 4 (*whose it is*) are simpler, less paraphrastic forms of the LXX. variant ᾧ ἀπόκειται.

5. Onkelos: לא יעדי עביד שולטן מדבית יהודה וספרא מבני בנוהי עד עלמא עד דייתי משיחא דדילה היא מלכותא וליה ישתמעון עממיא:

Onk., it will be seen, explains שבט of *ruler* generally, and מחקק of the *scribe*, מבין רגליו being interpreted (as substantially in LXX.) *from his descendants*, and *for ever* being added. In *b* he inserts *Messiah*, then (following the construction of ᾧ ἀπόκειται) adds מלכותא—'*until* Messiah *shall come whose* is the kingdom; *and to him the peoples shall be obedient*'. We shall see shortly how popular the explanation of Onkelos became.

There are traces of another reading which omits עד before דייתי—'shall not depart for ever, when Messiah', &c. (as though the Heb. interpunction were עַד כִּי). So R. Bechai: and one of the Firkowitsch MSS. reads also ארי ייתי for עד דייתי, with *athnach* in the text at עד[3].

6. Targum Jerushalmi: לא פסקין מלכין מדבית יהודה אף לא סברין מלפי אוריתא מבני בנוי עד זמן דייתי מלכא

[1] The dependence of the Pesh. upon traditional Jewish exegesis is clear: see the instructive comparison instituted by Perles, *Meletemata Peschitthoniana* (1859), p. 16 ff. It has even been argued, from this and other passages, that the Syriac translator (or translators) must have had the written Targum of Onkelos before them (Schönfelder, *Onkelos und Peschittho*, 1869, p. 13; Berliner, *Targum Onkelos*, 1884, ii. 127): see, however, on the other side, Nöldeke in the *Lit. C. B.* 1869, col. 1294, and 1884, col. 1348.

[2] To the same effect, also, Jacob of Edessa (7 cent.), *ibid.*, 189 E—F.

[3] Le Voisin in the *Pugio Fidei*, p. 265 (331 Carpzov); Berliner, *Targum Onkelos*, ii. p. 18.

משיחא דדידיה היא מלכותא וליה עתידין דישתעבדון כל מלכותא דארעא׃

מחקק is explained of 'the learned, teachers of the law': the rest substantially as Onkelos. סבר occurs Lev. xix. 32 Onk. (for שֵׂיבָה), in the sense of *one intelligent* or *learned*, sc. in the law. Afterwards the word became the technical name designating the teachers of a particular period, the successors of the אמראי (c. 500—650 A.D.)[1].

7. Samaritan Targum: לא יסטי שבט מיהודה ומנגד מבין סדריו עד הלא ייתי שלה ולידה יתנגדון עמין׃

Reads דגליו for רגליו, retaining the word שלה. The later Samaritans supposed Solomon to be referred to, who would forsake (1 K. xi. 1 f.) and abrogate the law (as though from שלל, *to strip away*)[2].

8. Targum Pseudo-Jonathan: לא פסקין מלכין ושליטין מדבית יהודה וספרין מאלפי אורייתא מזרעיה עד זמן די ייתי מלכא משיחא זעיר בנוי ובדיליה יתימסון עממיא׃

Messiah inserted (as in Onk.), but שילה explained as *his youngest child*, being connected with שליתה, Dt. xxviii. 57, which is rendered by Onk. זעיר בנהא, and where Rashi explains שליה as = בנים הקטנים. The first trace of an interpretation, which, however singular, will likewise, as we proceed, be seen to obtain considerable favour, and which is probably embodied in the Massoretic punctuation שִׁילֹה (= *his son*).

9. Old Latin: donec veniant quae reposita sunt ei.

With the variant: donec veniat cui repositum est (*or* cui reposita sunt). Merely translations of LXX.

10. Vulgate: donec veniat qui mittendus est.

שלה read as שָׁלֻחַ. An isolated rendering.

[1] Grätz, *Geschichte der Juden*[2], iv. p. 9, v. Chap. 1.

[2] See Gesenius, *de Pent. Sam.* p. 4; Eichhorn's *Repertorium* xvi. (1785), p. 168 f.; and below No. 20.

11. TALMUD, *Sanhedrin* 5ᵃ: לא יסור שבט מיהודה אלו ראשי גליות שבבבל שרודין את ישראל בשבט. ומחוקק מבין רגליו אלו בני בניו של הלל שמלמדין תורה ברבים:

The same passage is repeated *Horaioth* 11ᵇ.

The שבט is interpreted of the 'princes of the captivity in Babylon'. The 'prince of the captivity', as is well known, was a sort of governor of the exiles who remained in Babylon: the first of whom we hear was Mar Huna (c. 200 A.D.), and the succession continued unbroken till the 11th cent. They were reputed to be descendants of the house of David, their genealogy being traced back to Zerubbabel. They lived in some state, and exercised supreme authority in civil and criminal cases over the Jewish communities, but were subordinate to the government under which they lived, and, in Grätz's words, 'vassals of the Persian crown[1]'.

The מחקק, on the other hand, is referred to the 'descendants of Hillel, who gave instruction in the law', i.e. to the presidents of the Sanhedrin. On the Sanhedrin it will be sufficient here to remind the reader that it was instituted in Judæa under the Maccabees, and for more than a century continued to be the ruling authority of the nation. Under Herod it was deprived of political power, and the Romans left only religious matters and civil (not criminal) rights to its jurisdiction. This limitation of its power will explain the stress laid in the text on the teaching of the law. The Sanhedrin sat in the 'hall of polished stone' (the לשכת הגזית) close to the temple, and only such decisions as were passed by it there were held to be legally valid. According to the Jews it migrated from the לשכת הגזית, and lost at the same time all jurisdiction in capital causes, 40 years before the destruction of the second Temple[2].

[1] See Grätz, iv. 276—80.

[2] Rashi on *Sanh.* 41ᵃ: שאין דיני נפשות בכל מקום אלא בעוד שסנהדרי נוהגת בלשכת הגזית שנאמר וקמת ועלית אל המקום (דבר' י"ז) מלמד שהמקום גורם וכיון דחזו דנפישי רוצחין ולא היו מספיקין לדון עמדו וגלו משם. The same reason in *Ab. Zarah*, 8ᵇ, *ad fin.* Maimonides, *Hilchoth Sanh.* xiv. 13: ארבעים שנה קודם חרבן בית שני בטלו דיני נפשות מישראל אף על פי שהיה המקדש קיים מפני שגלו הסנהדרין ולא היו שם במקומן במקדש: See Edzardi,

Hillel (c. 75—5 B.C.) came from Babylon and settled in Jerusalem, where his character and learning quickly secured him a reputation, and he became president (נשיא) of the Sanhedrin, an office which was filled by his descendants till c. 425 A.D.[1]

12. In another passage of the Talmud, however, שילה actually occurs as a title of the Messiah. The passage, in order to be properly understood, must be cited at length[2]. *Sanh.* 98[b]:

אמר רב לא אברי עלמא אלא לדוד ואמר שמואל למשה. ורבי יוחנן אמר אלא למשיח. מה שמו דבי רבי שילא אמרי שילה שמו שנאמר עד כי יבוא שילה. דבי רבי ינאי אמרי ינון שמו שנא' יהי שמו לעולם לפני שמש ינון שמו. דבי רבי חנינה אמרי חנינה שמו שנא' אשר לא אתן לכם חנינה. ויש אומרים מנחם בן חזקיה שמו שנא' כי רחק ממני מנחם משיב נפשי ורבנן אמרי חיורא דבי רבי שמו שנא' אכן חלינו הוא נשא ומכאובינו סבלם ואנחנו חשבנוהו נגוע מוכה אלהים ומעונה:

"Rab said, The world was created only for the sake of David: Samuel said, It was for the sake of Moses: R. Yochanan said, It was only for the sake of the Messiah. What is his name? Those of the school of R. Shila say, Shiloh is his name, as it is said, 'Until *Shiloh*[3] (?) come'. Those of the school of R. Yannai say, Yinnon is his name, as it is said (Ps. lxxii. 17), 'Let his name be for ever, before the sun let his name be

Avoda Sara (1705), p. 61 (fol. 8[b]) and 236 (where other parallel passages are referred to).

[1] See Grätz, iii. 222 ff., Keim, *Jesus of Nazareth*, i. 349 ff., or the art. *Sanhedrin*, in Kitto's or Hamburger's Encyclopaedia.

[2] Often quoted: e.g. in Wünsche, *Die Leiden des Messias* (1870), p. 61 f. The passages of the O. T. applied in the Targums and other Jewish writings to the Messiah were collected by Schoettgen in the 2nd vol. of the *Horae Hebraicae*, esp. p. 140 ff.: they may be found also in Edersheim, *Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah*, ii. 707 ff.

[3] Or *his son:* comp. on no. 8.

perpetuated' [Heb. *yinnon*]. Those of the school of R. Chaninah say, Chaninah is his name, as it is said (Jer. xvi. 13), 'For I will give you no favour' [Heb. *chaninah*]. And some say, Menachem, [1]son of Hezekiah[1], is his name, as it is said (Lam. i. 16), 'For comforter [Heb. *menachem*], and restorer of my soul, is far from me'. And our Rabbis say, The leprous one [2]of the school of Rabbi[2] is his name, as it is said (Isa. liii. 4), 'Surely our sicknesses he hath borne, and our pains, he hath carried them, though we did esteem him stricken [*sc.* with leprosy], smitten of God, and afflicted[3]'."

Understood literally, such a passage is of little value: at the same time, interpreted more generally, these 'names' may be taken as a recognition on the part of the Jews that the attributes or qualities which they suggest would be those of their ideal king. The peculiarity here is that the title is in each case suggested by the name of a particular Rabbi: the pupils compliment their master by connecting his name with a title of the Messiah. The *exegetical* value of such interpretations is evidently *nil:* the authority of the admirers of Shila is of no greater weight in determining the true sense of Gen. xlix. 10 than that of the admirers of Yannai in determining the true sense of Ps. lxxii. 17. It is, however, in this doubtful company that 'Shiloh' is first cited as a name of the Messiah, though we do not learn how the word was read, or what it was imagined to signify[4].

13. Tanchuma (9 cent.): לא יסור שבט זה כסא מלכות שנאמר כסאך אלהים עולם ועד שבט מישור שבט מלכותך

[1] Omitted, acc. to Rabbinovicz (*Variae Lectiones*), in the best mss.

[2] My friend, Dr Neubauer, suggests that these words, obscure where they now stand, are either an alternative reading for *our Rabbis*, or should follow those words.

[3] Similar passages occur in the Midrash איכה on Lam. i. 16, and in the Midrash משלי on Pr. xix. 21 (7 names of the Messiah, according to R. Hona: צדקנו, ינון (Jer. xxiii. 6), צמח (Zech. vi. 12), מנחם (Is. li. 3), דוד (Ps. xviii. 51), אליהו, שילה (Mal. iii. 23). So ed. pr., Constant. 1512. Later edd. read *eight*, but give only the same seven.

[4] It need hardly be remarked that the Jews discover the Messiah in passages where no sound exegesis can recognize the idea; e.g. in Isa. xxvi. 6, רגלי עני, or 1 Chr. iii. 24 Anani (!), on account of the accidental resemblance with עני Zech. ix. 9, and עם ענני שמיא Dan. vii. 13.

(תהל' מ"ה ז'). ומחוקק מבין רגליו בשיבוא אותו מלך שהמלכות שלו שכתוב בו ברגלים תרמסנה עטרת גאות שכורי אפרים (ישע' כ"ח ג'). עד כי יבוא שילה שהמלכות שלו. ולו יקהת עמים יקהה שני עמים שנא' וישימו יד על פה ואזניהם תחרשנה (מיכ' ז' ט"ז) ד"א ולו יקהת עמים מי שעמים מתקהלין עליו שנא' שרש ישי אשר עמד לנס עמים אליו גוים ידרשו (ישע' י"א י') :

The sceptre is taken as that of the Messiah with reference to Ps. xlv. 7, the ver. as a whole (in accordance with the construction in the variant of Onkelos, noted above) being referred to the period *subsequent* to the advent of the Messiah: '*when he shall have come whose is the kingdom*', and the hostile power (signified by the 'crown of pride' in Isa. xxviii. 3) is destroyed, his dominion will be a permanent one: comp. Isa. xxviii. 5, Targ. (יי צבאות represented by משיחא דיי צבאות). Observe the quaint etymology suggested (in the first explanation) for יקהת.

14. Saadia (d. 942):

لا يزول القضيب من يهوذا والرسم من تحت امره الى ان يجيء الذى هو له واليه تجتمع الشعوب.

Agrees with nos. 3 and 4 ('whose it is').

15. Yepheth ben Ali (c. 950—990[1]):

لا يزول قضيب الملك من آل يهودة ولا المرسّم من بين رجليه الى ان يجيء سليله وله تدرس الشعوب

ثم قال עד כי יבא שילה ويشير به الى المسيح عمّ الذى يرسله

[1] Grätz, v. 305 f. The writer is indebted for this extract to the kindness of Dr A. Neubauer, Reader in Rabbinical Hebrew, Oxford, who transcribed it for him from MS. 278, fol. 286 in the National Library, Paris. He is indebted to him further for pointing out to him Nos. 16, 22, 27.

رب العالمين من اهل بيت דוד ويمسحه للملك ويملكه وكما قال אהבת צדק ותשנא רשע על כן משחך אלהים שמן ששן מחבריך وقال فى موضع آخر ויתר אחיו ישובון על [בני] ישראל (מיכ׳ ה׳ ב׳) فعرف ان المرتبة له وحده وسائر الاخوة يكونون فى جملة בני ישראל ولذلك اعطى خطة براسه كما قال ולנשיא מזה ומזה לתרומת הקדש (יחז׳ מ״ה ז׳) فمن اجل انه وحده المختار من בני דוד قال فيه עד כי יבא שילה ثم قال ולו יקהת עמים.

שילה is rendered *his son* (comp. no. 8), and is referred to the Messiah, the chosen one of David's sons, anointed and commissioned by the Almighty.

16. DAVID BEN ABRAHAM the Qaraite (c. 975)[1]: שילה. ועוא ויטש משכן שילה ثم ויבחר בשבט יהודה (תהל׳ ע״ח ס׳ ס״ח).

Comp. below, nos. 24, 27.

17. ABULWALID (11 cent.): עד כי יבא שילה سليله اى ولده

Agrees with Yepheth ben Ali in giving שילה the meaning *his son*. So no. 18 (*b*).

18. TOBIAH B. ELIEZER[2] (11 cent.): לא יסור שבט מיהודה אלו סופרים שביהודה כמו מושכים בשבט סופר (שופ׳ ה׳ י״ד). ומחוקק מבין רגליו אלו יושבי יעבץ (ד״ה א׳ ב׳ נ״ה) שמורין הלכות לישראל: עד כי יבא שילה פי׳ שי לו שעתידין אומות העולם להביא דורונות למשיח בן דוד שנאמר בעת ההיא יובל שי (ישע׳ י״ח י׳). ואומר מלכי תרשיש ואיים מנחה

[1] In his Lexicon, No. 1451 in Neubauer's Catalogue of the Hebrew MSS. of the Bodleian Library, Oxford.

[2] *Lekach Tob* (ed. Buber, Wilna, 1880).

ישיבו (תהל׳ ע״ב י׳). ולו יקהת עמים שעתיד להקהות שיניהם של עובדי כוכבים . . . . ס״א עד כי יבא שילה עד כי יבא בנו כמו ובשליתה (דבר׳ כ״ח נ״ז) :

Both שבט and מחקק interpreted of scribes or teachers. Jabez is supposed, on the ground of 1 Chr. ii. 55, to have been a residence of scribes. The last clause is rendered, Until gifts shall come unto him (שי לו): this is a new interpretation of שילה, which presupposes the *scriptio plena*[1].

19. The Breshith Rabbah. Of this great Midrashic work, there are for the § ויחי several recensions, differing in style from the rest of the work, and in all probability considerably later (11 cent.)[2]. The printed text itself contains a double recension (§ 98 being parallel to § 99); a third was published at Venice, 1602, under the title שטה חדשה לבראשית רבה, and others are quoted by Raymundus Martini and Abarbanel[3].

a. § 98. לא יסור שבט מיהודה. זה מכיר וג׳. ומחקק מבין רגליו. שבא ונתחבט לפני רגליו. עד כי יבא שילה. זה מלך המשיח. ולו יקהת עמים. שהוא בא ומקהה שניהם של עכו״ם.

The first part of this comment is obscure. For מכיר probably כפיבשת should be read (so ענן יוסף *ad loc.*), the allusion being to 2 S. ix. 6. The meaning appears to be that David's dynasty would continue in power till the advent of Messiah.

b. ד״א לא יסור שבט מיהודה זו סנהדרין שהוא מכה ורודה. ומחקק מבין רגליו אלו שני סופרי הדיינים שהם עומדים לפניהם אחד מימין ואחד משמאל. עד כי יבא

[1] The same explanation, almost in the same words, is cited in the *Pugio Fidei* II. iv. 4, from the *Bereschit Ketzara*.

[2] Zunz, *Gottesdienstliche Vorträge der Juden* (1832), p. 254—6.

[3] A German translation of the Breshith Rabbah has been recently published by Aug. Wünsche (1881): see p. 484 f., 498, 556.

שילה נמנו ואמרו הלל משל מי א״ר לוי מגלת יוחסים מצאו בירושלים וכתוב בו הלל מדוד.

(Other supposed pedigrees follow.)

The שבט is interpreted of the judicial authority exercised by the Sanhedrin, and the מחקק of the scribes (cf. חקק, Isa. x. 1) who registered its proceedings[1]. The view expressed by הלל מדוד is that the prophecy was fulfilled in the power of the Sanhedrin, the presidents of which (as stated above) were for some centuries descendants of Hillel, of the royal line. The explanation is similar to that of *Sanh.* 5[a], but differs from it in referring מחקק (as well as שבט) to the Sanhedrin, and not to the Resh Galutha.

c. § 99. This agrees almost verbatim with no. 13, and need not therefore be repeated.

d. (the שטה חדשה): (*a*) לא יסור שבט מיהודה זה ראש גלות שביהודה(?) שבבבל שרודין את עם ישראל במקל. ומחקק מבין רגליו אלו נשיאים של בית ר׳ שמלמדים תורה ברבים בא״י. (*β*) ד״א לא יסור שבט מיהודה זה בן דוד שעתיד לרדות את המלכות במקל שנא׳ תרועם בשבט ברזל (תהל׳ ב׳ ט׳) ומחקק מבין רגליו אלו יושבי יעבץ תרעתים שמעתים סוכתים (ד״ה א׳ ב׳ נ״ה) שמורים הלכות בישראל בסנהדרי גדולה שהיא יושבת בלשכת הגזית בחלקו של יהודה:

Obviously dependent upon nos. 11 and 18.

e. As cited in the *Pugio Fidei* of Raymundus Martini (c. 1270), p. 250 Le Voisin, p. 313 Carpzov: לא יסור שבט מיהודה זו לשכת הגזית שנתנה בחלקו של יהודה שנ׳ אחד מימין ואחד משמאל וכותבי דברי המחייבין ודברי המזכין.

[1] Comp. *Sanh.* 36[b], where it is stated that the Sanhedrin sat in a semicircle ושני סופרי הדיינין עומדין לפניהן

וימאס באהל יוסף ובשבט אפרים לא בחר ויבחר את שבט יהודה את הר ציון אשר אהב (תהל׳ ע״ח ס׳, ס״ח) הר המצוין בתורה וכן הוא אומר אוהב יהוה שערי ציון (תהל׳ פ״ז ב׳) שערים המצוינים בהלכה. ומחקק מבין רגליו אלו יושבי יעבץ שומרין (צ״ל שמורין) הלכות בישראל בסנהדרי גדולה שיושבת בלשכת הגזית בחלק יהודה שנ׳ ומשפחות סופרים יושבי יעבץ תרעתים וגו׳ (ד״ה א׳ ב׳ נ״ה). ומה לא יסור שבט מיהודה אלא לומר לך שלא נתן כח לסנהדרין לדין דיני נפשות אלא כל זמן שיושבין בלשכת הגזית שכיון שגלו משם למקום אחר בטלו דיני נפשות שנ׳ ועשית על פי הדבר אשר יגידו מן המקום ההוא (דבר׳ י״ז י׳) מלמד שמקום גורם. עד כי יבא שילה זה משיח.

Though this passage as a whole is not found in the printed editions of the *Breshith Rabbah*, its different parts (with the exception of the reference to Ps. lxxxvii.) have all been before us in other authorities: the allusion to 1 Chr. in particular agrees with *d.*, and the last clause זה משיח with *a.* (§ 98 of the printed text). The extract was doubtless made by Martini from a MS. exhibiting an independent recension of this Midrash[1]. The account given of the power of the Sanhedrin agrees with that in Rashi's note (p. 8); cf. also *Sanh.* 86[b], 87[a].

f. As cited in the *Pugio Fidei*, p. 657 Le Voisin, p. 842 Carpzov, from the Breshith Rabbah of R. Mosheh ha-Darshan[2]:

לא יסור שבט מיהודה זה משיח בן דוד שעתיד לרדות המלכות במקל שנ׳ תרועם בשבט ברזל (תהל׳ ב׳ ט׳). ומחקק שהוא עתיד למחוק האומות ברגלים שנ׳ תרמסנה רגל רגלי עני (ישע׳ כ״ו ו׳) זה משיח שנ׳ עני ורכב על חמור (זכר׳ ט׳ ט׳).

[1] Cf. Zunz, *l. c.* p. 256, 290 f.

[2] Zunz, p. 287 ff.; Neubauer, Preface to the *Chaldee Text of the Book of Tobit* (Oxford, 1878), p. viii f., xviii ff.

The first part of this agrees with *d.* (the only one in which the term מקל occurs): the connexion of מחקק with מָחַק is new: with the explanation of Is. xxvi. 6 comp. the note of Rashi *ad loc.*

20. Abusaid (11 or 12 cent.)[1]: لا يزول قضيب الملك من يهوذة والمرسّم من بين بنوده حتّى ياتى سليمان[2] واليه تنقاد الشعوب.

21. Rashi (d. 1104): לא יסור שבט מיהודה. מדוד ואילך אלו ראשי גליות שבבבל שרודים את העם בשבט שממונים היו על פי המלכות. ומחוקק מבין רגליו תלמידים אלו נשיאי ארץ ישראל. עד כי יבא שילה מלך המשיח שהמלוכה שלו וכן תרגם אונקלוס. ומדרש אגדה שי לו שנאמר יובילו שי למורא (תהל׳ ע״ו י״ב). ולו יקהת עמים אסיפת העמים:

Based directly upon the Talmudic explanation, no. 11, and Onkelos, no. 5, with an allusion (in Rashi's manner) to the Haggadic interpretation, no. 18.

22. Samuel of Russia (writing in 1124)[3]: לא יסור שבט מיהודה פי׳ מושל ושליט יהיה יהודה לעולם. וכן לא יסור מחוקק סופר וחכם שופט ודיין מבין רגליו של יהודה פי׳ מזרעו של יהודה לעולם יעמיד שופטים ומחוקקים עד כי יבא שילה פי׳ עד כי יבא מלך המשיח ששמו שילה והמלכות שלו. ולו יקהת העמים פי׳ ולו ינתן מלכות וגבורה מן השמים:

[1] Ed. Kuenen (Lugd. Bat. 1851).

[2] With the note, "Sic B et C in textu, A. شله. In C alia manus vocem سليمان delendam esse censuit, et in m. apposuit لا من الملك." See further Juynboll's preface to the *Chron. Sam.* p. 128.

[3] Neubauer's Catalogue, no. 213.

'Whose name is שילה, and whose is the kingdom'. The combination of the two interpretations is curious.

23. SAMUEL BEN MEIR (RASHBAM, grandson of Rashi). Not worth citing in full. The sovereignty of Judah will continue

עד כי יבוא יהודה שילה כלומר עד כי יבוא מלך יהודה הוא רחבעם שבא לחדש המלוכה בשילה שהוא קרוב לשכם אבל אז יסורו עשרת השבטים וג׳.

24. IBN EZRA (d. 1167): לא יסור שבט מיהודה. לא יסור שבט גדולה מיהודה עד שבא דוד שהוא תחלת מלכות יהודה וכן היה הלא תראה כי דגל יהודה נסע בראשונה גם אמר השם יהודה יעלה בתחלה (שופט׳ א׳ ב׳, כ׳ י״ח). ופי׳ מחקק סופר שיחוק על הספר. וטעם מבין רגליו שכן דרך כל סופר להיות יושב בין רגלי הקצין. שילה. יש אומרים כדרך המתרגם ארמית כטעם שלו. וי״א שהוא מגזרת ובשליתה (דבר׳ כ״ח נ״ז). ויש מי שהוציאו מל׳ קדמונינו ז״ל שליל. ויש מי שפירש אותו על עיר שילה ויפרש יבוא כמו ובא השמש או עד כי יבא קץ שילה כי כן כתוב ויטוש משכן שילה ואחר כן ויבחר בדוד עבדו גם זה איננו רחוק. או יהיה שילה כמו בנו והה״א תחת וי״ו כמו בתוך אהלה (ברא׳ ט׳ כ״א) מגזרת לא תשלה אותי (מלכ׳ ב׳ ד׳ כ״ח) שפי׳ לא תוליד[1]: וטעמו שיסורו גוים אל משמעתו וכן היו עמים רבים תחת יד דוד ושלמה בנו. ואין טעם עד כי יבא שילה שיסור השבט ממנו בבוא שילה רק טעמו כמו לא יחסר לפלוני לחם עד שיגיע עת שיהיו לו שדות וכרמים רבות. וכמוהו כי לא אעזבך עד אשר אם

[1] From a suggestion of Abulwalid's (*Book of Roots*, col. 725, ed. Neubauer: Kimchi, *s.v.* שלה *sub fin.*, who remarks והוא רחוק). Cf. no. 27.

עשיתי את אשר דברתי לך (ברא׳ כ״ח ט״ו) שישיבהו אל הארץ :

Recites the various explanations of שילה given by his predecessors. שליל occurs in the Mishna in the sense of the mature embryo: see Kimchi, *Book of Roots*, s. v. שיל, or Buxtorf. The allusion to Ps. lxxviii. appears to be based on no. 16. The fulfilment of the prophecy is referred to David, though Ibn Ezra does not state distinctly which explanation of שילה he himself accepts. The rendering (to adopt our idiom), 'Until the sun of Shiloh have set', is very far-fetched.

25. David Kimchi (d. 1235)[1]: לא תסור שרה מיהודה עד שיהיה לו יותר שיהיה מלך. ואמר זה על דוד ופירש שילה בנו מן ובשליתה. ודעת המתרגם על המשיח ותרגם שלה כמו שלו דיליה וכן בב״ר עד כי יבוא שילה עד שיבוא מי שהמלכות שלו. ועניין זה כאדם האומר לאחד קח זה עתה עד שאתן לך יותר. יקהת. שם וכן ליקהת אם. ופירושם משמעת ועבודה אומר כי העמים יהיו נשמעים אליו ועובדים אותו והיה זה לדוד וכל שכן למלך המשיח :

Similarly in the *Book of Roots:* והנבואה על דוד שהוא משבט יהודה או על המשיח.

שילה = *his son.* Referred primarily to David, secondarily to the Messiah.

26. The Yalkut (13 cent.) simply repeats previous interpretations (no. 11, 19 *d.* β, 18 [דורונות], 13 [להקהות שיניהם])[2].

[1] *Comm. on Genesis* (ed Ginzburg, Pressburg, 1842).

[2] The marginal reference to *Horaioth* 11[b], which has led Dr Edersheim, *l. c.* p. 709 (following Schoettgen), to suppose the text there to have been expurgated, is surely merely misplaced: in other editions (e.g. Warsaw, 1876) it is placed before the quotation No. 11, which (as there stated) occurs both in *Horaioth* and in *Sanhedrin*.

27. Aaron ben Elijah of Nicomedia (1346)[1]: לא יסור וגו׳. לא יסור שבט מיהודה אחרי שהראה מלכות דוד ושלמה בעבור שנחלקה מלכות ישראל בשר כי לא יסור שבט מיהודה כי בידוע מאמר ישתחוו אינו עונה רק בשביל המלכות על כן בסמוך גור אריה יהודה לא כפי דעת הקודמים שאמרו לא יסור שבט מרמיז לזמן שיהיה קודם מלוך דוד ע״ה שאותו הזמן אינו נקשר למאמר ישתחוו. על כן יאות לומר לא יסור שבט אחר שנחלקה המלכות. ומחוקק מבין רגליו מרמיז על זמן הגלות. וטעם מבין רגליו שיהיה מזרע המלכות וידעת כי המתמנים בגלות מזרע דוד הם בעלי למוד והיראה על כן קראם בשם מחוקק. עד כי יבא שילה יהיה הרמז על המשיח ונקרא שילה הטעם בנו מגזרת לא תשלה אותי (מלכ׳ ב׳ ד׳ כ״ח) אף על פי שהם חלוקי עקר הם אחודי ענין. ולו יקהת עמים כאשר בחזיון דניאל (ז׳ י״ד כ״ז) וכל עממיא אמיא ולישניא ליה יפלחון וישתמעון ויקהת יתכן לפרשו משמעת וקבול עול מלכותו עליהם וכן ותבוז ליקהת אם (משלי ל׳ י״ז).

After discussing the dagesh he proceeds ויש מי שהטעהו מלת עד ופרש עד כי יבוא שילה הוא נבוכדנצר עליו נאמר אשר לו המשפט (יחז׳ כ״א ל״ב) ונפסק מלכות יהודה ואיך יתכן לבשר על הקלקלה מה טעם ולו יקהת עמים:

שילה = *his son.* Referred to the Messiah.

28. Graecus Venetus (14 cent.): *ἄχρις ἂν ἀφίκοιτο σιλὼν, αὐτῷ ὑπακοὴ λεῶν.*

[1] In the כתר התורה (Eupatoria, 1866).

29. Don Isaac Abarbanel (1436—1506). This great writer, having examined in the course of a long and able note the views of different commentators, interprets himself שילה of a future Messiah (שהוא בנו של יהודה והוא מלך המשיח). He gives to שבט the general sense of hegemony or supremacy (מעלה והנהגה והשררה), which he observes was enjoyed by Judah from the earliest times, culminating in the monarchy of David. After the division of the kingdom, he considers the prediction to have been fulfilled in the royalty—greater or less (אם מעט ואם הרבה)—still retained by Judah, afterwards in the Princes of the captivity and the presidents of the Sanhedrin, and now—so he pathetically continues—'during the present long exile', in the rulers over Israel (שבט) appointed by the powers under whom they lived, and in the teachers and learned men (מחוקק) of each successive generation who would naturally, the ten tribes being lost, belong in the main to the tribe of Judah. Only when the Messiah has come, and Isa. xi. 9, Jer. xxxi. 34 have been fulfilled, will these be no longer needed: הנה אם כן נתקיימה ההבטחה ההיא בזמן ההצלחה ובזמן הגליות עד היום הזה:

In his ישועות משיחו (II. i. 6[1]) he speaks similarly. This is a polemical work, directed specially against Hieronymus de Sancta Fide[2] whose materials, however, were derived largely from the exhaustive treatise of Raymundus Martini. Unable to deny the fact of the migration of the Sanhedrin, and its loss of capital jurisdiction, 40 years before A.D. 70, he attempts to meet the force of the inferences drawn from the fact by Christian controversialists, by shewing that the migration was voluntary, and justified by the circumstances of the time. One cause of its migration was the prevalence in Jerusalem of violence and murder: the Sanhedrin, unable to check this, withdrew and resigned its power[3] כי לרשעת הפריצים לא היה לאל ידם.

[1] Fol. 24[a], ed. Karlsruhe (1828).

[2] *Hebraeomastyx* (Frankf. 1602),—a controversial discourse, delivered publicly by the author, in Spain, in 1412, when (according to the statement on the title page) it produced a great impression.

[3] Cf. p. 5, note 2.

Another cause was the signs and portents, indicating the approaching end (*Yoma* 39^{b}), which then began to terrify Jerusalem: the Sanhedrin took timely warning and חדלו להם מלשבת הגזית בראותם כי עת רעה באה. After this, he proceeds to develope the interpretation given by him in his Commentary, admitting, however, as a possible alternative, the explanation (no. 13), that the prophecy may refer to the time אחרי ביאת הגואל ומשם ואילך.

It is hardly necessary to remark that most of the explanations that have been reviewed are of interest only historically. It is curious to observe how persistently Dt. xxviii. 57 has influenced the exegesis of the passage: but it is of course an illusion to suppose that it throws any real light upon either מבין רגליו[1] or שילה. Nor is there any Hebrew word שיל meaning *son*. The opinion that either מחוקק or שבט denotes a scribe or teacher of the law must be discarded: it is read into the text at a time when the law was of central interest in Judaism, and perhaps also under the pressure of controversy with Christians, and is on a par with the interpretation of (e.g.) *v.* 15 to be found in the Targums. Nor can any fulfilment be found in the Sanhedrin (after its loss of capital jurisdiction), or in a succession of teachers: שבט and מחוקק connote not moral or religious authority, but *political*. Reference to the Messiah in *v.* 11, whether in its Jewish (see Targ. Jer. and Ps.-Jon.) or Christian form (e.g. Chrys. *Homil.* Gen.) must be given up: the picture there is one of peace, not warfare. And all patristic interpretation, in so far as it is influenced by the mistranslation *αὐτὸς προσδοκία ἐθνῶν* (which an ancient Christian, acquainted only with LXX., naturally could not but apply to Christ), must likewise be abandoned.

At the same time it appears clearly that עד כי יבא שילה was interpreted generally, by both Jews and Christians, in a Messianic sense. This sense however, as remarked above, was

[1] Even supposing that, on the analogy of יוצאי ירכו, מבין ר׳ could be used of a man, the desired sense would require, the verb being לא יסור, the addition of 'from those who issue forth' before מבין ר׳.

not bound up with a personal name *Shiloh*, but with the context of the verse, legitimately interpreted, and with the promise of supremacy which it seemed to contain. In so far as the passage gave occasion for controversy, the dispute was not as to whether שִׁלֹה or שִׁלֹה was the reading (for Christian antiquity knew, if possible, less of *Shiloh* than Jewish), but as to the person in whom it was fulfilled[1].

The explanation of Shiloh as the significant name of a person became dominant in the translations and commentaries of the 16th century[2]. The opinion that it denoted the place had been applied (though unsuitably and arbitrarily) by some of the Jews (e.g. no. 16); and in 1766 this view was revived in a new form, which has found considerable favour in modern times, by W. A. Teller. Delitzsch, who is one of its strongest advocates[3], urges in its behalf the great philological difficulty mentioned above as attaching to the popular explanation of 'Shiloh', and observes that inasmuch as everywhere else in O. T. Shiloh denotes the place, and there is no allusion in subsequent parts of the O. T. to Shiloh as a personal name of the Messiah, the natural rendering of the clause 'until he come to Shiloh' (cf. 1 S. iv. 12), should be adopted until it can be shewn to be unsuitable. Then looking at the history, he sup-

[1] The facts are misrepresented in Keil's Commentary, p. 397, E.T. 'We regard, therefore, Shiloh as a title of the Messiah in common with the entire Jewish synagogue and the whole Christian Church'. However, *Bezeichnung* is a more general term than 'title'.

The paraphrase (in Arabic) by a Christian hand, edited by Lagarde, *Materialien*, &c. (1867), i. 177 f., renders '*whose* is all', with reference to S. John i. 3.

[2] E.g. Sanctes Pagninus (1528): *Messias*. Luther had expressed previously his preference for the Jewish rendering *his son*, but in his version (1534) he rendered *Der Held*, with the note 'd. i. der glücklich sein und frisch durchdringen sollte'. Hence Coverdale (1535) *the worthy one*. Seb. Münster (1534): *quousque veniat Silo*, but without distinctly explaining how he understood the word philologically. Castalio (1551): sospitator. Vatablus (1557): *Silo*, i. e. felicitas seu author felicitatis. *Shiloh* was also adopted, probably through Münster's influence, by the English versions—the Great Bible (1539), the Genevan (1560, with the explanation 'the giver of al prosperitie'), the Bishops' (1568), and A. V. (1611).

[3] In his *Commentar über die Genesis* (1872), and his *Messianic Prophecies* (1880), p. 33 f.

poses that the prophecy was fulfilled in Josh. xviii. 1, pointing out (1) the marks of early preeminence assigned to Judah: it marched first in the wilderness (Nu. x. 14, &c.), went up first to battle (Ju. i. 2, xx. 18), received first its share in the division of the land (Josh. xv.): and (2) that the arrival of the Israelites at Shiloh really marked a turning point in the history of the people—the completion of the period of wandering, the beginning of their final settlement in Canaan (cf. Jo. xxi. 42, xxii. 4). Thus it was an epoch important enough to be singled out for notice in the blessing, the *apparent* connexion with שלה, שלוה helping the selection. The subsequent years confirmed the position which Judah had then secured; the יקהת עמים was realized primarily in the victories of David (2 S. viii.), while at the same time it would include that ideal relation of Israel to the heathen of which the prophets speak more distinctly. Thus in its ultimate scope the passage is still Messianic, though the thought is not attached to the word Shiloh.

The view is undoubtedly an attractive one. We see Judah the honoured of his brethren, victorious after battle, marching in triumphal progress to Shiloh, the place in Jacob's own country near Bethel and Shechem, and there, at home in the inheritance of his father, laying down the emblems of authority and enjoying the fruits of peace which he had secured, while the nations around own submissively his sway[1].

It will be noticed that, upon this interpretation, שבט denotes not a *sceptre*, but a *staff*, the symbol of military power.

For completeness, the principal views of other modern scholars may be here noticed.

(1) *Till peace* or *tranquillity cometh:* so Ges. (Lex.), Reuss, Knobel, Friedländer[2]. As the form שִׁלֹה is always that of a proper name, we must in this case point שֶׁלָה or שֶׁלָּה. The objection that such a word does not occur is not decisive: there are many ἅπ. λεγ. in the O. T., and the formation is legitimate

[1] Comp. Herder, *vom Geist der Ebr. Poesie*, II. 6. So Ewald, *Jahrbücher*, ii. 51, Hist. ii. 283 f. Luzzatto (in a long note), *Il Pentateucho volgarizzato e commentato* (Padova, 1871), and most recently Dillmann in his commentary (1883).

[2] The Jewish Family Bible (1881).

(cf. הֶגֶה, בֶּכֶה): it is a much stronger objection that with this rendering there is nothing in clause *c* to refer וְלוֹ to, and the parallelism (which is carefully observed throughout the Blessing) is spoilt.

(2) *Till he comes to peacefulness* or *a place of rest:* so Kurtz, Oehler[1].

(3) *So long as one cometh* (= *people come*) *to Shiloh*, so long as the worship at Shiloh (Jud. xxi. 19 ; 1 S. i. 3) is maintained, i.e. for ever (on the analogy of Hor. *Carm.* iii. 30, 7 f. Usque ego postera, &c. ; cf. Verg. *Aen.* 9, 446—9), will Judah retain its supremacy (Hitzig, Tuch, Gustav Baur). As עַד שׁ Cant. i. 12 = *as long as*, it is difficult to maintain that the same sense may not be borne by עַד כִּי. But the introduction of Shiloh in this manner is unexpected, and unsuitable in the context; nor are the comparisons cited from the Latin poets properly analogous to that between the state of Judah and the cult at Shiloh.

(4) Lagarde[2] (comparing Mal. iii. 1) conjectures, as Matthew Hiller (*Onomastica Sacra*, 1706) had done before him, שְׁאִילָה *his desired one*, which is accepted also by Bickell[3]. But the word savours of Syriac rather than of Hebrew : nor is the sense *asked* (1 S. xii. 13) quite suitable here.

(5) Mr Cheyne, in an essay[4] with the general argument of which the writer rejoices to find himself in entire agreement, thinks that the LXX. renderings presuppose a fuller text than שִׁלֹה, and suggests שִׁלֹה (יו)ש(ם) or (יו)ש(ת) עַד כִּי יָבוֹא. The construction is idiomatic, occurring even in an old lyrical piece (Jud. v. 14), and for those who are satisfied that no adequate meaning can be extracted from שִׁלֹה, it is the most plausible suggestion that has been made.

(6) Wellhausen, in his *Geschichte* (1878), threw out the suggestion (p. 375) that וְלוֹ was a gloss explanatory of the

[1] Theology of the O. T. § 229.

[2] *Onomastica Sacra* (1870), ii. 96.

[3] *Carmina V. T. Metrice* (1882), p. 188.

[4] Printed first in 1875, and repeated in the first and second editions of his *Isaiah* (vol. ii. Essay iv. On the Royal Messiah in Genesis). יוּשַׁם, as Mr Cheyne observes, had been proposed before by a German scholar, Dr Rönsch (*Z. Wiss. Th.* 1872, p. 291).

antiquated שִׁלֹה, and would accordingly strike it out. But this injures the parallelism still more fatally than the rendering *Till peace cometh*[1].

(7) C. von Orelli[2], feeling equally with Delitzsch the difficulties adhering to the personal interpretation, and dissatisfied with other suggestions, renders *Till he come to that which is his* or *his own* (*τὰ ἴδια*), comparing Deut. xxxiii. 7. This construction is possible: the accus. is used freely after verbs of motion, still we should expect the goal to be less indistinctly expressed than is done by שִׁלֹה.

Let us consider the prophecy on Judah as a whole, and first, irrespectively of the disputed clause, *v.* 10[b]. It forms one of a series of promises which (as has often been observed) are based upon an evident plan; and if it is to be properly estimated due regard must be given to its place in the series. The promise of an august future is first given to Abraham (xii. 2 f.): then it is limited to Isaac alone among his sons (xxii. 17, xxvi. 4): then it is further limited to Jacob (xxvii. 29)[3]. In chap. xlix., while abundant blessings for both land and people are showered upon Ephraim, Judah is plainly singled out among the tribes as the heir of the supremacy and power promised before to Abraham, Isaac and Jacob (comp. esp. *v.* 8 and xxvii. 29); his father's sons bow down to him, and the symbols of authority are retained by him till the period of contest is over and peace, as described *v.* 11, is secured. More than this, he is the *leader* of the tribes: but if this supremacy be attached to him, then he is the tribe on which the maintenance and future history of the theocracy depends[4]. Thus the prophecy falls into its place in the series: and when, at a later stage of the history, there is promised first (2 S. vii.) the per-

[1] The note is omitted in the second edition of the *Geschichte*, the *Prolegomena* (1883). Against Stade's proposal to omit the entire verse, see Dillmann.

[2] *Alttest. Weiss. von d. Vollendung des Gottesreiches* (1882), p. 137 f.

[3] The passages cited are from JE: there is a parallel series in the Priest's Code (P), xvii. 6, xxviii. 3 f., xxxv. 11, xlviii. 4, which, however, as that source is less closely connected with c. xlix., is here left out of consideration.

[4] Schultz, *Alttest. Theol.* (1878), p. 668, in the course of a judicious discussion of the passage.

manence of a particular dynasty, and afterwards (Isa. vii. ix.) a particular ruler of the same dynasty, both belong to the same tribe of Judah here singled out from amongst the whole group. However we interpret 10^b, then, the prophecy holds its rightful place, and is Messianic in that it promises *an ideal future to Judah.*

Is Judah, however, represented as possessing not supremacy or hegemony only, but royalty? In answering this question we must not, of course, read the history into the prophecy: for to what it refers historically is just the matter in dispute. The question is, *What image does* 10^a *suggest?* Is it the *staff* of a military leader, or the *sceptre* of a king? It seems to be the latter. (1) It is true that שבט סופר Jud. v. 14 (cf. for סופר 2 K. xxv. 19) may signify a marshal's staff, but שבט without any qualification would surely suggest a sceptre. (2) The staff *between his feet* presents the posture of a king seated on his throne, rather than of a commander engaged upon active service. (3) This interpretation is supported by the phrase in *v.* 8^b, comp. xxxvii. 7, where, when Joseph's brethren hear of the sheaves *bowing down* to him, they immediately ask, Wilt thou *be king over us,* or rule over us? It is difficult not to feel that the prophecy anticipates for Judah not hegemony only, but royalty.

If this be true, it is a serious objection to the rendering 'till he come to Shiloh'. Judah manifestly enjoyed no royal power till long subsequently to Josh. xviii: and even though, with Dillmann and Delitzsch, we are ready to give שבט the (here) doubtful sense of *staff,* the difficulty is not removed: the context contains, as we have just seen, other independent indications that the picture is one of royalty. Moreover the passages cited by Delitzsch from Numb., Josh. only shew that Judah enjoyed dignity, and priority: they reveal no trace of *supremacy* over the other tribes. It is a minor objection that Shiloh lay in the territory not of Judah but of Ephraim. Upon these grounds, as it appears to the present writer, this rendering must be abandoned[1]. Judah is designated as the royal tribe: and the

[1] Among recent writers, Schultz, Cheyne, Orelli, are equally dissatisfied with it.

sceptre is confirmed to it עד כי יבא שילה ולו יקהת עמים. The parallelism is so carefully observed throughout that there is a presumption that in clause *c.* some person is designated to which ולו in *d.* may be referred, that we must render therefore either '*until he*—Judah—*comes to*.....' or '*until*.....*comes*, having the submission of the nations'. Now the יקהת עמים, in one form or another, is a constant feature of the ideal future as depicted by the prophets—the relation being sometimes one of force (as xxii. 17, xxvii. 29, Ps. xviii. 43 f., Am. ix. 11 f.), sometimes one of spontaneous homage to the spiritual pre-eminence of Israel (Isa. ii. 2 f., Jer. iii. 17, Isa. xlv. 14, &c.).

The clause ולו יקהת עמים affords thus a presumption that some Messianic thought is concealed in *c.* If so, the words declare in poetic imagery, that political independence will be Judah's till the Messianic hope is realised. It is impossible to deny that this was remarkably verified by the result: and the passage, whatever its date, and whatever the interpretation of שלה, must be allowed to be one of those flashes of wonderful anticipation which occur in different parts of the O. T. Further than this it is not possible to advance with certainty. Undoubtedly some personal sense for שלה makes the *v.* more pointed, and provides the required climax. The objections to a personal name 'Shiloh' have been stated. If then we adopt the widely attested reading שֶׁלֹה, the rendering *till he whose* [it is] *shall come* would afford an excellent sense, but is not reconcilable with the absence of the subject in the relative clause[1]. Perhaps we should fall back upon the original LXX. construction, and render *Till that which* (or *he that*) *is his* (*das* or *der Seinige*) *shall come*, and regard the clause as an indeterminate expression of the Messianic hope, which was afterwards defined more distinctly. If this alternative be not accepted, we may be satisfied with Mr Cheyne's proposal. But apart from this uncertain clause, the passage as a whole pictures Judah as

[1] Schultz (p. 672), and apparently Nestle (*Z. Altt. Wiss.* 1884, p. 247), are disposed to consider the ellipse as possible. But the case is not parallel to the examples cited by Ewald, § 303[b].

the royal tribe and declares that its royal dominion will expand until it embraces the עמים. This is exactly what we should expect from a prophecy standing between xxvii. 29 and Ps. xviii. 43: the עמים not as comprehensive, nor the moral grounds of their adhesion emphasized, as later (e.g. Isa. ii.), but similar to Amos ix. The general scope of the context is thus indicated correctly, though somewhat too widely, by Eusebius[1], when he interprets the LXX. (*τὰ ἀποκ. αὐτῷ*) by the words *ἕως ἐὰν τῆς συντελείας ἐπιστάσης κομίσηται τὴν κατὰ τῶν ὅλων βασιλείαν.*

S. R. DRIVER.

[1] *Eclog. Proph.* i. c. 8 (referred to by Delitzsch).

NOTES IN LATIN LEXICOGRAPHY.

[Words marked * are not to be found in the lexicons of Georges (ed. 7) or Lewis and Short.

By *Gloss. Lat. Graec.* (*Philoxenus*) or *Philoxenus* simply, I mean the Latin-Greek glossary edited by Vulcanius in 1600, and falsely attributed to Philoxenus.]

Ambitor: add to the instances given by Georges Servius on Aen. 4 283, *ambitores etiam dicuntur qui ut honores consequantur discurrendo et rogando suffragia adquirunt.*

**Apparitorium, adiutorium* (Gloss. Epinal.). This word seems to be derived from *apparere*, to serve, so to assist.

Ardelio. The manuscripts of Martial 2 7 8 are in favour of writing this word *ardalio.* This form is also found in an ancient glossary in the Bodleian, *ardalio gluto:* the Epinal glossary has *adoleo*, probably for *ardalio.*

**Circumspectaculum*, translation of *ἀμφιθέατρον*: Gloss. Epinal.

Consectarius, efficient, effective: Nonius p. 91, Placidus p. 28 (Deuerling) *consectariam pernicialem.* In the current lexicons this word is derived from *consector*, but its usage, as well as the gloss in Placidus, points rather to *conseco* to cut: Cicero Fin. 3 § 26 *consectaria me Stoicorum, brevia et acuta, delectant:* 4 § 48 *tua brevia, quae consectaria esse dicebas...O plumbeum pugionem!* 4 § 50 *illud vero minime consectarium, sed in primis hebes eorum.*

**Coriolum*, dim. of *corium*, a little bit of leather: Festus p. 205 (Müller) s. v. *offendices.*

Corpore custos, a body-guard: Corpus Inscriptionum 6 4340, 4342, 4343 (early first century A.D.).

**Cudis,* an anvil: Excerpt. Charis. p. 552 Keil *cudis ἄκμων.*

Deluo. To the instances given by Georges add Cato R. R. 69 (according to the *codex Marcianus*) *eam* (*cummim*) *postridie deluito:* Livy 45 10 3 *deluere utcunque conati sunt* (the manuscript has *deluderet*): Gellius 2 26 15 *contra rufus color est delutior* (so the palimpsest). The word should also be restored (for *diluo*) to Servius Aen. 2 225, *alii delubrum dicunt ab eo quod nulli iunctum aedificio pluvia deluatur.*

**Derectarius κατάρατος*, Gloss. Lat. Graec. (Philoxenus). This gloss supports the theory which I have already maintained in this Journal, that *dierectum* is in some cases a corruption for *derectum.*

**Dispoliabulum*, an act of robbery (*dispoliare*). Quoted by Nonius p. 75 from Plautus Bacchides 376, where the manuscripts give *desidiabula.*

Euge pae. Surely this word stands, not for *euge papae,* as the lexicons say, but for *εὖγε παῖ*, well done, my boy!

Fluminalis: add to the lexicons Nonius p. 535 *lintres, naves fluminales,* where the Paris MS. reads *fluminares.*

Geno to produce, bring forth. This word should be restored to Paulus p. 94 (M.) *genium appellabant qui vim obtineret rerum omnium genendarum* (for *gerendarum*).

Impio: this word is used by Servius Aen. 6 8 without any moral significance: *ipsa impiant quae agnoscimus.*

Impunis: add Hyginus 8 p. 41 (Schmidt).

Insertus = open. Servius and Tiberius Donatus explain *insertas fenestras* in Aen. 3 152 as = open, unbarred: comp. Gloss. Lat. Graec. (Philoxenus) *insertas ἀνεῳγμένας.* I am inclined to explain *insertis malis* in Ennius Saturae 27 (Ribbeck) in the same way, and to doubt consequently whether there is any need of altering the word, as L. Müller does, into *infestis.* The Bodleian glossary mentioned above explains *insertas fenestras* as = *solis aut lunae lumine penetratas.*

**Lapsosus,* often tumbling: Gloss. Amplon. p. 348 *lapsosus saepe cadens.*

**Linicindele,* a lamp with a flax wick: Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. vol. 6 *linicindelia lucernae.*

**Lixa,* water: Nonius p. 48 *lixam aquam ad castra veteres*

dixerunt: p. 62 *lixam aquam veteres vocaverunt:* Isid. 20 2 22 *lixa enim aqua dicitur:* Gloss. Hild. *lixa aqua;* and other glosses quoted by Löwe, Prodromus Gloss. p. 403.

Lixo, a water-carrier: Gloss. Epinal. p. 13 (Sweet) *lixones aquarum portitores.* (Lewis and Short give *lixiones.*)

**Ludosus:* Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. vol. 6 *ludosi mimosi.*

**Lureo,* to be yellow. Mr Ellis has found this word in a thirteenth century manuscript of Ovid M. 2 776 *lurent rubigine dentes.* It had previously been conjectured by Ritschl in Plautus Menaechmi 828 *viden tu illic oculos lurere:* and it should perhaps be restored to Horace Epod. 17 33 *lurens in Aetna flamma,* where the MSS. vary between *virens* and *urens.*

**Lusitatio, ludus brevis;* Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 6 *lusitatio lusus,* the above quoted Bodleian glossary.

**Lustrum,* a light or illumination: Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 6 *lustrum quinquennii tempus aut lumen:* Gloss. Amplon. p. 345 *lustrum illuminatio.* Hence *lustrae, inlustrare,* to illuminate.

**Maerentia,* subst. f., mourning: Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 6 *maerentia tristitia.*

**Malatus* (apparently from *malum* = *morbus*), glossed as στυγνός in Gloss. Latino-Graec. (Philoxenus).

**Malebarbis,* with a thin beard: Gloss. Latino-Graec. (Philoxenus) *malebarbis σπανοπώγων* (so Vulcanius for *σπανόν*).

**Maleformis,* ill-shaped: Philoxenus; *maleformis δύσμορφος.*

**Maleiurus,* swearing falsely: Mai 7 *maleiurus periurus.*

**Mandibulum,* a manger: Philoxenus; *mandibulum φάτνωμα.*

**Manipulosus,* (?) arranged regularly in *manipuli* (?): Mai 6 and 7 *manipulosus directus* (read *derectus*).

**Marcido,* to melt, waste away: Philoxenus: *marcidat et marcerat, τήκει, λεπτύνει.*

Matus tristis: Mai 6. Petronius 41 *plane matus sum.*

**Meraria,* (?) a woman who drinks wine (?): Philoxenus; *meraria γευστρίς.*

**Merat, probrat:* Mai 6. Perhaps *probat, mero* = to declare pure.

**Minsare frequenter mingere:* Gloss. Hild.

**Modesto,* to order, govern: Mai 6 and 7, *modestare regere.*

**Modico*, to temper: Mai 7 *modicat temperat:* Osbern. ap. Mai 8 p. 366 *modicare temperare.*

**Morifico*, to cause delay: Gloss. Hild. *morificando moram faciendo.*

Nectus as the participle passive of *necare:* Mai 6 *necti mortui.*

**Neriosus* (from *Nerio*), strong, courageous: Mai 6 *neriosus resistens, fortis.*

**Noxatio:* glossed by Philoxenus as = *ἔνθυνα.* An assessment of penalties (?).

Obsequia, obedience: Philoxenus; *obsequia πειθαρχία.*

Oburbo: this, not *oburvo*, is the spelling of the *Corsianus* and the *Liber Glossarum* in Placidus p. 73 (Deuerling), *oburbas circumscribis.*

**Occalleo*, to be thick-skinned: Philoxenus; *obcallet παχυδερμεῖ.*

**Occupativus*, readily seizing: Philoxenus; *occupativa καταληπτικά.*

**Offibulo*, to fasten up with a *fibula:* Mai 6 *obfibulare concludere, circumdare.*

**Offimentum* (from *offire*) material for stuffing up: Philoxenus: *offimentum πῆλος.*

**Olfactio*, smelling: Philoxenus; *olfactio ὄσφρησις.*

**Opperimentum* (*opperior*), the act of waiting: Mai 6 *opperimentum expectatio.*

**Opter = propter:* Mai 6 *opter propter:* Placidus p. 71 (Deuerling) *opter videndum est ne mendosum sit et sit aut 'propter' praepositio aut 'obiter' adverbium.*

Oram solvere, resolvere, praecidere (Livy 22 19 10, 28 36 11, Quintilian 4 2 41). In these phrases is *ora* the rope, or the end of the rope? Servius Aen. 9 528 says *orae sunt extremitates*, and this is also the tenor of a note in Festus p. 182 (M.). So Nonius p. 441 defines *orae* as *cuiuslibet rei fines.* Compare Philoxenus, *ora ἀρχή.* Cicero (Tusc. 1 § 68) uses *orae* for *zones:* and this suggests that, like *plăga*, *ora* may have originally meant an extended line of rope, and so a border or hem. However this may be, I think that Ennius, when he wrote *quis potis ingentes oras evolvere belli* (Servius Aen. 9 528)

was thinking of this use of *ora* for a rope-end or rope: and that he meant either 'roll out into light the beginning and end of the war', or 'unroll the lengths of the war': was he misapplying Homer's πεῖραρ πολέμοιο (Iliad 13 359)? Quintilian (6 3 86) quotes the line *quis potis ingentes causas evolvere belli? Causas* may have arisen from a clerical error, but it is more probably a gloss on *oras*, which was taken to mean the beginnings (ends of the rope, as it were), and so causes. Compare Caecilius 3 (Ribbeck) *oram reperire nullam quam* (? *qua me*) *expediam queo* (nothing to take hold of): on which Festus (p. 182) remarks that *ora* here means *initium*.

**Papo* (from *papa*); Philoxenus; *papare* παππάζειν. Not to be confused with *pappare*.

**Parentarium*, a religious service in honour of parents, Charisius p. 34 Keil.

Parenticida: Gloss. Amplon. p. 366; *parricida dicitur qui omnes occidebat pares natura: parenticida qui parentes occidebat.*

**Pastuosus*, abounding in pasture: Mai 6 *pastuosus locus abundans.*

**Pedatus -ūs*, a prison: Mai 6 and 7, *pedatum carcerem.*

Pedo: this cognomen is explained in two ways (1) as = *qui pedestri ordine vadit* (Gloss. ap. Löwe, Archiv für Lexicographie &c. no. 1); (2) as = broad-footed: Philoxenus, *pedo, plancus,* πλατύπους.

**Pellector*, one who tempts or entices: Mai 6 *pellector persuasor, incitator.*

**Pergenuo*, to crawl along on the knees: Mai 6 *pergenuat, genibus pergit.*

**Pindo*, to pound: Gloss. Epinal., *pindere, pilo tundere.* Hence *pinsor.*

Plausilis = plausibilis: Mai 6.

**Posticium* παράθυρος: Exc. Charis. p. 553 Keil.

**Praeferentia*, preference, favour: Mai 6; *praeferentia gratia.*

**Silentia -ae*, silence: Exc. Charis. p. 546.

Singularius in Plautus Capt. 112, *his indito catenas singularias.* This word has puzzled the commentators a good deal.

Sonnenschein says it was "probably a technical term for some lighter kind of manacle." Lambinus took it as = *simplices, minores,* as opposed to *istas maiores.* No doubt it must mean *smaller, lighter,* but how? Because *singularius* means *what is suited to one person,* and *catena singularia* must therefore = a chain such as it is fair to put upon one person, not one large enough for two persons.

NOTES ON THE EPINAL GLOSSARY.

[The references are to Sweet's edition.]

P. 1 col. A. l. 27. *aupex qui aucupa exercet.* Read *auceps qui aucupium exercet.*

Ib. l. 28. *apparasin negotio.* Read *ἀπόρρησις negatio.*

Ib. l. 29. *Aerii virgae verreae.* Perhaps *exverrae virgae, a verrere:* Paulus p. 78 *exverrae sunt purgatio quaedam domus... quae fit per everriatorem certo genere scoparum adhibito, ab extra verrendo dictarum.*

Ib. l. 32. *ascesu intellectui.* Probably *αἰσθήσει intellectui:* so again p. 3 l. 9 col. C. *archesi intellectui, ascetron intellectum* for *αἰσθήσει, αἰσθητόν.*

Ib. l. 40. *apalogia ratio verborum.* Perhaps for *apologia, oratio: analogia, ratio verborum.*

P. 1 col. C. l. 5. *anudus quartana die.* Read *nudius.*

Ib. l. 13. *ascilium, mons in urbe roma;* read *Esquiliae:* and possibly in the gloss immediately above, *assellum spolium, assellum* may represent *σκῦλον,* written first *squillum* and then *esquillum.*

Ib. l. 24. *apolitarium ubi ponuntur res labentium.* Read *apodyterium ubi ponuntur res lavantium.*

Ib. l. 31. *anates proximi.* Read *agnati.*

Ib. l. 33. *achor conturbatio*
anes vallis.

Read (making one gloss) *Achor conturbationis vallis.*

P. 1 col. E. l. 30. *aria terra quae aratur.* Read *arva.*

P. 2 col. A. l. 7. *amfrite mare.* Read *Amphitrite.*

P. 3 col. C. l. 21. *arcsotonian antiquitatum.* Perhaps *ἀρχαιοτήτων.*

Ib. col. E. l. 17. *abristit longe est.* Perhaps *absistit.*

Ib. l. 26. *abduxit negavit.* Read *abdixit.*

P. 4 col. C. l. 7. *eleveus habundans, copiosus.* Perhaps *alluvius.*

Ib. l. 8. *aerectatio tuba.* Read *aere cavo, tuba;* Aen. 3 238.

Ib. l. 21. *agabo quod negotio praecedit.* Probably *arrabo.* Other glosses give *agabo qui negotia praecedit,* and *agabo* has consequently been supposed to stand for *agaso.*

Ib. col. E. l. 8. *allutes locus cenosus.* Read *alluvies.*

Ib. l. 9. *almus ager secundus.* Read *almus ager, fecundus.*

Ib. l. 15. *amata catenata ab eo quod sunt amici.* The facsimile clearly points to the words *ab eo quod est hamus.*

Ib. l. 18. *ambages nauticum.* The writing of the last word in the photographic facsimile makes me much inclined to conjecture *naeniam* (in the sense of humbug) for *nauticum.*

Ib. l. 23. *ambutimur incedimur.* Read *amburimur, incendimur.*

Ib. l. 24. *amatores quod amant quoniam quasi de uno rivo.* These corrupt words must belong to a misplaced gloss on *rivales.*

Ib. l. 28. *anacephaleos in repetitionem.* Read *anacephaleosin, repetitionem.*

P. 5 col. A. l. 26. *arcius lassus vel gravatus.* Perhaps *ἀργός.*

Ib. l. 33. *arguere ampliare.* Read *augere.*

Ib. l. 35. *arctuus erectus.* Read *arduus.*

Ib. col. C. l. 2. *artus sum, sidus in caelo.* Read *Arcturus.*

Ib. l. 13. *aucupium et acusatio unum.* Perhaps *aucupium exceptatio avium.*

P. 5 col. C. l. 37. *bibliothecatris qui codices secat.* Read *bibliothecarius qui codices servat.*

Ib. col. E. l. 6. *bilesus passus a amaritudinem.* Read *Biliosus, passus amaritudinem.*

P. 5 col. E. l. 13. *botium votum sit: bolio stabula boum.* Are these glosses identical, the first standing for *bolium boum stabulum?* And again, what is *bolio?* The ancient glossary in Mai Cl. Auct. vol. 6 gives *bucolia, bualia, i.e. stabula boum,* and Gloss. Hild. *bulum, bucolium pastoris.* Was there then a word *buale* or *bovale* = *bovile?* If so, I would propose for *bolio* to read *bualia.* Just below it may be observed that our glossary has *bucerum pecus bubialis,* which may mean *buale* or *bovale.*

Ib. l. 17. *bobor aves in palustris.* Perhaps *bubones, aves infaustae.*

Ib. l. 21. *buteriae armenta.* Read *buceriae* (sc. *pecudes*).

P. 6 col. A. l. 12. *busta incissa arbor ramis.* I suppose the first part of the gloss to stand for *busta incensa:* of *arbor ramis* I can make nothing, unless it mean *arbor remus* (Aen. 10 207 *centenaque arbore fluctum verberat*).

Ib. l. 18. *basileon grem rex.* Read *βασιλεύς graece rex: grem* representing *graece,* which is often (as in col. F. l. 27 of this page) written *grē.*

Ib. l. 27. *bullae ornamenta regalium camellorum.* Löwe, Prodromus p. 83, thinks camels are meant: but surely we should read *camillorum.* Paulus p. 43 *camillus proprie vocatur puer ingenuus:* Macrob. 1 Sat. 6 10 *hinc deductus mos ut praetexta et bulla in usum puerorum nobilium usurparentur...Alii putant eundem Priscum...cultum quoque ingenuorum puerorum inter praecipua duxisse, instituisseque ut patricii bulla aurea cum toga...uterentur.*

Ib. l. 28. *bigimen e duobus generibus conceptum.* Read *bigener.*

Ib. col. C. l. 38. *bachi antiqui:* the Bodleian glossary of the 8th or 9th century has *bacci antiqui.* This gloss is to be emended by the aid of another in the Bodleian glossary, *veteris bachi, vini.* This makes it evident that *bachi antiqui* arose simply out of an inversion, *bachi veteris* for *veteris bachi:* and that we should therefore read *bachi veteris, antiqui vini.*

Ib. col. E. l. 2. *bassandes baccae.* Read *Bassarides.*

Ib. l. 9. *boaptis aquae.* Perhaps *boa aquatilis* (sc. *serpens*): Paulus p. 30 *bova serpens est aquatilis.*

Ib. l. 14. *conisma picta imago.* Read *εἰκόνισμα.*

P. 7 col. A. l. 15. *clanculum mane.* Probably *diluculum.*

Ib. l. 35. *consterrtem indomitam.* Read *constantem.*

Ib. col. E. l. 14. *cereacas tubucines.* Perhaps κελευστάς.

P. 8 col. A. l. 5. *cacula lingua arida.* Perhaps *cala, ligna arida,* unless *cacula* stand for κάγκανα.

Ib. l. 7. *cascum vetus canticum.* Read *vetus, anticum.*

Ib. l. 21. *cirsum carpentium.* Read *cisium, carpentum.*

Ib. l. 35. *cripta ascussum.* Perhaps *absconsum.*

Ib. l. 36. *cadonca universalis.* Read *catholica.*

Ib. col. C. l. 5. *caeporicon iterarium vel viarum.* Read ὁδοιπορικόν *it. v. viaticum.*

Ib. l. 19. *crianoson brevis dictio in magna.* Perhaps ταπείνωσις.

P. 9 col. A. l. 7. *fiscos fraus.* Read *fucus fraus.*

Ib. l. 15. *flutas fluens.* Read *fluitans.*

Ib. l. 34. *fenicum cocimum.* Perhaps *phoeniceum coccinum.*

Ib. col. C. l. 17. *fogo manduco.* Read *phago.*

Ib. l. 22. *faserat imperat* (so the photograph). Perhaps *fas erat, imperatum erat.*

Ib. l. 26. *fagolidori manducantes.* From the photograph I am inclined to conjecture *phagones, lecantes, manducantes.*

Ib. l. 27. *farciretur ligaretur.* Perhaps *fasciaretur.*

Ib. col. E. l. 15. *fusa protacta.* Probably *proiecta.*

Ib. l. 24. *fidicula generator mentorum.* The words are printed wrongly, the reading evidently being *genera tormentorum.*

P. 10 col. A. l. 10. *falaria pars macedoniae.* Read *Pharsalia.*

Ib. col. E. l. 34. *garalum pelleum pastorale quod unco factum est.* Read *galerum pilleum p. q. iunco factum est.*

P. 11 col. A. l. 2. *gesieae divitiae.* Read *gazae.*

Ib. l. 8. *glaucum offusio oculorum id nebula.* Read *glaucoma off. oc. id est nebula.*

Ib. l. 18. *gramina siccamina lignorum arida.* Read *cremia.*

Ib. col. C. l. 15. *histriones salvatores vel praepositi meretricum.* Read *saltatores.*

Ib. col. E. l. 4. *inspuri incerti.* Perhaps *spurii incerti.*

P. 12 col. F. l. 38. *iniuum iniurium.* Read *iniquum.*

P. 14 col. A. l. 18. *lacinosum fannosum.* Read *pannosum.*

Ib. l. 19. *lancinat bellicat, trucidat.* Read *vellicat.*

Ib. l. 29. *lesia paradisum.* Read *Elysium.*

Ib. l. 38. *lermentum species quae lenit, ut lima.* Perhaps *levamentum species quae levat, ut lima.*

Ib. col. C. l. 10. *monofealmon unum oculum.* Read *μονόφθαλμον unoculum.*

Ib. l. 16. *Minerba palla de artium.* Read *Minerva, Pallas, dea artium.*

Ib. col. F. l. 29. *moenia superior domus.* Read *Maeniana.*

Ib. l. 33. *merothetes domus unguentorum.* Read *myrotheca.*

P. 15 col. C. l. 24. *merit floret.* Probably *maeret, plorat.*

Ib. col. E. l. 9. *monarcha pugna singularis.* Read *monomachia.*

Ib. l. 16. *manubla iteratio doctrinae.* Perhaps *manuale, breviatio doctrinae.*

Ib. l. 18. *mantica bis acuta.* Read *mantica, bisaccia.*

Ib. l. 20. *musitat manet.* Perhaps *mantat, manet.*

Ib. l. 35. *melfoben musa.* Read *Melpomenen, musam.*

P. 16 col. A. l. 10. *nemas carmen funebre vel deleramenta.* Read *nenias.*

Ib. col. E. l. 9. *oeteppia coitum matris aut sororis.* Read *Oedipeum coitum, matris,* &c.

P. 17 col. A. l. 23. *obeuntia gignentia.* Read *cingentia:* Aen. 6 58 *magnas obeuntia terras Tot maria intravi.*

Ib. col. E. l. 17. *prosomiam narrationem.* Perhaps *prosopopoeam.*

Ib. l. 24. *promeon orationum.* Perhaps *προοιμίων.*

P. 18 col. C. l. 25. *psade paturafa incerta et de octava* (*egregium*) *prosomaeam narrationem.*

Read perhaps *pseudepigrapha incerta. Prosopopoeam ethicam* (for *et de octava* (*egregium*)) *narrationem.*

Ib. l. 32. *periddon contextum.* Read *περίοδον.*

Ib. l. 35. *propicon moralium.* Read *τροπικῶν.*

P. 18 col. E. l. 5. *politica demonstrativa.* Read *apodictica.*

Ib. l. 32. *penula lacerna inmodicum cua ullae.* The photograph clearly indicates the words *in modum cucullae.*

Ib. l. 33. *prosatur genitor.* Perhaps *prosator* or *προπάτωρ?*

P. 19 col. A. l. 28. *proculum abhominatio.* Read *procul O! abominatio.*

Ib. l. 37. *plagella plagas dominum.* Perhaps *plagella plagast deminutive.*

P. 20 col. A. l. 21. *priscelli feminarum crurum ornamenta.* Read *periscelides.*

Ib. col. C. l. 32. *priapus deus oratorum.* Read *hortorum.*

Ib. col. E. l. 32. *polemina musicavii.* Read *Apollinea, musicali.*

P. 21 col. A. l. 7. *pactus modice strabus.* Read *paetus.*

Ib. col. C. l. 1. *persolla sono minor.* Read *persona minor.*

Ib. l. 18. *pelenum vehiculum.* Read *pilentum.*

Ib. l. 26. *persictius qui frequenter aliquid patitur.* Perhaps *passicius.*

Ib. l. 35. *pithi poetici.* Perhaps *Pythii.*

P. 22 col. A. l. 2. *quin imom magis in deo.* Read *quin immo, magis ideo.*

P. 23 col. A. l. 34. *scuriara sordida.* Probably *scurrilia.*

Ib. col. C. l. 5. *sipius sapiens.* Probably *sibus.*

P. 26 col. E. l. 37. *titurus hircus apud libeos.* Read *apud Libycos,* comparing Ps. Probus on Eclogue 1 1, who gives the same information.

I add the following upon the Paris glossary edited by Hildebrand, and the Bodleian glossary quoted above:

Utitur, fruitur, nascitur (Hild.). Read *vescitur.* Bodl. has *vescor utor.*

Vaga inbrevia (Hild.). Read *in vada, in brevia.*

Vellere aedificare (Hild., Bodl.). Perhaps *vela dare, velificare:* Bodl. has *vela dabant, velificabant.*

H. NETTLESHIP.

Phys. 2. 5, 195^{b} 31 : *νῦν δὲ τοῦτο ἔστω φανερόν, ὅτι ἄμφω ἐν τοῖς ἕνεκά τού ἐστιν, οἷον ἕνεκα τοῦ ἀπολαβεῖν τὸ ἀργύριον ἦλθεν ἄν, κομισόμενος τὸν ἔρανον εἰ ἤδει· ἦλθε δ' οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα, ἀλλὰ συνέβη αὐτῷ ἐλθεῖν καὶ ποιῆσαι τοῦτο [τοῦ κομίσασθαι ἕνεκα]· τοῦτο δὲ οὔθ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ φοιτῶν εἰς τὸ χωρίον οὔτ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης—ἔστι δὲ τὸ τέλος, ἡ κομιδή, οὐ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ αἰτίων, ἀλλὰ τῶν προαιρετῶν καὶ ἀπὸ διανοίας—καὶ λέγεταί γε τότε ἀπὸ τύχης ἐλθεῖν. εἰ δὲ προελόμενος καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα, ἢ ἀεὶ φοιτῶν ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ [κομιζόμενος], οὐκ ἀπὸ τύχης.*

I have ventured to bracket *τοῦ κομίσασθαι ἕνεκα*, on the supposition that it was originally a marginal gloss on the *τούτου ἕνεκα* which precedes. As regards the second word in brackets, it will be observed that *κομιζόμενος* spoils the correspondence which should subsist between this clause and that in the middle of the passage, *οὔθ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ φοιτῶν εἰς τὸ χωρίον οὔτ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης.*

De anima 3. 4, 429^{b}5 : *ὅταν δ' οὕτως ἕκαστα γένηται* [scil. *ὁ νοῦς*] *ὡς ἐπιστήμων λέγεται ὁ κατ' ἐνέργειαν—τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει ὅταν δύνηται ἐνεργεῖν δι' αὑτοῦ—, ἔστι μὲν καὶ τότε δυνάμει πως, οὐ μὴν ὁμοίως καὶ πρὶν μαθεῖν ἢ εὑρεῖν· καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ αὑτὸν τότε δύναται νοεῖν.*

Aristotle is describing *νοῦς* in its second stage, when it has been developed into what he terms elsewhere a *ἕξις*. He does this by recalling the analogous case of the *ἐπιστήμων* (comp. 2. 5, 417^{a}21) who, as soon as his power of knowledge has become

a ἕξις, is in a position to exercise this power at will (*βουληθεὶς δυνατὸς θεωρεῖν*, 417ª 27) or as he here puts it, of himself (*δύνηται ἐνεργεῖν δι' αὑτοῦ*). It is in fact this characteristic of free and self-determined 'energy' that differentiates the higher form of *δύναμις* called a ἕξις from the primitive *δύναμις* of which it is a development. If *νοῦς* therefore is to be described as a ἕξις, this point, that as a ἕξις it is able to *ἐνεργεῖν δι' αὑτοῦ*, is too important to be ignored; and if it is not to be found in the text as it stands, we may be pretty sure that there is something wrong somewhere. A very slight change will make the last clause yield the required sense:—

καὶ αὐτὸς δι' αὑτοῦ τότε δύναται νοεῖν.

By this means we not only get a clause that we want, but also rid ourselves of one that we do not want. In its traditional form the clause has no place here: the proper place for it would be in the sections at the end of the Ch., when Aristotle comes to deal with a wholly different matter—the question whether *νοῦς* is *νοητός*.

Eth. Nic. 3. 7, 1114ᵇ 21: *ὁμοίως γὰρ καὶ τῷ κακῷ ὑπάρχει τὸ δι' αὑτὸν ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐν τῷ τέλει.*

Read *αὑτοῦ*, in the same way as we have in 3. 4, 1111ᵇ 24—26, *τὰ μηδαμῶς δι' αὑτοῦ πραχθέντα ἄν...ὅσα οἴεται γενέσθαι ἂν δι' αὑτοῦ.* Comp. 3. 5, 1112ª 34, *τῶν δι' αὑτῶν πρακτῶν*—5. 7, 1132ᵇ 17, *αὐτὰ <τὰ> δι' αὑτῶν*—3. 5, 1112ᵇ 27, *δυνατὰ δὲ ἃ δι' ἡμῶν γένοιτ' ἄν· τὰ γὰρ διὰ τῶν φίλων δι' ἡμῶν πως ἐστίν· ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν ἡμῖν.*

Eth. Nic. 6. 13, 1144ᵇ 21: *καὶ γὰρ νῦν πάντες, ὅταν ὁρίζωνται τὴν ἀρετήν, προστιθέασι τὴν ἕξιν, εἰπόντες καὶ πρὸς ἃ ἐστι, τὴν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον.*

The editions seem to agree in keeping the comma after *τὴν ἕξιν*, but instead of being where it is, it should rather be after *προστιθέασι*: the *πρόσθεσις* or qualifying addition is *τὴν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον.*

Eth. Nic. 9. 11, 1171ᵇ 4: *τὸ δὲ λυπούμενον αἰσθάνεσθαι* [scil. *τὸν φίλον*] *ἐπὶ ταῖς αὑτοῦ ἀτυχίαις λυπηρόν· πᾶς γὰρ φεύγει*

λύπης αἴτιος εἶναι τοῖς φίλοις. διόπερ οἱ μὲν ἀνδρώδεις τὴν φύσιν εὐλαβοῦνται συλλυπεῖν τοὺς φίλους αὑτοῖς, κἂν μὴ ὑπερτείνῃ τῇ ἀλυπίᾳ, τὴν ἐκείνοις γινομένην λύπην οὐχ ὑπομένει, ὅλως τε συνθρήνους οὐ προσίεται διὰ τὸ μηδ' αὐτὸς εἶναι θρηνητικός· γύναια δὲ καὶ οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἄνδρες τοῖς συστένουσι χαίρουσι κτέ.

The odd shifting and changing from singular to plural, and plural to singular has been noted by Ramsauer, who is able however to discover in it some peculiar and hidden beauty—'mira quadam', he says, 'nec tamen ingrata vice'. It may be as well to see how the passage will read, if we transpose the clauses slightly, and thus remove the anomaly:—

τὸ δὲ λυπούμενον αἰσθάνεσθαί ἐπὶ ταῖς αὑτοῦ ἀτυχίαις λυπηρόν· πᾶς γὰρ φεύγει λύπης αἴτιος εἶναι τοῖς φίλοις, κἂν μὴ ὑπερτείνῃ τῇ ἀλυπίᾳ, τὴν ἐκείνοις γινομένην λύπην οὐχ ὑπομένει· ὅλως τε συνθρήνους οὐ προσίεται διὰ τὸ μηδ' αὐτὸς εἶναι θρηνητικός. διόπερ οἱ μὲν ἀνδρώδεις τὴν φύσιν εὐλαβοῦνται συλλυπεῖν τοὺς φίλους αὑτοῖς· γύναια δὲ καὶ οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἄνδρες τοῖς συστένουσι χαίρουσι κτέ.

Pol. 8. 5, 1340^{b} 15: οἱ μὲν γὰρ νέοι διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν ἀνήδυντον οὐδὲν ὑπομένουσιν ἑκόντες, ἡ δὲ μουσικὴ φύσει τῶν ἡδυσμένων ἐστίν.

For ἡδυσμένων we should perhaps write ἡδυσμάτων.

Rhet. 2. 5, 1382^{b} 31: φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδεὶς φοβεῖται τῶν οἰομένων μηδὲν ἂν παθεῖν, οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἃ μὴ οἴονται [παθεῖν], οὐδὲ τούτους ὑφ' ὧν μὴ οἴονται, οὐδὲ τότε ὅτε μὴ οἴονται.

The second παθεῖν I have ventured to bracket as a pretty obvious 'emblema'.

Rhet. 3. 8, 1408^{b} 28: ὁ δὲ τοῦ σχήματος τῆς λέξεως ἀριθμὸς ῥυθμός ἐστιν, οὗ καὶ τὰ μέτρα τμητά.

Instead of τμητά we should perhaps read τμήματα, and understand the word in the sense of 'section' or 'part', as a synonym for μόρια, which is the term used in the parallel in Poet. 4, 1448^{b} 21: τὰ γὰρ μέτρα ὅτι μόρια τῶν ῥυθμῶν ἐστί, φανερόν.

Poet. 3, 1448ª 20: *καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ μιμεῖσθαι ἔστιν ὁτὲ μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα ἢ ἕτερόν τι γιγνόμενον, ὥσπερ Ὅμηρος ποιεῖ, ἢ ὡς τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ μὴ μεταβάλλοντα, ἢ πάντας ὡς πράττοντας καὶ ἐνεργοῦντας τοὺς μιμουμένους.*

Notwithstanding Vahlen's defence of this passage as it here stands, I still think that Gumposch hit the right nail on the head when he suggested that *ἢ ἕτερόν τι* should be changed into *ὁτὲ δ' ἕτερόν τι*; but instead of supposing *ἢ* to be a mere corruption I would transfer it to another place in the sentence, and write the clause thus:—

<ἢ> ὁτὲ μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα <ὁτὲ δ'> ἕτερόν τι γιγνόμενον—

on the hypothesis that *ἢ*, having been accidentally omitted, was noted in the margin, and then came to be regarded as a correction of *ὁτὲ δ'*. The general sense of the passage stands out clearly enough: given the same subject and the same means you may represent the subject either (1) in the mixed way we see at the beginning of things in Homer; or (2) in a purely narrative way such as we see in certain of the later epics for instance; or (3) in a purely dramatic way, as they do on the stage. In the clause relating to this third possibility (*τὰ αὐτὰ μιμεῖσθαι ἔστιν...πάντας ὡς πράττοντας καὶ ἐνεργοῦντας τοὺς μιμουμένους*) it seems to me that Casaubon was quite right in questioning *πάντας*, though his suggestion, *πάντα*, intended apparently to mean much the same thing as *διόλου* does in 24, 1460ª 8, does not remove the difficulty one finds here. *πάντας*, I think, may either represent *πα<ριό>ντας*, or be a mutilated dittographia of *πράττοντες*.

Poet. 6, 1450ª 12: *τούτοις μὲν οὖν οὐκ ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν ὡς εἰπεῖν κέχρηνται τοῖς εἴδεσι· καὶ γὰρ ὄψεις ἔχει πᾶν καὶ ἦθος καὶ μῦθον καὶ λέξιν καὶ μέλος καὶ διάνοιαν ὡσαύτως. μέγιστον δὲ τούτων κτέ.*

The drift of this passage and what follows is shortly this: These six elements are generally requisite in a tragedy, but they are not all of equal importance. At the risk of adding one more to the list of failures to restore this passage, I venture to suggest that *οὐκ* is possibly a dittographia of the preceding

οὖν, and ὀλίγοι a blunder for ὀλίγου. Assuming this, and inserting ἅπαντες or πάντες with Bursian, we get this result:—

τούτοις μὲν οὖν ὀλίγου αὐτῶν <ἅπαντες> ὡς εἰπεῖν κέχρηνται τοῖς εἴδεσι.

—which is identical in form with what we have in Plato Apol. 22 B: ὡς ἔπος γὰρ εἰπεῖν ὀλίγου αὐτῶν ἅπαντες οἱ παρόντες ἂν βέλτιον ἔλεγον. The Index Aristotelicus will show that there are in Aristotle several instances of ὡς εἰπεῖν coming after σχεδόν, which is hardly distinguishable in meaning from ὀλίγου. The clause that follows will then give a reason for the 'all but universal' practice of the poets. As every play (πᾶν) has in it the potentiality of the six elements, the poets all but universally avail themselves of this fact, and actually use the six elements in their plays. The distinction herein involved between ἔχει and κέχρηνται, possession and use (comp. Eth. Nic. 7. 4, 1147ᵃ 10), is one that Aristotle (unlike his interpreters) cannot quite forget even in the Poetics. Every play, he says in short, 'has' these various elements, and so all but all the poets 'use' them.

Poet. 7, 1450ᵇ 21: διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων λέγωμεν μετὰ ταῦτα ποίαν τινὰ δεῖ τὴν σύστασιν εἶναι...κεῖται δ' ἡμῖν τὴν τραγῳδίαν τελείας καὶ ὅλης πράξεως εἶναι μίμησιν κτέ.

Read κεῖται δὴ ἡμῖν. Δή occurs in just the same position, at the beginning of a formal argument, in 1, 1447ᵃ 13—where as here the previous sentence has the word λέγωμεν. In 14, 1453ᵇ 15 also I think Spengel was right in wishing to correct ἀνάγκη δὲ into ἀνάγκη δή.

Poet. 10, 1452ᵃ 16: πεπλεγμένη δὲ λέξις μετὰ ἀναγνωρισμοῦ ἢ περιπετείας ἢ ἀμφοῖν ἡ μετάβασίς ἐστιν.

The word λέξις being obviously wrong, Vahlen has accepted in lieu of it the reading of the Aldine ed., ἐξ ἧς, but with a slight modification: on the hypothesis that the initial λ of λέξις represents the symbol for ἐστι he restores the passage thus: πεπλεγμένη δέ ἐστιν ἐξ ἧς. It has occurred to me that the reading δὲ λέξις may be a corruption of δε Δεξις i.e. δὲ δ' ἐξ ἧς—with the δέ twice over, in its elided and also in its unelided form, a phenomenon not unfrequent in MSS. (comp.

Plato Symp. 179 E, where instead of *οἵκαδ' ἐλθὼν* the Clarkianus has *οἵκαδε δ' ἐλθὼν*); or that the *δε* was originally intended as a correction of the *λε* in *λέξις*. On either supposition the primitive reading would seem to have been simply: *πεπλεγμένη δ' ἐξ ἧς*.

Poet. 11, 1452^{a} 32: *καλλίστη δὲ ἀναγνώρισις ὅταν ἅμα περιπέτειαι γίνωνται, οἷον ἔχει ἡ ἐν τῷ Οἰδίποδι.*

Instead of *οἷον* I suspect we should read *οἵαν*.

Poet. 11, 1452^{a} 33: *εἰσὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλαι ἀναγνωρίσεις· καὶ γὰρ πρὸς ἄψυχα καὶ τὰ τυχόντα ἔστιν ὡς <ὅ>περ εἴρηται συμβαίνει, καὶ εἰ πέπραγέ τις ἢ μὴ πέπραγεν ἔστιν ἀναγνωρίσαι.*

ὡς ὅπερ is Spengel's very simple correction of the MS. reading *ὥσπερ*. Vahlen's reading, *καὶ γὰρ πρὸς ἄψυχα καὶ τὰ τυχόντα ἔστιν, <ὅσα> ὥσπερ εἴρηται συμβαίνει*, involves (if I rightly apprehend his note on this passage) a twofold assumption, (1) that *τὰ τυχόντα* is to be dissevered from *ἄψυχα*, (2) that it is to be understood of incidents or events, and not of things: the concluding clause too (*καὶ εἰ πέπραγέ τις* etc.) becomes on this hypothesis a somewhat needless iteration of the sense of that which immediately precedes. Taking Spengel's correction on the other hand we get the following as the general sense of the passage: *Ἀναγνώρισις* is normally and in most cases in reference to persons, but it *may* also be in reference to (1) things—even things of a very casual sort (*πρὸς ἄψυχα καὶ τὰ τυχόντα*, e.g. the bow mentioned in 16, 1455^{a} 14), or (2) acts or deeds (*εἰ πέπραγέ τις ἢ μὴ* etc.). The expression *ὅπερ εἴρηται* may very well serve as a summary of what has been said on the subject of *ἀναγνώρισις*; and as for *ἔστιν ὡς*, it is just one of those qualifications that Aristotle so much affects. With the clause as amended by Spengel a passage in the Politics, 7. 17, 1336^{b} 31, may be compared: *συμβαίνει δὲ ταὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὁμιλίας καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων*—where *ταὐτὸ τοῦτο* is the almost exact equivalent of the *ὅπερ εἴρηται* in our passage.

Poet. 11, 1452^{b} 3: *ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ ἀναγνώρισις τινῶν ἐστὶν ἀναγνώρισις, αἱ μὲν θατέρου πρὸς τὸν ἕτερον μόνον, ὅταν ᾖ δῆλος*

ἄτερος τίς ἐστιν· ὁτὲ δ' ἀμφοτέρους δεῖ ἀναγνωρίσαι, οἷον ἡ μὲν Ἰφιγένεια τῷ Ὀρέστῃ ἀνεγνωρίσθη ἐκ τῆς πέμψεως τῆς ἐπιστολῆς, ἐκείνῳ δὲ πρὸς τὴν Ἰφιγένειαν ἄλλης ἔδει ἀναγνωρίσεως.

For ἐκείνῳ I would write ἐκείνου, so as to repeat the construction which we have twice in the first two lines. It will thus be a genitive after (as they say) ἀναγνωρίσεως, such double genitives being not so uncommon in Aristotle (comp. Vahlen on 18, 1456ª 6).

Poet. 15, 1454ª 17: ἔξει δὲ ἦθος μέν, ἐὰν ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη ποιῇ φανερὰν ὁ λόγος ἢ ἡ πρᾶξις προαίρεσίν τινα ᾖ, χρηστὸν δ' ἐὰν χρηστήν.

For προαίρεσίν τινα ᾖ, which has been variously emended, we might perhaps read προαίρεσιν <ἦν> τινα <δ>ἡ.

Poet. 15, 1454ª 28: ἔστι δὲ παράδειγμα πονηρίας μὲν ἤθους μὴ ἀναγκαῖον οἷον ὁ Μενέλαος ὁ ἐν τῷ Ὀρέστῃ· τοῦ δὲ ἀπρεποῦς καὶ μὴ ἁρμόττοντος ὅ τε θρῆνος Ὀδυσσέως (κτέ.).

Instead of ἀναγκαῖον one of the apographs (Nª in Bekker) substitutes ἀναγκαίου—which, if it may be taken as a feminine, as it occasionally is in Attic writers, gives the same sense as Thurot's ἀναγκαίας and is nearer the traditional reading (compare ἑκάστου for ἕκαστον in 18, 1456ª 6, and ἀλλ' ἄοινον for ἀλλὰ οἴνου in 21, 1457ᵇ 32). Some such change seems to be absolutely demanded by the meaning of the passage. Aristotle is now illustrating and supporting what he has said on the subject of the ἤθη by examples, and in the Menelaus of the Orestes he finds an example of πονηρία—a kind of πονηρία which cannot be justified by the exigencies of the plot, and which is therefore to be condemned as unnecessary and gratuitous. He reverts to this point that the πονηρία of Menelaus in the Orestes is unnecessary and indefensible in a later Ch., 25, 1461ᵇ 19: ὀρθὴ δ' ἐπιτίμησις καὶ ἀλογίᾳ καὶ μοχθηρίᾳ [so Vahlen for ἀλογία καὶ μοχθηρία], ὅταν μὴ ἀνάγκης οὔσης μηδὲν χρήσηται τῷ ἀλόγῳ, ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης τῷ Αἰγεῖ, ἢ τῇ πονηρίᾳ, ὥσπερ ἐν Ὀρέστῃ <τῇ> τοῦ Μενελάου. Had Aristotle meant to say that the example was unnecessary, he would surely be

condemning himself, and not Euripides. As far as I know, the word *παράδειγμα* means always in Aristotle one of two things, either (1) a model, from which copies are taken, or (2) an example illustrative of a rule or principle, and is not to be understood in the vague sense in which we sometimes use our English words 'case' and 'instance'.

Poet. 15, 1454^{a} 30: *ὅ τε θρῆνος Ὀδυσσέως ἐν τῇ Σκύλλῃ.*

Read *<τοῦ> Ὀδυσσέως*: and similarly in 16, 1454^{b} 26 *<ὁ> Ὀδυσσεὺς*; in 16, 1454^{b} 31 *<ὁ> Ὀρέστης*; in 24, 1460^{a} 30 *<ὁ> Οἰδίπους*. In all other instances in the Poetics (and they are very numerous) Aristotle rigidly follows Bp. Fitzgerald's rule as to the use of the article with the names of dramatis personae.

Poet. 15, 1454^{a} 33: *χρὴ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἤθεσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ τῶν πραγμάτων συστάσει, ἀεὶ ζητεῖν ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ τὸ εἰκός, ὥστε τὸν τοιοῦτον τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγειν ἢ πράττειν ἢ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ εἰκός, <ὡς> καὶ τοῦτο μετὰ τοῦτο γίνεσθαι ἢ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ εἰκός.*

I have inserted *ὡς* at the beginning of the last clause to show that it comes in only incidentally. The point here insisted upon is the unity which is to be observed in the treatment of the characters: the unity of plot having been so fully asserted in the earlier part of the book, does not require reassertion; Aristotle merely reminds us of it in order to facilitate our acceptance of the analogous rule he is now laying down for the characters.

Poet. 15, 1454^{b} 11: *οὕτω καὶ τὸν ποιητήν, μιμούμενον καὶ ὀργίλους καὶ ῥᾳθύμους καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντας ἐπὶ τῶν ἠθῶν, τοιούτους ὄντας ἐπιεικεῖς ποιεῖν, [παράδειγμα σκληρότητος] οἷον τὸν Ἀχιλλέα Ἀγάθων καὶ Ὅμηρον.*

If we provisionally set aside the two words I have ventured to bracket, the sense of the passage of which the above is a part becomes clear and consecutive:—As a skilful portrait-painter knows how to make his faces more beautiful than they really are without sacrificing the likeness (*ὁμοίους ποιοῦντες καλλίους γράφουσι*), so the poet, as a painter of character, must

idealize his portraits, and make even ὀργίλοι, ῥᾴθυμοι, and the like, seem ἐπιεικεῖς notwithstanding their defect, as Homer has done with Achilles. Aristotle, then (if we may still ignore the two words in question), regards the Homeric Achilles as ἐπιεικής, notwithstanding a defect of character which Homer, as a good portrait-painter, has known how to retain in his picture of him. What is the defect referred to? His ὀργιλότης, surely. It is observable in the Iliad *passim* (comp. Schol. Ven. A. on Il. 1. 1), and in the days of Horace was regarded as part and parcel of the conventional idea of Achilles: comp.

> Pelidae *stomachum* cedere nescii. Carm. 1. 6. 6.
> Hunc amor, *ira* quidem communiter urit utrumque. Ep. 1. 2. 13.
> *Iratus* graiis quantum nocuisset Achilles. Ep. 2. 2. 42.
> Impiger, *iracundus*, inexorabilis, acer. A. P. 121.

The first difficulty in this passage then is in σκληρότητος, which comes in where on general grounds we should expect rather ὀργιλότητος. The second is in παράδειγμα σκληρότητος. The whole point of the argument is that the Homeric Achilles ὀργίλος (or σκληρὸς) ὢν ἐπιεικής ἐστι—the word ἐπιεικής being a very essential and necessary part of a complex conception. Would παράδειγμα ὀργιλότητος (or σκληρότητος) serve to express this complex conception? Vahlen (Beitr. 2 p. 77) thinks it may; but as he gives no proof, I suppose that the evidence is not easy to find. We have however evidence against this view in this same Ch. and indeed in close proximity to this passage, when the character of Menelaus in the Orestes is cited as a παράδειγμα πονηρίας (1454ª 28), which can hardly be taken to imply a combination of ἐπιείκεια and πονηρία. Teichmüller (Aristot. Forsch. 1. p. 252), not seeing the difficulty, understands παράδειγμα in its ordinary sense, but his explanation of the text would be more *ad rem* if the words ran somewhat differently—if we had something like this instead: παράδειγμα σκληρότητος ὁ Ὁμήρου Ἀχιλλεύς. As regards σκληρότητος (to return to that point) Teichmüller's notion is that it is sufficiently justified by the comprehensive τἄλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντας ἐπὶ τῶν ἠθῶν, which comes in as a sort of 'etc.' after

ὀργίλους καὶ ῥᾳθύμους. This explanation is surely improbable enough in itself; and it becomes doubly so as soon as we reflect and ask ourselves why ὀργίλοι and ῥᾳθυμοι are thus mentioned together. As the ὀργίλοι are too quick to anger (Eth. Nic. 4. 11, 1126ª 13), so the ῥᾳθυμοι as here understood are too slow (comp. Eth. Nic. 8. 5, 1240ª 2); they are too easy-going, thus exemplifying that negative vice which Aristotle elsewhere proposes to term ἀοργησία, as the antithesis of the positive ὀργιλότης. There is therefore a certain logical propriety in saying 'ὀργίλοι, ῥᾳθυμοι, etc.' Two opposite vices connected with anger are distinctly before Aristotle's mind; whereas the other vices (positive and negative) are not so distinctly before his mind, and are accordingly only just recognized as possibilities by a vague and general 'etc.' So far then there is no sign of logical weakness on Aristotle's part; but, if we believe Teichmüller, we must suppose that at this point his mind suddenly gave way, and that he thus (1) found himself unable to think of an appropriate instance of ὀργιλότης, and so (2) thought that an instance of something else (σκληρότης) would do just as well; and moreover (3) was so perverse or misguided as to see in the Homeric Achilles an instance of σκληρότης, when it was so much more easy and natural to see in him an instance of ὀργιλότης—the very thing in fact which the logic of his own statement demanded. If therefore σκληρότητος is wrong, and παράδειγμα σκληρότητος is wrong, we may perhaps consider the patent grammatical difficulties connected with the words, as they stand in the text, as a further proof that they have no business to be in the text at all. They are just the sort of thing a Graeculus might scribble in the margin (comp. the intrusive πέντε in Poet. 6, 1450ᵇ 16, and δύο in Rhet. 1. 13, 1373ᵇ 3).

Poet. 16, 1455ª 16: πασῶν δὲ βελτίστη ἀναγνώρισις ἡ ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων, τῆς ἐκπλήξεως γιγνομένης δι' εἰκότων, οἷον †ὁ† ἐν τῷ Σοφοκλέους Οἰδίποδι καὶ τῇ Ἰφιγενείᾳ· εἰκὸς γὰρ βούλεσθαι ἐπιθεῖναι γράμματα.

Vahlen brackets the ὁ after οἷον. Perhaps it would be preferable to write τὸ, so as to make what follows mean 'the

incident in the Oedipus and the Iphigenia.'—In the latter case the incident is explained by what follows to be the sending of a letter, and Aristotle definitely tells us that this is *εἰκός*. Comp. 15, 1454^{b} 6: *ἄλογον δὲ μηδὲν εἶναι ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν, εἰ δὲ μή, ἔξω τῆς τραγῳδίας, οἷον τὸ ἐν τῷ Οἰδίποδι τῷ Σοφοκλέους.* As regards *ὁ = τό* I may observe that in 20, 1457^{a} 28 Dr Bigg has rightly, as I think, proposed to write *τὸ Κλέων* in lieu of the MS. reading, *ὁ Κλέων* (Journ. of Phil. 12. p. 107).

Poet. 18, 1455^{b} 32: *τραγῳδίας δὲ εἴδη εἰσὶ τέσσαρα· τοσαῦτα γὰρ καὶ τὰ μέρη ἐλέχθη· ἡ μὲν πεπλεγμένη, ἧς τὸ ὅλον ἐστὶ περιπέτεια καὶ ἀναγνώρισις· ἡ δὲ παθητική, οἷον οἵ τε Αἴαντες καὶ οἱ Ἰξίονες· ἥ τε ἠθική, οἷον αἱ Φθιώτιδες καὶ ὁ Πηλεύς· τὸ δὲ τέταρτον οησ, οἷον αἵ τε Φορκίδες καὶ Προμηθεὺς καὶ ὅσα ἐν ᾅδου.*

There are two very obvious material difficulties in this passage. (1) The section of which it forms part breaks the continuity of a series of remarks on the *δέσις* (or *πλοκή*) and *λύσις*; (2) the statement here does not quite harmonize either with what we read before this in Ch. 6 and Ch. 11 (1452^{b} 9) or with what follows afterwards in Ch. 24 (1459^{b} 8). To make it square with Ch. 24, even in the most superficial way, we have to assume (with Vahlen) a lacuna, through which a clause on the *ἁπλῆ τραγῳδία* has dropped out, and furthermore change *τὸ δὲ τέταρτον οησ* into *τὸ δὲ τερατῶδες* (with Schrader)—a most improbable correction, I think—or something else of the same sort. But even when we have done all this, a good deal of sophistical ingenuity is still required to bring the parenthetical *τοσαῦτα γὰρ καὶ τὰ μέρη ἐλέχθη* into some decent semblance of harmony with what we read in Ch. 6 and Ch. 7. On the other hand, if we look at the passage as it stands, and renounce all attempts to reconcile it closely with statements in other parts of the book, it seems to me that we may emend the text without any very drastic treatment of the mysterious *οησ*. The *εἴδη* or species of which Aristotle is now speaking are apparently constituted through the prominence, or special elaboration (comp. 18, 1456^{a} 5), of some one of the four *μέρη* or parts. Thus a tragedy is said to be *πεπλεγμένη*, if the *περι-*

πέτεια καὶ ἀναγνώρισις (here counted as one) is the prominent element (*ἧς τὸ ὅλον ἐστὶ περιπέτεια καὶ ἀναγνώρισις*); it is *παθητική*, therefore, if the *πάθος* is brought into prominence; and *ἠθική*, if there is in it a special elaboration of the *ἤθη*. What then is the fourth kind of tragedy, and what is the part which by its prominence gives it its distinctive character? It seems to be forgotten by those who have dealt with this passage that the very same *οησ* on which the whole question turns occurs in the MS. in another place also in the Poetics (21, 1458[a] 5), in the half-line quoted from Empedocles:—

μία γίνεται ἀμφοτέρων ὄψ

—where *ὄψ* is known to be the right reading, from Strabo (364 Cas.). But the *οησ* of the MS. does not represent *ὄψ* directly; it stands rather, I think, for *ὄψις*—the scribe having substituted the ordinary form of the word, just as Strabo says, *παρ' Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ δέ, "μία γίνεται ἀμφοτέρων ὄψ," ἡ ὄψις*—adding *ἡ ὄψις* in order to explain the unfamiliar word used by Empedocles (comp. Hesych. *ὄψ· ὄψις. ὀφθαλμός*). I take it then that, as regards the passage in Ch. 21, where we now rightly read *ὄψ*, the MS. reading *οης* = *o*Hς = *o*ΨIς, and do not think there is much to be said in favour of the alternative supposition that the *οης* = *o*Πς. Assuming this, then, that *o*Hς = *o*ΨIς—and even as late as the eighth cent. ΨI might have been written so as to be all but undistinguishable from H—we may restore our present passage thus:—

τὸ δὲ τέταρτον ὄψις, οἷον αἵ τε Φορκίδες καὶ Προμηθεὺς καὶ ὅσα ἐν ᾅδου.

By way of anticipating objections I may remark (1) that, if Aristotle (as emended) talks of the fourth 'part', instead of the fourth 'kind' of tragedy, the reason is not far to seek—he has no name for what we should term the 'spectacular' tragedy: (2) that if there is a certain impropriety in citing the plays mentioned, as though they were instances of the fourth 'part' (not of the fourth 'kind'), such disregard of strict logical congruity is to be seen *passim* in the Poetics, where *οἷον* is often used even more loosely than our own 'e.g.' The further point,

that the plays themselves were really 'spectacular' tragedies, I suppose I may take for granted, as it is practically assumed (comp. Poet. 14, 1453^{b} 9) in Schrader's emendation, which in some form or other has been accepted by so many eminent scholars.

Poet. 25, 1460^{b} 22: *πρῶτον μὲν τὰ πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν τέχνην· <εἰ> ἀδύνατα πεποίηται, ἡμάρτηται· ἀλλ' ὀρθῶς ἔχει εἰ τυγχάνει τοῦ τέλους τοῦ αὑτῆς...εἰ μέντοι τὸ τέλος ἢ μᾶλλον <ἢ μὴ> ἧττον ἐνεδέχετο ὑπάρχειν καὶ κατὰ τὴν περὶ τούτων τέχνην [ἡμαρτῆσθαι] οὐκ ὀρθῶς. δεῖ γὰρ εἰ ἐνδέχεται ὅλως μηδαμῇ ἡμαρτῆσθαι.*

In the above I have bracketed *ἡμαρτῆσθαι* as a dittographia of the *ἡμαρτῆσθαι* in the next line. It will be observed that in the parallel *ἀλλ' ὀρθῶς ἔχει* which precedes, and from which we have to supply an *ἔχει* to go with *οὐκ ὀρθῶς*, the word *ἡμαρτῆσθαι* does not figure. It would be extremely tiresome if it did, since *ὀρθῶς ἔχει* by itself as used here is the direct negation of *ἡμάρτηται*.

Poet. 26, 1462^{a} 4: *πρῶτον μὲν οὐ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἡ κατηγορία ἀλλὰ τῆς ὑποκριτικῆς.*

The connecting particle which seems to be wanted may be thus supplied: *πρῶτον μὲν <οὖν> οὐ τῆς ποιητικῆς κτέ.*

I. BYWATER.

CRITICAL NOTES, CHIEFLY ON THE MENAECHMI OF PLAUTUS.

[*The references in the Menaechmi are to Vahlen's Edition (Berlin 1882), in the other plays to the edition of Loewe, Goetz and Schoell (R), Ussing (U), or Tauchnitz (T).*]

Prol. 14.

Nunc argumentum uobis demensum dabo,
Non modio neque trimodio, uerum ipso horreo;
Tantum ad narrandum argumentum adest benignitas.

The third line seems generally admitted to be corrupt, though Ussing tries to defend it as it stands, explaining *tantum* as an adverb on the analogy of Verg. Aen. III. 348, *Et multum lacrimas uerba inter singula fundit.* It can hardly be supposed however, that the writer of the prologue would have deliberately preferred this construction, when *tanta* would suit the metre equally well. Brix[3] writes *Tanta ad narrandum argumentum adest benignitas,* Ritschl *Tanta ad narrandum nostra adest benignitas.* Is it not probable that a line has fallen out, as often in the cursive Mss. of this play, e.g. 283 (II. 2. 12) &c.? *Benignitas* seems invariably to be used in the Plautine prologues of the attitude of the public towards the prologue-speaker, never of the attitude of the prologue-speaker towards the public. So we have, Mil. Glor. 79 (II. 1. 1) (U):

Mihi ad enarrandum hoc argumentum est comitas,
Si ad auscultandum uostra erit benignitas.

And Merc. prol. 10 (R):

si operaest auribus
Atque aduortendum ad animum adest benignitas.

Comparing these two passages we might read here:

Tantum ad narrandum argumentum adest mihi comitas
Si ad auscultandum uostra adest benignitas.

The copyist's eye would pass from *adest* in the first to *adest* in the second line, as in line 283 from *Peniculum* to the same word in 284 (II. 2. 12 and 13). The writer of the prologue may well have taken these two lines from the Miles, as lines 52—55 are borrowed almost verbally from Poen. prol. 80—83 (R). *Tantum* would then be an adjective agreeing with *argumentum*, and referring to the promise to give them the argument *non modio neque trimodio uerum ipso horreo.*

Prol. 26. *Inponit geminum alterum in nauem pater.* Various suggestions have been made to avoid the hiatus. Mueller writes *geminum item*, Ritschl *geminorum*. Perhaps the simplest method would be to write:

Inponit geminum hunc alterum in nauem pater.

Hunc seems to be required here to contrast with *illum* in 28, as *huic* and *illi* are similarly contrasted in lines 40 and 42.

Prol. 50. *Ut hanc rem uobis examussim disputem.*

This word *examussim* occurs again in Plautus Most. 99 (I. 2. 19) (U):

Factae probe examussim,

and Amph. 843 (II. 2. 213) (R),

Ne ista edepol, si haec uera loquitur, examussimst optuma.

The passage from the Amphitruo however is quoted by Nonius 9. 10, s. v. *examussim*, in this form:

Si uera haec loquitur haec amussimst optuma.

Haec amussim is the reading of all the best Mss. except the Harleian, which has *haec amusim* (sic). May not the line have originally run?

Ne ista edepol si uera loquitur, haec amussimst optuma,

ista being accusative, neuter, plural, *haec* nominative, feminine, singular.

Paulus, 6. 9, has the following gloss on the word *amussim*. *Amussim, regulariter, tractum a regula, ad quam aliquid exaequatur, quae amussis dicitur. Quidam amussim esse dicunt non tacite, quod muttire interdum dicitur loqui.* This gloss seems to shew that *amussim* was used in the same sense as *examussim* or *adamussim*, and *amussim* is more likely to have been altered to the commoner *examussim* than vice versa. The second part of the gloss, *quidam amussim esse dicunt non tacite*, suggests the existence of an adverb *mussim* connected with *muttire and mussare*. In Aul. Gell. XVII. 8. 7, *cum omnes sensim ac summissim rideremus*, and Suet. Vit. Aug. 74, *Nam et ad communionem sermonis tacentes uel summissim fabulantes prouocabat*, should not *summussim* be read for *summissim*? *Summussim*, "under the breath", seems precisely the sense required in both passages, and in the passage from Gellius *summussim* is actually read by several Mss. Festus too 299. 3 quotes from Naevius, *Odi, inquit, summussos, proinde aperte dice quid siet.*

Should not *musse* be read also in Merc. prol. 54 (R)? Loewe, Goetz, and Schoell write:

Summo haec clamore; interdum mussans conloqui
Abnuere; negitare adeo me natum suom.

For *mussans* however B has *missa*, C and D *mussa*, so that *musse* is really nearer to the Mss.; an adverb also seems to suit the passage better than a participle. The reading *missa* of B may well represent an original *muse*, as in Curc. 21 (R) B, E, F have *mittit*, J *mutit*, in Truc. 312 (R) A alone has *mussitem*, all the other Mss. *musitem*. So in Gell. and Suet. *summissim* may well represent an original *summusim*.

Prol. 75. *Modo hic agitat leno, modo adulescens, modo senex.*

Brix and Ussing try to explain *agitat leno* as though it were *agitat lenonem*, or *lenonis partes*, which is surely impossible. The Mss. give for *hic agitat, ni caditat;* may not the true reading be *huc aditat*?

Diomede 345. 1. K. has,

adeo, adis, iteramus, adito, aditas dictitantes, ut Ennius, ad eum aditauere. *Aduenio* and *prodeo* are both used of an actor's appearance on the stage, and the frequentative seems specially appropriate here, to express the "many parts" which each actor has to take in turn.

115 (I. 2. 6).

Quo ego eam, quam rem agam, quid negoti geram,
Quid petam, quid feram, quid foris egerim.

For *egerim*, the second reading of B, B^1, C, D all give *legerim*. Brix[3] retains *egerim*; it would seem however that this can hardly be right, as the wife would not ask the husband what he *has* been doing out of doors when he is just going out. *Egeram* or *degeram* has been suggested, but these corrections both involve a further change of *foris* to *foras*, and Menaechmus would not be likely to suggest any idea of the kind to his wife, when he was actually trying to smuggle out a *palla*. May not *re geram* be the true reading? *Re geram* would easily be corrupted to *legeram*, and then corrected to *legerim*. It also seems to give a satisfactory sense, the wife summing up in these words the substance of her previous questions. "*Where I'm going? what I'm going to do? what my business is? what I'm after? what I'm going to fetch? what I'm up to out of doors?*" With this reading again the final cretic, like every other cretic in these two lines, will end with an iambus, which seems to lend an additional vehemence to the rhythm.

153 (I. 2. 40).

PEN. *Litigium tibi est cum uxore: eo mi abs te caueo cautius.*
MEN. *Clam uxorem* [*est*] *ubi sepulcrum habeamus, atque hunc comburamus diem.*

The Mss. of Plautus omit *est*, which is added somewhat doubtfully from Charisius. Ussing alters *sepulcrum* to *pulcre*, a violent change, and adopts the *est* of Charisius, scanning *atque hunc com.* as an anapaest! Ritschl, followed by Brix, supposes that a line has fallen out, e.g.

[*Ne time: si domi negatur, tamen nobis praestost locus*]
Clam uxorem ubi sepulcrum habeamus, hunc comburamus diem.

Sepulcrum however means not a "funeral", or a "funeral-feast", as Wagner suggests, but a "place of burial", and it is surely superfluous to say, "there is a place, where we can have a place of burial". The omission of *atque* too introduces an awkward asyndeton.

Should we read ?

Clam uxorem ubi sepulcrum habemus, hunc comburamus diem,

translating, "*There's that burial-ground of ours my wife doesn't know of, let's lay the day to rest there*". *Habemus* would be altered to *habeamus*, in order to correspond to *comburamus,* and *atque* added to complete the construction.

210 (I. 3. 29).

Madida quae mihi adposita in mensa miluinam suggerant.

Most editors retain this reading, taking *miluinam* as equivalent to *miluinam famem,* and translating " a kite-like appetite." *Miluinam* however would naturally mean not "a kite's appetite" (*miluinam famem*), but "kite's flesh" (*miluinam carnem*). For *miluinam* the Ambrosian gives *muluinam,* which Bernays proposed to alter to *bulimam,* comparing Paul. 32. 10,

Bulimam graeci magnam famem dicunt.

Ritschl adopting this suggestion writes,

Madida quae anteposita in mensa mihi bulimam suggerant,

which however introduces a rather violent change. Scaliger on Paul. l. c. pointed out that the form we should expect would be, not *bulimam,* but *bulimum* or *bulimiam,* corresponding to the Greek forms *βούλιμος* and *βουλιμία.* I would propose to adopt in this passage the form *bulimiam,* which is even nearer than *bulimam* to the *muluinam* of the Ambrosian, and read, merely transposing the last two words,

Madida quae mi adposita in mensa suggerant bulimiam.

247 (II. 2. 24).

Dictum facessas datum edis caueas malo
Molestus ne sis non tuo haec fient modo.

Brix reads *Dictum hau facessas doctum, si caueas malo,*

a somewhat violent change, which as he himself admits is not altogether satisfactory. Camerarius proposed

Dictum facessas doctum et discaueas malo,

but *discaueo* does not seem to occur elsewhere, and though *facessas* might mean "you should take yourself off", *dictum facessas* could hardly mean "you should take your jests off", as *facessere* does not seem to be used with an accusative in this sense. *Dictum facessas* would naturally mean "you should do what you are told", as we learn from Nonius 306. 26, where we read:

Facessere, facere: Ennius, Annalibus lib. I.:

Haec effatus, ibi latrones dicta facessunt.

Afranius, Inimicis:

Multa atque molesta es: potin ut dicta facessas?

Verg. Aen. lib. IV. (295,)

Imperio laeti parent ac iussa facessunt.

In the above passage of Afranius Ribbeck unnecessarily, as it would seem, alters *dicta facessas* to *hinc facessas.*

Praecepta facessit also occurs in Verg. Georg. IV. 548, and *praecepta facessunt* in Verg. Aen. IX. 45.

I would propose here,

Dictum facessas, datum edis, si caueas malo:
Molestus ne sis, non tuo haec fient modo,

translating "*You'll do what you're told, and eat what's put before you, if you don't want to get into trouble*". This sense seems to harmonize with the next line,

Illoc enim uerbo esse me seruom scio,

and also with 434 (II. 3. 94),

Dicto me emit audientem, haud imperatorem sibi.

For the form of sentence compare 1006 (V. 7. 34), Rud. IV. 4. 18 (T), &c.

It is possible that a line, which should be given to Messenio, has dropped out between 247 and 248 to this effect:

MES. *Tute hinc domum facessas, si caueas malo.*

In the passage of the Rudens just referred to there is a similar play on the double meaning of *facesso*, and *molestus ne sis*, &c., would come in with much more force after such an interpellation.

274 (II. 2. 4). *Prius iam conuiuae ambulant ante ostium.*

Obambulant has been suggested for *ambulant*, in order to avoid the hiatus. *Deambulant* however makes a better line, and is nearer to the Mss., as the *de* of *deambulant* might easily drop out after the preceding *ae* of *conuiuae*, cf. *abi deambulatum* Ter. Haut. 587 (III. 3. 26), &c.

290 (II. 2. 18). *Nam equidem insanum esse te certo scio.*

Ritschl reads *Nam equidem edepol* to avoid the hiatus, Brix[3] *Nam equidem insane insanum.* Perhaps however

Nam equidem insanissumum esse te certo scio

is more probable. Compare 505 (III. 2. 51),

Aut te piari iubes, homo insanissume,

and 809 (V. 2. 67), *ubi habitas, insanissume.*

293 (II. 2. 21).

Seu tu Cylindrus seu Coriendrus perieris.

Editors generally write

Seu tu Culindrus seu Colindrus perieris,

supposing a play either on *culus* (*anus*), and *colis* (*penis*), or on *culina* and *colina*. Here however there seems to be no particular force in playing on either of these two pairs of words. What we should expect would be rather a play on two kitchen-utensils. Should we read?

Seu tu Culindrus seu Colandrus perieris,

translating, "*whether you are cylinder or colander* (rolling-pin or strainer), *you may just go and be hanged*".

Colandrus is nearer than *Colindrus* to the *Coriendrus* of the Mss. as *ie* is a frequent corruption of *a*.

305 (II. 2. 33). CUL. *Non tu in illisce aedibus Habitas?*

MEN. *Di illos homines, qui illic habitant, perduint.*

Spengel suggested *Di illum hominem, qui illic habitat, hominem* is however very weak, and with this reading there seems no reason whatever for the introduction of the plural. Should we not write?

Di illum omnes, qui illic habitat, perduint.

Compare 441 (III. 1. 6),

Qui illum di omnes perduint.

So too 581 (IV. 2. 31),

Di illunc omnes perdant, &c.

Omnes would first be corrupted to *homines* as often in Mss., and *illum* would then be altered to *illos,* and *habitat* to *habitant* to correspond.

397 (II. 3. 58).

Saepe tritam, saepe fixam, saepe excussam malleo.

Ussing tries to explain *excussam* as the participle of *excutio,* Ritschl and Brix alter to *excusam.* Is not *excussam* simply an old form of *excusam,* the second *s* representing the lost *d*? So we have *essuri* 149 (I. 2. 38), and *essum* 448 (III. 1. 11), so too in Verg. Georg. I. 275 Ribbeck with all the best Mss. reads *incussum.*

404 (II. 3. 64).

Tertium Liparo, qui in morte regnum Hieroni tradidit.

Should not *in* be omitted? The simple *morte,* as an ablative of time, seems much more natural (cf. Verg. Aen. III. 333,

Morte Neoptolemi regnorum reddita cessit
Pars Heleno),

and *in* may well be a dittography of the following *m* of *morte.*

432 (II. 3. 87). *Ducit lembum dierectum nauis praedatoria.*

The word *dierectus* is found 13 times in the Editions of Plautus, viz.:

Bacch. 577 (IV. 1. 7) (U). *Recede hinc dierecte! Ut pulsat propudium!*

Capt. 630 (III. 4. 103) (U). *Quin quiescis? [i] dierectum, cor meum, ac suspende te.*

Cas. I. 1. 15 (T). *Abi rus, abi dierectus tuam in prouinciam.*

Curc. 240 (II. 1. 24) (R). *Lien dierectust. Ambula, id lieni optumumst.*

Men. 432 (II. 3. 87). *Ducit lembum dierectum nauis praedatoria.*

Merc. 183 (I. 2. 71) (R). *[Quin ab]i hinc dierectus: nugare in re capitali mea.*

ib. 756 (IV. 4. 16) (R). *Abin dierectus? Haud malast. At tu malu's.*

Most. 8. (I. 1. 8) (U). *Abi rus! abi dierecte! abscede ab ianua!*

ib. 834 (III. 2. 163) (U). *St, abi canis! St, abi dierecta! St, abin hinc in malam crucem?*

Poen. 160 (I. 1. 32) (R). *Abin dierectus? Dic mihi uero serio.*

ib. 347 (I. 2. 134) (R). *Bellua herclest. Ei dierecte in maxumam malam crucem.*

Rud. IV. 4. 126 (T). *Suculae. Quin tu i dierecta cum sucula et cum porculis!*

Trin. 457 (II. 4. 56) (R). *Abin hinc dierecte? Si hercle ire occipiam, uotes.*

The word also occurs in the Eumenides of Varro (Varro Sat. Men. 133, B), Non. p. 49, s. v. and p. 122, s. v. *insanitas,*

Apage in dierectum a domo nostra istam insanitatem.

The Mss. vary throughout between *dierectus, dlerectus, directus, derectus,* and *d'rectus,* and Professor Nettleship has shewn that in all probability the original form of the word was *derectus, dierectus* arising from a confusion of the two spellings *directus* and *derectus.*

A comparison of the different passages in Plautus seems to establish the two following laws with regard to the use of this word:

I. That it is used always with verbs of motion, (1) as a vocative, (2) as a nominative agreeing with the subject of the

verb, (3) as an accusative agreeing with the object. It would seem that *dierecte* is a vocative, not an adverb, as it is used only with masculine, never with feminine or neuter nouns. The only instance in Plautus, which appears to be at variance with the above rule, viz. that *dierectus* is used only with verbs of motion, is the passage from the Curculio 240 (II. 1. 24) (R),

Lien dierectust. Ambula, id lieni optumumst.

Here however B has *dieructus*, J *dirruptus*, which may well be right.

Is it not possible however that *disrectus* should be read here, from gloss. Hild. 310, *Disrectum, diuisum*, and Paul. p. 69, *Dirigere* (*disrigere*?), *apud Plautum ponitur pro discidere*? *Dieructus* in B might well be due to a confusion of *disrectus* with a gloss *dirruptus*. So Curc. 424. III. 54 (R),

Clypeatus elephantum ubi machaera dissicit,

should not *disligit* be read for *dissicit*?

The Mss. of Plautus give *dessicit* here, but Non. 290 s. v. *diligere* has *Diligit, diuidit; Plaut. in Curc.:*

Clipeatus elephantum ubi machaera diligit.

Titinius Proelia:

Pernam totam diligit.

Loewe too, Prodromus Glossariorum p. 383, quotes from a glossary the gloss, *Disligere soluere*. If *disligit* were the original reading it would have very easily been corrupted to *dissicit*, but it is difficult to see how an original *dissicit* could have passed into *diligit*. It has been suggested to me that the old English phrase "to unlace a capon" gives an exact parallel to this use of *disligere*.

A similar form is preserved by the Harleian Ms. alone, Nonius p. 100. Here the Harleian gives

Disrississimum, Varro, Bimarco:
Scena quem senem Latina uidit disrisissimum (sic).

In both cases *dis* is altered by the second hand to *di*; the Leyden reads respectively *dirississimum*, and *derississimum* altered to *dirississimum*, the other Mss. *dirissimum* or *durissi-*

mum, Buecheler *derississimum*. *Disrississimum* however seems to be clearly right.

The different readings of the Mss. here give an exact parallel to the supposed confusion between *dierectus, disrectus, directus* and *derectus*. A copyist of L might well have produced a form *dierississimum* from the *d*i*erississimum* of that Ms. In the passage from Varro Roeper wrote *hinc dierectam* for *in dierectum*, and *dierectam* would seem to be right, as

Apage hinc dierectam a domo nostra istam insanitatem

would be in accordance with the ordinary usage of Plautus. So too the explanation given by Nonius s. v. p. 49 *Dierecti, dicti cruce fixi, quasi ad diem erecti* points to the use of a participle in the example.

II. The word appears to be trisyllabic. This scansion suits a large majority of the passages, and the only cases where it presents any difficulty are the following:

(1) Bacch. 577 (IV. 1. 7) (U). *Recede hinc dierecte! Ut pulsat propudium!* Fleckeisen reads *Recedin* for *Recede*. It would however perhaps be better to write

Recede! In hinc dierecte? Ut pulsat propudium!,

as in every case, where the word is in the nominative or vocative, it is coupled with *i* or *abi, in* or *abin*.

(2) Merc. 183 (I. 2. 71) (R).

[*Quin ab*]*i hinc dierectus! nugare in re capitali mea.*

So Ritschl and Goetz, B however gives *In hoc*, C and D *I hinc*. It would be nearer the Mss. to write:

In hinc dierectus? Tun nugare in re capitali mea?

Tun would easily drop out between the *tus* of *dierectus* and the *nu* of *nugare*, while the interrogational form of sentence seems better suited to the passage.

(3) Men. 432 (II. 3. 87). *Ducit lembum dierectum nauis praedatoria.* Ritschl proposed to insert *eccum* between *lembum* and *dierectum*, and *eccum* here gives a very appropriate sense. Perhaps however it would be better to write *Ducit lembum*

dierectum eccum nauis praedatoria, as *eccum* would be more likely to drop out after the similar syllables *ectum* in that word.

(4) Rud. IV. 4. 126 (T). *Suculae. Quin tu i dierecta cum sucula et cum porculis?* Here the true reading is no doubt, *Et sucula est. Quin tu i dierecta,* &c.

441 (III. 1. 6).

Qui illum di omnes perduint, quei primus commentust [*male*]
Contionem habere, quae homines occupatos occupat.
Non ad eam rem otiosos homines decuit deligi,
Qui nisi adsint quom citentur, census capiant ilico.

In line 442 the Mss. have *qui* for *quae.* Editors generally alter to *quae*, but as there seems to be no reason why *quae* should have been corrupted to *qui,* it is perhaps better to retain *qui* and alter *occupat* to *occupet.* In the next line Ritschl and Brix read *Non ad eam rem hercle* with a mark of interrogation. The interrogation here is however very weak, and *hercle* in such a position is surely impossible. Perhaps the simplest correction would be to write

Non ad eam rem ni otiosos homines decuit deligi.

This gives the sense required, and *ni* would easily drop out after the *m* preceding.

450 (III. 1. 13).

Si id ita esset, non ego hodie perdidissem prandium,
Quoi tam credo datum uoluisse, quam me uideo uiuere.

Line 451 will neither scan nor construe as it stands. Brix reads, *Quod tam credo deos uoluisse,* an expression of pious resignation hardly in keeping with Peniculus' character. Should we read *quod tam credo eum uoluisse*? Peniculus being made with comic exaggeration to suppose, that the sole object the man who invented *contiones* had in view, was to make him lose his dinner.

credo eum might well be corrupted to *credatum,* then *cre* would be corrected to *credo* to complete the sense.

465 (III. 2. 11).

abstuli
Hanc quoius heres nunquam erit post hunc diem.
PEN. *Nequeo quae loquitur exaudire clanculum,*
Satur nunc loquitur de me et de parti mea.

Ritschl and Brix write line 468, *Satur nunc loquitur* &c., before 459 above, regarding it as out of place here. It seems however to suit this passage extremely well. Peniculus, hearing Menaechmus use the word *heres*, concludes at once that he is boasting of having cheated his parasite out of his share of the dinner, to which he was *aeque heres*. Cf. 482 (III. 2. 28).

496 (III. 2. 42).

Responde! surrupuistin' uxori tuae
Pallam istanc hodie atque dedisti Erotio?

Ritschl and Brix write *atque eam* to complete the metre. There seems however to be no necessity for *eam* in this place, and *atque huic* would restore the metre equally well. Cf. *hanc Erotium* 174 and 298, *huic Erotio* 592, 643 and 661, &c.

503 (III. 2. 49).

Tun me fuisse indutum pallam praedicas?
PEN. *Ego hercle uero.*

Should not *ego* be altered to *aio*? *Ago* is often found in Mss. for *aio*, and might easily pass into *ego*. For the form of sentence compare 163 (I. 2. 52) *id aio atque id nego*, and 622 (IV. 2. 67) *nego hercle uero.*

546 (IV. 1. 1).

Egone hic me patiar in matrimonio,
Ubi uir compilet clanculum quicquid domist.

Ritschl and Brix write *patiar esse* to complete the metre. *Esse* however seems weak, and there is no reason why it should have disappeared. Would not *tali in matrimonio* be more probable? *Tali* would easily drop out between *patiar* and *in*, and would be explained by *Ubi uir compilet*, &c., in the next line.

577 (IV. 2. 24).

Aut plus aut minus quam opus fuerat dicto dixeram controuersiam ut
Sponsio fieret quid ille qui praedem dedit.
Nec magis manufestum ego hominem unquam ullum teneri uidi,
Omnibus male factis testes tres aderant acerrumi.
Di illum omnes perdant: ita mihi hunc hodie corrupit diem:
Meque adeo, qui hodie forum unquam oculis inspexi meis.

Should not the whole of this passage be written in trochaic septenarii as follows?

Plús minusque quám opus fuerat dícto, dixei eam spónsio
Cóntrouorsiam út finiret. Quíd ille? Quid? praedém dedit.
Néc magis manufestum égo hominem unquam uídi ullum tenérier.
Ómnibus malefáctis testes trés aderant acérrumi.
Dí illunc omnes pérdant: ita mihi hunc hódie corrupít diem:
Méque adeo, qui hodié forum unquam óculis inspexí meis.

Spengel in the Reformvorschläge writes the first two lines:

Haud plus quam opus fuerat dicto dixi controuorsiam
Ut finiret sponsio, &c.

Ritschl:

Plus minus, quam opus fuerat dicto, dixeram ut eam sponsio
Controuorsiam finiret, &c.

Brix [3]

Haud plus, haud minus quam opus fuerat dixi, eam controuorsiam ut
Sponsio finiret. Quid ille ignauos? Quid? praedem dedit.

Spengel's version is wide of the Mss. and Brix's *Haud plus haud minus* hardly gives the sense required.

The *Plus minus* of Ritschl seems to be right in point of sense, but the usual form appears to be either *plus minusue* as Ter. Phorm. 554, Suet. Oct. 84, or *plus minusque* as in Plaut. Capt. 990 (v. 3. 18) (U), where we have:

Eheu, quom ego plus minusque feci quam me aequom fuit.

Dixi also seems more probable than *dixeram*, as all the other verbs in the passage are in the perfect tense, *deixei* and *tetuli* in the preceding, and *uidi* in the following line. Moreover *dixei eam* is nearer to the Mss. *dixeram* than *dixeram ut eam.*

Brix scans the third line as it stands as a trochaic octonarius, Spengel adopts the same metre but writes:

Nec magis manufestum ego hominem unquam quam illum ullum teneri uidi.

The substitution of *tenerier* for *teneri*, as suggested above, allows the line to be scanned as a trochaic septenarius, and the change is a very slight one, as in nearly all Mss. the older form is regularly altered to the more modern.

The next two lines are generally written as iambic octonarii, they seem however to give a better rhythm if scanned as trochaic septenarii.

592 (IV. 2. 39).

Quam hodie uxori abstuli atque huic detuli Erotio.

Brix and Spengel both bracket this verse. It seems however distinctly to improve the sense, and the wife may well be referring directly to it in line 731 (V. 1. 41),

Domo suppilas tuae uxori et tuae
Degeris amicae,

where Vahlen, rightly, as it would seem, writes *tuae uxori aufers* &c. The line will scan as a trochaic septenarius if written,

Quám hodie uxori ábstuli atque détuli huic Erótio,

and it may be noticed that the last two lines of the first canticum in this play are also trochaic septenarii preceded, as here, by iambic dimeters.

628 (IV. 2. 73).

MEN. *Quid dixisti?*

PEN. *Nescio,*

Eam ipsus roga. MEN. *Quid hoc est, uxor? quidnam hic narrauit tibi?*

Eam ipsus is the reading of B^2, B^1 has *Eam plus*, C *Eam psusei.*

Would it not be better to write?

Eámpse ipsus roga. Quíd hoc est uxor? Quídnam hic narrauít tibi?

The sense required is "ask herself", and the *ei* of C may well represent the lost *e* of *eampse*, and *i* of *ipsus*, inserted in the wrong place. Compare too Ter. Ad. 608,

Quapropter te ipsum purgare ipsi coram placabilius est.

632 (IV. 2. 78).

Ut dissimulat: non potes celare: rem nouit probe.

B has *potest* for *potes*. Should we retain *potest* and change *celare* to *celari*, translating, "*she cannot be kept in the dark*"? This suits *nouit* better, and *continere* is similarly written for *contineri* in line 251.

657 (IV. 2. 103).

Cum uiro cum uxore di uos perdant. Properabo ad forum.

Fleckeisen writes *Qua uirum qua uxorem;* Ussing

Cum uiro, uxor, di uos ambo perdant, &c.

Qui uirum cum uxore di uos, &c., is however nearer to the Mss., cf. 441 (III. 1. 6), &c.

711 (V. 1. 29).

Nam med aetatem uiduam esse mauelim.

Brix writes,

Nam med aetatem uiduam hic esse mauelim.

hic is however very weak, and it would seem better to write

Nam med aetatem uiduam uixe mauelim,

as *x* and *ss* are constantly interchanged in Mss., and *u* would easily disappear after the preceding *m*. *Vidua uiuito* occurs in line 718, and the alliteration seems to improve the passage. *Vixe* is not quoted from any extant author, but it is mentioned by Servius Comm. in Don. 444. 23 K *uixe, pro eo quod est uixisse.*

This use of the perfect infinitive is not uncommon in old Latin, e.g. *habuise uelet, fecise uelet*, &c. are found in the Senatus Consultum de Bacchanalibus, *tacuisse mauellem* Plaut. Curc. 512 (IV. 2. 26) (R), &c.

A similar change would correct both metre and grammar in Plaut. Poen. 570, 571 (III. 1. 67 and 68) (R),

AG. *Quin etiam deciderint femina uobis in talos uelim.*
AD. *At edepol tibi nos in lumbos linguam, atque oculos in solum.*

This is the reading of the Ritschl edition, the Mss. however give in the first line, *Quin etiam deciderint uobis femina in talos uelim*, which will not scan, and gives no construction for the second line.

Both scansion and construction are restored by writing,

Quin femina etiam decidisse uobis in talos uelim.

So too Merc. 934 (V. 2. 93),

EUT. *Stultus es noli istuc quaeso dicere.*
CHAR. *Certum exsequist,*

a simple way of restoring the metre would be to write

EUT. *Stultus es, noli istuc, quaeso, dixe.*
CHAR. *Certumst exsequi.*

735 (V. 1. 44).

Quem tu hominem arbitrare nescio.

Ritschl and Brix write,

Quem tu med hominem esse arbitrare nescio,

esse is however weak, and there seems no reason why *med* should have fallen out before *hominem.*

Quem tú hominum hominem me árbitrare néscio

gives a more vigorous sense, and *hominum* would naturally drop out before the *hominem* immediately following.

778 (V. 2. 36).

Men interrogas?
Nisi non uis. Quotiens monstraui tibi uiro ut morem geras.

Should not *nisi non uis* be given to the *matrona*? It makes no sense as it stands, while it comes in very well as an answer to *men interrogas.*

818 (v. 2. 76).

Viden tu illi oculos uirere? ut uiridis exoritur colos
Ex temporibus atque fronte, ut oculi scintillant, uide.

Virere and *uiridis* can hardly both be right. Ritschl suggested *lurere,* from *iurere* in C, and this word has been shewn by Mr Robinson Ellis to exist in Ovid. Some further correction seems however still to be required, as *Viden tu illic oculos lurere,* followed by *ut oculi scintillant uide,* is surely very awkward. Should we not write ?

Viden tu illi maculas lurere?

So Capt. 590 (III. 4. 63) (U) we read,

Viden tu illi maculari corpus totum maculis luridis?

where the reference is again to a man, who is supposed to be mad.

I would suggest a somewhat similar alteration Trin. 540 (II. 4. 139) (R),

Sues moriuntur angina acerrume.

All the Mss. seem to read *acerrume* here, except A, which has either *acerrume* or *acerrumi.*

Haupt suggested *angina acri acerruma,* but though *acri* might easily drop out before *acerruma,* there seems no reason for the change of *acerruma* to *acerrume.*

May not the true reading be *macerrumae*? M would easily drop out in a Capital Ms. between two A's, and the sense produced seems to be just what is required by the next line,

Oues scabrae sunt, tam glabrae, em, quam haec est manus.

The pigs, which ought to be fat, are worn to skin and bone with quinsy; while the sheep, which ought to be woolly, have lost all their fleeces from the mange.

827 (v. 2. 85).

Poste autem illic hircus alius qui saepe aetate in sua.

All the Mss. have *illi circo salus.* Should not the unaspirated form *ircus* be retained, which is mentioned by Varro L. L. 5. 19. 97, and Quint. 1. 5. 20, as used by the ancient writers? So Merc. 272 (II. 2. 1) R, all the Mss. including A have *ircum,* Merc. 275 (R), B has *id* $\widehat{qm}$, i.e. *irquom,* Poen. 873 (IV. 2. 51) (R) all the Mss. except A have *irquinae.* In this passage of the Menaechmi the form *ircos* seems to point to an original *irquos.*

835 (V. 2. 93).

SEN. *Priusquam turbarum quid faciat amplius.*
MEN. *Enim ereo.*

For *enim ereo,* Ritschl writes *hem iam reor,* which seems very weak, Ussing *enimuero eas,* Brix *enim haereo,* lengthening the *us* of *amplius. Enim uero haereo* may well be the true reading as in Merc. 739 (IV. 3. 38) (R). The line would then run,

Priusquam turbarum amplius quid faciat. Enim uero haereo.

842 (V. 2. 100).

Haud male illanc [*a me*] *amoui, nunc hunc inpurissumum.*

Bothe suggested *a me* to complete the sense, others write *hinc amoui;* A. Palmer suggests *hunc hircum,* which however seems hardly possible before the *barbatum tremulum Tithonum* in the next line. Should we read *inpuratissumum* for *inpurissumum*? *Inpuratissume* occurs Rud. III. 4. 46 (T) in the same place in a trochaic septenarius.

886 (V. 4. 10).

Atque eccum ipsum hominem obseruemus quam rem agat.

The hiatus may easily be removed by writing,

Atque eccum ipsum: obseruemus hominem quam rem agat.

Cf. 455 (III. 1. 17), *Obseruabo, quid agat, hominem.*

891 (V. 5. 5).

Quem ego [*hodie*] *hominem, si quidem uiuo, uita euoluam sua.*

To avoid the hiatus Camerarius wrote *deuoluam,* a word which does not seem to occur elsewhere in this sense, Bergk *ui uita*

euoluam sua, but any idea of violence seems to be out of place here. It is tempting to suggest

uita euitabo sua.

Euitare is used in this sense by Ennius, Attius and Apuleius, and seems to give the exact meaning required by the passage.

908 (v. 5. 22).

Potionis aliquid, priusquam percipit insania.

Percipit uesania seems perhaps the simplest way of restoring the metre, so 866 (v. 3. 2) Bothe suggests *ualidus ut uesaniam* for *ut ualidus insaniam.*

946 (v. 5. 60).

Quid ego nunc faciam? domum ire cupio: uxor non sinit:

Camerarius wrote *at uxor non sinit*, Mueller *domum ire quom cupio. Id uxor non sinit* is however rather nearer the Mss., and may be right.

984 (v. 7. 14).

MEN. *Ecquis suppetias mi audet ferre.*

MEN. *Ego, ere, audacissume.*

Editors generally write *Ego, ere, audeo audacissume. Ego, uero, ere, audacissume*, is however nearer the Mss., and the strengthening particle seems to improve the sense.

994 (v. 7. 22).

Eripe oculum isti, ab umero qui tenet, ere, te obsecro.

Most editors give, *Eripe oculum istic, ab umero qui tenet te, ere, obsecro.* It is however rather nearer the Mss. to write

Eripe oculum isti, te ab umero qui tenet, ere, te obsecro.

1023 (v. 7. 51).

Alii me negant eum esse qui sum atque excludunt foras:
Etiam hic seruom esse se meum aiebat, quem ego emisi manu.

The whole passage from 1020, *Cum uiatico*, down to 1025, *marsuppium*, occurs again after line 1011 above. There line 1024 appears as two lines, in the following form:

Vel ille qui se petere modo argentum modo qui seruom se meum
Esse aiebat quem ego modo emisi manu.

The following version of these two lines seems to come as near to the Mss. as any other:

Vel ille, qui se [uasa aiebat] petere et argentum modo,
Qui seruom se meum esse aiebat quem ego modo emisi manu.

In line 1024 *Etiam hic* seems clearly a gloss on *uel ille*; the copyist's eye passed from the first to the second *qui*, and the intervening words are omitted. *Modo* has also disappeared, having, as we see from the other version, found its way into the same place in the previous line, *modo argentum modo.* In the version after 1011, the second line beginning with *Qui seruom* scans and makes sense as it stands. In the first line the copyist has omitted *uasa aiebat*, no doubt from the similarity of these words to *esse aiebat* in the same place of the following line, and *modo* has been inserted before *argentum* from the *modo* before *emisi.* For *qui se uasa aiebat petere et argentum* compare 1038 (v. 8. 7), *Cum argentum dixi me petere et uasa*, and *uasa atque argentum* in line 1018 (v. 7. 47).

1070 (v. 9. 29).

Nam ego hominem homini similiorem nunquam uidi alterum,
Neque aqua aquae neque lacte est lacti, crede mihi, usquam similius.

Editors generally write the first line

Nam hominem homini similiorem nunquam uidi ego alterum,

in order to avoid the hiatus after *uidi.* Would it not be better to retain *ego* in its present place, and insert *usquam* between *uidi* and *alterum*? writing the line,

Nam ego hominem homini similiorem nunquam uidi usquam alterum.

The stronger negation seems to add to the sense, while *usquam* would easily disappear after the *nunquam* immediately preceding, and before *usquam* in the same place of the following line. Compare Most. 888 (III. 3. 2) (U):

Numquam edepol ego me scio
Vidisse usquam abiectas aedis, &c.

1123 (v. 9. 82).

Potaui atque accubui scortum: pallam et aurum hoc.

Camerarius suggested *mihi dedit* to complete the line, and editors have generally adopted this suggestion. *Abstuli* would however appear more probable, comparing line 465 (III. 2. 11):

Prandi, potaui, scortum accubui, [ei] abstuli
Hanc, quoius heres nunquam erit post hunc diem.

Amph. 648 (II. 2. 18) (R).

Virtus praemiumst optumum.

This is the reading of the Mss. The line occurs in a canticum consisting of bacchiac tetrameters, and Loewe and Goetz restore the metre by writing,

Virtus optumum praemiumst optumorum.

This reading however involves a change in the Mss. order of the words; we should moreover expect *bonorum* rather than *optumorum*. The order of words in the Mss. is preserved by writing,

Virtus praemiumst optumum praemiorum.

For the form of words compare the epitaph on Scipio Barbatus:

Honc oino ploirume cosentiont Romai
Duonoro optumo fuise uiro uiroro.

Curc. 72 (I. 1. 72) (R).

PHAED. *Me inferre Veneri uoui iam ientaculum.*
PAL. *Quid? antepones Veneri te ientaculo?*
PHAED. *Me te atque hosce omnis.*

This is one of the passages where the Harleian Ms. of Nonius alone has preserved the true reading. It gives for line 73 (Non. 126. 11),

Quid antepones Veneri ieientaculi?

which is clearly right, as it is exactly the sense required by the following line. So line 72 should no doubt be written,

Me inferre Veneri uoui ieientaculum.

(See my edition of the Harleian Ms. in the Anecdota Oxoniensia series 1882.)

Epid. 232 (II. 2. 48) (R).

Supparum aut subminiam, ricam, basilicum aut exoticum.

For *subminiam* B and J have *sub miniam*, A *subnimniam*, Nonius 540. 10, *subnimium*. In Nonius the Mss. present no variety. Is not *subnimium* right? It seems to be simply a play on the words *sub-parum* and *sub-nimium*, as we might say in English, "an under-petticoat or an under-greatcoat".

Poen. p. XXVI. (R).

Are not Messrs Goetz and Loewe mistaken in referring the Glossary forms *subitillus, sibitillus, siuitillus* and *simitillus* to the word *scriblita*? Should they not rather be referred to *subitillus* (*σουβίτυλλος*), a kind of cake mentioned by Athenaeus from the *Ἀρτοκοπικός* of Chrysippus of Tyana, side by side with the *σκριβλίτης*? *Ἐκ τυροῦ δὲ, φησὶ, γίνεται πλακούντηρα τάδε, ἔγχυτος, σκριβλίτης, σουβίτυλλος, γίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐξ ἅλικος σουβίτυλλος* (cf. Ath. 647 C).

Truc. 730 (IV. 2. 18) (R).

Stultus es, qui facta infecta facere uerbis postulas:
Thetis quoque etiam lamentando lassa hau fecit filium.

Lassa is Schoell's suggestion for the *lausum* of the Mss. Other suggestions are *plausum, lessum, pausam* and *rusum*. The sense required clearly is, "*Thetis did not restore her son to life by her laments*". Of the conjectures enumerated above *rusum* gives the most satisfactory sense, but is rather wide of the Mss.

lausum. Should we not read *saluum*? *Saluum* contains just the same letters as *lausum,* and gives the exact sense required. The line would then run:

Thetis quoque etiam lamentando saluom hau fecit filium.

Codex Amplonianus[1], p. 264, 431 (Loewe Glossae Nominum p. 127),

Ammus: ager secundus.

This gloss occurs in a series of glosses beginning with the letters *al.*

Loewe suggests,

Alluuius ager: ager fecundus.

Fecundus seems pretty certain, but *alluuius* is surely wide of the mark. Should it not rather run?

Almus ager: ager fecundus.

Cf. Verg. Georg. II. 430, *Parturit almus ager.*

Propertius I. 21 (Baehrens).

Tu, qui consortem properas euadere casum,
Miles, ab Etruscis saucius aggeribus,
Quid nostro gemitu turgentia lumina torques?
Pars ego sum uestrae proxima militiae.

In line 3 all the Mss. give *Quid,* which is retained by the two latest editors, Baehrens and Palmer. With this reading the only possible translation seems to be, "Why turnest thou thine eyes from our tale of woe?" But would *torques nostro gemitu* be used for *torques a nostro gemitu*? The Italians of the renaissance corrected *quid* to *qui,* but this does not seem to be of much benefit to the sense. Should we not rather read

Quin nostro gemitu turgentia lumina torques?

Quid is an extremely frequent corruption for *quin* in cursive Mss.; in the Harleian Ms. of Nonius indeed *quin* is written *quid* more often than not. *Nostro gemitu* would then be either

the contracted form of the dative, equivalent to *ad nostrum gemitum*, or, perhaps more probably, a causal ablative, meaning either "*Why turnest thou not thy tear-laden eyes to listen to our tale of woe?*" or "*at our tale of woe.*" The picture intended seems to be this: *A dead soldier seeing a wounded comrade hastening from the field of battle, first implores him as a comrade to stay and listen to his mournful tale, and then adjures him, as he hopes for his own safety, to carry to his sister the news of his death.*

J. H. ONIONS.

ADVERSARIA.

Aesch. Theb. 429

τίς ἄνδρα κομπάσαντα μὴτρ εσάς μενεῖ

So the Medicean according to Merkel's transcript. I believe that μὴτρ εσάς, in which it will be observed the accent is wrong, has arisen from a forgotten word ἀτρεστήσας. The adj. ἄτρεστος, and the adverb ἀτρέστως, occur three times in Aeschylus. Paley's σαφηνεῖν in Cho. 197 has hardly more authority.

Theb. 549

κλύων ἀνοσίων ἀνδρῶν. εἰ θε. οἱ
θεοὶ τούσδ' ὀλέσειαν ἐν γᾷ.

The peculiar form of the corruption εἰ θε. οἱ points to something unusual, perhaps to the digammation of οἱ 'for him'; the dative might also account for the circumflex in Med. I would read therefore εἴθε οἱ as in Trach. 650 ἃ δέ οἱ φίλα δάμαρ.

Suppl. 818, 19

κελεύω βίᾳ μεθέσθαι
ἴχαρ φρενί τ' ἄταν ἰὼ ἰὸν

Possibly ἰὼ ἰὸν is the remnant of ἀνιαρόν, ἀν- having been absorbed in consequence of the -αν of ἄταν.

Eum. 815—817

ἀλλ' οὐδὲν αὐτοῦ δεῖ· σὺ δ' εὐπιθὴς ἐμοὶ
γλώσσης ματαίας μὴ 'κβάλῃς ἐπὶ χθόνα
καρπὸν φέροντα πάντα μὴ πράσσειν καλῶς.

I would suggest *ἐπίφθονα*, which would give a construction for *γλώσσης* (surely it cannot depend on *καρπόν*) and a perfectly clear sense 'odious utterances of a wanton tongue, bearing as their fruit that all fares ill.'

Choeph. 543

οὔφις ἐπᾶσα σπαργανηπλείζετο.

So M. Wecklein does not mention in either of his volumes a conj. which I have long thought probable, that *ἐπᾶσα* is a truncated remnant of *ἐπεισφρείς*. Cf. Herc. Fur. 1266 *Ἔτ' ἐν γάλακτί τ' ὄντι γοργωπὸς ὄφεις Ἐπεισέφρησε σπαργάνοισι τοῖς ἐμοῖς*, apparently an imitation; and for *ἐπεισφρεὶς* Phaeth. fr. 781 Nauck, v. 46 *μή τιν' Ἥφαιστος χόλον Δόμοις ἐπεισφρεὶς μέλαθρα συμφλέξῃ πυρὶ*, where however it seems to be active. For the intransitive use see Dindorf's edition of Stephanus s. v. *εἰσφρέω*.

Petron. 37. One of the guests at Trimalchio's banquet describing Fortunata, the wife of the host, says 'She measures money by the bushel. And yet only just now what was she? Under pardon of your Genius, you would have refused to take a piece of bread from her hand.' '*Nunc, nec quid nec quare, in caelum abiit et Trimalchionis topanta est.*' Bücheler retains *topanta* as a barbarized Greek word of common life = 'factotum.' In reading Spartianus' life of Hadrian I encountered the word *toparca* c. 13. I suspect this to be the right word here. Aeschylus Choeph. 664 has *γυνὴ τόπαρχος* and the word occurs in Pliny. Fortunata was Trimalchio's vice-gerent and supreme in the management of his household.

Petron. 42. Seleucus, one of the company at Trimalchio's, says 'I don't bathe every day; *baliscus enim fullo est, aqua dentes habet.*'

Baliscus, which has never been explained satisfactorily, possibly represents the same word which occurs in Placidus as *falliscus*, an axe or knife. *Forca quam nunc falliscum appellamus nunc cultrum, alias securis, qua pontifices in sacris utuntur, dicta ab eo quod ferienda petat.* The sense would be

'water has sharp teeth, and the washing-man (who steeps the body in water like a fuller) cuts like a knife.'

Lucil. fr. incert. 99 Müller

Nequam aurum est auris quoduis uehementius ambit.

So Festus as well as Paulus. The Balliol Glossary which contains an abridged Paulus at the end has *quo uis;* and this is much the simplest and to my mind most probable correction. 'The gold is a very wanton, it clasps the ears more rudely than anything you can think of.' Lucilius is speaking of ear-rings, as Sinnius Capito explained: his other interpretation that *aurum* here = 'money' whose solicitations are overpowering, is very far-fetched.

Lucil. fr. Magis Suspect. II. Müller, 449 Lachm.

Varro L. L. v. 138 speaking of *pilum* and *pistrinum* adds *inde post in urbe Lucili pistrina et pistrix.* The word *pistrix* 'bakeress' was certainly used by Lucilius (inc. 96): I suspect therefore that it was in this sense that the plural *pistrices* is mentioned as Lucilian in the Balliol Glossary. *Pistris belua marina lincius pistrices dixit pluraliter.*

Lucil. XXX. 44 M.

Illo quid fiat Lamia et Pitto ixiodontes
Quod ueniunt?

So MSS rightly, I believe. Alciphron III. 28 *γραῦν ἐπὶ ἑνὶ γομφίῳ σαλεύουσαν, ἀληλιμμένην τῷ ἐκ τῆς πίττης ἐλαίῳ.* The two old hags used a kind of *tar-oil* for their teeth; hence they are called 'slimy-toothed,' and the name of one of the pair is Pitto, 'Old Pitch.'

Lucil. XXX. 11 M.

Virtutis haec tuae artis monumenta locantur.

I had corrected this *Virtuti haece tuae cartis m. l.* I now find Lachmann has *cartis,* with *Virtutisque tuae* (Junius). I see no reason for abandoning *Virtuti haece.*

The following fragments may I think belong to Lucilius, though I have no direct evidence to prove that they do.

Cic. Att. XII. 45. 2 *Nam ceteroqui ἀνεκτότερα erant Asturae: nunc* haec quae refricant hic me magis angunt.

Gloss. Phillips 4626. *Pes ferrum scul(p)toris unde dicitur* ut recto sculpat pede.

I have before mentioned in this Journal (vol. VIII. p. 71) that the glosses which are found in this Glossary, nearly but not quite agreeing with Paulus Diaconus, are sometimes fuller than Paulus and almost look as if they had been drawn from the original Festus. Compare Paulus *Angiportus est iter compendiarium in oppido, eo quod sit angustus portus, id est aditus in portum* with Gloss. Phill. *Andron* (MS *Andra*[1]) *et androna sunt idem .i. angiportus. dicitur autem angiportus quasi angustus portus .i. aditus.* Then *Angiportus edium atria. Angiportus est iter compendiosum in oppido et angustum ac secretum. Dicitur autem hic angiportus et hoc angiportum. Unde Terentius id angiportum quod est peruium.* Paulus also has an article *Andron locus domicilii angustior longitudine in quo uiri plurimi morabantur, ut gynaeceum a mulieribus:* but no word of this has made its way into the Phillipps article. Compare again Paulus *Solox lana crassa uel pecus lana contextum* (*non tectum*, Müller) *Titinnius lana soloci ad purpuram data et Lucilius Pascali pecore et montano hirco atque soloce* with Gloss. Phill. *Solox lana crassa. Solox pecus lana contectum Tintinnius lana soloci ad purpuram data. Lucilius pastali ac montano hirto atque soloce.* It will be seen that in several points Phill. approaches nearer to Festus (in this instance preserved) than Müller's MSS of Paulus. Festus has *Solox lana crassa, et pecus quod passim pascitur non tectum. Titinius in Barrato Ego ab lana soloci ad purpuram data, et Lucilius Pastali pecore ac montano hirto atque soloce.* Both Festus and Phill. have *pastali, hirto:* Paulus *pascali, hirco.* If then Phill. and Paulus agree *against* Festus, they are probably right: and if so *contectum* (for which *contextum* is a mere clerical error) is right, *non tectum* in the MS of Festus either wrong, or at least not read by Paulus. So again Paulus *Mantisa additamentum dicitur lingua Tusca, quod ponderi adicitur, sed deterius et quod sine ullo usu est. Lucilius Mantisa obsonia*

uincit. Gloss. Phill. *Mantissa superflua ciborum additamenta unde Lucius Mantissa obsonia uicit.* Paulus p. 231 *Plancae tabulae planae, ob quam causam et planci appellantur, qui supra modum pedibus plani sunt.* Gloss. Phill. *Plancus dicitur qui supra modum planos habet pedes. Plance enim sunt tabule late et plane.* The additional *latae* in Phill. may have come from Festus. Paulus p. 221 *Patagium est quod ad summam tunicam assui solet, quae et patagiata dicitur, et patagiarii qui eiusmodi faciunt.* Gloss. Phill. *Patagium est illud quod ad summam tunicam assuitur ex purpura et auro uariatum, unde et ipsa patagiata dicitur et patagiarius artifex.* It is difficult not to believe that the additional *ex purpura et auro uariatum* was in Festus. Paulus p. 220 *Palmulae appellantur remi a similitudine manus humanae.* Gioss. Phill. *Palmula est extrema pars remi a similitudine palme dicta de qua Virgilius Litus ama et leuas prestringat palmula cautes.* It seems very unlikely that Festus should have defined *palmulae* as *remi* simply; and if he did define, *extrema pars remi* is what he may have written: though the quotation from Aen. v. (which is incorrect, *praestringat* for *stringat sine*) may have been added from some other source. Festus p. 317 *Stalagmium genus inaurium uidetur significare. Caecilius in Carine, cum ait: Tum ex aure eius stalagmium domi habeo.* Paulus p. 316 *Stalagmium genus ornamenti aurium. Caecilius ex aure eius stalagmium domi habeo.* Gloss. Phill. *Stalagmium genus inaurium unde Cecilius ex aure eius stalagmium domi habeo.* At first sight this gloss appears to be identical with Paulus, and it certainly could not come direct from Festus, as both *in Carine* and *Tum* are omitted. Yet if the gloss was taken from Paulus, it is strange that *inaurium*, which Festus uses, should be substituted in it for Paulus' *genus ornamenti aurium:* and we are almost driven to the conclusion either that another recension of Paulus was known to the writer of the Glossary, or that Paulus himself drew from an abridged Festus. Festus p. 213 *Pectenatum tectum dicitur a similitudine pectinis in duas partes diuisum, ut testudinatum in quattuor.* Paulus p. 212 *Pectenatum tectum dicitur a similitudine pectinis in duas partes deuexum ut testudinatum in quattuor.* Gloss. Phill. *Pectenatum dicitur tectum*

instar pectinis in duas partes diuisum, ut testudinatum in quatuor. Here Festus and Paulus agree exactly, except that F. has *diuisum*, P. *deuexum.* Our Glossary has *diuisum.* The problem is just the same as in the case of *soloci* mentioned above. *If* the Glossator followed Paulus, it must have been a different recension from ours. Did he not take it from a *different* abridgment of Festus' work? Paulus *Diffarreatio genus erat sacrificii, quo inter uirum et mulierem fiebat dissolutio. dicta diffarreatio quia fiebat farreo libo adhibito.* Gloss. Phill. *Diffarreatio genus sacrificii quod inter uirum et mulierem fiebat de farre adibito olido eratque eorum abinuicem diuortium.* Here the Glossary is in close agreement with Paulus, yet with a variation of some importance. Paulus has *adhibito farreo libo,* the Glossary *de farre adibito olido.* This *may* no doubt be a mere misreading of some MS of Paulus: but it is equally possible that it preserves an original reading of which our Paulus is a corruption, viz. *de farre adhibito oliuo.* Paulus 271 *Rumitant rumigerantur. Naeuius: Simul alius aliunde rumitant inter sese.* Gloss. Phill. *Rumigerulus dicitur adrumator qui rumores apportat Inde rumigeror aris et rumito tas unde Neuius Simul alius alii rumitant inter se.* Here the difference is important; for no one can doubt that the verse is a Saturnian and ended with *inter se.* Whatever then is the true reading of the rest of the verse, the Glossary has here preserved a fact of consequence, and a fact which Paulus obscures. Paulus p. 271 *Rumen est pars colli qua esca deuoratur, unde rumare dicebatur, quod nunc ruminare.* Gloss. Phill. *Rumen pars gutturis est proxima gurgulioni, quo esca deuoratur, unde et rumare antiqui dicebant, quod nunc dicimus ruminare.* Is *proxima gurgulioni* a mere expansion due to the Glossator, or was it in the original abridged by Paulus? Paulus 276 *Remeligines et remorae a morando dictae. Plautus Quid nunc illae tam †diuinitus remorantur remeligines? et Lucilius Quaenam uox ex te resonans meo gradu remoram facit?* Gloss. Phill. *Remora dicitur a remorando sicut mora a morando, unde lucilius que nam uox ex te resonans meo gradui remoram facit? Remiligo similiter dicitur mora hec remiligo huius remiliginis.* Here the first part of Festus' article is preserved *Remeligens et remorae memorando*

dictae sunt in Plauto in Patina Nam quid illae nunc tam diuinitus remorantur remeligines? to which it is not difficult to see that the Glossary approaches more nearly than Paulus, for Müller is certainly right in considering *memorando* to be a mistake for *remorando*, not *morando*.

If then Paulus says *Lura os cullei uel etiam utris, unde lurcones capacis gulae homines et bonorum suorum consumptores*, Gloss. Phill. *Lurco gluto uorax a lurcone pisce dictus qui ceteros deuorat pisces Alii dicunt quia a lura quae dicitur os cullei uel* (MS *ut'*) *utris dicuntur lurcones capacis gule homines i. gulosi;* it seems a plausible conjecture that the second derivation of *lurco* from a fish of that name was also in Festus. I am inclined similarly to recognize Gloss. Phill. *Est autem indolis bonum iuuentutis incrementum et quasi quedam future probitatis imago* as a nearer approach to the original Festus than the truncated remnant which Paulus gives *Indoles incrementum industria.* So again Paulus has *Sororiare mammae dicuntur puellarum, quum primum tumescunt.* Gloss. Phill. adds to this *Sicut fraterculare puerorum unde Plautus Tunc papille primum sororiabant.* This is the nearest approach I know to the restoration of the words in the article, only partially preserved, of Festus *Sororiae* (l. *Sororiare*) *mammae dicuntur puellarum, ut fraterculare puerorum. Plautus in Fribolaria: ———— papillae pri———— uolui dicere ———— opus est uerb———.* I would read *Tunc papillae primulum Sororiabant: illud uolui dicere, Fraterculabant: quid opust uerbis pluribus?* Müller is, I think, quite wrong, except in the last words.

I have said enough to prove the value of the Phillipps Glossary as an independent fount: and shall now proceed to illustrate some passages by its help. And first Catullus. Under the word *Lodix* the Glossary quotes Martial XIV. 152 *Lodices mittit tibi docti dextra Catulli* reading *dextra* for *terra* of MSS. The change is a remarkable one, and I think may have occurred also in Cat. LXVIII. 155 sqq.

Sitis felices et tu simul et tua uita,
Et domus ipsa in qua lusimus et domina,

Et qui principio nobis terram dedit aufert
A quo sunt primo omnia nata bona.

If we read *dextram dedit hospes* we get a very good meaning, which I cannot illustrate better than by another extract from Gloss. Phill. *Hospes dicitur quasi ostii pes quia olim quando quis hospitandi gratia domum alicuius ingrediens suscipiebatur, ponebat domus ipsius dominus et qui suscipiebatur pedem super ostium et datis dextris iurabat susceptus quod pacificus esset eius ingressus. hospes dicitur tam qui suscipit tam qui suscipitur.* The *hospes* meant by Catullus would be the owner of the house in which Allius brought about the meeting of the poet with Lesbia, possibly the father of Allius himself, without whose consent or connivance Catullus could not have gratified his passion.

Cat. LXI. 102, 3

Lenta qui uelut adsitas
Vitis implicat arbores.

Gloss. Phill. *Adsita arbor dicitur cum aliud aliquid quod sustentet adiungitur quemadmodum uitis ulmo uel populo. unde oratius quo populus adsita surgit* (Epp. II. 2. 170) *quod uidelicet uitibus maritetur quas portat.*

LXI. 149—151

En tibi domus ut potens
Et beata uiri tui
Quae tibi sine seruiat.

I think I have found some support for this the generally received conjecture for *sine se ruit* of MSS in the Glosses on Apollinaris Sidonius which I am now printing in our *Anecdota Oxoniensia.* MS. Digb. 172 p. 145[a] col. 2 top *Pronuba est illa quae cum noua nupta domum uiri nupti petit ut eam custodiat et ei seruiat.*

LXI. 155, 6

Cana tempus anilitas
Omnia omnibus †amnuit.

The form *amnuere,* palpably old though preserved here only by D, is found in the Laud MS (saec. X.) of Sidonius IV. 2 *non*

amnuis 'you do not refuse' and in Gloss. Bodl. Auct. T. II. 24 *amnuit contra dicit.* Prof. Key thought it right in this passage of Catullus; but his interpretation is rather forced. Might it not mean simply, that the shaking head of the old woman seems to say 'Fie' or 'Don't' to all; a sort of general protest, which youth knows well how to understand?

Prop. IV. (V.) 9. 35, 6

Fontis egens erro, circaque sonantia lymphis,
Et caua suscepto flumine palma sat est.

Scaliger corrected *circaque* into *circoque,* quoting on Tib. I. 3. 77 *circanea auis* used of the circling kite, and the glosses *circitat, circat* κυκλεύει, *circito* περινοστῶ, *circitor lustrator* περιοδευτής. To these add Gloss. Phill. *circare est circumcirca aliquid quaerere,* which exactly expresses what Hercules is described by Propertius as doing. 'I beat about in search of the place where I hear water plashing.'

One more quotation. *Sterteo tis facit praeteritum sterti. unde persius Cor iubet hoc etenim postquam desterterat esse.* (Pers. VI. 10.)

In this excerpt *etenim* is an error for *Enni:* but *sterteo,* which at first sight looks wrong, points I think to a knowledge of the ordinary perfect *stertui,* from which *sterti* was an abnormal deviation. The full meaning might be thus exprest: *sterteo* perf. *stertui* is notwithstanding a verb of the 3rd conjugation, and is not only inflected in the pres. as such (*sterto, tis*), but in the perfect and pluperfect (*sterti, sterteram*). This reading of the Glossary is confirmed by one of Iahn's MSS which has *desterterit,* and I should be inclined to consider it old.

Before I leave the subject of Glossaries, in which I have long had a special interest, some results of which will I hope appear in Prof. Minton Warren's shortly forthcoming edition of one of the oldest Glossaries of St Gallen, I will quote two extracts from the Balliol Glossary which has been so often mentioned.

Recalent adhuc calent, quasi diceret, non longum est tempus quod fuerunt. The reference is to Aen. XII. 35 *recalent nostro Tiberina fluenta Sanguine adhuc campique ingentes ossibus albent.* Prof. Nettleship says on this passage "Wagner's explanation 'recalet flumen quod antea gelidum fuerat' seems better than Servius's 'iterum calent, magna quod bis uicti pugna." The explanation of the Balliol Glossary differs from each of these: 'the streams of Tiber have still *the after-glow* of our warm blood,' *re-* expressing more vaguely the same idea as *adhuc.* This sense suits equally well a passage of Ausonius 197. 13—16 *Tu meae semper socius iuuentae Pluribus quamuis cumulatus annis Nunc quoque in nostris recales medullis, Blande Leonti.* The memory of Leontius left an after-glow (not, kindled into a new glow) in the breast of his pupil.

Reboare resonare. Virgilius reboabantque silue cycadis. The passage is not in Virgil. But that it was early supposed to be by him is clear from Gloss. Phill. *Recens aliquando ponitur pro recenter, nomen pro aduerbio. Virgilius Sole recens orto numerus ruit omnis in urbem Pastorum, reboant saltus siluaeque cicadis.*

Aetna 394 Munro

Atque hanc materiam penitus discurrere, fontes
Infectae †eripiantur aquae radice sub ipsa.

For *eripiantur* I would read *crispantur.*

Cic. de Rep. I. 36. 56

Imitabor ergo Aratum, qui magnis de rebus dicere exordiens a Ioue incipiendum putat. L. *Quo Ioue? aut quid habet illius carminis simile haec oratio?* S. *Tantum, inquit, ut rite ab eo dicendi principium capiamus, quem unum omnium deorum et hominum regem esse omnes docti indoctique †expoliri consentiunt.*

Lactantius Inst. I. 11 with this passage in view says *Regnare in caelo Iouem uulgus existimat: id et doctis pariter et indoctis persuasum est.* It is wonderful that Halm, who quotes this, should not have seen that *expoliri* is not *pariter,* but *ex parili.*

Lact. de Mort. Persecutorum XXI. *Dignitatem non habentibus poena ignis fuit et exilii. primo aduersus Christianos permiserat, datis legibus ut post tormenta damnati lentis ignibus urerentur.*

In this corrupt passage (emended in a great variety of ways) the one thing which is clear is that *exile* is out of place. Lactantius has been speaking of the cruel punishments, tearing by enormous bears, &c., which Maximianus inflicted on men of rank and position. Then he comes to men of no official position. These were punished by fire and—what? He states himself; *post tormenta ignibus urerentur.* It is obvious that before burning they were tortured. Read therefore *eculei. Id primo,* &c. Cuper in his notes on the *eculeus,* c. XXIII., which seems to have been a sort of high frame on which the body was extended, whilst the flesh was ript open with *ungulae* or other instruments, quotes a passage from the Martyrology of Ado of Vienne (a work seemingly compiled after the 9th century) in which the words are interchanged *Dein catenatus et in †exilium directus est, in quo rursum diutius fustibus caesus.*

Sidon. III. 13 *Cum discubuerit, fertur actutum, si tarde comedat, in rapinas, si cito saturetur, in lacrimas.*

Read *in latrinas,* as not only the assonance, but the sense proves: and cf. Roby on Justinian p. 119. The latrinae or privies were generally near the kitchen, and the kitchen would be not far from the dining-room.

Sid. I. 9 *Videre mihi uideor ut rideas, quia perspicis nostram cum milite comico †ferocissime iactantiam.*

MS. Laud. 104 has *ferocisse,* which is obviously right. Sidonius' boasting had assumed the braggart airs of the Miles Gloriosus, Pyrgopolinices.

Scholia Bernensia Lucani II. 199 Usener

SEPE FAMES PELAGIQ. F. †tytrobora morte.

Possibly *cycloborae morte* 'a death by hurricane.' This sense would easily grow out of the other, familiar to most students, from Aristophanes, of a rushing mountain-torrent.

Schol. Bern. IV. 814 *Fuit enim et orator optimus et uir fortis et inter arma litteris †militauit.*

Usener suggests *uacauit.* Would not *uelitauit* 'skirmished as a litterateur' be nearer the original word? Priscian attests the existence of *uelito* as well as the commoner *uelitor* Vol. I. p. 396 Hertz.

Luc. V. 277

Quid satis est, si Roma parum est? iam respice canos
Inualidasque manus et inanes cerne lacertos.

It is strange that Corte who saw that *cerne* was a mistake for *carne* (on Plin. Epp. XI. 9) should afterwards have retracted his obvious and certain conjecture. *Cerne* is indeed intolerably feeble, in a passage where every word is strong as the iron veterans who utter it. The mistake (it is true) is old, for the Vienna palimpsest has CE . . E, if Detlefsen may be trusted: but I cannot think any one familiar with Lucan's style can doubt that it is one. That very palimpsest has CONVÊLLE in IV. 196: and the abl. with *inanis* is proved by Dräger (Hist. Synt. I. 582) from Cic. Att. II. 8. 1 *Nulla enim abs te per hos dies epistola inanis aliqua re utili et suaui uenerat.* A MS in my possession (perhaps of saec. XIII.) has *inanescere.*

Ammian. Marcellin. XXIX. 1. 31 Gardthausen

Caerimoniali supersistit cortinulae sacerdos pensilem anulum librans, sartum ex Carpathio filo perquam leui, mysticis disciplinis initiatum; qui per interualla distincta †retinentibus singulis litteris incidens saltuatim, heroos efficit uersus interrogationibus consonos.

In this spiritualistic description, a ring suspended by a thread knocks against a metallic plate set on the top of a tripod, and spells out hexameters by striking successively the letters of the alphabet incised upon the rim of the plate. It seems probable therefore that for *retinentibus* we should read *recinentibus;* each letter rings as the *anulus* strikes against it.

Lucr. II. 553

Disiectare solet magnum mare transtra †cauerna
Antemnas proram malos tonsasque natantis.

Munro accepts here Lambinus' conj. *guberna*, a word found in Lucilius in the sense of *gubernacula*.

From Servius on Aen. II. 19 *Alii fustes curuos nauium, quibus extrinsecus tabulae adfiguntur, cauernas appellarunt; unde, quia naues texi dicuntur et cauernae nauium sunt, permansit in metaphora, ut et 'intexunt' diceret et 'cauernas,'* it would appear that *cauernae* was a name for rounded ship-timbers, to which exterior planks were attached. The description is somewhat vague, but distinct enough to make it probable that the word might have been used by Lucretius in the sense of spars. I would therefore read *cauernas* with the corrector of Lachmann's quadratus. I cannot feel the force of Lachm.'s remark 'quasi quis aut foramina natare dicat aut curuaturas costarum'; for (1) no one would be likely to explain *cauernas* as 'holes' either in the passage of Lucretius or that of Servius; (2) *if* the *fustes curui nauium* &c. are the curved ribs of the ship, they might conceivably float; (3) Servius' words are too indeterminate to make this explanation certain; (4) it is to my mind very improbable that *guberna* should have been corrupted into *cauerna*.

Lucr. II. 40—43

Si non forte tuas legiones per loca campi
Feruere cum uideas belli simulacra cientis
Subsidiis magnis et ecum ui constabilitas
Ornatas armis †itastuas† pariterque animatas;
His tibi tum rebus timefactae religiones
Effugiunt animo pauide.

itastuas (as everyone will probably now admit) is *statuas*, though at the beginning of cent. XVI. it was perhaps only in Italy that the conj. could have been made. But is it not more probably the substantive than the verb? Often as I have read over this line in Munro's edition, I have never failed to stop at his reading of this verse *Ornatasque armis statuas* 'and you

marshall them equipped in arms' (Transl. to ed. 1). For (1) it inserts a *que* not in MSS, (2) the prosthetic *i* is far commoner with nouns than verbs, to judge by Schuchhardt's examples (Vulgär Latein II. pp. 337 sqq.), (3) *istatuam* in Orelli 1120 is a substantive, (4) *Estatua* is Provençal for *statua*, see Honnorat, Dictionnaire Provençal-Français, (5) the construction proceeds more evenly, if *statuas* is appositive, whereas a new verb interrupts the tenor of the sentence, (6) the comparison of the armed warriors to statues is natural, and found elsewhere, e.g. Shakespere, Henry IV. Part I. Act 4, Sc. 1, 'glittering in golden coats, like images.'

Mart. Spect. 15. 8.

After seven verses describing the feats performed by Carpophorus in the Amphitheatre, the spearing of an enormous bear, the slaughter of a lion and a pard, the epigrammatist sums up with a line which as given by Friedländer in the specimen of his forthcoming edition is written in T (the codex Thuanaeus of the IXth century)

Praemia cum laudem ferre, adhuc poterat.

This is, if I mistake not,

Praemia cum laudum ferret, adhuc poterat

'when he retired with the prize of his achievements, he might have gone on still'. This agrees with Schneidewin's reading, except that he reads *tandem* for *laudem*. But *tandem*, though sufficiently like *laudem*, will not account for *laudis* the reading of the other MSS, whereas a variation of plural and singular like *laudum laudis* is a not uncommon phenomenon in MSS.

Mart. Spect. 22 and 23

Sollicitant pauidi dum rhinocerota magistri
Seque diu magnae colligit ira ferae,
Desperabantur promissi proelia Martis;
Sed tandem rediit cognitus ante furor.
Namque grauem cornu gemino sic extulit ursum,
Iactat ut impositas taurus in astra pilas.
Norica tam certo uenabula dirigit ictu (23. 1)
Fortis adhuc teneri dextera Carpophori.

Ille tulit geminos facili ceruice iuuencos,
Illi cessit atrox bubalus atque bison.
Hunc leo cum fugeret, praeceps in tela cucurrit.
I nunc et lentas corripe, turba, moras.

The last six verses are usually printed as an independent epigram, and they seem to be written so in T, which however has no distinct lemma prefixed to them. Both Schneidewin and Friedländer consider them to be two epigrams and are obliged accordingly to alter *tam* in 7 to *iam* (Schn.) or *quam* (Gilbert ap. Friedl.). But even then *tulit* in 9 has no meaning; for how could Carpophorus be said to carry two bulls on his neck without feeling their weight? And this is *necessarily* the meaning, and Friedländer's view 'he carried off as booty' is impossible. I think it certain that the supposed two epigrams are really one. A rhinoceros brought upon the arena for some time refused to fight; but at last moved to rage tossed a gigantic bear on his tusks with the ease of a bull tossing balls. His precision of stroke was as great as Carpophorus' in spearing animals on the arena. His (the rhinoceros') neck carried with no effort two bullocks; *bubali* and bisons gave way before him: he frightened a lion so much as to make him rush blindly on the pikemen's spears. *After this* (*I nunc*) it is unreasonable for the crowd of spectators to complain that they have been kept waiting. If the rhinoceros was slow to shew fight, the feats he enacted when once roused were extraordinary.

Since I wrote the suggestion on Petron. 42 given above, I came across the following verses of the comic poet Antiphanes (fr. 245 Kock) which form a remarkable parallel.

Ἐς μακαρίαν τὸ λουτρόν, ὡς διέθηκέ με.
ἐφθὸν κομιδῇ πεποίηκεν, ἀποκναίσειεν ἄν
κἂν ὁστισοῦν μου λαβόμενος τοῦ δέρματος,
οὕτω στερεόν τι πρᾶγμα θερμόν ἐσθ' ὕδωρ.

R. ELLIS.

NEW SUGGESTIONS ON THE IBIS.

SINCE the publication of my edition of the *Ibis* in 1881 (I may perhaps be permitted here to acknowledge with gratitude the favourable reception which the work has received not only from my own countrymen and America, but from eminent scholars of France Germany and Italy—notably from that illustrious patriarch of Latin and Greek philology, Dr Rudolf Merkel, and Dr Zingerle, second to Merkel alone in his profound knowledge of Ovid; and, last but not least, to Dr Karl Schenkl, whose able review in the Zeitschrift für Oesterreich. Gymn. 1883, pp. 259—271, will receive, I trust, in a new edition the consideration which its learning and judgment challenge) my attention has only been directed incidentally and at intervals to those obscure points on which repeated meditation had not been able to throw more than an uncertain light. But, as happens in other matters, chance sometimes discovers what research has failed to penetrate. It is with the conviction that some of the suggestions now offered are nearer to a true solution than those presented in my edition that I once more call attention to some passages of the *Ibis*.

And first, I believe that I have discovered a more direct imitation of the poem than any of those which I have collected in c. VII. of my Prolegomena, in a verse of the Commonitorium of Orientius, a Christian poet whose date is uncertain, but may be placed approximately in the first half of the fifth century A.D. In the second of the two books of Elegiacs in which

Orientius has couched his exhortation to a Christian life occurs this hexameter (315)

Ille miser uere nec erit miserabilis ulli,

which is a very close adaptation of the following verse of the *Ibis* (117)

Sisque miser semper nec sis miserabilis ulli,

for most critics will, I hope, agree with me in rejecting a verse of Avitus (de Sententia Dei, III. 95)

Iamque miser factus, nondum miserabilis ille est

as the source from which Orientius borrowed. The opposition of *miser, miserabilis* seems indeed to be of tolerably frequent recurrence in Christian writers; Sidonius (I. 7) has *miser, nec miserabilis erat,* and Savaron has there quoted other parallels from Jerome Lactantius and Cassianus.

Orientius has another expression which is found in the *Ibis,* C. II. 203, 4

Cereus ut caecae positus sub tempore noctis
Conpensare diem luminis officio.

Cf. *Ib.* 624

Prodidit officio luminis ipsa parens,

a passage to which I shall return later, only remarking here that the verse of Orientius[1] is strongly in favour of my view that *luminis* in the passage of the *Ibis* means 'light' not 'eye'.

317, 318

Aut ut oliuifera quondam Sicyone profecto,
Sit frigus mortis causa famesque tuae.

Reading Petronius I came across the following words, c. 88 *Verum ut ad plastas conuertar, Lysippum statuae unius liniamentis inhaerentem inopia extinxit.* Pausanias speaks of Λύσιππος Σικυώνιος (II. 9. 8), Pliny of *Lysippus Sicyonius*

[1] Orientius imitates Catullus, I think, I. 120 *Ignoras uentos aedibus oppositis,* cf. Cat. XXVI. 1, 2, 5 *Furi, uillula nostra non ad Austri Flatus opposita est neque ad Fauoni...O uentum horribilem atque pestilentem!*

(XXXIV. 61). To the Romans of the Empire Lysippus would probably be *the* man of Sicyon. Pliny (XXXIV. 37) says of him *cum Lysippus MD opera fecisse prodatur, tantae omnia artis ut claritatem possent dare uel singula.* The story there told by Pliny that Lysippus' heir found in his treasure-chamber 1500 gold denarii only proves that the most diverse accounts existed of the death of the famous statuary.

525, 6

Vtque lyrae uates fertur periisse seuerae,
Causa sit exitii dextera laesa tui.

I now incline to explain this distich by supposing two persons of the same name to be confused. The name is *Philokles.* Xenophon says (Hellen. II. 1. 31) Lysander, after the battle of Aegos-potami, put to death Philokles, one of the Athenian generals, for the cruelty with which he and the other Athenians had treated the prisoners taken in the war, partly in throwing from precipices the complete crews of two triremes, partly from the resolution which the Athenian assembly had adopted of cutting off the right hands of all prisoners whom they took alive. Plutarch (Lysand. 9) states this with a variation of some importance. The Athenians had resolved on the suggestion of Philokles to cut off *the right thumbs* of such as they took in war, *ὅπως δόρυ μὲν φέρειν μὴ δύνωνται, κώπην δὲ ἐλαύνωσι,* words which are repeated (with *βαστάζειν* for *φέρειν* and *ἐλαύνειν δύνωνται* for *ἐλαύνωσι*) by Aelian (V. H. II. 9), who, like Cicero (de Off. III. 11), states the decree to have been passed against the Aeginetans. This mutilation of the right hand (*dextera laesa*) urged upon the Athenians by Philokles as a means of disabling their enemies, and used by Lysander as an argument for putting Philokles to death, might with strict propriety be called *causa exitii* to the latter.

There is another Philokles who might well represent the *uates lyrae seuerae,* a tragic poet, the rival and contemporary of Sophocles, whom he is stated in one of the Argumenta to the Oedipus Tyrannus to have defeated when Sophocles produced

that play[1]. Aristophanes alludes to the harshness of his style Vesp. 462

> Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί' οὐ ῥαδίως οὕτως ἂν αὐτοὺς διέφυγες
> εἴπερ ἔτυχον τῶν μελῶν τῶν Φιλοκλέους βεβρωκότες,

where the Scholiast explains ὡς τοῦ Φιλοκλέους ἀγρίου ὄντος ἐν τῇ μελοποιίᾳ. Ὁ Σοφοκλῆς γὰρ ἡδὺς, διὸ καὶ μέλιττα ἐκαλεῖτο. ἔπαιξεν οὖν, ὡς εἰ εἶπεν· εἴπερ τὴν πικρίαν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν σκληρότητα εἶχον, οὐκ ἂν ῥαδίως αὐτοὺς διέφυγες, ὡς τοῦ Φιλοκλέους ὄντος σκληροῦ σφόδρα καὶ δριμυτάτου. His tetralogy, the *Pandionis*, is alluded to in Av. 281 ἀλλ' οὗτος μέν ἐστι Φιλοκλέους ἐξ ἔποπος, where the Scholiast gives the following account of him: Ἔστι δὲ ὁ Φιλοκλῆς τραγῳδίας ποιητὴς, καὶ Φιλοπείθους υἱὸς ἐξ Αἰσχύλου ἀδελφῆς. ὅσοι δὲ Ἁλμίωνος αὐτόν φασιν, ἐπιθετικῶς λέγουσι διὰ τὸ πικρὸν εἶναι. Ἅλμη γὰρ ἡ πικρία. γεγόνασι δὲ Φιλοκλεῖς δύο τραγωδιῶν ποιηταί· εἷς μὲν ὁ Φιλοκλέους ἀπόγονος· ἐκείνου μὲν γὰρ υἱὸς Μόρσιμος· τούτου δὲ Ἀστυδάμας, ἐκ τούτου δὲ Φιλοκλῆς καὶ ἕτερος ὁ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν περιπεπτωκὼς τῷ νεωτέρῳ Φιλοκλεῖ. Suidas gives substantially the same account, with some additions, e.g. that he wrote one hundred tragedies, among them an Erigone, Nauplius, Oedipus, Oeneus, Priamus, Penelope, Philoktetes, and some variations, as that his father's name was Polypeithes, and that he was called Bile (χολή) in consequence of his bitter style (διὰ τὸ πικρόν). In both accounts Philokles has a son Morsimus, Morsimus a son Astydamas, Astydamas a son Philokles. But the concluding sentence not only of the scholion but of Suidas is obscure. Clinton F. H. II. p. xxxiv. interprets the last words of the scholion to mean that Astydamas had two sons, Philokles and a second Astydamas. To me it seems more probable that they contain some mistake and that what Suidas tells us τούτου δ' (Ἀστυδάμαντος) ἕτερος Φιλοκλῆς τραγικός (στρατηγός other MSS) is the original form of which the scholion is a confused corruption[2]. Be this as it

[1] This story is given on the authority of Dikaearchus.

[2] I say nothing here of the second article in Suidas on Philokles, which appears to me inextricably confused, as (1) it makes Philokles a *comic* poet and yet (2) identifies him with the person surnamed Halmion διὰ τὸ πικρὸν εἶναι.

may, the variant in Suidas' MSS as to τραγικός or στρατηγός is important for my purpose. For if one of the two kindred tragic poets called Philokles was in some accounts described as a general, the author of the distich in the *Ibis* would have some justification for ascribing to his poet Philokles what really happened to a general of the same name. And that the elder Philokles *is* the 'poet of the austere lyre' seems to me likely not only from the connexion of Philokles with Aeschylus, the austere poet *par excellence*, but from the allusions to that connexion in contemporary writers, such as Telekleides' Αἰσχύλου φρόνημ' ἔχων (Schol. Thesmoph. 168).

623, 4

Vtque Melantea tenebris a caede latentem
Prodidit officio luminis ipsa parens.

Though I think the explanation given in my edition is probably the right one, I have come across a story in Plutarch which (if some accessories are supplied) might seem to suit it as well. It is a story from the Persian court of Artaxerxes II. Stateira, the wife of Artaxerxes, was poisoned by one Belitaris or (otherwise) *Melantas*. Gigis, a female servant of Parysatis, was, from her knowledge of pharmacy, suspected of the crime. Artaxerxes, at first unable to arrest Gigis, as Parysatis kept her in her own house and would not give her up, caused her, when at last she begged Parysatis to be sent home, to fall into an ambuscade during the night. Gigis was thus arrested and put to a cruel death. So far Plutarch. If we complete his story by supposing that while escaping under cover of darkness, Gigis was betrayed by her mother's lighting a torch and exposing her features, every part of the distich will be explained. 'As Gigis, hiding in dark night from Melantas' deed of murder (i.e. not to be arrested as guilty of a murder committed by Melantas) was betrayed by her own mother kindling a light and so revealing her features.'

For this use of *a* cf. Aetna 375 Munro *clauditque uias luctamine ab imo* 'against the turmoil below' (M.) and more closely Fronto Laudes Fumi et Pulueris p. 214 Naber *Ioui Iunonique cubantibus nubem ab arbitris* 'from the sight of witnesses' *obstitisse.*

465, 6

Victima uel Phoebo sacras macteris ad aras,
Quam tulit a saeuo Theudotus hoste necem.

None of the explanations of this distich given in my edition include any mention of *Apollo*, a fact which, though by no means conclusive, must at least be counted against them. The following theory opens up a series of questions which my present limits will not allow me to follow out, but which it will be necessary for any future editor of the *Ibis* to consider, especially in regard to the point (lately much insisted on by Merkel) of interpolations. I must premise however by saying that both Theodotus and Theodorus, with which the name is often interchanged, *are among the very commonest of Greek names;* and that *no* theory of a story in which a name so familiar throughout the Roman world is the centre of a history so vaguely expressed, can be looked upon as certain, or indeed as more than plausible[1].

Among the accounts of Martyrdoms which have come down to us from the first four centuries of Christianity none holds a more important place than the Μαρτύριον τοῦ ἁγίου Θεοδότου Ἀγκύρας καὶ τῶν σὺν αὐτῷ ἑπτὰ παρθένων. The first notice of it is in Leo Allatius' (librarian of the Vatican 1661—1669) *de Symeonum scriptis Diatriba* p. 86. Allatius showed the MS containing it (Vat. 655) to Daniel Papebroch, a Dutch Jesuit, who edited it complete in the Bollandist Acta Sanctorum under May 18, with a Latin version opposite, in 1685. A complete translation of it in English will be found in Mr Mason's Persecution of Diocletian pp. 355—373. The brief histories which the Greek Menologia give (1) of the seven martyred virgins and the recovery of their bodies by Theodotus (May 18), (2) of the martyrdom of Theodotus himself (June 7), are seemingly abstracts of this unusually detailed 'Act of the Saints'. The author was one Nilus (Νεῖλος), who states that he had been from the first an associate of Theodotus and that what he tells

[1] See the story in Amm. Marc. XXIX. 1. 29, a curious anticipation of modern spiritualism. The fifth volume of Tillemont's Mémoires pour servir gives in the Index the names of *four* Theodoti all martyrs.

us he had himself seen. *Ἡμεῖς δὲ λέγωμεν ὡς ἐξ ἀρχῆς συνόντες τῷ Μάρτυρι ἅπερ καὶ ἔγνωμεν καὶ ὄψεσιν αὐταῖς (ἐ)θεασάμεθα τὴν καρτερίαν τοῦ ἀνδρός.* (Act. Sanct. T. xv. p. 149 c.) And again at the end of his narrative (p. 155 c) he says he had given his account *μετὰ πάσης ἀκριβείας...ὃς καὶ ἐν τῇ φυλακῇ συνὼν αὐτῷ* (during Theodotus' imprisonment) *καὶ ἕκαστα γνοὺς ἃ εἰς γνῶσιν ἤγαγον, πανταχοῦ τῆς ἀληθείας φροντίσας, ὅπως καὶ ὑμεῖς μετὰ πάσης πίστεως καὶ πληροφορίας ἀκούοντες σχοίητε μέρος μετὰ τοῦ ἁγίου καὶ ἐνδόξου Μάρτυρος Θεοδότου.*

The period at which Theodotus was martyred is not stated in the Act, but the 'edicts wherein it was bidden that all the Churches wheresoever situated, together with their Altars, should be levelled to the ground, the Priests dragged to the Altars of the idols, and there be first forced to sacrifice, and then compelled to forswear their religion' (Mason's Translation, p. 356) seem to suit the third edict of Diocletian, which, apparently in the shape of an excepting clause to his Act of amnesty passed at the end of 303 or beginning of 304, enacted that imprisoned clerics who wished to be set free, might do so by sacrificing; but that if they resisted, torture might be applied to force them (Euseb. viii. 6. 20). It makes indeed little difference whether it was under this or Maximianus' fourth Edict *ut, ubicumque Christiani inuenti fuerint, superstitionem colentes, aut sacrificare cogantur dis aut certis poenis intereant* (Passio Sabini ap. Baluze Miscell. Vol. ii. pp. 47 sqq.) that Theodotus was arrested. That this was the persecution which martyred him is the conclusion not only of Papebroch, but of Tillemont (Mémoires pour servir Tom. v.), men to whom the entire literature of the subject was familiar.

Theodotus was by profession a *κάπηλος* or retail tradesman at Ancyra in Galatia. During the earlier period of the persecution he used his shop or *καπηλεῖον* (he was a seller of wine) as a harbour of refuge for distressed Christians, whom he would encourage to face torture and even death rather than betray their religion. Among these was one Victor, who had been arrested on a charge brought by the priests of Artemis; he had accused Apollo of committing incest with his sister before

the altar at Delos. Victor was threatened with torture, and promised wealth and honours if he recanted. Theodotus induced him to submit to torture: he bore it with firmness, but at last, worn out, demanded a respite and shortly after died in prison. Theodotus' next exploit was to rescue the ashes of a martyr named Valens from the waters of the river Halys. Similar, but more daring, was his recovery of the bodies of seven nuns, who, after successfully resisting the lewd embraces of some youths commissioned to the task by the governor of Ancyra, a savage named Theoteknus, had been sunk with stones round their necks in the waters of an adjoining lake. The eldest of these was named Tekusa; the others were Alexandra, Phaena, Claudia, Euphrasia, Matrona, Iulitta. A youth Polychronius, nephew of the martyred Tekusa, now came forward to betray Theodotus. He was accused before Theoteknus of rescuing the bodies of the virgins and of inciting the Christians to refuse to worship the images of the Gods. Urged to flee, he presented himself of his own accord at the tribunal. Theoteknus offered him not only a complete amnesty but the friendship of the Emperors[1] and *the Priesthood of Apollo* if he wisely consented to sacrifice. Then Theodotus burst into a passionate denunciation of the pagan Gods with all their abominations, Zeus, slayer of his father, paramour of his mother Rhea, husband of his sister: Ares and Hephaistos, each enamoured of his sister; Apollo's incest with Artemis at Delos: at the same time contrasting the miracles of Jesus, and the mystery of his life and death. Theoteknus, exasperated, ordered him to be lifted to the torturing-block (*ξύλον*), and leapt from his seat to take part himself in his execution. The description of the horrid torture which followed I give in the words of the original; Mr Mason's translation is on p. 368.

Οὐδὲν οὖν τῶν τιμωρητικῶν ὀργάνων λοιπὸν ἡσύχαζεν, οὐ πῦρ, οὐ σίδηρος, οὐκ ὄνυχες· ἀλλὰ ἄλλος ἀλλαχόθεν περιστάντες καὶ τὴν ἐσθῆτα περιῤῥήξαντες τῷ ξύλῳ ἀνήρτησαν

[1] This seems a tolerably distinct note of time. The expression could not have been used of the Decian persecution, nor at any other period with the same propriety as at the time when Diocletian and Maximianus were combining to extirpate Christianity.

καὶ ἀποδιαστάντες τὰς πλευρὰς αὐτοῦ τοῖς ὄνυξιν διεσπάραττον, ἕκαστος ὅσον εἶχε δυνάμεως, οὐκ ἐνεγκόντες τὸν κάματον.... Ἀτονησάντων οὖν ἐκείνων ἕτεροι προσελθόντες διεδέχοντο τοὺς προτέρους· ὁ δὲ καλλίνικος ἀγωνιστὴς τοῖς μὲν δημίοις ὥσπερ ἀλλότριον τὸ σῶμα πρὸς σπαραγμὸν παρεδίδου, καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν ἄτρεπτον εἶχε πρὸς τὸν ἁπάντων δεσπότην. Ἐκέλευσε δὲ Θεότεκνος ὄξους δριμυτάτου ῥαίνεσθαι τὰς πλευρὰς αὐτοῦ καὶ λαμπάδας πυρὸς αὐτῷ προσφέρεσθαι. δριμυχθεὶς δὲ ὁ ὅσιος ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄξους, ἅμα δὲ καὶ τῶν πλευρῶν αὐτοῦ καιομένων, κνίσα τις ἐγένετο· ὅθεν αἰσθόμενος τῆς κνίσης τῶν σαρκῶν αὐτοῦ ὀπτωμένων δυσχεράνας διέστρεφε τοὺς μυκτῆρας αὐτοῦ.

Then follows a short dialogue in which Theoteknus again asks him to recant, Theodotus as sternly refuses. Then Theoteknus *ἐκέλευσε τοῖς δορυφόροις λίθοις αὐτοῦ τὰς σιαγόνας τύπτειν καὶ τοὺς ὀδόντας ἐκφέρειν.* (Act. Sanct. xv. p. 161.)

This first torture over, in which Theodotus had been hoisted on the *ξύλον*, then torn open with hooks, then, after strong vinegar had been poured over his sides, set on fire with blazing torches, then brayed in the cheeks and his teeth knocked out with stones, he was carried still living through a crowd of excited spectators to prison. After an interval of five days he was again brought before Theoteknus, and again solicited to acknowledge the Gods by sacrificing, *ἐπίγνωθι τὴν δεσποτείαν τῶν παντοδυνάμων θεῶν, ὅπως καὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων δωρεῶν ἀπολαύσῃς ἃς πρῶτον μὲν ὑπεσχόμην, νῦν δὲ ἑτοίμως ἔχω παρασχεῖν θύσαντί σοι τοῖς θεοῖς.* He again refused, and was a second time lifted to the frame, probed with *ungulae*, removed, placed upon heated potsherds (*ἐπιτεθῆναι πεπυρωμένοις ὀστράκοις*), then for the third time lifted to the *ξύλον*, and his wounds reopened. Then Theoteknus seeing that the executioners could do no more, ordered him to be beheaded, and to have his body burnt: a sentence which, we are told, was defeated by the appearance of a supernatural light, which prevented the executioners kindling the wood of the funeral-pile.

This narrative of the execution of a Christian martyr has many points which seem to agree singularly with the description of the *Ibis*.

1. Theodotus might well be called *a victim to Apollo.* For (*a*) the persecution of Diocletian was not set on foot till a favourable response had been given by the oracle of Apollo at Branchidae. Lactant. de Mort. Persecutorum XI. *Nec sic quidem flexus est Imperator ut accommodaret assensum, sed deos potissimum consulere statuit, misitque haruspicem ad Apollinem Milesium. Respondit ille ut diuinae relligionis inimicus.* (*b*) Apollo and his sister Artemis are brought into special prominence in the narrative of Nilus, Theodotus having not only supported Victor in his denunciation of the incest ascribed to them, but himself denounced that incest at the very moment of his execution. (*c*) The priesthood of Apollo was offered as the price of his recantation.

2. The words *sacras macteris ad aras* find a natural interpretation, perhaps the most natural, in the circumstances of this execution. Not only must altars of the Gods have been standing ready in case Theodotus recanted and did sacrifice in proof of his recantation, but the epithet *sacras* 'sacrificial' would have a particular significance when the victim sacrificed might have escaped by offering sacrifice himself. That altars *were* actually there seems to be implied by the fact that the priests present at the execution are stated to have torn off their garlands; for these they would only have worn in anticipation of an act of sacrifice at an altar. Indeed the Act expressly says of Theoteknus that he forced Christian priests *προσάγεσθαι τοῖς βωμοῖς καὶ ἀναγκάζεσθαι θύειν καὶ ἀρνεῖσθαι τὴν εὐσέβειαν.*

3. Theoteknus would well suit the words *saeuo hoste.* The Act describes him as having a natural bias for cruelty and rejoicing in slaughter and blood (Mason, p. 355), and the details of the execution, at which he was not only present, but bore a personal share, are minutely and elaborately cruel.

But how, it will be asked, did a distich commemorating the death of a Christian martyr find its way into the *Ibis?* Two answers may be given. Either (1) the poem was not written by Ovid at all and dates from a considerably later period, or (2) it has been interpolated, a theory which has been advocated by Merkel in his last edition (1884) and before him by

Schrader. The question of forgery is intimately connected with the literary history of the *Ibis*, as I have shown in my edition. A large number of fictitious stories, as is well known, early found their way into the scholia: can we regard these as indicating a doubt as to the genuineness of the poem itself, either as a whole, or in parts? (Prolegom. p. lviii.) These fictitious stories and the forged verses which accompany them seem to belong to a period after the Gothic invasion of the Empire, and perhaps are not later than Justinian (482–541). I consider them to be either by a Christian or at least to contain allusions to Christian controversies. May we carry our suspicions a step beyond, and find in some of the distichs of the *Ibis* itself traces of Christian fabrication? This indeed is no necessary inference from the two verses describing (if they do describe) the martyrdom of Theodotus. For the publicity of that barbarous execution might well impress every one who witnessed it, and as one of the crowning atrocities of a sanguinary epoch have stamped itself in the memory of pagans not less than Christians. But the question has to be considered as a whole; and if the Act of Nilus really records a fact of Diocletian's persecution (as few will doubt), and the distich of the *Ibis* really refers to that fact (which is more than possible), then a portion of the poem, and one which all the best MSS acknowledge, must have been written at a time when Christianity was the acknowledged religion of the greater part of the world, and the incidental celebration of one of its most heroic deeds might most naturally perhaps be referred to a Christian also.

R. ELLIS.

[My friend, Mr R. W. Raper, to whom I submitted the above paper, has sent me the following view as to the authorship of the *Ibis*. He thinks it may have been "composed by a Christian exile as an imprecation on a pagan and persecuting emperor with whom he had once lived on friendly terms." R.E.]

"The poem would thus assume its natural and proper place in the literature whose 'worm dieth not and whose fire is not

quenched,' as a polished thunderbolt forerunning those terrible denunciations of a later time, necessary it might be for the purification of an unbelieving world, and itself anticipating, including and surpassing all anathemas excommunications comminations and damnatory clauses before and after: the peculiarity of the Ibis being that though breathing the sterner spirit of Christianity and thoroughly penetrated with righteous indignation it is nevertheless purely pagan and mythological in form: thus only could it have been well understood by the pagan potentate to whom it was addressed and the literary world by whom it was intended that it should be read.

As the devoted object of the poem was not really Ibis, l. 61, 2,

Et quoniam qui sis nondum quaerentibus edo
Ibidis interea tu quoque nomen habe,

so the ingenious author was not really Naso: but his contemporaries were not deceived. The personality of the gifted exile was not wholly hidden.

'Well knew that gentle band
Who in another's fate now wept his own.'

The motive of this double pseudonymity can hardly have been any other than fear; nor is it easy to divine whom the author writing from beyond the bounds of the civilised world and enjoying something like the security of the North pole could have greatly feared, were it not that the person so elaborately denounced being emperor, the mere mention of his name in such a context might have armed the hands of adventurous assassins, eager for their reward and ready to penetrate to the very cradle of the North wind in order to carry out what they believed to be the imperial will. It may therefore be assumed as probable that the unknown target of these multiform imprecations was at the time of their publication ruler of the world. The few indications to be found in the poem itself favour this view. Ibis is evidently regarded as too great to be likely to read the poem himself. He was to cause it to be read aloud to him on his birthday and on the 1st of January, the latter being

the very day on which the military oath of allegiance was taken to the emperor. Cf. line 66,

Haec tibi natali facito Ianique Kalendis
Non mentituro quilibet ore legat.

His birthday is for execratory purposes presumed to be the dies Alliensis, lines 219, 220,

Haec est in fastis cui dat gravis Allia nomen
Quaeque dies Ibin publica damna tulit.

Had the personage intended occupied any rank or station lower than that of Caesar to have styled him 'publica damna' and to have assigned him such a state birthday would have been a compliment greater than the author of the Ibis would be likely to pay him. The very number of lines—over 600, nearly every one of which contains a separate imprecation—seems out of all proportion if applied to a private person. Again the provocation given by Ibis has something imperial and tyrannical about it.

Ibis had not only banished the writer but allowed him no peace in his banishment: kept reminding the world of his ignominious fate: by speech or by decree would not allow his memory to die out of the forum: forbad his wife to weep for him: confiscated his property and forgetful of former friendship wielded his power not to lighten but to intensify the effect of the blow on the innocent family and household of the unfortunate exile. Lines 10—21,

Ille relegatum gelidos Aquilonis ad ortus
Non sinit exilio delituisse meo,
Vulneraque immitis requiem quaerentia uexat,
Iactat et in toto nomina nostra foro,
Perpetuoque mihi sociatam foedere lecti
Non patitur miseri funera flere uiri.
Cumque ego quassa meae complectar membra carinae
Naufragii tabulas pugnat habere mei,
Et qui debuerat subitas extinguere flammas
Hic praedam medio raptor ab igne petit.
Nititur ut profugae desint alimenta senectae.

It is a singular coincidence that an emperor, notable for his cruelty, alone of emperors, it might almost be said alone of all dwellers in Rome whose names and birthplaces have come down to us, was born at Leptis on or near the river Cinyps—the one indispensable condition to which the genuine Ibis must conform. L. 222,

Qui simul inpurae matris prolapsus ab aluo
Cinyphiam foedo corpore pressit humum.

Septimius Severus, whose African accent and provincial pronunciation of the Latin language clung as a reproach to him long after he became emperor, showed himself so sensitive to taunts about the family dog Latin that he sent away his sister from Rome in consequence of the ridicule he incurred through her indifferent grammar and barbarous speech. Ael. Spart., Severus 15,

'Cum soror sua Leptitana ad eum uenisset uix Latine loquens ac de illa multum imperator erubesceret, dato filio eius lato clauo atque ipsi multis muneribus redire mulierem praecepit.'

In ll. 228—32 there is unmistakeable allusion not only to the severity but to the dog Latinity of this emperor,

Gutturaque inbuerant infantia lacte canino,
Hic primus pueri uenit in ora cibus:
Perbibit inde suae rabiem nutricis alumnus,
Latrat et in toto uerba canina foro.

Cf. latrator Anubis, Aen. VIII. 698—where also barking is the arch-symbol of barbarism.

Some of his severity was exercised towards Jewish and Christian converts; Ael. Spart., Severus 17, *Iudaeos fieri sub gravi poena uetuit, idem etiam de Christianis sanxit,* one of whom may have retaliated by writing the Ibis."

[The Editors insert Mr Raper's note at Mr Ellis's request, regarding it as an ingenious but not altogether serious speculation on the part of the writer.]

H. A. J. MUNRO.

It has been usual in this periodical to give obituary notices of its more distinguished contributors. This has been done in the cases of Conington, of Cope, of W. G. Clark, of Shilleto; and I am now called upon to say a few words in commemoration of a scholar at least the equal of any one of those named above. It may indeed be said that no loss has been felt as so heavy by Cambridge men, no news created such consternation as that of his unexpected death. Munro was cut off while in the very fulness of intellectual power and activity, not as some of our most eminent men, after months or years of mental or bodily decay. No man of his standing—he was sixty-five when he died—seemed to us more likely to attain a great age. An apparently robust frame, habitual healthy exercise and prudence in diet, coupled with unabated zeal and delight in his favourite pursuits, led us to indulge the hope that, like the late Adam Sedgwick, he would for many years to come continue to be the pride of his College and University, and a referee trusted by all, on any doubtful or curious question in his own department of literature.

The obituaries which have hitherto appeared in the "Athenæum," "Academy," "Saturday Review," &c., most of them well-informed and judicious, lay, as might be expected, especial stress on Munro's performances as an Editor of Latin Classics. Doubtless for many years his attention seemed devoted to the criticism and interpretation of the Roman poets, especially those of the pre-Augustan age, a field in which much had been done by Lachmann, Ritschl, and other German scholars. Of these, though a sincere admirer, he was no slavish imitator; but rather

an independent discoverer in regions which their labours had made accessible to other explorers. His edition of Lucretius is by all English scholars, and I believe by most of those Germans who understand our language, admitted to be the best in existence, and his labours on Catullus have thrown new and striking light on the poems he has touched upon. A complete edition, had it been wanted, of this exquisite poet but most foul-mouthed libeller and lampooner, lay well within his powers; but for reasons mentioned in confidence to a friend, he shrank from the task. Had he lived, he might have favoured us with a new Edition of the 'ardent Lucilius', whose difficulties, as these pages testify, he delighted in grappling with.

Munro's merits were scarcely less in Greek than in Latin criticism. His articles on Aristotle in the "Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology" are remarkable for the qualities which by universal consent mark his Latin criticisms—the same thoroughness, the same manly and independent judgment, the same scrupulous fairness, the same combination of caution and courage mark his performances in both departments. The splendid epithet *πάντη τελεσιουργός* is in his own department as applicable to him as to the great Athenian to whom it was originally applied. A recent re-perusal of his critique of the 5th Book of Aristotle's Ethics has revived the feelings of surprised admiration which it excited in my mind on its first appearance in 1855. He was at that time the only writer (so far as I know) who had the boldness to maintain the Eudemian origin of that Book, which had however excited the suspicions of several less daring critics. Neither Brandis, Spengel, nor Zeller were prepared to go the length to which Munro's criticism advanced; and though his contention is generally admitted in this University and in Oxford, I know not whether the hesitation of the learned elsewhere has even yet been removed. To me I confess Munro seems to have proved his point, and I cannot but feel that his tact and discernment of style, and his thorough sympathy with Aristotle's way of thinking and expressing himself on ethical subjects, together with a corresponding sense of the inferiority of that pinchbeck Aristotle, Eudemus, justify his claim to an ex-

ceptionally high position among the masters of the "higher criticism." After his lucubrations on Aristotle, some years elapsed before he returned to the criticism of Greek authors. Of late, however, he had bestowed considerable pains in the study of Euripides, a poet whose merits seemed to him to have missed their due recognition among the English scholars of the day. His emendation of a most obscure passage in the Medea, which Porson did not venture to meddle with, is, if not certain, at least highly probable, and better than that proposed by the brilliant Charles Badham, of whom Munro always spoke in terms of admiration. Guess-work he held in deserved contempt, as any reader of his Euripidea, in the 20th and 22nd numbers of this Journal, cannot fail to discover. On the other hand, he was not one of those who, as was said of a departed Greek Professor, "construe through a brick wall." His critical tact rarely failed to detect a flaw in a received text; and though his proposed emendations are not always what we call convincing, they are invariably well supported by examples as well as by argument. A large proportion will, I venture to anticipate, be adopted by future editors.

No notice of Munro's performances would be complete without some reference to those translations into Latin and Greek Verse which formed the amusement of his *horae subsecivae*, and his consolation during his attendance at the deliberations of our College Council. Of these compositions I presume not to offer any criticism of my own. They are very generally accepted as perhaps the best contemporary specimens of an art for which many other Cambridge scholars have shewn their aptitude. They are very unlike any other compositions of the kind, but I do not know any which I should put above them, unless it be that remarkable *tour de force*, Dean Merivale's rendering in Latin Hexameters of Keats's Hyperion. Munro was not, like Dr Kennedy, an original Latin poet; nor did he ever produce or at least print anything like the best of Shilleto's Greek epigrams or lampoons. But in his translations into Latin verse we discern a masculine vigour peculiar to himself, and the same austerity of taste which caused him to prefer Lucretius and Catullus to any later poets.

Of modern literature it may be said that he had read all that was worth reading—or, to adopt the distinction laid down by Bentley, all that was worth quoting. His knowledge of French, German and Italian authors was profound and extensive, and he spoke all three languages with fluency and correctness, though not with the best accent. His taste in art was like his taste in literature, somewhat austere. True masterpieces of whatever school he thoroughly and keenly appreciated; but he also delighted in the less matured beauties of the early Florentines, whom he thoroughly knew. To these and the galleries and churches containing them he was, as I can testify, an excellent guide.

Of Munro's moral qualities those who knew him best thought the most highly. The same manliness which characterised his understanding may also be said to have pervaded his character. Other men, having less of the *praefervidum ingenium* of his race, may have been more amiable, or rather more "aimable"; but the higher virtues, genuine kindness of heart included, none possessed in fuller measure. The lines of the Laureate are as applicable to him as they were to the person to whom they originally referred:

> "A man more pure and bold and just
> Was never born upon the earth."

W. H. THOMPSON.

καὶ ἐξεπέτασαν τὸ βιβλίον τοῦ νόμου περὶ ὧν ἐξηρεύνων τὰ ἔθνη τὰ ὁμοιώματα τῶν εἰδώλων αὐτῶν.

From this reading, which is supported by Cod. Sin., Cod. Alex., Cod. Venet., and apparently all the MSS. except four cursives, as well as by both the Latin Versions (*de quibus scrutabantur gentes similitudinem simulacrorum suorum*), it appears to be impossible to extract any satisfactory sense. The older commentators indeed explained it to mean that the heathen endeavoured to find in the Jewish sacred books resemblances to their own myths, hoping thereby to establish the truth of them. For example they would have identified the Giants of Genesis with the Greek Titans, Moses with Minos, Samson with Hercules, and so forth.

But as Grimm justly observes, apart from all other difficulties, this explanation would require ἐν οἷς instead of περὶ ὧν. The received reading, he says, gives no sense, and without attempting to account for its origin he accepts the reading found in Codd. 55. 74. 243. [71 τοῦ ἐπιγράφειν ἑαυτῶν] and the Aldine and Complutensian editions, which insert τοῦ ἐπιγράφειν ἐπ' αὐτῶν before τὰ ὁμοιώματα. The plural περὶ ὧν is peculiar, but it may be regarded as a plural of the class to which the singular antecedent belongs. The meaning will then be as follows. 'They spread out the book of the Law, for copies of which the heathen used to make search, in order to draw the likenesses of their idols upon them.' The heathen had insulted the Law by scrawling rude pictures of idols or idolatrous emblems on all the copies they could find, and the Jews spread out before God a copy thus desecrated, in order as it were to bring the outrage before His eyes and plead for judgment on its perpetrators. Cf. 2 Kings xix. 14 ff.

It is however unsatisfactory to adopt a reading found in four cursives only, without attempting to give any explanation of the reading of the older and better MSS. It is no doubt possible that the words *τοῦ ἐπιγράφειν ἐπ' αὐτῶν* have been lost in these MSS., but it is more probable that they are only a gloss, though I believe a correct one so far as the sense is concerned.

How then can the origin of the received reading be explained? I would suggest that the original Hebrew text had אשר חקקו הגוים עליהם את דמות עצביהם or the like: i.e. "upon which the heathen had scrawled the likenesses of their idols." חקק to inscribe, draw, was confused with חקר and rendered by *ἐξηρεύνων*; and אשר...עליהם rendered by *περὶ ὧν* instead of *ἐφ' ὧν* to suit *ἐξηρεύνων*. This confusion of חקק and חקר actually occurs in Jud. v. 14, where מחקקים is rendered *ἐξερευνῶντες*: and for חקק 'to draw' or 'inscribe' see Ezek. xxiii. 14.

But further, if we may assume some such reading in the original Hebrew text, we can explain the Syriac version, of which Grimm is content to say that it deviates altogether from the Greek, "perhaps only paraphrasing a text before it." It reads:

ܘܦܪܣܘ ܠܢܡܘܣܐ ܘܩܛܪܘ ܩܕܡ ܡܪܝܐ ܥܠ ܥܡܡܐ ܕܐܠܨܘܗܝ ܠܡܥܒܕ ܐܝܟ ܕܥܒܕܘ ܐܢܘܢ

"And they spread out the roll of the Law, and lamented before the Holy One concerning the heathen, who compelled them to behave after their fashion."

The Syriac translator interpreted חקקו "decreed," disconnected אשר from עליהם, and supposed the literal meaning to be: "because the heathen had imposed as a statute on them the likeness of their idolatries": of which he gave a free explanatory paraphrase.

A. F. KIRKPATRICK.

ON THE FORMS OF DIVINATION AND MAGIC ENUMERATED IN DEUT. XVIII. 10, 11.

Part II.

The first part of this paper dealt with the diviners called *Qōsĕmīm;* we now pass on to

(2) מעונן *MĔʿŌNĒN* and (3) מנחש *MĔNAḤĒSH,*

which are the two remaining chief species of divination. The former is very obscure, and was so even to the versions, whereas there is a perfectly consistent exegetical tradition that the latter refers to augury or the drawing of omens from natural phenomena. As *mĕʿōnēn* is too obscure to be fixed with any certainty without the aid of the method of exclusions, and as some of the current theories look for it also within the region of omens, it seems best to begin with the less obscure word and try to find what various kinds of presages may be taken as covered by it.

As regards the exegetical tradition, it is to be observed that the LXX. in rendering the verb by *οἰωνίζεσθαι* and *nĕḥāshīm* by *οἰωνοί* (Num. xxiv. 1) must not be held to think of auguries from birds only; any omen is to the Greeks an *οἰωνός*; and the Seventy themselves plainly take the word in a wide sense in Gen. xliv. 5, 15. The Aramaic translators simply retain the Hebrew word, or at least use the same root, which was familiar to their own dialects, and covered omens of very various kinds; if the Peshito in Lev. xix. 26 adds the limiting phrase "by means of winged creatures," this is due to the influence of the LXX. (compare Field's note on the Syro-Hexaplar rendering of Deut. xviii. 10).

The Old Testament itself gives very little hint as to the kind of omens sought by the *mĕnaḥēsh;* Balaam observed omens on the hill-tops, Joseph apparently by hydromancy, that is, by watching the play of light in a cup of liquid. But we shall hardly be wrong in supposing that the *nĕḥāshīm* of the Hebrew, which from these two examples had a wide range, were not very different from the manifold *neḥshē* of the Syrians. Among the latter, as among the Arabs, omens from the flight, course, and cries of birds and beasts appear to have been the most usual, for these are prominent in most of the glosses; but a large range of other portents is recorded. Thus in Hoffmann *Opusc. Nest.* p. 93 l. 19 *sqq.* we read "*mnahhesh,* scil. [observing] signs that lie in words or actions or the cries of birds or fire or atmospheric changes or rain or the [astrological] complexion of times and the like, from which they infer, so to speak, that this is good and that bad, and that a man should push on or stop." A gloss in Bar Ali, most part of which is word for word the same with this, will appear in the *Thesaurus;* it adds "physical movements" and "fortuitous occurrences" so that every possible kind of natural omen seems to be included. Bar Bahlul gives among other glosses,

ܢܫܦܐ ܐ ܒܟܫܦ ܚܙܝܬܐ ܘܡܢ ܒܥܐ ܚܫܚܐ

—so here we have the lot at length transferred from the region of ritual to that of natural divination. The general conclusion seems to be that all natural omens fall under this root, as all oracles fall under ܩܘܡ.

In Arabic, forms of the corresponding root نحس are ordinarily used of bad luck and unlucky things or signs. But this may well be a narrowing of the meaning, similar to what we observe in طَيِّرَة; unlucky omens naturally are more observed than lucky ones. And in support of this it may be argued that in Arabic Conj. V means "to search out." Thus the *Tāj al-'Arūs* cites from "the story of Badr" the phrase فنجعل يتنحس الاخبار presumably in the same connection in which Ibn Hishām i. 428 and Ṭabari i. 1292 have Conj. V of

حسّ. The conjecture lies near, therefore, that تنحسّ is an extension of the same biliteral root as appears in حسّ. It ought however to be observed that Tebrizi (*Ḥam.* ed. Freytag, p. 104, l. 2) declares *tanaḥḥasa* in the sense "search out" to be peculiar to the Ṭayyi, so that it is quite possible that we have here to do with an old loan-word from the Aramaic.

But however this may be, the Syriac and Aramaic usage is too clearly marked to allow us to assume (with reference to לחשׁ and to נָחָשׁ serpent) that the verb originally meant to hiss or whisper. Whispered incantations have nothing in common with augury. More reasonable is Bochart's suggestion that *niḥēsh* is a denominative from *nāḥāsh*. For, as he shews, it was a widespread belief in antiquity that the power of divination, or of understanding the prophetic speech of birds, was obtained by the aid of serpents; and Philostratus *Vita Apollonii* i. 20 expressly says that the Arabs thought to acquire the power of understanding the prophetic voice of animals by eating the heart or liver of serpents. But here also the difficulty arises that while our word for augury seems to be common to all the Semitic dialects, *nāḥāsh*, "serpent," is peculiar to Hebrew. Or if we admit a connection between *nāḥāsh* and the Arabic *ḥanash*[1] we separate it from our verb, which in Arabic has not *sh* but *s* as its third radical.

It would seem then that for *qesem* and *naḥash* at least we have clearly-defined fields, the first covering oracles and sacred omens, the latter omens from natural things in the largest sense. *Mĕ'ōnēn*, therefore, which stands between *qōsēm* and *mĕnaḥēsh*, and may be coordinated with either of them separately, ought also to be the name of an important class of diviners, and can hardly be related to a mere species within the genus of auguries—*e.g.* the observation of clouds. So again, it is plain

[1] So Fleischer in Seetzen's *Reisen* IV. 513, Lagarde, *Mittheilungen*, p. 230. Though Seetzen found this word still living as applied to a species of *coluber* it was not well understood by the native Arabic scholars even in old times. See Ahlwardt, *Chalef elahmar*, p. 97 *sq.*, and Ibn Doreid, *Kitāb al-Ishtiqāq*, p. 260. The Banū Ḥanash were a clan of the Aus, so the word was not originally limited to the district in which Seetzen found it.

alike from the place which the name holds in the list, and from the use of מורה revealer, as its synonym (*supra*, xiii. 276) that we must think of some kind of divination proper and not of sorcery, such as rain-making. The same reasons appear conclusive against Fleischer's suggestion in Delitzsch on Isaiah ii. 6, that it comes from عَنَّ "hinder," and means properly one who exercises coercive magical arts (Nestelknüpfen, *nouer l'aiguillette*), especially to prevent men from coming at their wives. There is not the least proof that a derivative of عَنَّ was ever the name for a class of sorcerers. The Arabic عِنِّين and the Syriac ܥܢܝܢܐ (Elias Nis. in Lag., *Praetermissa*, p. 12, l. 1—the same gloss which Castell after Thom. Nov. mistranslates "Ninna, gemitus dolorosus"), to which Fleischer refers, simply mean "impotent." Of course if a verbal form from this root is used which implies that a person has been *rendered impotent by some one*, the reference, according to common Eastern superstition, will usually be to the supposed act of a sorcerer who has put the poor man under a spell[1], but this proves nothing for our purpose.

The exegetical tradition is so various that it would be tedious to give it at length. The main points may be put shortly as follows:—

(*a*) Onkelos and the Targum to the Prophets simply transcribe the Hebrew words עונן and מעונן, and the forms in which they do so, according to the editions of Berliner and Lagarde, are such as to make it very improbable that the word is a real Aramaic one. It cannot be argued from the Targums, at least as our texts stand, that the root is necessarily ענן and not עין or עון.

(*b*) There is a class of interpretations which take the word as coming from עין "an eye," represented by the Palestinian

[1] How this was done away among the Northern Semites about 700 A.D. we are told in Lag. *Rel. Syr.* 133: "they who bend a needle and insert the head in the eye, or set seals on locks and throw them into a deep well or hide them in the ground that a man may be kept away from his wife."

Targum on Deut. (and probably also on Lev. xix. 26, where the text in the Polyglotts is corrupt) in Sifrā, Sifrē, and the Peshito of our passage. All these understand some sort of charm or fascination affecting the eyes. The same derivation may have guided Symmachus, who twice has *σημειοσκοπούμενος*, and Jerome, who thinks sometimes of auguries, sometimes of dreams. But the variations in detail between the views resting on this derivation, especially in the Jewish tradition, are such as to shew that all are mere guesswork. Further, none of them has intrinsic probability, and the Peshito elsewhere translates otherwise.

(*c*) The Sept. in Deut. xviii. 10, 14, in 2 Kings xxi. 6 and 2 Chron. xxxiii. 6 (which follow our passage), and in Isa. ii. 6, thinks of *cledonism*, and this view Aquila extends to Lev. xix. 26 (LXX. *ὀρνιθοσκοπήσεσθε*; cp. Jer. xxxiv. 7 [xxvii. 9], *οἰωνίσματα*), to Micah v. 12 (LXX. *ἀποφθεγγόμενοι*), and probably to Isa. lvii. 3 (LXX. *υἱοὶ ἄνομοι*)[1].

This, then, is the most consistent tradition, but in view of the variations of the LXX. it cannot be said to be strongly attested. And indeed *cledonism*, or the putting of a prophetic sense on words spoken with another reference (John xi. 50 *sq.*) can never have been the business of a class of men (Jud. ix. 37, Jer. xxvii. 9, Micah v. 12), or been so marked a type of divination that Isaiah could speak of it as characteristically Philistine, and that Isa. lvii. 3 could found on it a name of opprobrium. Moreover we have seen that in Syriac the root NḤSH includes presages from words (comp. also the Syro-Hex. on Deut. xviii. 10 and 2 Kings xxi. 6). And according to 1 Kings xx. 33 this must have been the case in Hebrew also. Putting cledonism aside then, the only hint in the versions that has anything definite about it, as indicating a distinct kind of divination, is *ἀποφθεγγόμενοι, i.e.* utterers of *ἀποφθέγματα*, or oracles conveyed in sentences, in the Septuagint of Mic. v. 12. This is worth examination, because it really gives a different species from anything we have yet had before us, and is also

[1] In Lev. xix. 26, the gloss must belong to our word not to תנחשו. In Isa. lvii. 3, the rendering is ascribed to Symmachus, but Jerome cannot have read *κληδονιζόμενοι* in Sym. but probably *υἱοὶ σημειοσκοπουμένης*.

so peculiar that it does not look like a mere guess. But to test what it is worth we must first look at the two pieces of evidence given in Isa. ii. 6 and Jud. ix. 37. From these we see that the kind of divination meant is Philistine and Canaanite. Among the Canaanites of Shechem it was connected with that famous sacred tree which under various names appears so often in the Old Testament. Now oracles from trees are a known form of Semitic vaticination. We have seen the "lonely tree" appealed to for help in later Syriac superstition; among the Arabs we have the prophetic cry proceeding from the thorny gharqad (*Aghāni* I. 14, comp. Dozy, *Hist. des Mus. d'Esp.* I. 98), and a voice was heard in the shrine of the Samura trees of al-'Ozzā (Krehl, *Rel. der Araber*, p. 76 *sqq.*), while in the Old Testament we have the burning bush and the sound in the tops of the Bekāīm (2 Sam. v. 24). The *mĕ'ōnĕnīm* might therefore well be the interpreters of such an oracle. This is Ewald's solution, and he explains the word by the Arabic غن, supposing it to refer to the hum or whisper of the moving leaves, such as was heard at the oracle of Dodona.

This view has obvious advantages over all others that have come before us, and especially it does allow us to think of the *Mĕ'ōnĕnīm* as a quite distinct class from the others. For *qesem* has to do with an oracle by signs, each of which has a definite meaning, and simply gives a decision yea or nay on a plain question. In like manner omens have an established meaning; but sounds from the whispering of the wind in a tree have not a conventional sense; they require an inspired interpreter like the Pythia at Delphi and the Peleiades at Dodona—both of which oracles are connected with trees. Now our passage cannot well be without allusion to inspired diviners, and though the wizards who spoke by inspiration of familiar spirits or ghosts from the earth are mentioned below, these cannot have been the only inspired diviners known to our author. We know that in Phoenician religion there were men who professed to draw their inspiration from Baal or from the Ashera—which is only a conventionalised form of the sacred tree. Here indeed we have

to do not so much with confessed prophets of strange gods as with practitioners within Israel who shared the methods of the heathen; but the Ashera was retained in Samaria and also in Judaea, long after the Phoenician Baal was banished, and it would be strange if with it there was not retained some class parallel to the "prophets of the Ashera" of Ahab's time. In Micah v. *meʿōnēn* and *Ashēra* are connected together. To all appearance the sacred tree at Shechem became a Hebrew sacred tree in course of time, and still continued to be a "tree of the revealer"; and the prophetess Deborah herself gave her revelations, according to Judges iv. 5, at the sacred tree near Bethel, which another account connects with the nurse of Rachel (Gen. xxxv. 8). But this being so it is difficult not to think that Ewald perhaps makes too much of the sound in the tree top as the characteristic of this type of revelation—inspired *μάντεις* were necessary where there were oracular trees, but were not necessarily found only there. The characteristic of natural as distinct from spiritual inspiration of the *μάντις* is that it requires an exciting physical cause, and this might be found in the rustling of the leaves of a tree, as we see in the case of Dodona: but the kind of *μαντεία* is not changed if some other physical stimulant is used. And if we accept the etymological comparison with the Arabic which Ewald suggests, it appears most natural to give it a different turn.

The word غُنَّة has been fully illustrated by De Goeje (in the glossary to his edition of Abu 'l Walīd Moslim) who shews that it properly means a hoarse sound—a voice with a nasal twang, or in which the Semitic gutturals are emphasised. It is also used of the humming of insects. Now the characteristic utterance of the Arabic soothsayer is the monotonous rhythmical croon called سجع, *saj'*, properly the cooing of a dove, a word which has entered Hebrew in the form מְשֻׁנָּע; and a low murmur همهمة, or a whisper وسوسة, is similarly ascribed to the *Kāhin* (see Hoffmann in Stade's *Zeitschrift*, 1883, p. 89). The name *mĕʿōnĕnīm* may be assigned to the same category; the nearest parallel to it is חרטם, which Hoffmann plausibly

derives from خطم, so that it too will refer to the nasal twang of the soothsayer. If so the rendering *ἀποφθεγγόμενοι* is perfectly correct.

In this connection I venture to offer a suggestion as to the much-disputed Πελειάδες of Dodona. Whether we may infer from the legend in Herodotus that these female soothsayers were really of Eastern origin is not quite plain, but there is no doubt that between Greek and Semitic divination there is a very complete and detailed similarity. The older explanations of the name Πελειάδες are certainly insufficient, and Bouché-Leclercq proposes to replace them by a new one, according to which the "dove-priestesses" are named from the sacred doves of Astarte-Aphrodite, with whom he identifies the Dione of Dodona. This explanation is attractive, but it almost necessarily involves the further hypothesis that the Peleiades are the last survivals of what was originally a totem tribe, or at least that Astarte was actually worshipped at Dodona as a dove. This is not probable, as an eastern Astarte worship was certainly not the primitive cult of Dodona, and it is not favoured by analogy. For at Delphi also—the other great oracle which had a female prophetess—the Pythia had an animal name, Μέλισσα, and this name can hardly have to do with an insect totem, for it is used of the priestesses of other deities, notably of Demeter and her daughter and of Cybele—all prophetic goddesses. It seems therefore more easy to suppose —and here Herodotus appears to bear us out—that the Dove-soothsayers were so named from their croon, resembling the Arabic *saj'*, or the dove-like moaning of Hebrew demon-wizards (Isa. viii. 19 compared with xxxviii. 14), and that the *μέλισσα* in like manner is the humming priestess. And here it is curious to observe that the tree (אלון) or palm-tree of Deborah at Bethel cannot have originally been connected with the prophetess of the tribes north of the valley of Esdraelon (see Wellhausen-Bleek p. 188), but according to the legend in Genesis belongs to the mythical nurse of Rachel, *i.e.* to a heroine of the tribe of Joseph. But Deborah means a bee, and the "tree of the bee" is parallel to the "tree of the soothsayers

who hum or murmur hoarsely." Finally, the great oracle of the Philistines, of whose *'ōnĕnīm* Isaiah speaks, is the oracle of the Fly-Baal (בעל-זבוב). Here we get into a region of hypothesis for which it is hard to find verification; but the analogies in favour of the sense hoarsely humming soothsayers for *mĕ'ōnĕnīm*, seem as complete as can well be expected in such a matter.

We have thus found three clearly-defined regions of important divination for the three first names on our list, the oracle by signs and tokens at the sanctuary for the first, the oracle by inspired *μάντεις* for the second, and the region of natural signs and portents for the third. And this appears to cover all the leading forms of the higher divination, except perhaps dreams and visions. But according to Deut. xiii. 1 *sqq.*, compared with Num. xii. 6, these fall rather under the head of prophecy, true or spurious: they are not condemned by their form but by two criteria, (*a*) whether they are spoken in the name of false gods, (*b*) whether the veracity of the prophet is justified by events, Deut. xviii. 20, 22. They have therefore no proper place in our list, though in a broader way of speaking the spiritual prophets include them in *qesem*[1].

The three practices already described are in their origin all species of divination proper, such as formed an essential element in the greater religions of antiquity, and especially in religions where, as among the Semites, the national or tribal god was looked upon as a king and judge. The remaining names in the list, on the other hand, belong to the region of magic and magical divination, the art which seeks not reverently to ascertain the will but to constrain the operation of supernatural powers. The difference between divination and magic is apt to be obscure to us, and in point of fact the two tended to run

[1] As regards revelation by dream or nocturnal vision it seems worth noting that the mysterious being that appears to Eliphaz, Job iv. 12 *sqq.*, finds a parallel in the Arabic آت, or supernatural visitant who appeared in her sleep to the mother of 'Amr b. Kolthūm, *Agh.* ix. 182, to predict the greatness of her son. This *āti* was visible; but the grandfather of 'Amr who receives a similar revelation in sleep only hears a voice; *hatafa bihi hātifun.* When the Moslem lexicographers explain *āti* by angel they read their own ideas into the ancient belief.

together in the decadence of the old religions, but on the whole the higher nations of antiquity, the Greeks for example, admitted divination as a function necessary to the state, but condemned magic as a black art. And so too in Israel the oldest law directed against a forbidden art (Exod. xxii. 17 [18]), and the oldest state interference against such things (1 Sam. xxviii.), refer to items included in the Deuteronomist's list of magical practices.

This list enumerates five species, which again fall into two distinct groups. For the three last all go together, the Ōb (E. V. familiar spirit) and the Yid'ōnī (E. V. wizard) being habitually associated with one another, and also, as appears from 1 Sam. xxviii., with necromancy. These therefore are a group by themselves, and according to Isa. xlvii. 9, 12, another connected group embraces the two others, viz.:

(4) מכשף *MĚKASSHĒF* and (5) חבר חברים *ḤŌBĒR ḤĂBĀRĪM.*

The sense of the second term is fixed by Psalm lviii. 6, where it is a synonym of מְלַחֵשׁ, *mělaḥēsh*, whisperer, applied to a serpent-charmer. The substantive לָחַשׁ, *laḥash*, is used of the charm that keeps a snake from biting in Eccles. x. 11, Jerem. viii. 17, but seems to mean any charm in Isa. iii. 3 and some sort of female ornament in Isa. iii. 20. Comparing Gen. xxxv. 4, where earrings appear as forbidden and idolatrous, and also the Syriac word for an earring (ܩܘܕܫܐ, literally, "a holy thing"), we cannot doubt that the ornaments meant by Isaiah are earrings used as amulets. This sense may then be connected with the other and etymologically obvious one of "a whispered incantation," by assuming that the amulet is one worn in the ear to prevent an incantation heard from taking effect. The *lĕḥāshīm* are not amulets in general, for they must in the context be a specific ornament, and another kind of ornament mentioned is also an amulet, viz. the שַׁהֲרוֹנִים, or *lunulae.* These last were worn by the Arabs (Jud. viii. 24), and are therefore identical with the moon-shaped amulets of silver called *ta'wīdh*, worn round the neck, on which see *Harīrī*,

De Sacy's 2nd ed., p. 49. The form was that of a crescent moon or, as the commentator explains, of a horse-shoe, so that this is the same kind of amulet which is still often found on stable doors.

Serpent charming is a thing common to all the Semites. For the Arabic serpent-charmer (حاوٍ ,راقٍ) see Ahlwardt's *Chalef elahmar*, p. 74; the Syrians not only have the thing, but they give it the same names as in Hebrew, *ḥabbūr* = חבר, *lāḥōsh* = מלחש. The former word does not mean "one who binds by magic or ties magic knots" (ܚܒܪ ܟܫܦ, Lag. *Rel.* 131. l. 18, Ar. *mo'aqqid*—cp. *Sūr.* cxiii.); the verb means to connect or interlace (hence חָבֵר, partner, חֶבֶר, a college of priests or the like, Arabic خُبْرَة, a partnership of a special kind), but hardly to bind, and so the *ḥōbēr ḥăbārīm* is best taken as *nectens verba*, just as in Arabic خَبَر, *khabar*, is a narrative. This application of the root to incantation is probably confined to the Northern Semites, for خبير, which appears in a passage cited by Hoffmann (in Stade's *Zeitschr. ut supra* p. 92), as a synonym of حازٍ, seer, may mean simply a wise man. *Laḥash* on the other hand might seem to be connected with لاحوس, "disastrous," and سنة لاحسة, "a bad year," but the former is well explained by the *Tāj* on the analogy of قاشور (licking and stripping being natural figures for destructiveness), and the latter is simply "a year that licks up the herbage." On the whole therefore North Semitic incantation seems to have a peculiar vocabulary, and this may perhaps be connected with the influence of the Babylonian and Assyrian magic. That connection at all events appears in the Syriac word used in our passage, viz. *āshōph* = אָשַׁף in Daniel, which is claimed as an Assyrian word (Schrader *KAT.* 2nd ed. p. 430, Halevy, *Documents Relig.* p. 76). The *āshōph*, according to *Opusc. Nest.* p. 93 *sq.* is a higher sort of person than the common *lāḥōsh*, or snake and scorpion charmer, being able to make all poisonous

creatures go where he likes by merely pronouncing over them the names of demons. One can easily understand that a descendant of the old Chaldaean אשפים claimed a higher place than the common serpent-tamer of the East; but the *āshōph* and *lāḥōsh* are not radically different, and Field in his note on Deut. xviii. 10 has shewn that the former does not really mean *οἰωνιστής*, as is argued in *Thes. Syr. s. v.*

As divination by the aid of ghosts and chthonic demons belongs to the other group of magical arts, it would seem that the *mĕkashshēph* must differ from the enchanter only by using material drugs or charms instead of words. This agrees with Mic. v. 11, where *kĕshāphīm* are something that can be dashed from the magician's hands, and also with the Talmudic usage, as exemplified by Buxtorf and Levy. Thus *kĕshāphīm* will be, as LXX. renders them, *φάρμακα*, in the narrower and original sense, not including charms that are recited. The Aramaic equivalent for the *mĕkashshēph* is *ḥarrāsh*, and his works are *ḥershīn*, in Hebrew חרשים, Isa. iii. 3, where these are paired with *laḥash*, just as in our passage and Isa. lvii. *kĕshāphīm* are paired with *ḥăbārīm*. The synonyms and contrasts here are so clearly marked in Hebrew and Aramaic—on the one hand, words derived from כשף and חרש, on the other, words from חבר, לחש, אשף—that the etymology that proposes to connect אשף and כשף at once falls to the ground. Both חרש and כשף however remain etymologically very obscure.

Still, as regards the former at least, it seems possible to learn something from the Arabic. That *ḥărāshīm*, *ḥershīn* in the sense of *φάρμακα* do not come from חרש = حرث = ܚܪܫ is obvious, for a *shin* common to both Hebrew and Syriac represents Arabic *sin*. It is worth considering therefore whether the Arabic form of the word is not to be found in خَرِس and خَرِسَة, the peculiar food given to women in childbed, and consisting of *farīqa* and the like. Farīqa (literally "shredded") is a medicinal broth of dates and fenugreek (see the quotation in Dozy from the *Mosta'īnī*). Ibn al Athīr, cited in the *Tāj*, connects the خَرِسَة with the legend in *Sur.* XIX. 25, and here the *Kāshshāf*

explains that dates were supposed to facilitate delivery, and to be specially good for women in childbed, and that it was customary with the Arabs not only to give them to the mother but to rub the child's gums with them تحنيك. From all this it appears that the *khorsa* or *khors* is a drug, a *φάρμακον* in the original sense of that word, and this seems to supply the best etymology of *ḥărāshīm*, and to confirm our conclusion that that word originally means magical appliances or drugs.

The etymology of מכשף is still more difficult, and has not been made easier by the remarks of Fleischer in Levy *Neuheb. Wörterb.* II. 459, who rightly rejects the old and phonetically untenable etymology from كشف, but comparing كسف, as applied to the eclipse or obscuring of heavenly luminaries, suggests that כשף II is properly to lower the voice, to murmur. Against this there is the evidence that *kĕshāphīm* were material charms or operations. And it is to be observed that if the Hebrew word corresponds to the Arabic كسف the latter must be a *double* root. Arabic س represents alike the old Semitic ס and the sound which in Hebrew is שׂ; thus for example Arabic سمر unites the two very different senses of waking by night (שׁמר) and in II of nailing (סמר). In like manner, if كسف corresponds to כשף as well as to כסף it must include two roots, and in point of fact it has two quite distinct senses, (1) to cut, *e.g.* to hough an animal, (2) to be obscured; of a luminary to lose its light; figuratively, *kāsif-al-wajh*, of dark and frowning countenance. The root כסף applied to the pale metal (silver) and to the pallor of shame or eager desire, obviously belongs to the second of these senses, "pale" and "obscure" being united in the idea of loss of colour. This therefore would leave for כשף the root-meaning to "cut." Now the only other etymological hint is that got from the Syriac ܟܫܦ supplicate, deprecate[1]. And this can be most naturally explained as primarily meaning "to cut oneself"; for a most characteristic feature of Semitic

[1] ܩܘܣܦܐ or ܩܣܦܐ gausăpa is a loan-word and not Semitic: Lagarde *Ges. Abh.* p. 27, so it ought not to have been adduced by Fleischer.

religion is the practice so vividly described in 1 Kings xviii. 28, where the Baal worshippers while earnestly invoking their god cut themselves with swords and lances till the blood gushes out. The same usage appears in Jer. xli. 5—compare also (with Spencer *De Legibus* II. xiii. 2) Hos. vii. 14, LXX. (יתגודדו for יתגוררו), and Theodoret's note, and the well-known orgies of the Galli (Lucian, *De Dea Syria*, ch. 50). These rites were deprecatory (Minutius Felix XXIV. 6, "qui sanguine suo libat et vulneribus supplicat") and are akin to the atonement still practised in the *Ḥijāz* under the name of *naqā* نقاء. According to the information which I gathered at Ṭāif in 1880 this atonement applies only to offences short of murder. With bare and shaven head the offender appears at the door of the injured person, holding a knife in each hand, and says

النقا نقانا والنقا نقّى الرجال الذي كمانا

"the *naqā* (cleansing) purges us and it purges such as are like us." This I was told means that through the *naqā* "his face becomes white" (وجهه أبيض). Saying these words the penitent strikes his head repeatedly with the knives or gets another to do so for him, if his nerve fails him. Then drawing his hands over his bloody scalp he wipes them on the door-post (comp. Ex. xii. 7). The injured man must now come out and cover the suppliant's head with a shawl (صمادة), and then kill a sheep and make a feast of reconciliation.

From all this the symbolism of self-inflicted wounds is clear, and the Syriac usage of our root is so naturally explained that we must at least provisionally try to explain *kĕshāphīm* also from the verb "to cut." Comparing then the synonym *farīqa* "shredded" for *khors* in the sense of medicinal broth, one is tempted to guess that the *kĕshāphīm* are primarily كسف, *kisaf*, the herbs or other drugs shredded into a magic brew. In that case *kĕshāphīm* and *ḥărāshīm* are synonyms; but the former, for which Jehu reproaches Jezebel, and which are specially associated with Assyria and Babylonia (Isa. lvii., Nahum iii. 4) are perhaps ultimately Chaldaean, reaching Israel through

Tyre, while the latter, which according to Isa. iii. 3 had a public standing in Judah, may have been indigenous.

(6) אוב. (7) ידעוני. (8) דרש אל־המתים.

These three, as we have seen, are closely connected; according to Isa. viii. 10 to consult *ōb* and *yid'ōnī* is to consult the dead. Further the *yid'ōnī* is never mentioned without the *ōb*, and seems to be merely another variety of the same thing. Now the *ōb* is certainly a sort of subterranean spirit which seems to speak from the ground with a twittering voice (Isa. xxix. 4). The *yid'ōnī* has the same sort of voice, Isa. viii. 18. In Lev. xx. 27 the latter as well as the *ōb* is a spirit of some kind speaking in the ἐγγαστρίμυθος, and this seems to be the common sense, though just as the בעלת־אוב may, by a familiar Semitic idiom, be briefly called an אוב, so the man who has a ידעוני may himself be called by that name (1 Sam. xxviii. 3, 9). The English version therefore is inexact in our passage and in various parallel ones; the construction is "he who consults an *ōb* or a *yid'ōnī*." The ancient versions made the same mistake; they appear to have understood ידעוני as if it were the same as γνωστής or عراف, a man who possesses secret knowledge; the Arabic .

According to its etymology the *yid'ōnī* may be most naturally understood as a "familiar" spirit, and this will supply the necessary distinction between it and the *ōb*. For those who divine by the latter profess, as we see in the case of the witch of Endor, to call up any ghost, and not merely a particular *yid'ōnī* their familiar.

The idea of a familiar spirit is not foreign to the Semites; it is the Arabic رئي, the تابع or "follower" of the soothsayer (see Hoffmann *ut supra*, p. 93). The familiar spirit speaks in the belly of the wizard whom he possesses (ἐγγαστρίμυθος) while the Baălath-ōb pretends to see a ghost which she describes, but her dupes only hear a voice which by ventriloquism seems to come out of the ground. But in Leviticus xx., which is of somewhat later date than Deuteronomy, this distinction is

lost; the *ōb*, as well as the familiar spirit, is inside the man or woman. Possibly this change of sense had begun when our passage was written, and thus the consultation of a ghost would be different from the consultation of an *ōb*. But there are of course various ways of consulting the dead, and the last item in our list may simply aim at making the prohibition complete. But the whole question of the cult of the dead among the Semites would need a paper to itself and cannot be further discussed here.

The net result of this discussion may be summed up in a sort of table of forms of divination and magic.

A. Divination Proper.

(1) Oracle or other divination by the *sacra* of a god, *qesem*.

(2) Mantic inspiration, *'ōnēn*.

(3) Divination by natural omens and presages, *naḥash*.

B. Magic and Magical Divination.

1 (*a*) by magical appliances, *kĕshāphīm*.

1 (*b*) by incantations, *ḥabārīm*.

2 (*a*) by the subterranean *ōb*.

2 (*b*) by a familiar spirit, *yid'ōnī*.

2 (*c*) by ghosts in general.

W. ROBERTSON SMITH.

NOTE ON EVANG. MATT. 27 27—30 (cl. MAR. 15 16—19. IO. 19 2 3[1]).

THE mockery recorded by three evangelists in the history of the Passion was known to the author of Barn. ep. (c. 7) and afforded entertainment to Celsus (Orig. c. Cels. II 34). I do not remember to have seen the following parallel cited[2].

Plut. Pomp. 24 § 5 (the insolence of the pirates):

ἐκεῖνο δὲ ἦν ὑβριστικώτατον· ὁπότε γάρ τις ἑαλωκὼς ἀναβοήσειε Ῥωμαῖος εἶναι καὶ τοὔνομα φράσειεν, ἐκπεπλῆχθαι προσποιούμενοι καὶ δεδιέναι, τούς τε μηροὺς ἐπαίοντο καὶ προσέπιπτον αὐτῷ συγγνώμην ἔχειν ἀντιβολοῦντες· ὁ δὲ ἐπείθετο ταπεινοὺς ὁρῶν καὶ δεομένους. ἐκ τούτου δὲ οἱ μὲν ὑπέδουν τοῖς καλτίοις αὐτόν, οἱ δὲ τήβεννον περιέβαλλον, ὡς δὴ μὴ πάλιν ἀγνοηθείη. πολὺν δὲ χρόνον οὕτω κατειρωνευσάμενοι καὶ ἀπολαύσαντες τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, τέλος ἐν μέσῳ πελάγει κλίμακα προσβαλόντες ἐκέλευον ἐκβαίνειν καὶ ἀπεῖναι χαίροντα, τὸν δὲ μὴ βουλόμενον ὠθοῦντες αὐτοὶ κατέδυον.

Take it in North's version (ed. 1579 pp. 689 690):

But yet the greatest spight & mockery they vsed to the ROMANES, was this, That when they had taken any of them and that he cried

[1] If in Io. 19 13 (with Justin and Whately) we could take *ἐκάθισεν* transitively (as act. apost. 2 30, Eph. 1 20) Pilate himself would join in the mockery and say derisively (Io. 19 14) *ἴδε, ὁ βασιλεὺς ὑμῶν* (Salmon Introd. to N. T. 79).

[2] [Mr Wright reminds me that it has not escaped Dr Field. But the *otium Norvicense* is known to so few, and the passage gains so much by comparison with Philo, that I am unwilling to withdraw the article.]

he was a citizen of ROME, and named his name: then they made as though they had bene amazed, and affrayed of that they had done. For they clapped their handes on their thighes, and fell downe on their knees before him, praying him to forgeue them. The poore prisoner thought they had done it in good earnest, seeing they humbled them selues as though they seemed fearefull. For some of them came vnto him & put shooes on his feete: others clapt a gowne on the backe of him after the ROMANE facion, for feare, (sayd they) least he should be mistaken an other time. When they had played all this pageant, & mocked him their bellies full: at the last they cast out one of their shippe ladders, and put him on it, & bad him go his way, he should haue no hurt: and if he would not goe of him selfe, then they cast him ouer the bord by force and sent him packing[1].

In the gospels a reputed King is arrayed in gorgeous robes, with mock sceptre and crown. In Plutarch the captive who relies on CIVIS ROMANVS SVM for protection, is attired in the Roman full dress, *toga* and *calceus* (see my notes on Iuv. I 119, III 149 with *addenda* and esp. Cobet *collectan.* 513—4). The knee is bowed in homage by the pirates as by the soldiers. Insult added to injury is the tradition of tyranny from the Roman triumphs to the *autos da fé* of the inquisition.

See also (referred to in Wolf's *Curae*) Philo in Flaccum 6 (II 522 M), an insult offered indirectly to King Agrippa in the person of a harmless lunatic Karabas, who, going naked day and night in Alexandria, was the butt of the children of the streets:

συνελάσαντες τὸν ἄθλιον ἄχρι τοῦ γυμνασίου καὶ στήσαντες μετέωρον, ἵνα καθορῷτο πρὸς πάντων, βύβλον μὲν εὑρύναντες ἀντὶ διαδήματος ἐπιτιθέασιν αὐτοῦ τῇ κεφαλῇ, χαμαιστρώτῳ δὲ τὸ ἄλλο σῶμα περιβάλλουσιν ἀντὶ χλαμύδος, ἀντὶ δὲ σκήπτρου βραχύ τι παπύρου τμῆμα τῆς ἐγχωρίου καθ' ὁδὸν ἐρριμμένον ἰδόντες ἀναδιδόασιν. ἐπεὶ δὲ ὡς ἐν θεατρικοῖς μίμοις τὰ παράσημα τῆς βασιλείας ἀνειλήφει καὶ διεκεκόσμητο εἰς βασιλέα, νεανίαι ῥάβδους ἐπὶ τῶν ὠμῶν φέροντες ἀντὶ λογχοφόρων ἑκατέρωθεν εἱστήκεσαν, μιμούμενοι δορυφόρους, εἶθ' ἕτεροι προσῄεσαν, οἱ μὲν ὡς ἀσπασόμενοι, οἱ δὲ ὡς δικασόμενοι, οἱ δ' ὡς ἐντευξόμενοι περὶ κοινῶν πραγμάτων. εἶτ' ἐκ περιστῶτος ἐν κύκλῳ πλήθους ἐξήχει βοή τις ἄτοπος Μάριν ἀποκαλούντων. οὕτως

[1] [An early example, as a friend remarks, of *walking the plank*.]

δέ φασιν τὸν κύριον ὀνομάζεσθαι παρὰ Σύροις· ἤδεισαν γὰρ Ἀγρίππαν καὶ γένει Σύρον καὶ Συρίας μεγάλην ἀποτομὴν ἔχοντα, ἧς ἐβασίλευσε[1]. Here we have the diadem, sceptre and robe, the homage 'hail, lord,' and the contemptuous indifference of the Roman governor.

JOHN E. B. MAYOR.

[1] cf. the anger of the Alexandrians (c. 5 p. 521) at the very title 'King of the Jews': ἤσχαλλον ἐπὶ τῷ γεγενῆσθαί τινα βασιλέα Ἰουδαίων, οὐχ ἧττον ἢ εἰ αὐτός τις ἕκαστος βασιλείαν προγονικὴν ἀφῄρητο. c. 6 p. 523 pr. Flaccus allowed these insults to be offered to a king and *Caesar's friend* in his presence.

MISCELLANEA.

1. Soph. Trach. 1160:

πρὸς τῶν πνεόντων μηδενὸς θανεῖν ὕπο MSS.

Wecklein conjectures *χρῆναι θανεῖν* for *θανεῖν ὕπο*. Read *βροτῶν* for *πρὸς τῶν*.

2. Claudian Rapt. Proserp. 2. 317:

occurrunt properi *lecta* de plebe ministri.

Jeep's ms 'L' has *media de plebe*, 'V' has *lecta*, but the latter makes no sense and the former seems only a phrase which has slipped in from being familiar to the copyist—a cause which has produced errors elsewhere in Claudian's mss. The 14th cent. ms of Claudian in the library of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, has *leta*. Read '*laeta*.'

3. *Κίνδυνος*. In their account of this word, Liddell and Scott omit the later sense 'battle'. Thus Polyb. 1. 87. 10; 2. 19. 5; 3. 65. 8; *ὁλοσχερὴς κίνδυνος*, 'a general engagement' 3. 69. 12. So *κινδυνεύειν* 6. 25. 3; *διακινδυνεύειν* (dimicare) 3. 14. 4; *προκ.* 6. 22. 3; *συγκ.* 2. 3, 5 &c.

F. HAVERFIELD.

Lancing College,
Shoreham,
Sussex.

ON CERTAIN DIFFICULTIES WITH REGARD TO THE GREEK TETRALOGY.

It is perhaps no exaggeration to say that for the external history of the Greek Drama we have no material contemporary or nearly contemporary. The scores of works which have been written on the subject are really based on evidence both scanty in amount and uncertain in character. Nor is the cause far to seek. We have not and do not expect to have elaborate descriptions, written simply for the sake of giving information to posterity, of things well-known and familiar to all at the time of writing. On the other hand the writers on the subject who alone give us any fulness of material are mere antiquaries—burrowing in the remains of a past which they only half understood—mistaking conjecture for certainty and certainty for conjecture. Of this failure of evidence in important points one might find innumerable instances. Perhaps it appears worst in the case of comedy, where in spite of the great remains of the actual drama which we possess, we know nothing with certainty of the arrangements for its performances, or the relation in which these stood to those of tragedy. Nay, of the very origin of comedy we are ignorant: it might well-nigh have sprung full-grown from the brain of Aristophanes. Again, in the case of tragedy, what can be more significant of our practical ignorance of the whole matter than the interminable dispute as to the question "were women present at the tragic performances?"

Thus much is prefaced because it is necessary to protest in the first instance against drawing a single conclusion upon any subject connected with the drama either from the silence of the authorities or from their confused accounts. They are silent because they are ignorant—they are confused because they do not understand.

On the question which it is proposed briefly to treat of here —the question in the first place of the existence of the tetralogy at Athens at all, and in the second place, of the modifications it underwent—we have about the average amount of external information, with rather more than the average amount of absurdity and contradiction. We have references—careless and obscure no doubt, but still references—extending over a very long period of time; we have an almost entire specimen of the thing whose very existence has had doubt cast upon it; lastly we have indirect evidence of the most valuable and unimpeachable kind. It is proposed in this paper to explain as far as possible the absurdities and discrepancies which exist, and to shew that there are acknowledged facts which can be accounted for in no other way than by the existence and development of the tetralogy.

It will be well to take first the actual mass of evidence which we have not only of the existence but the prolonged existence of the tetralogic form, then to examine the objections brought against the authority of this evidence, and lastly to shew the inherent probability of and indeed necessity for the existence of the trilogy and tetralogy.

The following sets of three and four plays are distinctly enumerated by ancient authorities. It is particularly necessary to observe the *titles* of the plays mentioned as forming the groups.

Aristias son of Pratinas, and so contemporary of Aeschylus, produced in 468 a tetralogy, of which three plays, Perseus, Tantalus, and the Wrestlers, are mentioned.

Polyphradmon wrote a Lycurgeia (no enumeration of plays).

Aeschylus has the following assigned to him: in 472 the Phineus, Persae, Glaucus Potnieus, Prometheus: in 468 the Laius, Oedipus, Seven against Thebes, and Sphinx: in 458 the Agamemnon, Choephoroe, Eumenides and Proteus: lastly a

Lycurgus tetralogy consisting of the Edoni, Bassarides, Neaniskoi, and Lycurgus[1].

Of Euripides we find mentioned: in 438 the Cretan Women, Alcmaeon in Psophis, Telephus and Alcestis: in 431 the Medea, Philoctetes, Dictys, and the Reapers: in 415 the Troades, Alexander, Palamedes, and Sisyphos; lastly, after his death the Iphigenia in Aulis, Alcmaeon in Corinth, and Bacchae, were published as a trilogy. Of minor poets, we have ascribed to Xenocles a set of four—Oedipus, Lycaon, Bacchae, Athamas; to Nicomachus[2] the Μετεκβαίνουσαι, Tyndareus or Alcmaeon, and Teucer; to Meletus an Oedipodea, and to Philocles a Pandionis, of which more hereafter.

It is here to be noticed that in the majority of cases the plays said to have formed a trilogy are widely different in subject, and herein surely lies a great proof of the trustworthiness of the grammarians on whom we chiefly rely in this place. For had they been simply stringing together, to suit a preconceived idea, the plays to form a trilogy of united subject, they might very easily have picked out enough sets of three with more probable connection between them than these, from the lists of Aeschylus' and Euripides' works. On the contrary, by faithfully chronicling facts which must have appeared strange to themselves, they have rendered their account not improbable, but probable, and, according to the rules by which we judge such evidence as theirs, have greatly strengthened their authority.

We have these direct testimonies; but we have also another which seems to be far more valuable because more indirect. On the grave[3] stone of Theodectes, the author of the Lynceus, it was written that he had conquered 13 times, and it is stated both by Stephanus and Suidas that he wrote 50 tragedies. That 50

[1] Only those of which we are certain are mentioned. There are one or two more combinations of three (e.g. the Myrmidons, Nereids, and Ransoming of Hector) among Aeschylus' plays, which are generally supposed to have formed trilogies.

[2] The first is very possibly an insertion by mistake, in which case the three plays will be Tyndareus, Alcmaeon, and Teucer.

[3] Stephanus s. v. Φασηλίς. Suidas s. v. Θεοδέκτης.

is a round number for 52, and that 13 tetralogies are implied, seems almost certain. It would seem therefore that in these facts we have a more valuable testimony not only to the existence of the tetralogy, but to its persistence in some form down to a late date, than any amount of silence or confusion of authorities can overthrow.

Another passage which contains a distinct allusion to the tetralogy is one which has been truly described as "baited to death"—viz. the passage in Suidas in which he states that Sophocles "began to exhibit with drama against drama, and not with tetralogies."

Before proceeding to discuss this passage, it is necessary to guard against a preliminary misapprehension. This arises from the circumstance that we speak commonly of Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides as forming a direct succession of poets. We speak as if Aeschylus had died and Sophocles had succeeded to his kingdom, and Sophocles had died and Euripides had reigned in his stead. We forget that Sophocles had been the ruler of the Athenian stage for years when the Orestean trilogy was produced, and that he actually outlived Euripides. Hence we refer changes to one poet of the three, and are astonished to find them in full operation in the plays of him whom we consider his predecessor, or to find them non-existent in his own earlier plays. So in this case, we have no right to assume that the change spoken of was the instantaneous result of the appearance of the youthful Sophocles in the tragic arena. Sophoclean tragedy was not a full-blown product of the year 468 any more than it existed in all its glory till 405 and then disappeared at once and for ever. We may expect to find therefore, in the later years of Aeschylus, that he and Sophocles are in many points in exactly the same position as regards the drama, and similarly must not be astonished if we detect in the last dramas of Sophocles the peculiarities of his contemporary Euripides.

To return to the passage of Suidas: various views have been held as to its meaning by foreign[1] scholars. Welcker believed that the words could mean that Sophocles contended with three

[1] English authorities treated it with scanty respect: e.g. Clinton in the *Philological Museum* 1, p. 74.

separate dramas against the united trilogy of his opponent. C. F. Hermann thought it possible that after Sophocles' time the four dramas were still produced, but on different days. Lastly, Boeckh seems to have held that it was left to the poet's own choice whether he would contend with a single play or a full tetralogy, having no higher claim to the prize in the latter case than in the former. This last opinion may be dismissed on several grounds. Setting aside the difficulty of judging in such a case, the idea of one poet being able to claim the assistance of the state for the provision of four choruses, while another merely required one, is obviously only to be admitted on the strongest positive evidence, which is here altogether lacking.

What then is the solution? If we look at the four plays which make up each of the first three tetralogies of Euripides, we are struck by the fact that in each case we possess only one play of the four. We gather that it was the most important of the four. Of the last tetralogy, or rather trilogy, which was published after Euripides' own death, we have two plays. Of these the Iphigenia in Aulis[1] has come down to us in a mutilated condition, which might almost give occasion for doubt as to whether it was ever performed—at least in its present shape.

Secondly, the enormous length of the Euripidean trilogy, reconstructed on the scale of the plays we possess, must be noticed, in comparison with the extent of the actually performed Aeschylean trilogy. Three plays of the length of the Persae would amount to just over 3200 lines—and the similarity in length of Aeschylus' plays is remarkable—the Agamemnon always excluded. On the other hand, three plays of the length of the Phoenissae of Euripides would amount to over 5300 lines. There is obviously something that requires accounting for here.

We may attempt to account for it thus. Sophocles began his dramatic career on the lines of Aeschylus—with his three tragedies, each with a chorus of 12, and their satyric play, probably with a chorus of 14. The first play is said, on the autho-

[1] There are several monographs on the subject of this unfortunate play and its interpolations, enumerated by Bernhardy, *Gr. Lit.* 3, p. 471.

rity of a vague remark of Pliny[1] the elder, to have been the Triptolemus. Nothing proves that this, if the date be correct, was not part of a tetralogy. After the victory of Sophocles, we are told that Aeschylus retired from Athens, leaving his young rival undisputed ruler of the Athenian stage. His influence thereon must have been something enormous. Making all allowance for the peculiar Athenian character and constitution, the appointment of a man as general for a successful play is surely a proof of abnormal personal influence. Moreover from the inscriptions we now know that he held the office of Hellenotamias, and was at one time one of the city treasurers. Had he been an ambitious man instead of the εὔκολος he was, he might probably have risen to great political power: that being such a one as he was he did attain to any high office is a proof of the commanding position his simple dramatic talent had won him.

Thus much is necessary to explain his being able to effect the vast change which we must now attribute to him. Some ten years after his first appearance the number of contending poets evidently increased greatly. In 476 the choregia seems to have been confined to one or two persons. Gradually the burden increased until every tribe had to furnish its choragus, and this implies that ten poets contended. Now obviously ten tetralogies could not be performed—leaving space for comedies at least—in the four days ordinarily assigned to the festival. The unauthorized dicta of Sauppe and others, who lay down as established that the regular allowance was a tetralogy in the morning and a comedy in the afternoon, may of course be dismissed at once.

This growing difficulty then was probably the reason for Sophocles' change. That change seems to have amounted to this. At the great Dionysia the poet was compelled to exhibit only one play of his four. That the tetralogic form was preserved by the majority of poets in publishing their plays seems undoubted; but at the great Dionysia only one play from each competitor could be admitted, and the dramatist had to select

[1] Plin. *H. N.* xviii. 7, who simply says that the Triptolemus was performed about 145 years before Alexander's death—a fine example of the authorities on which we rely for the history of the Greek Drama.

the best of his four for the purpose. The other three plays were left to the reading public and to the minor theatres. The former class was now greatly on the increase. The time of the ἀναγνωστικοὶ, who wrote solely for readers, had not yet come, but no doubt Euripides was more popular with the latter than ever he was on the stage, on which on the whole he was unsuccessful. The minor theatres were also multiplying fast, and there would be a fair field for the remaining plays of the tetralogy—indeed in the case of a popular poet they must have at times represented the whole set of four complete. After all the great Dionysia was but the first trial of the poet's work. His popularity might be great in the country and even in the foreign theatres, in spite of his failure—accidental or otherwise—in the first contest.

This theory of the publication of the tetralogy while only one of its plays was selected for representation at the great Dionysia at once disposes of the following difficulties—

(i) the persistence of the tetralogy, as seen from evidence, after it had been driven from the great stage.

(ii) the fact that more plays are assigned to a poet than the number of years of his activity or even life, which is inexplicable if we suppose that every play had to be acted, *not* in a tetralogy, at the great Dionysia.

(iii) the fact that one play in each tetralogy after Aeschylus' time seems always the most important.

(iv) the great length of the Sophoclean and Euripidean drama, which this new system rendered possible.

(v) the difference of subject in the four plays of Euripides' tetralogies, which allows of one being cut completely away from the rest.

(vi) the silence of authors like Aristotle. To them the great play of the tetralogy was the only one which required much notice, and the isolated character of the subject of the others would not, even if they were quoted, necessarily induce the mention of the tetralogy.

(vii) by means of this theory it seems possible to explain certain much-debated passages hereafter to be cited, which have caused doubt to be thrown on the whole subject.

Did then Sophocles ever write tetralogies? In all probability he did for the first few years only of his dramatic career, and this accounts for the small number of satyric plays ascribed to him. The number of these is probably that of his trilogies, but we find none of these latter expressly assigned to him by ancient authorities. Here then we have another proof of the good faith of the scholiasts. If out of Euripides' long list of tetralogies we find four only mentioned, and the same assigned to Aeschylus, it is exactly to be expected that of Sophocles' few trilogies casual citation would not cause the mention of any at all. Now certainly the grammarians had never read the passage of Suidas on which our knowledge is founded, and surely there is no plausible ground for their silence except that they are telling the truth, and are not given over to the invention of tetralogies at random out of their own imaginations.

Later times have not proved so careful or so unimaginative. Schöll, as is well known, devised a whole system of Sophoclean trilogies—an attempt which ended in throwing discredit upon the whole subject; and lately Mr Watkiss Lloyd has endeavoured to prove the coherence in trilogic form of certain of Sophocles' plays. If his argument be accepted, it places a trilogy of this author as late as 409 B.C., the received date of the Philoctetes.

It is more probable that Sophocles did abandon the tetralogy in his own person. Nay, more; he severed all association with it by his increase of the chorus to 15—a most significant abandonment of the old fourfold division of the κύκλιος χόρος. He was released thereby from the necessity of writing satyric dramas. But with these or some substitute for them in the shape either of a fourth tragedy or of a tragi-comedy the tetralogy went on and flourished at the lesser festivals, in the minor theatres, and among the reading public. Set free from the chain of the tetralogy, he now gave to the drama the shape which it finally took under his hand. He made the interest formerly distributed over three plays now centre in the one. Naturally the length of the single drama greatly increased, and its representation in this expanded form had now become possible by reason of the change he had introduced. How

thoroughly the trilogy was incorporated into the single drama may be seen from the fact that the whole trilogy Pandionis of Philocles was constructed out of Sophocles' one play of Tereus.

Let us now briefly examine the disputed passages previously referred to. Firstly, Diogenes Laertius tells us on the authority of Thrasyllus that the four plays of the tetralogy were acted at the four festivals of Dionysia (majora are meant), Lenaea, Panathenaea, and Chutroi (Anthesteria). This seems so absurd—especially the substitution of the Panathenaea for the country Dionysia—that Cobet brackets the whole passage as the work of an ignorant interpolator, and as such it seems to be generally regarded. But surely it looks as if the writer—whether he was Thrasyllus, who would know very little about it, or an interpolator—had after all some hazy idea of the real state of the case. He seems to have known that at the great Dionysia one play only of the tetralogy was acted, and also to have known that others were performed at the smaller festivals. In particular he speaks of the satyric play as having been performed at the Anthesteria, and there is a certain verisimilitude about this statement. The writer may be confused and ignorant in his remarks, but a theory which explains a statement however slightly is surely better than one which dismisses it as mere nonsense. Some critics, it may be observed in passing, have taken up the statement and believed it to be actually true. C. F. Hermann indeed seems to have founded on it his curious theory of the performance of the four plays of the tetralogy on the four successive days of the great Dionysia.

Secondly, we have a passage quoted from the Frogs in which, the beginning of the "Oresteia" being asked for, the beginning of the Choephoroe is given. Now the titles of plays were as we know most uncertain. In many cases certainly one play was known under two or more names, and this is very probably the reason for the incredible number of titles of plays which we find assigned to one writer—the same play being mentioned more than once under its different names. In fact, the name seems in some cases to have been imposed by the spectators, and hence we get such absurd misnomers as the 'Cresphontes' for a play in which the incidents are laid after

the death of the nominal hero. If an example of a double name for an existing tragedy is required, we have that of the Hecuba, which was also known as the 'Troades.' Hence we need not be surprised to find that the Choephoroe was known by more than one title. Nor may we hesitate at the name 'Oresteia' for a single play. It is actually the name applied to a single "lyrical tragedy" of Stesichorus[1]; and if the Oedipodea attributed to Meletus be not a single play, it adds one more to the list of examples by which we prove the persistence of the trilogic form.

But in any case the use of the name 'Oresteia' in this way is an additional proof of the theory stated above. It proves namely that one play of the trilogy had been singled out as the one best fitted for ordinary representation—that the one in fact was taken as representing the whole three, and that, though the great group of plays was certainly familiar to the Athenian citizen, one of them was the play for ordinary performance. There may have been many reasons for the rejection of the other two, but one might suggest in the case of the "Agamemnon" the choral difficulties, and in that of the Eumenides the cause lies on the surface. The terrific character of the play, to which such direful results are attributed in the well-known story told by Pollux, would render it unfit for general representation.

The remaining difficulties are few, and may be briefly treated. First, why is it that we have so few satyric plays mentioned, much less preserved, when there should properly have been one in existence for every tetralogy? The answer is plain. In the case of Sophocles, his personal abandonment of the trilogy set him free from the satyric play, and, as before remarked, the number of such which he did write may be approximately taken as corresponding to the number of tetralogies he produced in conformity to custom before he succeeded in introducing his change. Later on, the satyric play, as adapted only to a primitive audience, and indeed conquered on its own ground by Old Comedy, was replaced either by a fourth tragedy

[1] Fragments collected by Blomfield, *Mus. Crit.* 2, p. 266.

or a tragi-comedy, and at times altogether dropped, as unfitted for the readers and hearers of more polished times. Lastly, we may answer the question "where are the satyric plays?" by the very parallel one "where will be the librettos of modern burlesques fifty years hence? Nay rather, where are they now?" These ephemeral productions, intended merely as the lightest of farces, in all probability as a rule never got beyond stage-copies. Certainly many of them would never be current literature, or likely to be looked upon as anything more than airy trifles, rather to be discarded than owned by the great tragedians who condescended to write them.

It is asked, was the "Capture of Miletus" a trilogy, and if not, why not? In the answer to this question really lies the reply to the whole doubt as to the origin of the trilogy, and the reason for believing it to have existed. It may be taken as certain that down to the time of Phrynichus the old dithyrambic arrangement had so far lingered on that the bulk of the play (as even in the case of the Supplices of Aeschylus) was still choral. The chorus was still the old κύκλιος χόρος of Arion and Stesichorus, fifty in number, dancing and singing round the altar of Dionysus. But the Capture of Miletus we may take to have been well-nigh the last of the old régime, for the Phoenissae is now suspected to have been at least a play in three divisions, with a tripartite chorus—a near approach to the trilogy. Thereafter then Aeschylus divided that chorus completely, and restoring the old satyric drama to some of its former honours, apportioned to it one-fourth of the old chorus, now divided into four bands of twelve, or it may be three of twelve and one of fourteen.

But if we reject this theory of the development of the trilogy, we have a hard fact to encounter and a hard question to answer. What became of the κύκλιος χόρος? where did the original fifty disappear to? how comes it that in 490 B.C. the chorus consists of fifty, and in 480 of twelve? Why did the division take place? Is there any answer to give to this except that the huge drama was divided, with its chorus, both for convenience and artistic effect, into three parts, with their appendix—the trilogy and tetralogy? Deny the existence of

these, and how do we account either for the fall from fifty to twelve, or for the curious subsequent return to fifteen?

The doubts which have been raised as to the trilogy are based on the want of evidence, on the conflict of authorities, and on the lack of a reason for the whole system. It has been sought in this paper to account for the silence, to explain the conflict, and lastly to shew that not only is the existence of the trilogy to be accounted for, but that its non-existence is not to be accounted for—in fact, that any such theory introduces into the question a difficulty far more startling than any it professes to remove.

A. T. S. GOODRICK.

THE PRYTANEUM, THE TEMPLE OF VESTA, THE VESTALS, PERPETUAL FIRES.

THE object of this paper is to prove the common origin of the Greek prytaneum and the Italian temple of Vesta[1], and to suggest an explanation of the origin of the order of the Vestals as well as of the custom of maintaining perpetual fires.

Every Greek state had its prytaneum which may be described as the town-hall of the capital. None but capital cities had a prytaneum. Hence when the king of Athens extended his sway over the whole of Attica, each petty town, hitherto independent, had to abolish its prytaneum and for the future the prytaneum of Athens was the prytaneum of Attica[2]. The essential feature of the prytaneum was its hearth (ἑστία) which differed from other hearths only in this that it was preeminently the hearth of the city, the common hearth[3]. On this hearth there burned

[1] To a minute comparison of Hestia and Vesta Mr Preuner has devoted five hundred laborious pages which it would be rude to characterise as dull and inaccurate to describe as lively. That Mr Preuner has not anticipated the conclusions reached in this paper will appear from the following passage, which I extract from the two hundred and sixty-sixth page of his learned work: "In der That weder die Hestia im griechischen Königshaus entspricht der in der Aedes Vestae zu Rom, noch das Prytaneon der republicanischen Zeit in Hellas der Regia mit dem Vestaheiligthum, und zwar wiederum weder in der republicanischen noch in der königlichen Zeit. Und die Unterschiede bestehen nicht etwa in blossen Modificationen wie sie auch bei Entlehnung statt finden können, es sind generelle Unterschiede." (*Hestia-Vesta*, Tübingen, 1864.)

[2] Thucydides ii. 15; Plutarch, *Theseus* 24.

[3] Pollux i. 7; *id.* ix. 40; κοινὴ ἑστία, Aristotle, *Pol.* 1322 b 8.

a perpetual fire[1]. The prytaneum was sacred to Hestia[2], the personified goddess of the hearth[3]. In the prytaneum ambassadors were entertained and distinguished citizens maintained at the public expense, and it was the head-quarters of the officials known as prytanes[4]. Now considering (1) that the name prytanis is nearly equivalent to king[5], (2) that in some states, *e.g.* Rhodes[6], the prytanes always continued to be the chief magistrates, (3) that the prytanes had their head-quarters

[1] Casaubon on Athenaeus 700 D (vol. III. p. 279 of the separate reprint of his commentary) was of opinion that the fire in the prytaneum was merely a lamp and he is supported by Theocritus xxi. 36 *sq.* as well as by the passage in Athenaeus on which he comments. It is quite possible that in some places the original fire on the hearth may have dwindled into the 'rudimentary organ' of a simple lamp (see below, p. 170), but that this was not universally the case appears from Pausanias' description of the fire in the prytaneum of Elis (v. 15, 9).

[2] Pindar, *Nem.* xi. 1, with the scholiast. For the statement that the Athenian prytaneum was sacred to Pallas there is no better authority than that of the scholiast on Aristides *Panath.* p. 103 ed. Jebb (vol. III. p. 48 ed. Dindorf), the doubtfulness of whose testimony is sufficiently revealed by the hesitation with which he speaks: τὸ δὲ πρυτανεῖον τόπον εἶναι λέγουσιν τῆς Παλλάδος ἱερόν κτλ. In his day the prytaneum clearly lived only in tradition. Weighed against the statements of Pindar and his old scholiast as well as the silence of Pausanias, and the fact that the Athenian prytaneum contained an image of Hestia, the testimony of this feather-weight scholiast kicks the beam.

[3] The Athenian prytaneum contained an image of Hestia (Pausanias i. 18, 3). Whether other prytanea had images of her, we cannot tell.

[4] For the apparent exception to this rule at Athens, see below.

[5] Hesychius πρύτανις· βασιλεύς, ἄρχων, χορηγός, ταμίας, διοικητής; Suidas πρύτανις· διοικητής, προστάτης, φύλαξ, βασιλεύς, ἄρχων, ταμίας, ἔξαρχος; Etym. Magnum πρυτανεῦσαι· διοικῆσαι, προστατεῦσαι, φυλάξαι, βασιλεῦσαι, ταμιεῦσαι. The officials known at Athens and elsewhere as prytanes, were known in some states as ἄρχοντες, in others as βασιλεῖς, Aristotle, *Pol.* 1322 b 28. In Aeschylus (a poet especially conservative of ancient usages) we find the king of Argos thus addressed: πρύτανις ἄκριτος ὢν | κρατύνεις βωμὸν ἑστίαν χθονός (note that the ἑστία of the king or prytanis is the ἑστία of the state), *Suppl.* 370 *sq.* Again in *Prom.* 169 Zeus is spoken of as μακάρων πρύτανις. The old historian Charon of Lampsacus wrote a work on the Spartan kings, whom he called prytanes, Suidas, *s.v.* Χάρων; see Müller's *Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum*, vol. I. p. xvi *sqq.*

[6] Livy xlii. 45; Appian, *Bell. Civ.* iv. 66; Plutarch, *Praec. ger. reip.* xvii. 3. Cp. Polybius xiii. 5, xv. 23, xxvii. 6, xxix. 4. Dionysius Halicarnensis even says τά γέ τοι καλούμενα πρυτανεῖα παρ' αὐτοῖς [the Greeks in general] ἐστιν ἱερὰ καὶ θεραπεύεται πρὸς τῶν ἐχόντων τὸ μέγιστον ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι κράτος, *Antiq. Rom.* ii. 65.

in the prytaneum, (4) that the prytaneum was the mark of a capital city, (5) that at Athens it was the seat of the most ancient law court[1], and (6) that its essential feature was a hearth such as every house possessed, we can hardly help concluding that the prytanis was anciently the king or perhaps rather the chief or headman of a petty independent town and that the prytaneum was his house[2 3]. The king proper (*βασιλεύς*) was the powerful chief who put down the petty chieftains round about, added their territories to his own, and welded the whole into a single state. The memory of this political revolution was clearly preserved in Attica[4] where down to the time of Pausanias some of the small towns still cherished traditions of the days when they had been ruled by kings of their own[5].

This general conclusion is confirmed and illustrated by the history of the prytaneum at Athens. The situation of the Athenian prytaneum in the time of Pausanias is not doubtful. It stood on high ground at the foot of the northern declivity of the acropolis. This situation, indicated by inscriptions and harmonizing with the narrative of Pausanias, is accepted by all modern enquirers[6]. But it is equally certain that in the time

[1] This seems proved by the legal use of the term *πρυτανεῖα* as well as by the nature of the cases which in historical times were tried in the court of the prytaneum (Demosthenes, *Aristocr.* 644; Pollux viii. 120; Pausanias i. 28, 10). Indeed among the innumerable relics of ancient thought and custom preserved, as in a museum, by the law, there can be few if any that bear the marks of a hoarier antiquity than the court of the prytaneum.

[2] Observe that the hearth in the prytaneum appears to have had the same privilege of sanctuary as the hearth in the king's house; Plutarch, *De mul. virt.* 17 compared with Thucydides i. 136.

[3] The identity of the prytaneum with the king's house had already been assumed by Duncker (*Geschichte des Alterthums*, 3rd ed. 1881, vol. v. pp. 83, 467, 470), and (more ambiguously) by Preller (*Griechische Mythologie*, 3rd ed. 1872, i. p. 345).

[4] Thucydides ii. 15; Plutarch, *Thes.* cc. 24. 32.

[5] Pausanias i. cc. 14. 31. 38.

[6] Leake, *Topography of Athens*, i. pp. 8, 252, 269; E. Curtius, *Attische Studien* ii. p. 62; *id. Erläuternder Text der sieben Karten zur Topographie von Athen*, pp. 45 *sq.*, 53; *id. Atlas von Athen*, p. 12; *id. Karten von Attika, Erläuternder Text*, p. 6; C. Wachsmuth, *Die Stadt Athen im Alterthum*, p. 221; C. Bursian, *Geographie von Griechenland* i. p. 295; Dyer, *Ancient Athens*, p. 263; Baedeker, *Griechenland*, p. 27 (on p. 77 the author has confused the tholus with the prytaneum); Milchhöffer in Baumeister's *Denkmäler des klassischen Alterthums*

of Pausanias the prytanes sacrificed and dined, not in the prytaneum, but in the Round-house (Tholus, a circular building in a different part of Athens)[1]. Persons maintained for honour's sake at the expense of the state always received their allowances in the prytaneum, and that the prytanes did so originally there can be no doubt. Why did they not continue to do so? A glance at the topography of Athens will supply the answer. In historical times the government offices[2] stood in the inner Ceramicus, the busy centre of Athenian city life[3]. That the Ceramicus was not the oldest quarter of the city may be inferred from its situation (on the low ground to the north-west of the acropolis) and follows from the express statement of Thucydides[4]. If then the Ceramicus was a comparatively new quarter, we can understand why it never contained the prytaneum[5]. For the prytaneum no doubt stood in the oldest part of the town and there would always be a strong sentimental and religious feeling against shifting this ancient hearth of the city to the newer quarters. Hence when the government offices were transferred for the sake of convenience to the bustling new town, the prytaneum would be left to slumber, with other venerable relics of the past[6], in the quiet back streets of the sleepy old town. The Council Chamber[7] formed one of the group of public offices in the new town and as the prytanes were the committee for the time being of the Council their presence was of course required in the Ceramicus. Thus it would have been obviously incon-

s. Athen, I. p. 172; G. F. Hertzberg, *Athen*, p. 26.

[1] Pausanias i. 5, 1; Pollux viii. 155; Suidas, Harpocration, Timaeus *Lex. Plat.*, s. v. *θόλος*; Bekker, *Anecdota Graeca* I. p. 264.

[2] *τὰ ἀρχεῖα*, Bekker, *An. Gr. l. c.*; Leake, *Topography of Athens* I. p. 243.

[3] For a vivid picture of this quarter of the city with its motley life see E. Curtius, *Attische Studien* II. p. 42 *sqq.*

[4] ii. 15, *τὸ δὲ πρὸ τούτου ἡ ἀκρόπολις ἦ νῦν οὖσα πόλις ἦν καὶ τὸ ὑπ' αὐτὴν πρὸς νότον μάλιστα τετραμμένον.*

[5] When the scholiast on Aristophanes (*Peace* 1183) says that the statues of the Eponymi stood near the prytaneum, he confuses the Tholus with the prytaneum. The Eponymi stood over above the Tholus (Pausanias i. 5, 1), *i.e.* on the northern slope of the Areopagus overlooking the Ceramicus.

[6] The Agraulium (Pausanias i. 18), the Bucoleum (Suidas *s. v. ἄρχων*; Bekker, *Anecd. Gr.* I. 449, 20), and the Basileum (Pollux viii. 111).

[7] *βουλευτήριον*, Pausanias i. 3, 5.

venient for them to go up for lunch or an early dinner to the prytaneum[1]. To toil up the steep and dusty street in the sweltering heat of a southern noon would have been trying to elderly gentlemen (of whom there was no doubt a fair sprinkling among the fifty prytanes) and to hurry down to their office immediately after lunch would have been exceedingly bad for their digestion. It was natural therefore that a building should be put up for their convenience in the neighbourhood of the Council Chamber where they could dine and sacrifice without the expenditure of time and energy which daily visits to the prytaneum during business hours would have entailed. This building was the Tholus or Round-house[2]. On the other hand the distinguished persons whom Athens delighted to honour by providing them with a free breakfast, lunch, and dinner every day of their lives, as they had no business to take them down to the Ceramicus, had also no need

[1] The prytaneum lay (as mentioned above) at the foot of the northern declivity of the acropolis between what are now known as the chapel of the Saviour (Sotir) and the chapel of Simeon (Wachsmuth and Milchhöffer *llcc.*). The height of the chapel of the Saviour above the sea is 110·09 metres (Curtius, *Atlas von Athen*, p. 10), that of the site of the στοὰ βασίλειος (near which was the Council Chamber, Pausanias i. 3, 1 and 5, 1) 62·5 metres (*Atlas von Athen*, Bl. III). I follow, without attempting to pass judgment on, the usual hypothesis that the prytaneum of Pausanias' time was the old prytaneum and not (as Curtius supposes) a structure of Roman times. But my argument would only be strengthened if we could accept the theory (put forward by Curtius with more of ingenuity than proof in the second part of his *Attische Studien*) that the Old Market of Athens, and with it the old prytaneum, lay on the southern side of the Acropolis. For in that case the prytanes would have had a much longer and wearier way to trudge from the New Market (in the Ceramicus) to the Old. They would have been obliged to cross the saddle between the Acropolis and the Areopagus and skirt the southern face of the Acropolis, without so much as the shadow of the great rock to screen them from the fierce glare of the sun.

Dr Dyer, doing battle with Curtius, makes Plutarch (*Theseus* 24) assert roundly that the prytaneum of his day stood where it had stood since the time of Theseus. (*Ancient Athens*, p. 264.) All that Plutarch does say is that the prytaneum of Theseus stood "where the city (τὸ ἄστυ) now stands"—a sufficiently vague expression. Dr Dyer may be right in crossing swords with Curtius on this question, but if he is to vanquish so redoubtable a *sabreur*, he would need sharper weapons than a misplaced comma and a little bad Greek.

[2] Pausanias i. 5, 1.

to shift their quarters there, and they continued to take their meals regularly up at the prytaneum[1]. The Tholus where the prytanes dined was a round building with a pointed, umbrella-shaped roof[2]. So unusual a shape of building was probably adopted for some special reason and this reason could hardly be other than that this was the shape of the prytaneum itself, of which the Round-house was in some respects the representative. When with the growth of the city in a new direction it was found necessary to strip the prytaneum of some of its functions and transfer them to a new building in a more convenient site, it was but natural, considering the sacred and venerable character of the building, that the new structure should be a close copy of the old; if the new was round, so probably was the old[3]. Recollecting that the Italian temples of Vesta (the correspondence of which to the Greek prytanea will be shown on independent grounds) were round[4], we may perhaps venture to generalise the conclusion arrived at for the prytaneum of Athens and say that originally the prytanea of Greece were round[5].

[1] On the separation of the two sets of meals, see Curtius, *Attische Studien* II. p. 63 *sqq.* and Westermann in Pauly's *Real-Encyclopädie s. v.* σίτησις. The ground about the prytaneum was found littered with lists of the prytanes and state-pensioners (ἀείσιτοι), Milchhöffer *l. c.* In the "Field of Famine" (Λιμοῦ πεδίον) which adjoined the prytaneum we may perhaps detect a sarcastic reference to the persons who fared sumptuously every day at the expense of their less fortunate fellow citizens, or perhaps rather a feeling allusion to the numerous lazzaroni (familiar to every visitor to the south of Europe) who sat (and still sit) at the gates of the rich.

[2] Hesychius, Harpocration, Suidas, Timaeus *Lex. Plat.*, *s. v.* θόλος; Etym. Magnum *s. v.* σκιαί.

[3] Curtius appears to share this view, if we may judge from his expression: "Es gab täglich eine zwiefache vom Staate gedeckte Tafel und *eine zwiefache Tafelrunde*," *Attische Studien*, II. p. 64.

[4] The very word tholus is used of the temple of Vesta by Ovid (*Fasti* vi. 282, 296). Cp. Servius on Virgil, Aen. ix. 408, "Alii tholum aedium sacrarum dicunt genus *fabricae Vestae et *Panthaere.....Aedes autem rotundas tribus deis dicunt fieri debere, Vestae, Dianae, vel Herculi vel Mercurio."

[5] The excavations at Olympia have raised a presumption that the prytaneum there was square (Curtius und Adler, *Olympia und Umgegend*, p. 35). But owing to the superposition of later buildings the excavation of the prytaneum was very laborious and its results uncertain. Even if it were proved to have been square, we should

If the prytaneum was originally the house of the chief (prytanis), we should expect to find it forming part of, or at least adjoining, the king's palace (*βασιλεῖον*) at Athens. When the *πρύτανις* of Athens rose to be *βασιλεύς* of Attica, his increase of dignity would be marked by an increase in the splendour of his house—his *πρυτανεῖον* became a *βασιλεῖον*. In point of fact the prytaneum did stand near (how near we cannot say) to the palace[1]. The latter was the head-quarters of the tribal kings, four in number, one for each of the ancient Attic tribes[2]. In historical times these tribal kings were still men of the old blue blood; their functions were largely sacerdotal but they also presided in the ancient criminal court of the prytaneum. What their original relations were to the kings of Attica cannot now be determined; but their titles, their residence in the palace, their analogy (as priests and titular kings) to the *rex sacrificulus* at Rome (whom we know to have been a representative of the old kings), all point to the conclusion that they were the representatives of the ancient tribal chieftains. And when we consider that their head-quarters adjoined the prytaneum, that they presided in the criminal court of the prytaneum, and that they themselves are spoken of by Plutarch[3] in the same chapter as kings and prytanes indifferently, we have fresh reason for confidence in the view that the prytanis was originally the chief and the prytaneum his house.

The history of the palace at Athens resembled that of the prytaneum. As some of the functions of the latter were transferred to a building more conveniently situated for the trans-

hardly be surprised that in this splendid centre of Greek life the antiquated prytaneum should have made way for a new and grander structure in the fashionable style of the day. In the common meeting ground of all Greeks architectural conservatism could hardly maintain so firm a footing as in individual states.

It would be unsafe to lay much weight on the evidence of Suidas (who defines *πρυτανεῖον* by *θόλος* and *θόλος* by *πρυτανεῖον*) because, like the scholiast on Aristophanes referred to above, he may have confused these two buildings at Athens. But this confusion would be all the more likely to arise if the buildings were of similar shape.

[1] The *βασιλεῖον* was near the *βουκολεῖον* (Pollux viii. 111) and the *βουκολεῖον* was near the *πρυτανεῖον* (Suidas *s. v. ἄρχων*; Bekker, *An. Gr.* 449, 20).

[2] Pollux viii. 111, 120.

[3] *Solon* 19.

action of public business, while the old building retained the title, together with the less pressing business, of the prytaneum, so some of the duties previously no doubt discharged by the *βασιλεύς* in the *βασιλεῖον* were for similar reasons transferred to the *στοὰ βασίλειος*[1], the office of the *ἄρχων βασιλεύς* in the Ceramicus. But like the prytaneum the older building retained its title: it was still the *βασιλεῖον*, while the office in the Ceramicus was only the *στοὰ βασίλειος*.

To sum up: the prytaneum, a round building with a pointed, umbrella-shaped roof, was originally the house of the king, chief, or headman (prytanis) of an independent village or town and it contained a fire which was kept constantly burning. It is only necessary to add that when a colony was sent out, the fire for the chief's house (prytaneum) in the new village was taken from that in the chief's house of the old village[2].

Turning to Italy we at once identify the Latin Vesta with the Greek Hestia[3] (to whom the prytaneum was sacred). But while in Greece the original identity of the goddess with the domestic hearth was still shown by the identity of their names, in Italy their relationship was so far obscured that the hearth had resigned its old name to the goddess (who had really much less claim to it) and was content to be known by the modest title of *focus*. But the origin of the goddess, if obscured, was not forgotten[4], and in that 'twilight of the gods' when Vesta too paled her ineffectual fires, her humble birth was dragged to light and all her little peccadillos held up to scorn by the pitiless logic of a great christian divine[5]. Vesta, then, like Hestia, was originally the fire on the hearth, and hence the main feature in her sanctuary, as in the prytaneum, was an ever burning fire. To complete the resemblance it is needful

[1] Pausanias i. 3, 1.

[2] Etym. Magnum 694. 28; Schol. on Aristides, *Panath.* p. 103 ed. Jebb.

[3] G. Curtius, *Greek Etymology*, p. 400; H. Jordan in Preller's *Römische Mythologie*, 3rd ed., II. p. 155 n. 3.

[4] Ovid, *Fasti* 285, "Nec tu aliud Vestam quam vivam intellige flammam."

[5] Augustine, *De civ. dei* iv. 10. Even before Augustine, Firmicus Maternus had taken up his parable and suggested that as Vesta was after all only the kitchen fire she should have cooks to look after her and not virgin priestesses who were often no better than they should be (*De errore profanarum religionum* 14, 3).

to show that the so-called Temple of Vesta was originally not a temple but the king's house.

In the first place her so-called temple never was, strictly speaking, a temple at all. This fact we have on the authority of Varro himself[1]. Adjoining the temple or house of Vesta were two buildings, the one known as the Atrium Vestae, the other as the Regia, and tradition asserted that on the site of one or other of these buildings or on that of the temple itself once stood the Palace of Numa[2]. Now as the Regia formed the residence, in republican times, of the Pontifex Maximus[3] and Rex Sacrificulus[4], both of whom succeeded to the priestly functions of the king, there is little room to doubt that the temple of Vesta was once part of the king's house, and since its essential feature was its hearth, we may reasonably conclude that this hearth was originally the hearth of the king's house. The Lares and Penates which were worshipped here[5] as in every private house were no doubt originally the Lares and Penates of the king. In fact the public hearth with its gods was a simple repetition of what was to be seen in every Roman house: the only difference was that here the householder (the king) had departed[6].

[1] Aulus Gellius xiv. 7, 8 "Inter quae id quoque scriptum reliquit [Varro] non omnes aedes sacras templa esse ac ne aedem quidem Vestae templum esse." Cp. Servius on Virgil, *Aen.* vii. 152, ix. 4.

[2] Ovid *Fasti* vi. 263; *id. Trist.* iii. 1, 28 *sqq.*; Solinus i. 21. Cp. Servius on Virgil, *Aen.* viii. 363.

[3] Burn's *Rome and the Campagna*, p. 78.

[4] Servius *l. c.*

[5] Marquardt's *Römische Staatsverwaltung* III. p. 244 *sq.*

[6] The resemblance of the Italian temple of Vesta to the Greek prytaneum did not escape Dionysius Halicarnensis and he explained it by supposing that the former was a direct imitation of the latter (*Ant. Rom.* ii. 65). Mommsen also notes the resemblance and appears to account for it in the same way (*History of Rome* I. p. 125). The parallels which I shall presently cite make it much more probable that the prytaneum and the temple of Vesta were independent developments from a common original type. Mommsen however has approached, if not quite grasped, the idea that the hearth of Vesta was of old neither more nor less than the hearth of the king (I. pp. 70, 124).

A distinct tradition of the time when each head of a clan was at the same time priest of Vesta for his people, is preserved in Dionysius Halicarnensis *l.c.* Examples of the king acting as priest for his people need not be multiplied; I will cite only one: the Eastern Slavonians had no regular class of priests; "the chief of the *Rod* [clan] exercised the functions of priest, king, and judge." Ralston, *Songs of the Russian People*, p. 83.

Two more points of resemblance to the prytaneum may be noted. In the first place the traditions which connected the Vesta and Penates of Rome with those of Alba and Lavinium point clearly to the custom of colonies lighting their perpetual fires at the ever-burning hearth of the mother town, for there can be little doubt that Alba was the earliest seat of the Latin race in Latium.

In the second place the Italian temple of Vesta like the Greek prytaneum was a round building. In regard to the Roman temple of Vesta tradition preserved the memory of the time when its walls were made of wattled osiers and the roof was of thatch[1]; indeed with that peculiar clinging to the forms of the past which is characteristic of royalty and religion, the inmost shrine continued down even to late times to be formed of the same simple materials[2]. Thus looking back into the dim past, as our eyes get accustomed to the gloom, we descry the chiefs of the old Graeco-Italian clans dwelling in round huts of wattled osiers with peaked roofs of thatch. And through the open door of the hut we see a fire burning on the hearth. Who tended the fire?

No doubt the chief himself saw to it that the fire was kept constantly burning[3], but the actual gathering of sticks and putting them on the fire probably fell on those maids-of-all-work in early households—the wife and daughters. Afterwards the fire in the hut which royalty had relinquished to religion was tended by maidens, four, later six in number, who entered on the service in childhood (between the years of six and ten) and continued in it for thirty years, when they were free to return to the world[4]. These vestal virgins appear to have been under the *patria potestas* of the king and, under the republic, of his successor the Pontifex Maximus[5]. But if they were under the *patria potestas* of the king, they must have been either his wives or daughters; their rule of celibacy excludes the former

[1] Ovid *Fasti* vi. 261 *sq.*

[2] Festus *s.v. penus.*

[3] See the reference to Dionysius Halicarnensis on p. 155 n. 1, and cp. p. 158 n. 1.

[4] Dionysius Hal. ii. 67; Aulus Gellius i. 12. Cf. Marquardt, *Römische Staatsverwaltung* III. p. 323 *sqq.*

[5] Marquardt *ib.* 241.

supposition; it remains therefore that they were his daughters[1]. Various circumstances confirm this view. Down to the time of Augustus the *rex sacrificulus* (one of the representatives of the old king) continued to live in the Regia adjoining the temple of Vesta and the Vestals lived in a house abutting on the Regia[2]. It appears that originally they had to be of patrician birth[3]. They were treated with marks of respect usually accorded to royalty: thus on the streets they were preceded by a lictor and the highest magistrates made way for them; they sometimes enjoyed the exceptional privilege of riding in a carriage; at public games a place of honour was assigned to them; and after death they, like the Imperators, were allowed to be buried within the city walls "because they were above the laws[4]." Again they enjoyed the royal privilege of mercy, for if they met a criminal on the way to execution, his life was spared, just as in Madagascar "if a criminal can obtain sight of the sovereign, he is pardoned whether before or after conviction...Even criminals at work on the high-road, if they can catch sight of the monarch as he passes by, may claim their pardon. Hence, by a sort of anomaly in this singular law, they are ordered to withdraw from the road when the sovereign is known to be coming by[5]." The custom seems to have its root in the very common unwillingness of the sovereign to be reminded of death[6]. If this explana-

[1] The number of the Vestals perhaps points to a union of tribes and their chiefs. Festus (p. 265 ed. Lindemann) thought that they represented the "first and second Titienses, Ramnes and Luceres," and there was a tradition of the time when there was as yet no common hearth for the whole people, but only a common hearth for each *curia* on which the headman of the *curia* offered sacrifice (Dionys. Halic. ii. 65)—a state of things corresponding perhaps to the condition of Attica before the *συνοικισμός*, when each village had as yet its own prytaneum.

[2] Dion Cassius (liv. 27) says that Augustus gave up the Regia to the Vestals: *τὴν μέντοι τοῦ βασιλέως τῶν ἱερῶν ταῖς ἀειπαρθένοις ἔδωκεν, ἐπειδὴ ὁμότοιχος ταῖς οἰκήσεσιν αὐτῶν ἦν.* The foundations of the temple of Vesta were discovered in 1874 and the house of the Vestals in 1884; H. Jordan, *Der Tempel der Vesta, die Vestalinnen, und ihr Haus*, in the *Historische und philologische Aufsätze* published in honour of E. Curtius' seventieth birthday, Berlin 1884.

[3] Marquardt, *ib.* 325.

[4] "Quia legibus non tenentur," Servius on Virgil, *Aen.* xi. 204.

[5] Ellis, *History of Madagascar*, i. p. 376.

[6] For an example of this, see Wood's *Natural History of Man*, i. p. 72.

tion is correct we may be sure that no such "march past" took place in regal as was often witnessed in imperial Rome: *morituri te salutant.*

The functions of the Vestals[1] consisted of those simple household duties which naturally fell to the women even of a chief's family in the olden time. They looked after the fire, fetched water from the spring[2], mopped the house, and baked

[1] Marquardt, *ib.* 329.

[2] Down to the latest times this water had to be fetched, as it was fetched in the beginning, from a natural source (springs or rivers), in Rome from the spring of Egeria or the Camenae. This piece of religious conservatism was pathetically illustrated last year, when the excavations at Rome revealed the fact that water was never 'laid on' the house of the Vestals: the benefit of those great aqueducts which brought water from the Alban hills to the rest of Rome was denied to the Vestals alone. (H. Jordan, *Der Tempel der Vesta*, p. 215 *sq.*) When water-pipes were first introduced at Rome, they were no doubt condemned as irreligious, and pious people would have nothing to do with them. Similarly, bridges at Rome and elsewhere were long regarded with suspicion and existed only in a deprecatory manner under the scowl of a justly offended god. For is it not an injury to the river god to rob him of his food by carrying dryshod over his head the people who in the course of nature would have been drowned at the ford? Clearly it is but common justice to give him 'compensation for disturbance' in the shape of a toll of human blood. At Rome Father Tiber kindly agreed to waive all proprietary rights for an annual consideration of two dozen persons flung from the old wooden bridge into his yellow stream. Thus to reconcile science and religion was the special business of the Big Bridgemaker —*Pontifex Maximus*—a cross between a theologian and a civil engineer. In Germany, when a man is drowning in a river, they say "the spirit of the stream is getting his yearly victim;" Grimm, *Deutsche Mythologie*, p. 409. In England, the spirit of the Ribble (known as Peg o' Nell) was content with a life every seven years; W. Henderson, *Folk-lore of the Northern Counties*, p. 265. When a new bridge was built at Halle in 1843 the people thought that a child should have been built into it; Grimm, *D. M.* 956. When the Hooghly bridge was being built at Calcutta, the natives "got hold of the idea that Mother Ganges, indignant at being bridged, had at last consented to submit to the insult on the condition that each pier of the structure was founded on a layer of children's heads;" "Times" correspondent at Calcutta, 1st August 1880, quoted in Gomme's *Folk-lore relics of early village life*, p. 29. In Albania there is a general tradition that human sacrifices were offered when a bridge was built. When a new bridge was built over the Arcen twelve sheep were killed and their heads placed under the foundations of the pillars; J. G. von Hahn, *Albanesische Studien*, I. p. 161. Traditions of human sacrifices at the building of bridges are current also in Greece, and it is even said that in Zacynthus the people would still offer such sacrifices if they did not fear

cakes of meal. We are reminded of the princess Nausicaa in the *Odyssey* washing the family linen and of those royal damsels

the law; B. Schmidt, *Das Volksleben der Neugriechen*, p. 197 *sq.* For less precious sacrifices still offered annually in Austria and Germany to water spirits see Th. Vernalecken, *Mythen und Bräuche des Volkes in Oesterreich*, p. 168; Ad. Wuttke, *Deutscher Volksaberglaube* § 429. Cf. Gray's *China* II. p. 34 *sqq.* Formerly in Germany bridges were often built by the devil; Grimm *D. M.* 853. In Herzegovina the Moslems regard the office of engineer with pious horror and curse a new bridge when they pass it as the devil's own handiwork; A. J. Evans, *Through Bosnia and Herzegovina*, p. 314.

We can now understand why no iron was allowed to be used either in the construction or repair of the old wooden bridge over the Tiber (see the passages quoted in Jordan's *Topographie der Stadt Rom im Alterthum* I. i. p. 396). The reason was not, as Mommsen appears to suppose, political (viz. in order that the bridge might the more easily be broken down at the approach of an enemy), but religious. In the history of man iron is a modern innovation as compared to bronze and still more to wood and stone; therefore like every innovation it is offensive to the gods. Hence no iron was used in making the old Tiber bridge, just as amongst the Jews no iron tool was used in building the temple at Jerusalem (1 *Kings* vii. 7) or in making an altar (*Exodus* xx. 25). (The latter may be a consequence of the fact that the original altar was of natural unhewn stones, but the analogy of the temple makes the other way.) Arrian found an altar of unhewn stone at Trebizond and kindly 'restored' it, little wotting of the impiety he was guilty of (*Periplus Ponti Euxini* § 2). In making the clavie (one of the usual Yule-tide fire-wheels) at Burghead in Scotland, no hammer was allowed to be used; the hammering had to be done with a stone (E. J. Guthrie, *Old Scottish Customs*, London and Glasgow 1885, p. 223). Again, the men who made the need-fire in Scotland had to divest themselves of all metal (Grimm, *D. M.* 507). In Cappadocia it was not allowed to slay the victim with a knife; it had to be beaten to death with a club (Strabo xv. 3, 15). The implements employed by the Roman priests were of bronze (Macrobius, *Saturn.* v. 19, 11 *sqq.*; Servius on Virgil *Aen.* i. 448; Joannes Lydus, *De mensibus*, i. 31). It is this dislike of the old deities to iron which makes it so effective a charm against them; iron keeps off angry spirits as a fire does wild beasts. Thus when Scotch fishermen were at sea and one of them happened to take the name of God in vain, the first man who heard him, called out "Cauld airn," at which every man of the crew grasped the nearest bit of iron and held it fast for a while (Guthrie p. 149). With a similar intention the Moors of Morocco put a knife or dagger under a sick man's pillow (A. Leared, *Morocco and the Moors*, p. 273). For more examples see L. Strackerjan, *Aberglaube und Sagen aus dem Herzogthum Oldenburg*, § 233; A. Wuttke, *Deutscher Volksaberglaube*, § 414 *sq.*; Tylor, *Primitive Culture* I. p. 140. As was to be expected, the dislike of gods to iron is shared by kings. The king of Corea "is hedged round with a divinity that has an antipathy to iron. This metal must never touch his august body" (W. E. Griffis, *Corea the Hermit Nation*, London 1882, p. 219).

who going forth to draw water found Demeter sitting sad and weary under the shadow of an olive tree by the Maiden's Well. In short in those early times the daughters were the servants of the house, a daughter married out of the house was a servant lost, and hence it would be natural that the father should seek to keep at least one daughter at home to do housemaid's work. From this simple origin, I venture to conjecture, arose the order of the Vestals. They were the unmarried daughters whom the chief kept at home to mind the house, their special duties being to fetch water and attend to the fire. These duties would naturally be discharged first by the elder, and after their marriage, by the younger daughters, and in time it would come to be an obligation binding on one at least of the daughters (probably the youngest) not to marry out of the house in her parents' life. Hence the obligation of temporary celibacy; and it is to be observed that at Rome the vow of the Vestals was only for thirty years, so that every Vestal was free to marry at the age of thirty-six or forty at the latest—a rule which tallies perfectly with the above theory of the origin of the obligation of celibacy, for by that time the daughter's services would probably be no longer needed in the house of her parents. Why this long service at home, and with it the obligation of celibacy, was binding on the daughters of chiefs more than on those of common men will appear presently[1]. That a religious order of so much dignity and importance as that of the Vestals should have arisen from so humble a beginning, need surprise no one. From the unthinking majority of mankind long established customs receive a blind homage approaching or equalling that which they pay to the unchanging laws of nature; time elevates the mean and sanctifies the commonplace, till men may end by believing, as they did believe at Rome, that the safety of a great empire hangs on the twirling of a housemaid's mop[2].

[1] A reminiscence of the time when the ultimate responsibility for the maintenance of the fire rested with the king, though the immediate superintendence fell to his daughter, may perhaps be found in a ceremony regularly performed by the Vestals: on a certain day they went to the *rex sacrorum* (the representative of the old king) and said, "Watchest thou O King? Watch." Servius on Virgil, *Aen.* x. 228.

[2] The question naturally suggests itself: if the temple of Vesta and the

The question still remains, why was so much importance attached to the maintenance of a perpetual fire? The extinction of this fire at Rome was regarded as the greatest misfortune that could befall the state; it was thought to portend the destruction of the empire and expiatory sacrifices were offered and ceremonies performed in order to avert the evil omen[1]. Of course, on the principle just stated, once the custom of maintaining a perpetual fire was started its final canonisation, so to speak, was almost inevitable. But what started the custom? That its history goes back to the embryo state of human civilisation seems proved by the fact that when the fire chanced to go out it was formally rekindled by the most primitive of all modes of lighting a fire, that of rubbing two sticks against each other[2]. It is probable therefore that some light may be thrown on the Roman custom by comparing it with the customs of peoples in earlier stages of civilisation[3].

Turning to South Africa, we are told by a distinguished traveller that amongst the Damaras the chief's daughter "is to

prytaneum both sprang from the chief's house and if the Vestals were originally his daughters, why was there not developed an order of Vestals in Greece, to attend to the perpetual fire in the prytaneum? To this we can only reply that many circumstances may have occurred to prevent the custom developing in the particular line which it followed in Italy. The chief, e.g. may have had no daughters, or if he had he may have preferred to leave the household duties to slaves. In classical times the fire in the prytaneum was attended to by elderly widows (γυναῖκες πεπαυμέναι γάμων, Plutarch, *Numa* 9). It is possible, as Thomas Hyde suggested, that the Greeks had tried the system of Vestal virgins and found it wanting (*Historia religionis veterum Persarum*, p. 142).

[1] Dionysius Halic. *Ant. Rom.* ii. 67; Livy xxviii. 11.

[2] Festus s. v. *ignis*, p. 78 ed. Lindemann. Cp. Tylor, *Early History of Mankind*, p. 237 *sqq.*; Klemm, *Culturwissenschaft, Das Feuer*, p. 67; A. Kuhn, *Die Herabkunft des Feuers*, p. 12 *sqq.*

[3] A section of Mr Preuner's learned work bears the heading "Ueber arische Parallelen" (*Hestia-Vesta*, p. 416). This looks promising and we start off in gallant style with a comparison of Vesta to the Indian Agni. But the audacity of this comparison appears to have taken Mr Preuner's breath away, for after making it he stops as dead as if he had been shot: "Allein wir bleiben hiebei stehen." Here then we will let Mr Preuner stand and get his wind, while we venture a little way from the weary highroad of Greece and Rome into the virgin forest of comparative custom and religion. It is true that there are certain conspicuous 'Notices to trespassers' warning us back, but nobody minds them.

the Damaras what the Vestal was amongst the ancient Romans; for, besides attending to the sacrifices, it is her duty to keep up the 'holy fire.' Outside the chief's hut, where he is accustomed to sit in the day-time, a fire is always kept burning; but, in case of rain or bad weather, it is transferred to the hut of the priestess, who, should it be deemed advisable to change the site of the village, precedes the oxen with a portion of this consecrated fire, every possible care being taken to prevent it being extinguished. Should however this calamity happen, the whole tribe is immediately assembled, and large expiatory offerings of cattle are made; after which the fire is re-lit in the primitive way—namely by friction..... A portion of such fire is also given to the head man of a Kraal, when about to remove from that of the chief. The duties of a Vestal then devolve on the daughter of the emigrant[1]." Observe that "the hut of the priestess" here mentioned is the chief's hut, for the priestess is his daughter and the chief has as many houses as wives. The daughter who acts as priestess is probably (according to Mr Andersson) the daughter of the chief or favourite wife[2]. To complete the resemblance between these African chieftains and the old Graeco-Italian kings, it is only needful to add that the Damara huts are circular and are constructed of pliant sticks lashed together, so as to form a pointed umbrella-shaped roof, brushwood being inwoven between the ribs and mud plastered over the brushwood[3].

Mark the complete correspondence between Damaraland and ancient Italy. In both we see the chief's round hut, formed of wattled osiers, with its umbrella-like roof. In the hut (or outside of it in fine weather) burns a perpetual fire tended by the vestal his daughter; its extinction is regarded

[1] C. J. Andersson, *Lake Ngami*, pp. 223, 224.

[2] That the daughter who acts as priestess is unmarried is not stated in my authorities (C. J. Andersson, *op. cit.*; Waitz, *Anthropologie der Naturvölker* II. p. 416; J. G. Wood, *Natural History of Man* I. p. 348; G. Fritsch, *Die Eingeborenen Süd-Afrika's*, p. 233; Bastian, *Der Papua des dunkeln Inselnreichs*, p. 257 *sq.*) but seems a natural inference from the nature of her duties.

[3] F. Galton, *Tropical South Africa*, p. 191; Wood, I. p. 343 *sq.* Andersson (*op. cit.* p. 225) says that the huts are semi-circular, but he means hemispherical.

as a great calamity, to be expiated by sacrifices; it is rekindled by friction; and when a new village is founded (or colony sent out) fire from the old sacred fire is taken to be the sacred fire of the new village[1].

When we have thus tracked the custom of maintaining a perpetual fire to a savage tribe in Africa, a simple explanation of its origin is not far to seek. Savages are commonly obliged to make fire by rubbing two sticks against each other, in the form either of the fire-drill or of the stick-and-groove[2]. The process is laborious at the best of times, and it is especially so in wet weather. Hence it is convenient to keep a fire constantly burning from which other fires may be kindled as they are needed[3]. This convenience rises to necessity in the case of savages who do not know how to make fire. Thus the Andaman Islanders, according to Mr E. H. Man (whom an eleven years residence in the Islands and an intimate acquaintance with the people entitle to speak with authority), have always been ignorant of the art of producing fire, and hence they take the utmost pains to prevent its extinction. "When they all leave an encampment with the intention of returning in a few days, besides taking with them one or more smouldering logs, wrapped in leaves if the weather be wet, they place a large burning log or faggot in some sheltered spot, where, owing to the character and condition of the wood invariably selected on these occasions, it smoulders for several days, and can easily be rekindled when required[4]." Here we see

[1] The same applies to Greece, except that in Greece there is no evidence that the fire was tended by the chief's daughter.

[2] See Tylor *l. c.*

[3] This obvious explanation of the origin of perpetual fires is given by Dr Gustav Fritsch in his valuable work *Die Eingeborenen Süd-Afrika's* (Breslau 1872), p. 232. It had occurred to me independently. Cp. also R. Taylor, *New Zealand and its inhabitants* (London 1870), p. 368, and Lubbock, *Origin of Civilisation*, p. 312.

[4] E. H. Man, *Aboriginal Inhabitants of the Andaman Islands*, Trübner & Co. [1885], p. 82. How the Andamanese (or mankind in general) got fire originally is a question which does not here concern us. That fire was first procured from a tree struck by lightning is unlikely, though the peculiar sanctity which the Parsis ascribe to such fire and the pains they take to procure it might put us on this scent. (See D. J. Karaka, *History of the modern Parsis*, London, 1884, II. p. 213.) Mr Man inclines to think that the

the perpetual fire, pure and simple, the maintenance of which is a mere matter of practical necessity and has not yet been elevated into a religious obligation; for we are assured by the same excellent authority that the Andamanese do not hold fire sacred and have no superstitious beliefs in reference to its extinction[1]. Again the Tasmanians, we are positively assured, never remembered a time when they were obliged to make fire; even the method of kindling fire by friction was unknown to them. Hence they never allowed the fire to die out; when they migrated, fire-brands were carried by the women, one of whose duties it was to keep up the perpetual fire[2].

In a village the perpetual fire would be most likely to be maintained in the chief's house and the persons who would most naturally look after it would be the chief's wife or daughters. Amongst the Damaras and old Italians this duty devolved on the daughters, and that this was often the case may perhaps be inferred from the fact that we find perpetual fires tended by virgins in other parts of the world[3]. Thus in Lithuania the holy fire was maintained in the temple of Praurónia by maidens who had taken a vow of chastity[4]. At Kildare in

Andamanese got their fire from one or other of the two volcanos (one of them now extinct) in the Islands. This so far confirms Oscar Peschel's view of the origin of fire among men (*Völkerkunde*, 6te Aufl. 1885, p. 138). On this view the heaven from which Prometheus stole his fire was the "skyish head" of some great volcano.

[1] Man, *op. cit.* p. 83. Mr Man further informs us that "while it is the women's business to collect the wood, the duty of maintaining the fires, whether at home or while travelling by land or sea, is not confined to them, but is undertaken by those of either sex who have most leisure or are least burdened."

[2] The Rev. Mr Dove, quoted by James Bonwick, *Daily life and origin of the Tasmanians*, p. 20. On the other hand Mr Bonwick, standing up for his ill-starred protegés, stoutly asserts that there is plenty of evidence that they knew how to make fire. But the only evidence he adduces is that of a respectable bushranger. See also Tylor's *Early History of Mankind*, p. 235 *sq.*

[3] Mallet (*Northern Antiquities*, I. p. 120, ed. 1809) says: "The goddess Frigga was usually served by King's daughters, whom they called prophetesses and goddesses; these pronounced oracles, devoted themselves to perpetual virginity, and kept up the sacred fire in her temples." But there appears to be no good authority for this statement, which is omitted in the revised edition of Mallet by J. A. Blackwell.

[4] A. Bastian, *Der Mensch in der Geschichte*, III. p. 215.

Ireland the perpetual fire sacred to St Bridget was tended by holy virgins[1]. Amongst the Iroquois there was a class of virgins whom Lafitau compares to the Vestals, but of their functions he had no very definite information[2]. The Iroquois certainly maintained a perpetual fire, the extinction of which would have been thought to portend their national destruction[3]. In Peru the Virgins of the Sun preserved the sacred fire and it was an evil omen if they let it out. This holy fire was annually kindled from the sun's rays reflected from a concave mirror; in bad weather, when there was no sun (as indeed must have been often the case at Cuzco, where, according to the proverb, they have thirteen months of rain in the year[4]) the fire was lit by the friction of two sticks. An unfaithful virgin, like a Vestal at Rome, was punished by being buried alive[5]. At Cuzco these virgins

[1] Camden, *Britannia*, p. 747 (ed. 1607). Amongst the Celts virgin priestesses had charge of the sacred fire; Gardner, *Faiths of the World*, I. p. 899. Solinus speaks of the sacred fires amongst the ancient Britons (p. 115, ed. Mommsen). On the sacredness of fire amongst the Irish, cp. Spenser, *A view of the present state of Ireland*, p. 634 (Globe ed.): "Likewise at the kindling of the fire, and lighting of candells, they say certayne prayers, or use some other superstitious rites, which sheweth that they honour the fire and the light."

[2] Lafitau, *Mœurs des sauvages Ameriquains* (Paris 1724), I. p. 173.

[3] Brinton, *Myths of the New World*, p. 151.

[4] Fr. von Hellwald, *Die Erde und ihre Völker*, Berlin und Stuttgart, 1884, p. 204.

[5] Garcilasso de la Vega, *Royal Commentaries of the Yncas*, I. p. 298, II. p. 163, Markham's translation. The other duties of the virgins were to make the Inca's clothes, to bake the bread for the great sacrifices, and brew the liquor which the Inca and his family drank on these occasions (Garcilasso, I. p. 296 *sqq.*). It is possible that Garcilasso may, as Mr Tylor suggests (*Early History of Mankind*, p. 252), have touched up the picture of these virgins in order to complete the resemblance between them and the Vestals, but that he, the son of an Inca princess and born about ten years after the conquest of Peru by the Spaniards, should have invented the whole story is of course incredible and is not intended to be insinuated by Mr Tylor. For references to the other Spanish authorities, who treat of these Virgins of the Sun, see J. G. Müller, *Geschichte der amerikanischen Urreligionen*, Basel 1867, p. 388; Waitz, *Anthropologie* IV. p. 464. M. Reville suggests that the intention of burying an unchaste virgin was to hide his faithless priestess from the sight of the sun she had dishonoured (*Les religions du Mexique, de l'Amérique centrale et du Pérou*, Paris 1885, p. 367), but the real reason (as pointed out to me by Prof. Robertson Smith) is the reluctance to shed tribal blood. In early times when the blood-feud is in full force, to shed the blood

were the daughters of the Inca and his relations; in the provinces they might be the daughters of distinguished chiefs, but the lady superior was usually of the blood royal[1]. A fugitive from the emissaries of justice, who succeeded in throwing himself at the feet of these virgins as they marched in solemn procession through the streets, was saved[2]. In the great temple at Mexico before each chapel stood a stone hearth, on which a fire was kept constantly burning by the virgins and priests, and dreadful misfortunes were supposed to follow its accidental extinction[3]. Girls were sometimes devoted from infancy to the service of the god; some took a vow of perpetual virginity, some entered the service only for a term of years. A broom and a censer were their emblems. Death was the penalty for incontinence[4]. That the fire-worship of Mexico, for all its gorgeous and awful pageantry, sprang from the fire on the domestic hearth may be inferred from the Mexican custom (like the old Italian, Greek, Slavonic, and modern Hindu custom) of throwing food and drink into the fire before a meal[5]. The same primitive offering to the fire was common amongst the savage Redskins who never developed an elaborate religious ritual like that of barbarous Mexico[6]. In Yucatan there was an order of

of a fellow-tribesman, from whatever cause, is an inexpiable offence. Hence modes of execution are adopted which do not involve the actual spilling of blood. Such modes are drowning (the penalty of a *parricidium* in old Rome) and burying alive. Both penalties occur in old German law (Grimm, *Deutsche Rechtsalterthümer*, p. 694 *sqq.* In medieval Italy assassins were buried alive; comment. on Dante, *Inferno*, xix. 49). The fact that such a penalty was adopted for the Virgins of the Sun and for the Vestals seems to prove that both were originally tribal, not national, priestesses.

[1] Garcilasso de la Vega I. pp. 294, 299; R. B. Brehm, *Das Inka-reich*, Jena 1885, p. 139; J. G. Müller, *op. cit.* p. 387. Cp. Prescott, *History of the Conquest of Peru*, bk. I. ch. 3.

[2] Brehm *op. cit.* p. 141.

[3] Bancroft, *Native Races of the Pacific States*, II. p. 583.

[4] Bancroft, *ib.* 204 *sqq.*, cp. 245 and III. p. 435.

[5] For Mexico, Bancroft III. 393; for Italy, Servius on Virgil *Aen.* i. 729 and Preller's *Römische Mythologie*, 3te Aufl. 1883, II. 107 *sq.*; for Greece, E. Buchholz, *Die homerische Realien*, II. ii. p. 213 *sqq.* and Merry on Odyssey ix. 231; for India, Monier Williams, *Religious Thought and Life in India*, London 1883, p. 416 *sqq.*; for the Slavonic custom, J. V. Grohmann, *Aberglauben und Gebräuche aus Böhmen und Mähren*, p. 41.

[6] Waitz, *Anthropologie*, III. p. 208. To this day no well-bred Moqui, Zuni

Vestals instituted by a princess who acted as lady-superior. The members were volunteers who enrolled themselves either for a fixed time or for life. Their duty was to tend the sacred fire; those who broke their vow of chastity were shot to death with arrows[1].

Next to the Peruvians and Mexicans, the American tribes which had the most marked fire-worship were those of Louisiana, and though they had no order of Vestals, we may glance at their customs before we return to the Old World. Amongst the Natchez the temple, containing an ever-burning fire, stood beside the chief's hut. According to early travellers the temple was round, with a dome-like roof, and contained the bones of chiefs, but when Charlevoix visited the tribe in 1721, though the perpetual fire was maintained, the temple was not round but oblong, and the few old bones he saw about would not have furnished forth half a human skeleton[2]. Of the Assinais or Ainais we are told[3] that they had in common with the Naichas (= Natchez?) a house of sacred, ever-burning fire. It stood midway between the tribes, was round and built of straw, and served as council- and assembly-house. The resemblance to the prytaneum is obvious, especially to that which Theseus established at Athens as the centre and symbol of united Attica. From Louisiana it is (to the anthropologist) a mere step to New Mexico, where the Pueblo Indians watch over the eternal fire in the estufa, a large subterranean chamber, serving as bath-room, town-house, council-chamber, club-room, and church[4].

or other Pueblo Indian will eat of food without throwing a scrap into the fire (J. G. Bourke, *The Snake-dance of the Moquis of Arizona*, London 1884, p. 255).

[1] Bancroft III. p. 473. That fire-worship is still practised by the Indians of Yucatan appears from a native calendar for 1841-2. See the *Folk-Lore Journal*, I. p. 248.

[2] Charlevoix *Histoire de la Nouvelle France*, VI. p. 173 *sqq.*: Lafitau, *Mœurs des sauvages Ameriquains*, I. p. 167; Chateaubriand, *Voyage en Amérique*, p. 227 *sqq.* (ed. 12mo. Michael Levy); H. Schoolcraft, *Information respecting the history, condition and prospects of the Indian tribes of the United States*, V. p. 68; Waitz, *Anthropologie*, III. p. 217 *sqq.*

[3] By Espinosa in Waitz III. 221.

[4] Bancroft I. pp. 537, 554. Since the conversion of these Indians to Christianity the maintenance of the perpetual fire in the estufa has become exceptional (W. A. Bell, *New Tracks*

It is a necessary consequence of the practice of maintaining a perpetual fire that when the tribe is migratory the fire is carried with it. Thus we saw that when the Damaras shift their kraal, the fire is solemnly carried before the cattle by the chief's daughter. Similarly the Israelites carried their fire before them on the march[1]. A survival of this practice is seen in a custom of Russian peasants. When they move from one house to another they rake the fire out of the old stove into a jar and solemnly carry it to the new one, greeting it with the words "Welcome, grandfather, to the new home[2]."

Again, when, the old village remaining stationary, a new one was founded, it was natural that the fire for the new village

in North America, p. 161). There was no fire burning in the estufa from which Captain Bourke was so summarily ejected (J. G. Bourke, *op. cit.* p. 22 *sqq.*). The estufa is in the chief house in the village, but as the office of chief is elective it does not follow that the chief house is the house of the chief (W. A. Bell, *l. c.*).

[1] *Exodus* xiii. 21. Different from this are the cases (referred to by Knobel on *Exodus l. c.*) where the fire is carried as a signal at the head of a column marching by night, as is still done by caravans in Arabia and as Thrasybulus did when he led the exiles home to Athens by wild mountain-paths on a moonless night (Clemens Alexand., *Strom.* 163).

[2] Ralston, *Songs of the Russian People*, p. 120 *sq.* See the ceremony described at length, *ib.* 137—9. A trace of the same custom appears in the old Norse mode of taking possession of land. When a Norseman landed in Iceland, he took possession of as much land as he could march round from six in the morning till six at night, and where his march began and ended he lit a fire; this was called 'marching round the land with fire.' Grimm, *Deutsche Rechtsalterthümer*, 3rd ed. 1881, p. 195. The rule here mentioned by Grimm was itself a limitation (introduced when unoccupied land in Iceland was growing scarce) of the old custom which allowed a man to take possession of as much land as he could march round carrying fire; see K. Maurer, *Island von seiner ersten Entdeckung bis zum Untergang des Freistaats*, München, 1874, p. 36 *sq.* For other (perhaps derivative) forms of this Norse mode of taking possession by fire see J. C. Poestion, *Island das Land und seine Bewohner*, Wien 1885, p. 296. It is possible that the old custom in Lewis of carrying fire round the homestead may be derived from this Norse custom (Martin's *Description of the Western Islands of Scotland* in Pinkerton's *Voyages and Travels*, vol. III. p. 612). But taken in connection with the other forms of *dessil* (as it was called) which prevailed there, it is much more likely that this was a mode of so-called purification. It is a question whether the Norse custom itself may not best be explained in this way. Carrying fire round was a Roman mode of purification (Servius on Virgil, *Aen.* vi. 229. See Lomeier, *De veterum gentilium lustrationibus*, c. xxxv.).

should be taken from the common fire of the old. This is done by the Damaras and used to be done by the old Greeks and Romans and apparently also by some North American Redskins, for we hear of one of these tribes having received its fire from another kindred tribe[1]. Similarly Phœnician colonists setting out from Tyre took fire with them from the altar of Hercules (Melqart)[2].

As the common fire of the village was that in the chief's house, it was natural that in course of time fire should be regarded as the outward symbol of a king and should be carried before him, as it used to be carried before his predecessor, the chief of a nomadic tribe, in days of old. Thus fire was carried before Asiatic kings[3] and from them the practice was borrowed by later Roman emperors[4]. High above the tent of Alexander the Great hung a fiery cresset and "the flame of it was seen by night and the smoke by day[5]." When a Spartan king marched to war, fire from the altar in his house was carried before him and might not be quenched[6].

Finally, if the religious duty of maintaining a sacred fire sprang simply from the convenience of keeping up a constant fire in ages when the kindling of fresh fire was difficult, it might be expected that, though the maintenance of a perpetual fire was obligatory as a public duty on the chief, every individual householder would have found it a practical convenience to keep up such a fire for his own use. And this appears to have

[1] Waitz, III. 208.

[2] Bastian, *Der Mensch*, III. p. 218. Cp. Movers, *Das phönizische Alterthum*, I. pp. 48, 101. Movers (p. 404) believes that the priestesses of Melqart were virgins and he points to the virgin priestesses of Hercules at Thespiae in Boeotia (Pausanias ix. 27, 7).

[3] Xenophon, *Cyropædia*, viii. 3, 12; Ammianus Marcellinus xxiii. 6, 34; Quintus Curtius iii. 3, 7.

[4] Dio Cassius lxxi. 35; Herodian i. 8, 4; i. 16, 4; ii. 3, 2; ii. 8, 6; vii. 1, 9; vii. 6, 2; Meiners, *Geschichte der Religionen*, I. p. 237. Cp. De Quincey, *Confessions of an English Opium-eater*, p. 151.

[5] Q. Curtius v. 2, 7 "Observabatur ignis noctu, fumus interdiu." Curtius represents this as an innovation introduced by Alexander from purely military motives, because the sound of the bugle was lost in the trampling and hum of the great multitude. But this looks like a rationalising explanation of the historian.

[6] Xenophon, *Respub. Laced.* 13; Nicolaus Damascenus in Stobaeus' *Florilegium* xliv. 41.

been a wide-spread custom. The native Australian always has (or had, before he was corrupted by lucifer-matches) his fire-stick with him, and if his wife lets it out, so much the worse for her[1]. Similarly the Fuegians, though they know how to make fire by means of iron pyrites, never use it except when forced to do so, preferring to keep a fire always burning and to take a fire-stick with them when they travel[2]. Amongst the Indians of Guiana we are told that "fire has very seldom to be made afresh; for it is continually kept burning in every house, and even on long canoe-journeys a large piece of smouldering timber is usually carried. Even when walking across the savannah an Indian sometimes carries a fire-brand[3]." In New Zealand the ridge-pole of the roof is supported in the middle of the house by a pillar, the bottom of which is carved in the likeness of a human being supposed to represent the founder of the family and on the fire-place immediately before this ancestral figure the fire burns perpetually[4]. (Here we see Vesta and the Lar together.) We have M. Lenormant's word for it that the Accadians recognised as a god the flame that burned on the domestic hearth[5]. It is therefore only charitable to suppose that they did not suffer the deity to die for simple lack of dry sticks. In a Laplander's hut the fire burns continually summer and winter[6]. The lamps in the houses of the Arctic Highlanders are never allowed to go out[7]. In Corea

[1] R. Taylor, *New Zealand and its inhabitants*, p. 367. "On the western coast the best way which the Australian native has of preserving this element so essential to his comfort, is to collect the seed stems or stalks of the Banksias, or rather the abortive ones, these are denuded of their outer coverings, leaving a dark brown velvety-looking centre, which is very retentive of fire, and burns slowly; so that one of those fire-sticks, which is only eight inches will last for a considerable time, a bag of them will suffice for an entire day."

Here we have the νάρθηξ of Prometheus.

[2] Wood's *Natural History of Man*, II. p. 522.

[3] E. F. Im Thurn, *Among the Indians of Guiana*, London 1883, p. 257.

[4] Taylor, *ib.* p. 501. Cp. Polack, *Manners and customs of the New Zealanders*, I. p. 165, who however only says that the fires are rarely wholly extinguished in a village.

[5] *La Magie chez les Chaldéens et les origines Accadiennes*, p. 171.

[6] Regnard's *Journey to Lapland*, in Pinkerton's *Voyages and Travels*, I. p. 177.

[7] Ross, *Voyage of Discovery*, p. 130.

great pains are taken to maintain the house-fire unextinguished from generation to generation; its extinction is regarded as the prognostic and cause of the greatest misfortunes to the family[1]. The custom of maintaining a perpetual fire on every family hearth appears to have been Indo-European[2], for it is to be found amongst almost all the peoples of our wide-spread race from Hindustan to Scotland. At Benares and other strongholds of Brahmanism a certain number of orthodox Brahmans still maintain sacred fires in their houses[3]. Amongst the old Iranians the fire on the domestic hearth was kept constantly burning[4]. Amongst the South Slavonians to this day the fire on the hearth of a peasant's house is never allowed to die out; its extinction would be the sign of the extinction of the family[5]. In the

[1] Dallet, *Histoire de l'Église de Corée*, Paris, 1874, I. p. cxlvii.

[2] Cp. Max Müller, *Lectures on the Science of Religion*, p. 153; W. E. Hearn, *The Aryan Household*, London and Melbourne, 1879, p. 49 *sqq.*; G. L. Gomme, *Folklore relics of early village life*, London 1883, p. 85 *sqq.*; E. Meyer, *Geschichte des Alterthums*, Stuttgart, 1884, § 428.

[3] Monier Williams, *Religious Thought and Life in India*, p. 392; cp. *ib.* p. 364. Cp. *Ordinances of Manu*, ii. 230, 231, 232, 248; *id.* iii. 84; *Institutes of Vishnu*, lix. 1. 2; *Âpastamba*, II. ii. iii. 15 (with Bühler's note, *Sacred Books of the East*, vol. II. p. 105); *Gautama* v. 7 *sqq.*; *Baudhâyana*, II. ii. iv. 22. On reverence for the fire in Vedic times see Duncker, *Geschichte des Alterthums*, III. p. 31.

[4] W. Geiger, *Ostiranische Kultur im Altertum*, Erlangen 1882, p. 254; Spiegel, *Eranische Alterthumskunde*, III. p. 693. In every settlement of Parsis an everlasting fire is kept burning, the Bahrâm fire, 'preserved by a more than Vestal care'; J. Darmesteter, *Zend-Avesta* I. p. lxxxix. Cp. D. J. Karaka, *History of the modern Parsis*, London 1884, II. p. 213 *sqq.*

[5] F. S. Krauss, *Sitte und Brauch der Südslaven*, Wien 1885, p. 592. The religious importance attached by the South Slavonians to the fire on the domestic hearth is further shown by the conspicuous part which it plays in their marriage ceremonies; see Krauss *ib.* pp. 386, 399, 400, 430, 431, 436. Cp. Kuhn und Schwartz, *Norddeutsche Sagen, Märchen und Gebräuche*, p. 522. The Slavonic worship of ancestral spirits was clearly connected with the fire on the hearth; Ralston, *Songs of the Russian people*, p. 84, cp. pp. 86, 119, 120. For traces in Bohemia of Slavonic reverence for fire see Grohmann, *Aberglauben, &c. l. supra cit.*

With regard to the Lithuanians we know that they worshipped fire (Olaus Magnus, *Gentium Septentrionalium hist. brev.* iii. 1) and maintained perpetual fires in honour of Perkunas (K. Schwenk, *Die Mythologie der Slawen*, pp. 73, 75) and of Curcho (*id.* p. 92), and they appear to have worshipped the fire on the domestic hearth, for in some places they adored a domestic god called Dinstipan, *i.e.* the director of the smoke or chimneys (Gomme, *Folklore relics of early village life*, p. 90 n.).

cottage of a German (especially North German) peasant the fire was never allowed to die out except on the death of the head of the house[1]. In the Isle of Man "not a family in the whole island, of natives, but keeps a fire constantly burning; no one daring to depend on his neighbour's vigilance in a thing which he imagines is of so much consequence; and every one firmly believing that if it should ever happen that no fires were to be found throughout the island, the most terrible revolutions and mischiefs would immediately ensue[2]." At Burghead in Scotland the cottage fires used to be lit from a common fire on the 12th of January and it was lucky to preserve this fire throughout the year[3]. Lastly (for the shadows in the forest are growing long and it is time to return to the high road) we find the custom, or clear traces of it, in modern Greece and Italy and may therefore fairly suppose that it existed there of old, though direct proof of this seems wanting[4]. In modern Greece the old custom survives in the practice of keeping a lamp always burning before the holy pictures. The chief picture is usually that of the Virgin or of the saint whose name the householder bears, but that these holy pictures represent the old household gods and that the lamp represents the domestic fire, there can hardly be a doubt[5]. If the lamp dies out, it is an evil portent;

[1] L. Preller, *Römische Mythologie*, II. p. 159; Geiger, *op. cit.* p. 254.

[2] Train's *History of Isle of Man*, I. p. 316, quoted by Gomme, p. 97.

[3] Gomme, p. 98; cp. Dyer's *Popular British Customs*, p. 507 *sq.*; E. J. Guthrie, *Old Scottish Customs*, p. 223 *sqq.*

[4] The passages of ancient authors referred to by M. Fustel de Coulanges (*La cité antique*, 11me éd. Paris, 1885, p. 21) seem inconclusive.

[5] The differentiation of the single original house-fire into a fire for ordinary purposes and a sacred fire (lamp or otherwise) before the images of the gods, naturally takes place when the original single room is differentiated into a kitchen and parlour. Amongst the Romans it took place in antiquity. The atrium was originally dining-room and kitchen in one (Servius on Virgil, *Aen.* i. 726), and in it stood the images of the household gods beside the fire (Horace, *Epod.* ii. 66; Martial iii. 58, 22 *sq.*). But when the kitchen was removed to the back of the house, the gods sometimes remained in the parlour, and sometimes followed the kitchen. In the later empire their shrine stood at the entrance of the house and before it burned a perpetual lamp. Marquardt, *Römische Staatsverwaltung* III. p. 123; Overbeck und Mau, *Pompeji*, 4te Aufl. 1884, p. 268 *sq.* A similar separation appears to have taken place in ancient Greece. See K. F. Hermann, *Lehrbuch der griechi-*

and when the family moves to a new house, they carefully carry the burning lamp with them[1], thus keeping up the custom of carrying the fire to the new home which we have seen practised by the Damaras in South Africa, by the Israelites in the Desert, and by the ancestors of these same Greeks more than two thousand years ago. But it is to Calabria that we must look for the most perfect survival of the primitive custom. At the present day the fire on the hearth of a Calabrian peasant's house is never (except after a death) allowed to die quite out, even in the heat of summer. It is a bad omen if it should chance to be extinguished and the girls of the house, whose special care it is to keep at least a single brand burning on the hearth, are sadly dismayed at such a mishap[2]. Here we have embryo Vestals and a fairly developed Vesta. Here too, as in the Aryan family, the father acts as household priest when he blesses the Yule log and calls upon his children to pay it reverence[3].

So much for perpetual fires. The further and closely related question of the meaning of new fires, *i.e.* the formal extinction and rekindling of fires at fixed periods (especially at the solstices and at the beginning of summer and of winter) cannot be treated

schen Privatalterthümer, 3te Aufl. 1882, p. 151.

[1] B. Schmidt, *Das Volksleben der Neugriechen und das hellenische Alterthum*, Leipzig 1871, p. 54; J. T. Bent, *The Cyclades*, London 1885, p. 43; Leake, *Travels in Northern Greece*, iv. p. 145. In a Greek folk-tale we read of a poor man who sold his son that he might have wherewithal to buy oil for the holy lamp; J. G. von Hahn, *Griechische und albanesische Märchen*, i. p. 288. In ancient Greece it was an evil omen to dream of extinguishing the fire on the hearth (Artemidorus, *Onirocr.* ii. 10).

[2] Vincenzo Dorsa, *La tradizione greco-latina negli usi e nelle credenze popolari della Calabria citeriore*, Cosenza 1884, p. 20. In some districts on winter nights when the family is retiring to rest the mother makes the sign of the cross over the fire and blesses it. A Calabrian form of oath is to nip a flame between the fingers and swear saying, 'By this light of God' (*ib.* p. 21). The custom, still observed in Calabria, of extinguishing fires after a death appears to have existed in ancient Greece and Rome, cp. Apuleius *Met.* ii. 24, and this is perhaps the true explanation of "tunc odimus ignem" in Juvenal iii. 214, about which the commentators σεμνῶς πάνυ σιγῶσι. For an explanation of the custom I may refer to my article *The primitive ghost and his relations* in the 'Contemporary Review,' July 1885.

[3] Vincenzo Dorsa, *op. cit.* p. 20.

of here[1]. Suffice it to say that a careful examination of the many different forms of this custom—ranging from the homely Scotch mode of making the yearly fire to the stately Mexican rite of rekindling the fires at the close of every cycle of fifty-two years (one of the most striking ceremonies the world has ever witnessed)—will probably show that, however widely they diverged from the parent type, they, like the custom of maintaining perpetual fires, probably owed their origin not to any profound theory of the relation of the life of man to the courses of the heavens, but to the elementary difficulty of lighting the kitchen fire by rubbing two sticks against each other[2].

J. G. FRAZER.

[1] Still less can I discuss the extinction and renewal of fire on special occasions, as during an epidemic or after a death (see last note but one). For this class of cases appears to rest on other trains of thought than the class referred to in the text.

[2] I am painfully conscious of the lameness and impotence of this conclusion when I contrast it with the gorgeous passage in which Mr Preuner takes leave of his readers. The rocket (for fired by his eloquence I feel that I am soaring into metaphor) begins to rise on p. 449 and culminates on p. 464, bursting into a dazzling effulgence of rhetoric, in which 'unity,' 'nationality,' 'freedom,' 'religion,' &c., are seen circling in more than rainbow brilliance round the Idea, their centre and sun.

POSTSCRIPT. The above paper was in type before Mr J. H. Middleton's new book, *Ancient Rome in* 1885, came into my hands. His view on the origin of the perpetual fire of Vesta (p. 181) is practically identical with mine, except that he does not connect it with the chief and his daughters. I am indebted to him for the distinction, which I had hardly grasped, between the Atrium Vestae and the Regia, as well as for the reference to Ovid, *Tristia*, iii. 1, 28 on p. 153.

PLATO'S LATER THEORY OF IDEAS.

V THE *SOPHIST*.

§ 1 *The* διαιρέσεις. sophist 216 A—237 A *and* 264 C—268 D.

It will be convenient to divide the *sophist*[1] into two parts: (1) the principal inquiry, the search for a definition of the term σοφιστής, which occupies the beginning and the end of the dialogue, 216 A—237 A and 264 C—268 D, (2) the episodical investigation of the μὴ ὄν, which occupies the intervening portion, 237 A—264 B. Of these two parts, the episodical investigation has for the student of Platonism a more obvious interest than what (from the standpoint of the interlocutors) I have called the principal inquiry. But it will not be safe to assume that the latter is devoid of philosophical significance. It is possible, perhaps even probable, that the search for the definition, not only introduces the discussion of the μὴ ὄν, and covers an attack upon certain of Plato's contemporaries, but also indirectly contributes something to the system with which the episode is directly concerned. Accordingly in this section I propose to trace the course of the principal inquiry, and to say something about it by way of comment and interpretation,

[1] I seize the earliest opportunity of expressing my deep obligations to W. H. Thompson's original and important paper '*On the genuineness of the* Sophist *of Plato, and on some of its philosophical bearings*' (*Transactions of the Cambridge Philosophical Society* XI 146 ff 1858 = *Journal of Philology* VIII 290 ff), which, by its clear recognition of an 'Eleatic logic,' taught me to see in the polemic of Zeno a *logical* interpretation of the Parmenidean maxim. I have found Campbell's notes upon the details of the *sophist* not less helpful than his comments upon the *Theaetetus*.

though the final consideration of this part of the dialogue must be reserved until I can take account also of the διαιρέσεις of the *politicus*.

The question 'Are sophist, statesman, and philosopher one, two, or (as their distinct names would seem to imply) three?' having been proposed by Socrates, the Eleate proceeds to seek a λόγος or definition of the term σοφιστής, in order that there may be no mistake about the thing which it signifies. By means of successive διαιρέσεις, the art of the sophist is defined—

(1) as 'that branch of mercenary persuasion in private which professes to impart ἀρετή and exacts payment in the shape of a fee', in opposition to κολακική, which is 'that branch of mercenary persuasion in private which offers pleasure or gratification, asking for sustenance in return':

(2) as 'that branch of mental commerce which purveys from city to city discourses and lessons about ἀρετή', in opposition to τεχνοπωλική, which is 'that branch of mental commerce which purveys from city to city discourses and lessons about the arts, e. g. music, painting, puppet-showing':

(3) as 'that branch of mental trading which purveys within a city lessons about ἀρετή, those lessons having been manufactured by another',—and (4) as 'that branch of mental trading which purveys within a city lessons about ἀρετή, those lessons having been manufactured by the purveyor himself',—in opposition to similar sorts of τεχνοπωλική:

(5) as 'that branch of eristic which brings pecuniary gain to the practitioner',—eristic being the systematic form of antilogic, and dealing with justice, injustice, and other abstractions, and antilogic being that form of disputation which uses question and answer in private as opposed to continuous discourse in public,—in opposition to ἀδολεσχική, which is 'that branch of eristic which causes pecuniary loss to the practitioner and is apt to try the patience of listeners':

(6) as 'that branch of education which purges away the vain conceit of wisdom by means of cross-examination', in opposition to νουθετητική, which is 'that branch of education which laboriously and with indifferent success seeks the same result by means of admonition',—education (παιδεία) being here carefully distinguished from technical instruction (δημιουργικαὶ διδασκαλίαι). It may be

doubted however, the Eleate ironically remarks, whether, when we attribute sophistry to the practitioner of the ἔλεγχος, we do not do him too much honour[1].

Thus the sophist has presented himself as:

(1) νέων καὶ πλουσίων ἔμμισθος θηρευτής.
(2) ἔμπορος περὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς μαθήματα.
(3) περὶ ταὐτὰ ταῦτα κάπηλος.
(4) αὐτοπώλης περὶ τὰ μαθήματα.
(5) περὶ λόγους ἀθλητής, τὴν ἐριστικὴν τέχνην ἀφωρισμένος.
(6) δοξῶν ἐμποδίων μαθήμασι περὶ ψυχὴν καθαρτής.

These definitions being thus various, whilst the last is even questionable, it would seem that we must not rest here: and accordingly the Eleate proceeds to collect hints with a view to another διαίρεσις. It has been seen that the sophist disputes, and teaches others to dispute: let us now consider the subjects of his disputations. The sophist disputes, and teaches others to dispute, about things divine, cosmical, metaphysical, legal and political, technical; in fact, about all things. He has therefore the semblance of universal knowledge; but not the reality, because universal knowledge is not attainable by man. Thus, as the painter imitates the making of all things, so the sophist imitates the knowing of all things. Consequently, he may be ranked amongst the artists as a sort of puppet-shower. Further, whereas the art of image-making (εἰδωλοποιική) is divisible into likeness-making (εἰκαστική), which accurately preserves the proportions of the model, and semblance-making (φανταστική), which only seems to preserve them, the art of the sophist belongs to the latter of these two sections.

At this point however we find ourselves face to face with the difficulty which attends the whole subject of 'seeming' and 'falsehood'. To assert the existence of such things, is to violate the precept of Parmenides and attribute existence to the nonent. Hence arises the episodical investigation of the μὴ ὄν, which occupies more than half the dialogue. The difficulty in question having been disposed of, the principal inquiry is resumed at 264 C, with the result

[1] Ξ. Τί δέ; τοὺς ταύτῃ χρωμένους τῇ τέχνῃ τίνας φήσομεν; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ φοβοῦμαι σοφιστὰς φάναι. Θ. Τί δή; Ξ. Μὴ μεῖζον αὐτοῖς προσάπτωμεν γέρας. 230 E. I conceive that αὐτοῖς represents τοῖς ταύτῃ χρωμένοις τῇ τέχνῃ. Zeller however, *Ph. d. Gr.* I 967, and Campbell *ad loc.*, not perceiving the irony of the passage, make αὐτοῖς stand for τοῖς σοφισταῖς.

that the σοφιστής is (7) 'a conscious impostor, who, in private, by discontinuous discourse, drives his interlocutor to contradict himself in respect of classes of human invention', in opposition to the δημολογικός, 'the conscious impostor, who, in public, by continuous discourse, imposes upon crowds in respect of similar classes', the one being the ape of the φιλόσοφος, the other the ape of the πολιτικός.

It would seem then that, whatever conclusions we may hereafter reach in regard to the philosopher and the statesman, the sophist is not to be identified either with the one or with the other. Thus the ostensible result of the dialogue,—taken by itself apart from the *Theaetetus* and the *politicus*,—is, to make definite Plato's conception of σοφιστική and δημολογική, of the sham philosophy of the eristics, and of the sham statesmanship of the politico-rhetoricians. But we must not assume this ostensible result to be the sole outcome of this part of the dialogue, until we have first examined the process by which the result is obtained, or, to be more precise, until we have ascertained the relations of the successive definitions, and accounted for their variety.

Let it be supposed that the course of the so-called sophistical movement was something of this sort:

The Greek thinkers of the presophistical period were professedly dogmatists. Apart from their fundamental principles, the systems of Heraclitus, Parmenides, Anaxagoras, and Democritus, were indeed sceptical: but the doctrines of flux, of ent and nonent, of νοῦς and παντσπερμία, of plenum and vacuum, were held by them as certain and scientific truths: and on the strength of these doctrines, their authors called themselves, and were called by others, 'philosophers', i. e. seekers after knowledge for its own sake. In short, they held that there is such a thing as truth, and that it is the proper object of human research.

About the middle of the fifth century however, Protagoras of Abdera drew the sceptical inference from which his predecessors had shrunk. Whereas they had endeavoured, if not to explore, at any rate to define, the region of knowledge, Pro-

tagoras conceived that, man being the measure of all things, there is no such thing as objective truth. He was therefore no *φιλόσοφος*. Neither was he a *τεχνίτης* or artist.

Now in the first half of the fifth century, the *φιλόσοφοι* and the *τεχνῖται* had had the monopoly of teaching of the higher sort, the *τεχνῖται* giving professional teaching or special instruction, while, so far as there was such a thing as non-professional teaching or general education, it had for the most part fallen to the *φιλόσοφοι*. Hence the overthrow of philosophy threatened to be the ruin of the general education of the time.

Perceiving the danger, Protagoras looked for a substitute, and found one in the study of *ἀρετή*, 'culture' or 'civic excellence'. Hence Plato makes him say that he communicated to his pupils 'good counsel' or 'prudence' (*εὐβουλία*), which should fit them to manage their households, and to take part by word and by deed in civic affairs: in short, that he made men good citizens[1]. As means to this end,—in other words, as instruments of education,—he chose subjects of a literary character; oratory, grammar, style, and the interpretation of the poets. The appellation *σοφιστής*, by which he called himself, marked his claim to have found in *ἀρετή* the 'wisdom' which the *φιλόσοφοι* had vainly sought in 'truth' or 'knowledge', and at the same time distinguished him from the *τεχνῖται*, who did not pretend to seek 'wisdom', much less to find it. His lectures were marvellously popular, and the fees which he received made him a rich man. The example which he set was followed by Prodicus of Ceos, and others.

Like Protagoras, Gorgias of Leontini started with the renunciation of philosophy: but, whereas the Ionian doctrine of motion was Protagoras' point of departure, that of Gorgias was the Eleatic doctrine of rest. Like Protagoras too, Gorgias had a substitute to offer for the pursuit of truth: but, whereas

[1] *τὸ δὲ μάθημά ἐστιν εὐβουλία περί τε τῶν οἰκείων, ὅπως ἂν ἄριστα τὴν αὑτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικοῖ, καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως τὰ τῆς πόλεως δυνατώτατος ἂν εἴη καὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν. Ἆρ', ἔφην ἐγώ, ἔπομαί σου τῷ λόγῳ; δοκεῖς γάρ μοι λέγειν τὴν πολιτικὴν τέχνην καὶ ὑπισχνεῖσθαι ποιεῖν ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς πολίτας. Αὐτὸ μὲν οὖν τοῦτό ἐστιν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ ἐπάγγελμα ὃ ἐπαγγέλλομαι.* *Protagoras* 318 E.

Protagoras' substitute was literature in general studied as a means to 'civic excellence', Gorgias, rejecting the gospel of culture, concentrated his attention and the attention of his pupils upon the professional study of rhetoric; and accordingly, though his contemporaries of the end of the century doubtless regarded him as a sophist, he called himself by preference, not 'sophist', but 'rhetorician'[1]. The distinction was convenient and natural: convenient, inasmuch as from the standpoint of personal experience Gorgias communicated professional skill to pupils who intended to make a professional use of it, so that he bore a greater resemblance than Protagoras to the *τεχνῖται*; and natural, inasmuch as the teaching of rhetoric had begun in Sicily perhaps twenty years before Protagoras began to preach culture and took to himself the name of sophist.

Meanwhile the teaching of the itinerant sophists was eagerly caught up at Athens. Amongst their Athenian pupils there were some who already intended to enter the sophistical profession, and afterwards won reputation in it: and rivals presently declared themselves, whose teaching was not derived from the authors of the movement.

Further, the course of study underwent modification. To the purely literary subjects which Protagoras used as instruments of general education, his immediate successors added such subjects as ethics (orthodox and heretical), mathematics, and archaeology; and it was not very long before Hippias of Elis and others began to handle, from the non-professional point of view, subjects which had hitherto been taught, from an exclusively professional point of view, only by the *τεχνῖται*[2].

[1] Σ. Τί δαὶ δή; οἱ σοφισταί σοι οὗτοι, οἵπερ μόνοι ἐπαγγέλλονται, δοκοῦσι διδάσκαλοι εἶναι ἀρετῆς; Μ. Καὶ Γοργίου μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταῦτα ἄγαμαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἄν ποτε αὐτοῦ τοῦτο ἀκούσαις ὑπισχνουμένου, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καταγελᾷ, ὅταν ἀκούσῃ ὑπισχνουμένων· ἀλλὰ λέγειν οἴεται δεῖν ποιεῖν δεινούς. *Meno* 95 B. καὶ νῦν οὕτως εἰπέ, τίς ἡ τέχνη καὶ τίνα Γοργίαν καλεῖν χρὴ ἡμᾶς. μᾶλλον δέ, ὦ Γοργία, αὐτὸς ἡμῖν εἰπέ, τίνα σε χρὴ καλεῖν ὡς τίνος ἐπιστήμονα τέχνης. Γ. Τῆς ῥητορικῆς, ὦ Σώκρατες. Σ. Ῥήτορα ἄρα χρή σε καλεῖν; Γ. Ἀγαθόν γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ δὴ ὅ γε εὔχομαι εἶναι, ὡς ἔφη Ὅμηρος, βούλει με καλεῖν. Σ. Ἀλλὰ βούλομαι. Γ. Κάλει δή. Σ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄλλους σε φῶμεν δυνατὸν εἶναι ποιεῖν; Γ. Ἐπαγγέλλομαί γε δὴ ταῦτα οὐ μόνον ἐνθάδε ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλοθι. *Gorgias* 449 A.

[2] Ἱπποκράτης γὰρ παρ' ἐμὲ ἀφικόμενος οὐ πείσεται ἅπερ ἂν ἔπαθεν ἄλλῳ τῳ συγ-

Thus, in the early days of the movement,—say from 447 to 427,—sophists were paid professors,—first itinerant, afterwards stationary,—of *ἀρετή*, civic excellence or general education. As instruments of education they used, sometimes non-technical subjects, sometimes technical subjects; but, if their subjects were technical, they treated them from a non-technical point of view. At Athens however, where the principal sophists naturally congregated, oratory for obvious reasons soon became exceptionally popular; and the study of it was doubtless stimulated by the advent of Gorgias in 427. Consequently, the teachers of rhetoric, though commonly regarded as sophists, were sometimes distinguished from the sophists properly so called, so as to form a class apart under the name of rhetoricians.

Meanwhile the original characteristics of the sophist ceased to be distinctive even for those who were content to bear the appellation. Speculation being at a low ebb, antagonism to philosophy was no longer a note of sophistry. The value of a liberal education being generally acknowledged, the paid professors no longer cared to insist upon the claims of *ἀρετή*. As, amongst them, they taught all the subjects for which there was a demand, there was in the matter of their teaching nothing to distinguish them from other teachers. But there was in the manner of it an obvious peculiarity, which, as time passed, became more and more prominent: while the specialist, whatever his subject, was an executant, and therefore bound to possess and to communicate practical skill, the sophist was a theorist and a critic, and consequently studied, not so much verifiable solidity of attainment, as rather skill in exposition and debate. Now continuous exposition was the function of those sophists who, as we have seen, had asserted for themselves an independent position under the name of rhetoricians. Hence in the fourth century, and even as early as the close of the fifth, the sophist, strictly so called, was a paid professor who possessed

γενόμενος τῶν σοφιστῶν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοι λωβῶνται τοὺς νέους· τὰς γὰρ τέχνας αὐτοὺς πεφευγότας ἄκοντας πάλιν αὖ ἄγοντες ἐμβάλλουσιν εἰς τέχνας, λογισμούς τε καὶ ἀστρονομίαν καὶ γεωμετρίαν καὶ μουσικὴν διδάσκοντες—καὶ ἅμα εἰς τὸν Ἱππίαν ἀπέβλεψε—παρὰ δ' ἐμὲ ἀφικόμενος μαθήσεται οὐ περὶ ἄλλου του ἢ περὶ οὗ ἥκει. τὸ δὲ μάθημά ἐστιν εὐβουλία κ.τ.λ. Protagoras 318 D.

and imparted skill in private debate, in opposition to the rhetorician, who possessed and imparted skill in public exposition. In short, eristical proficiency took the place of civic excellence as the end of the sophist's teaching.

Resembling in some sort both the professor of civic excellence and the professor of eristic, and yet very different from either, was the unique personality of Socrates. A foe to philosophy, and a renegade from art, he regarded ἀρετή as the end of human endeavour, and debate as the method by which it was to be attained. But his method influenced his conception of the end, and his conception of the end his method: his method led him to understand by ἀρετή, not 'the excellence of the citizen', but 'the excellence of the man'; and his end caused him to seek in debate, not victory, but the elimination of the vain conceit of knowledge. Furthermore, he took no pay for his teaching. Thus, if by sophist is meant one who gives a general education, in opposition on the one hand to the φιλόσοφος who seeks scientific truth, and on the other hand to the τεχνίτης who cultivates and communicates executive proficiency, Socrates was a sophist: but it must not be forgotten that, in his theory of general education, in the use which he made of his method, and in his view of his relation to his pupils, he was at variance with all others who were called by that name.

In the first half of the fourth century there was a further development of the sophistical movement. As the sophists who had taught 'civic excellence' had been succeeded by the teachers of eristic, so the rhetorical sophists were succeeded by the political sophists. It is true that Isocrates, the chief representative of political sophistry, like Gorgias, resented the title of sophist; but the care which he takes to distinguish himself from the sophists, both eristical and political, shows plainly enough that he was commonly ranked with them. Indeed it might be thought that he bore a closer resemblance than some of his predecessors to Protagoras, the founder of the profession, inasmuch as both of them were teachers of πολιτικὴ ἀρετή. But changed circumstances had modified the meaning of this phrase, and whereas Protagoras professed to make his pupils good *citizens*, Isocrates claimed to turn out good *politicians*. He was

however in any case a professor of political philosophy regarded from a rhetorical, rather than from a scientific, point of view, and, if not a sophist, was, at any rate, very like one.

Assuming that the foregoing sketch represents with sufficient accuracy the course of the sophistical movement, I now proceed to assign to the successive stages above indicated the several definitions proposed by the Eleate.

In the early days of sophistry, when Protagoras and Prodicus were making progresses through Greece, attracting attention and admiration by the novelty of their teaching and the brilliancy of their discourse, the Athenian father may well have defined *σοφιστής* as *νέων καὶ πλουσίων ἔμμισθος θηρευτής*, on the one hand assimilating him to the *κόλαξ* in so far as he courted young men of position, and on the other hand distinguishing him from the *κόλαξ* in so far as the one took his payment in kind, the other in money. And it will be remarked that in spite of the "dash of temper" and the superficiality which the wording of this definition betrays, it serves the purpose of discriminating Protagoras and the early sophists in general from the rest of contemporary mankind.

But again the sophist of the early days might be regarded as a merchant who imports discourses and lessons about *ἀρετή*, in contradistinction to the *τεχνίτης*, who imports discourses and lessons about the arts. In this way we get the second definition, *ἔμπορος περὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς μαθήματα*, which definition, like the first, serves to distinguish the itinerant teachers of *ἀρετή*, such as Protagoras and Prodicus, from the rest of mankind, but implies, on the part of those who framed or accepted it, not so much reprobation as rather interest and respect. In short, it represents the characteristics of primitive sophistry, as they appeared to the young Athenians who filled the lecture-rooms of the sophists, and as they appeared to the sophists themselves.

The definitions obtained by the third and fourth *διαιρέσεις*, *περὶ ταὐτὰ ταῦτα κάπηλος* and *αὐτοπώλης περὶ τὰ μαθήματα*, discard the note or mark of itinerancy, and under the term defined expressly include native Athenians, whether their stock-in-trade was provided by others or produced by them-

selves. Plainly these definitions belong to the time when, the itinerant teachers having lost the monopoly of general education, their imitators and rivals continued to teach on the old lines.

In the fifth διαίρεσις however 'skill in debate' takes the place of 'civic excellence' as the end of the sophist's teaching. Thus this διαίρεσις represents the eristic sophist of the end of the century, by which time some of the purveyors of general education, if not all of them, had ceased to insist upon ἀρετή, while those sophists who made a specialty of oratory had begun to assert for themselves an independent position as rhetoricians. Further, it will be observed that the fifth definition is carefully framed so as to exclude the greatest of the disputant sophists, Socrates.

On the other hand the sixth definition applies to Socrates, and to no one else. That is to say, it is framed in view of the catastrophe of 399, when Socrates, who a moment ago was expressly excluded, was regarded as the very specimen partium, and fell a victim to the popular outcry against sophistry.

Finally, the seventh definition belongs to the later period, when it was necessary to distinguish the sophist from the δημολογικός, i.e. from such an one as Isocrates, who, being professional teacher of politics and rhetoric, was doubtless often called a sophist, but notwithstanding heartily disliked the title, inasmuch as the function of the contemporary sophist,—the teaching of the art of disputation,—appeared to him, as it did also to Plato, to lead to superficiality and imposture.

It would seem then that Plato here takes account, not only of different aspects, but also of different stages or forms, of so-called sophistry; and that accordingly the first six definitions, though for the ostensible purpose of the dialogue they may be superseded by the seventh, are for the historian of the sophistical movement not a whit less important.

But further it seems to me that Plato is interested in observing, not only the meanings which, at different times and with different persons, attached to the term 'sophist', but also the circumstances by which the changes in its meaning were brought about: and I think that this characteristic of the

exposition is important enough to warrant me in restating the history of the word, as I gather it from the passage before us.

When Protagoras called himself 'sophist', his pupils understood by that term one who, while in his character of professional teacher he bore a certain resemblance to the τεχνῖται, was distinguished from them inasmuch as he brought from foreign parts, not technical skill, but general culture: and in this sense it was applied, not only to Protagoras, but also to Prodicus and to others. The sophists and their pupils were not however the only persons who used the term. The Athenian of the old school, observing more or less closely those who called themselves by the name, discovered another affinity, which when conjoined with an appropriate difference, enabled him to discriminate 'sophists' from the rest of mankind. He thought of them as flatterers, who beset young men of the richer class, taking their reward in the shape of a pecuniary fee. So far there was no confusion. But soon specimens presented themselves which, with the existing definition, could not be so easily disposed of. Thus there were paid professors of civic excellence who were not itinerant. Were such professors 'sophists', or were they not? Included by the definition of the parent (νέων καὶ πλουσίων ἔμμισθος θηρευτής), they were excluded by the definition of the son (ἔμπορος περὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς μαθήματα). Considerations of convenience immediately settled the question: itinerancy ceased to be a characteristic of the sophist; but he was still a trader, wholesale or retail, in intellectual wares. And now a still greater change was effected in the meaning of the term. Following the example of Gorgias, the rhetoricians, whose teaching, like that of the τεχνῖται, was not general, but special, sought, by the assumption of the title of ῥητορικοί, to distinguish themselves from the sophists, whilst other teachers, who retained the old appellation, no longer laid stress upon the pursuit of ἀρετή; and, when in this way civic excellence ceased to be the principal article in the sophist's programme, eristic, the art of disputation, took its place. In short, whereas the earlier sophists, aiming at ἀρετή, used as their instruments of education various branches of literature,

the later sophists, adding to their list the subjects which were taught from the professional point of view by the τεχνῖται, but treating them popularly or non-professionally, made success in debate, rather than resultant "sweetness and light", the end of their teaching. Plainly it was only by a considerable change in the definition that the term 'sophist' could be applied to these teachers of eristic: yet it would have been absurd to call them by any other name. They were the natural successors of the earlier sophists: and, despite the development which had taken place, the name, with a modified meaning, was conveniently retained. Next it became necessary to take account of Socrates, who, though excluded by all the existing definitions, inasmuch as he took no fee, was in some sort a teacher both of ἀρετή and of eristic, and thus, though his ἀρετή was not the ἀρετή of the earlier sophists, nor his eristic the eristic of the later, in a manner combined the characteristics of both. Here no consensus was arrived at. Usage never decided whether Socrates was, or was not, to be regarded as a sophist, Isocrates for example accounting him as such, while Plato declined to do so. Lastly, in the person of Isocrates, the professor of statesmanship, we have another anomalous case. As a paid professor, who did not communicate professional skill in any of the arts commonly so called, he was generally regarded as a sophist: but, for himself, conceiving that the arts were unsatisfactory instruments of education, especially when they were handled popularly and eristically, he was anxious to distinguish himself from the contemporary eristics, and accordingly disliked to be called by the title which they bore. Plato admits the justice of the distinction drawn by Isocrates; but, whereas Isocrates had further claimed in virtue of his statemanship to be called 'philosopher', declines to regard him either as 'philosopher' or as 'statesman', and by way of distinguishing him, on the one hand from the philosopher and the statesman, and on the other from the sophist, assigns to him the title of δημολογικός.

In short, Plato not only shows that within the memory of man the term 'sophist' had borne various meanings, but also indicates that the variety of those meanings was due, in part to

difference in the view taken of sophistry by the framers of the definitions, in part to change in the sophists' theory of their own functions, and in part to the growth and development, side by side with sophistry, of kindred professions which had to be discriminated from it.

But, whereas in the preceding paragraphs I have placed the first six definitions on a level with the seventh, it is clear that Plato assigns to the seventh a special importance. What is his reason for so doing? I conceive that the seventh definition is preferred to the rest, not because of any intrinsic superiority which it possesses, but because it has a direct bearing upon the inquiry instituted in this dialogue.

The first six *διαιρέσεις* do not directly advance the inquiry, since, so far from yielding a final and authoritative definition of the term 'sophist', capable of comparison with similar definitions of the terms 'statesman' and 'philosopher', they go to show that the meaning of the term is different for different persons, at different times, and in different relations, so that it is incapable of final and authoritative definition. The seventh definition has, of course, no greater claim than the rest to finality and authority. But, whereas the rest have regarded the sophist in other relations than those in which it is here desired to regard him, the seventh definition brings him into comparison with the philosopher and the statesman (to say nothing of the *δημολογικός*), and fixes the meaning of the four terms, as understood, relatively to one another, under existing circumstances, by the Stranger and Theaetetus. By 'sophist' they mean 'a conscious impostor, who, in private, by discontinuous discourse, drives his interlocutor to contradict himself in respect of classes of human invention', in opposition to the *δημολογικός*, 'the conscious impostor, who, in public, by continuous discourse, imposes upon crowds in respect of similar classes', the one being the ape of the *φιλόσοφος*, the other the ape of the *πολιτικός*.

Now Isocrates, not only claimed for himself in virtue of his art of statesmanship the title of 'philosopher', but also denounced the Socratics in general and Plato in particular as 'sophists'. Would it not seem that we have in this dialogue

(together with more important matter) Plato's reply to his rival's tirade? 'There is no virtue in a name', Plato says in effect, 'but for my own part I reserve the titles of φιλόσοφος and πολιτικός for those who, from the standpoint of knowledge, deal with eternal, immutable, existences, whilst to those who from the standpoint of ignorance drive their interlocutors to self-contradiction in respect of classes of human invention, I give the names of σοφιστής and δημολογικός. It is on this ground that I call myself a φιλόσοφος and not a σοφιστής: it is on this ground that I call you a δημολογικός and not a πολιτικός'.

But, though Plato may have been glad of an opportunity of explaining why he resented Isocrates' application of the term 'sophist' to himself, and why he accounted Isocrates, if not a 'sophist', yet very like one, we must not assume that his purpose is purely controversial. What then is the deeper lesson which the διαιρέσεις teach? Surely they are intended to show in a familiar instance—most certainly they do show—the uncertainty, the relativity, and the mutability of certain general names. We have seen that, a group of individuals having called themselves by a common name, by way of marking their common possession of certain characteristics which seem to them important, and this name having been acknowledged by the rest of the community, the meaning of the name is uncertain, relative, and mutable: uncertain, in so far as individuals add to the recognized characteristics personal impressions of their own; relative, inasmuch as the difference of the group in question from surrounding groups is part of the meaning; and mutable, not only in consequence of changes in the characteristics of the recognized members of the group, but also in consequence of the appearance, outside the group, of new groups which must be distinguished from it.

Now if the meaning of a general name such as 'sophist' is thus uncertain, relative, and mutable, there is in this case no eternal, immutable, connotation to be hypostatized as an idea: indeed, as the appellation is arbitrary, and the grouping of the particulars a matter of temporary convenience, there is no need of any such hypothesis. Thus the study of the word 'sophist'

is a practical disproof of the crude realism of the *republic* and the *Phaedo*, which recognizes ideas, not only of natural kinds, such as man and horse, but also of artificial classes, such as table and bed. In the language of the seventh hypothesis of the *Parmenides*, 'sophist' is an ἔγκος ἄνευ ἑνός, εἷς φαινόμενος ὢν δὲ οὔ: the group in question is a class, arbitrarily constructed and consequently liable to alteration[1], not a natural kind, determined from the beginning of the world and to the end of it incapable of change. Or again we may say that we have here no more than a Socratic universal, useful in so far as it guards us against inconsistency of speech, but making no pretensions to objectivity, and therefore incapable of being known.

The διαιρέσεις are then important, not merely in so far as they promote the principal inquiry, but also inasmuch as they refute the claims of artificial classes to be regarded as objects of knowledge; in other words, inasmuch as they prove that of artificial classes there cannot be eternal and immutable εἴδη.

§ 2 *The μὴ ὄν.* 237 A—242 B.

Having thus anticipated the conclusion of the principal inquiry, I now return to the episodical investigation of the μὴ ὄν.

It will be remembered that, in the course of the seventh and last διαίρεσις, having divided εἰδωλοποιική into εἰκαστική and φανταστική, the Eleate bethinks himself that the whole subject of seeming and falsity is difficult and obscure. How can we say that a man speaks falsely, or has a false opinion, without involving ourselves in a contradiction? To assert the existence of false opining is to set at naught Parmenides' warning against the ascription of Being to the Nonent. This warning the Eleate proceeds to develop with a view to the particular application which he has indicated.

It would appear (1) that μὴ ὄν is not predicable either of ὄν or of τι; whence it follows that one who attempts to say μὴ ὄν, does

[1] Compare *Parmenides* 164 B ff, together with my comments, *J. of Ph.* XI 316, 324.

not so much as speak—*οὐδὲν λέγειν φατέον*: (2) that *ὄν* is not predicable of *μὴ ὄν*; whence it follows, as we cannot use the terms *μὴ ὄν* and *μὴ ὄντα* without attributing number (which is an *ὄν*) to these nonentities, that *μὴ ὄν* cannot be thought, spoken, uttered, or conceived—*ἔστιν ἀδιανόητόν τε καὶ ἄρρητον καὶ ἄφθεγκτον καὶ ἄλογον*: and (3) that in this very sentence we are guilty of more inconsistencies than there are assertions contained in it, since the words *ἄλογον, ἄρρητον, ἄφθεγκτον, ἀδιανόητον, ἐστίν* all imply number.

Now what is an *εἴδωλον*? It is *τὸ πρὸς ταληθινὸν ἀφωμοιωμένον ἕτερον τοιοῦτον*, and consequently both is and is not: so that unless we are prepared to abandon our statement that the sophist is an image-maker who by his art engenders in us false opinions, we must refute the dogma 'The Ent is, the Nonent is not'. Accordingly in self-defence the Eleate proceeds to examine the theory of father Parmenides, in order to show that there is a sense in which 'the Ent is not, the Nonent is'.

While it may be questioned whether the maxim 'The Ent is, the Nonent is not' was held by Parmenides in the sense here given to it, there can be little doubt that Zeno,—whose logical theory, developed in the course of controversy, carried him to a dangerous distance from the metaphysic of his predecessor,—would have been quite content with the Stranger's exposition of Eleaticism. One who maintained that the same thing could not be at once like and unlike, was bound to hold that the same thing could not be at once *ὄν* and *μὴ ὄν*: and if we, or others for him, went on to infer that there is no such thing as an image, and that falsehood is impossible, these corollaries are in perfect harmony with the doctrine of the non-existence of plurality, and with the polemic by which that doctrine was justified. Nor is there anything to shock Zeno in the conclusion *ὡς οὔτε φθέγξασθαι δυνατὸν ὀρθῶς οὔτ' εἰπεῖν οὔτε διανοηθῆναι τὸ μὴ ὂν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἀδιανόητόν τε καὶ ἄρρητον καὶ ἄφθεγκτον καὶ ἄλογον.* But the following paragraph, 238 ff, —numbered (3) in my summary,—in which it is shown that on Zenonian principles, the Zenonian argument against the *μὴ ὄν* falls to the ground, may reasonably be regarded as a Platonic supplement, and when the Eleate announces his intention of

turning his hand against his father Parmenides, it becomes certain that he, the Eleate, represents, not Eleaticism proper, but the neo-Eleaticism of Plato.

Plainly the pages with which I am now concerned are only transitional and preparatory. Nevertheless on several grounds they are both interesting and important.

First, they form a link between the *sophist* and the *Parmenides*. The sixth hypothesis of the last named dialogue, *ἓν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν*, assumes, not that the One *πῶς οὐκ ἔστι πῶς δὲ ἔστι*, but that it *οὐδαμῶς οὐδαμῇ ἔστιν οὐδέ πῃ μετέχει οὐσίας*: i. e. it starts from the second of the two axioms indicated in *sophist* 238 A Ξ. Μὴ ὄντι δέ τι τῶν ὄντων ἆρα προσγίγνεσθαι φήσομεν δυνατὸν εἶναι; Θ. Καὶ πῶς; Indeed the very words of this axiom are echoed in *Parmenides* 163 E Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἔστι γε αὐτῷ τι τῶν ὄντων. And the results obtained in the two dialogues are in perfect accord: compare with *sophist* 238 C, quoted above, and 239 A, *Parmenides* 164 A Τί δέ; τὸ ἐκείνου ἢ τὸ ἐκείνῳ, ἢ τὸ τί, ἢ τὸ τοῦτο ἢ τὸ τούτου, ἢ ἄλλου ἢ ἄλλῳ, ἢ ποτὲ ἢ ἔπειτα ἢ νῦν, ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἢ δόξα ἢ αἴσθησις ἢ λόγος ἢ ὄνομα ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν τῶν ὄντων περὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν ἔσται; Οὐκ ἔσται. In both places then the barrenness and the insufficiency of Zeno's conception of the *μὴ ὄν* are emphatically noticed.

Secondly, I think I see a significant allusion at 239 D. Relying upon the doctrine of the impossibility of image-making, the sophist asks 'What do you mean by an image?' To this question Theaetetus replies 'Plainly we shall say *τά τε ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι καὶ κατόπτροις εἴδωλα, ἔτι καὶ τὰ γεγραμμένα καὶ τὰ τετυπωμένα καὶ τἄλλα ὅσα που τοιαῦτά ἐστιν ἕτερα*.' 'But', replies the Eleate, 'the sophist will demand a general definition, not a catalogue of instances': *τὸ ἐκ τῶν λόγων ἐρωτήσει σε μόνον*. Θ. Ποῖον; Ξ. Τὸ *διὰ πάντων τούτων, ἃ πολλὰ εἰπὼν ἠξίωσας ἑνὶ προσειπεῖν ὀνόματι, φθεγξάμενος εἴδωλον ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ὡς ἓν ὄν*. Now the demand for a general definition as opposed to a catalogue of particulars, is notoriously characteristic, not only of Socrates, but also of Plato: and the care which Plato takes in enforcing the demand at the beginning of the *Theaetetus* and elsewhere, is a tolerably clear proof that it continued to be characteristic of the Socratics and had not

become a commonplace of the contemporary eristic[1]. Further, the language of the sentence quoted above is the very echo of that of the *Meno*: *τὴν δὲ μίαν* [sc. *ἀρετήν*], *ἣ διὰ πάντων τούτων ἐστίν, οὐ δυνάμεθα ἀνευρεῖν.* M. *Οὐ γὰρ δύναμαί πω, ὦ Σ., ὡς σὺ ζητεῖς, μίαν ἀρετὴν λαβεῖν κατὰ πάντων, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις.* 74 A. *ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα ἑνί τινι προσαγορεύεις ὀνόματι, κτλ.* 74 D. *οὐ μανθάνεις, ὅτι ζητῶ τὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τούτοις ταὐτόν; ἢ οὐδὲ ἐπὶ τούτοις, ὦ Μένων, ἔχοις ἂν εἰπεῖν, εἴ τις ἐρωτῴη· τί ἐστιν ἐπὶ τῷ στρογγύλῳ καὶ εὐθεῖ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἃ δὴ σχήματα καλεῖς, ταὐτὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσι;* 75 A. Who then is this sophist who peremptorily requires 'the rational definition', 'the one in all', 'that which pervades the plurality called by the same name', and at the same time asserts the absolute nothingness of the *μὴ ὄν*? It seems to me that it is none other than Plato himself, who in the passage about *ὄν* and *μὴ ὄν* at the end of the fifth book of the *republic* declares the particular *καλόν*, in so far as it is *μὴ καλόν*, to be non-existent, 479 A ff, and thus commits himself to the Zenonian heresy. Hence in the passage before us I think I see a confession that the view of *ὄν* and *μὴ ὄν* taken in the *republic* was sophistical, rather than philosophical; in other words, that it had the appearance of wisdom, rather than the reality.

One other allusion may be noted in this place. Whatever the date of the *Theaetetus* may have been, it was prior to the *sophist*. Now in the first named dialogue, 183 C ff, the theory of flux having been dealt with at length, Theaetetus challenges Socrates to submit the theory of rest to a similar scrutiny. Socrates declines the challenge, excusing himself on the grounds, that he distrusts his own ability to rise to the height of Parmenides' argument, and that he fears lest the throng of discussion should distract attention from the question 'What is Knowledge?' But in the *sophist*, 241 D, the Eleate remarks *Τὸν τοῦ πατρὸς Παρμενίδου λόγον ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν ἀμυνομένοις ἔσται βασα-*

[1] Campbell remarks upon *τὸ ἐκ τῶν λόγων*, "In this, as in other respects, the Sophistic method is the caricature of that of Socrates. Cf. *Theaetet.* 146, *Meno* 79." The method here described is the method of Socrates, and no mere caricature of it.

νίζειν, and accordingly a careful study of Eleaticism ensues. Thus the *sophist* supplements the *Theaetetus*, though the question whether this relation between the two dialogues was preordained by their author may be left for the present open.

The moral of this transitional section of the dialogue, 237 A —242 B, is then, that the Eleatic doctrine of the *ἀκοινωνησία* or incommunicability of *ὄν* and *μὴ ὄν* is suicidal, and that accordingly we must *βιάζεσθαι τό τε μὴ ὂν ὡς ἔστι κατά τι καὶ τὸ ὂν αὖ πάλιν ὡς οὐκ ἔστι πῃ.*

§ 3 *The ὄν.* 242 B—250 E.

Apologizing for thus turning against the founder of his school, the Stranger begins by noting that previous thinkers, whether they recognized three principles, or two, or one principle only, or one and many in successive epochs, or one and many simultaneously, had not been sufficiently explicit in the statement of their views. When one of them tells us that *ἔστιν ἢ γέγονεν ἢ γίγνεται πολλὰ ἢ ἓν ἢ δύο, καὶ θερμὸν αὖ ψυχρῷ συγκεραννύμενον, ἄλλοθί πῃ διακρίσεις καὶ συγκρίσεις ὑποτιθείς*, he leaves his dictum incomplete; i.e. he does not explain the attribution of *οὐσία* or *γένεσις* to the element or elements postulated: so that *ὄν* is in fact no less a mystery than *μὴ ὄν*. By way of justifying this assertion, the Stranger passes in review the several theories of *ὄν* which have been hitherto suggested, grouping them under two principal heads, according as they recognize a determinate or an indeterminate number of elements, and subdividing the first group into those who recognize two or more elements and those who recognize one element only.

(1) What is meant by the dualists (who here represent the determinate pluralists generally), when they say that the two elements *are*? Existence is not a third element, since by assumption there are only two elements: nor is it one of the two elements, since, [in the absence of a theory of *κοινωνία* such as Plato provides in the sequel,] if it were either of them, the duality would be reduced to unity; nor again is it the sum of the two, since in this way also a unity would be the result. Thus the dualists, and the determinate pluralists generally, leave Being and its relation to the elements unexplained.

(2) The monists, i.e. the Eleatics,—for it is their form of monism which alone in this place concerns us,—are inconsistent, (*a*) in giving to their element the two names ἕν and ὄν, as on Eleatic principles there is no second thing to carry the second name, (*b*) in making the ὄν whole and spherical, as these epithets imply divisibility, whereas the αὐτὸ τὸ ἕν of which they are thinking is indivisible: and, if it should be argued, (*a*) that the ent πάθος ἔχει τοῦ ἑνός, so that it shall be possible to regard it at once as one and as a whole, or (*β*) that the ent is not whole, it would seem, that (*a*) on the one hypothesis, ent and one are not identical, and thus the universe is a plurality, and that (*β*) on the other hypothesis, either (*β′*) there is such a thing as an αὐτὸ τὸ ὅλον, in which case ent falls short of itself, and so is nonent, and the universe is a plurality, or (*β″*) there is no such thing as τὸ ὅλον, in which case the ent is nonent, the universe is a plurality, and, what is more, the ent cannot be, or become, or have number.

This, the Stranger continues, though not a complete statement of the difficulties involved in the teaching of the διακριβολογούμενοι, i.e. of those who postulate either one element or a determinate number of elements, may serve on the present occasion: and accordingly we may now turn to τοὺς ἄλλως λέγοντας, i.e. those who postulate an indeterminate number of elements.

Here I pause to comment.

In regard to the determinate pluralists, i.e. those early pluralists who recognized a definite number of elements, the Eleate contents himself with the remark that they have no theory of Being; in other words, that, whereas their assertion that such and such elements exist cannot mean that such and such elements are an additional element, they supply no other explanation of the dogma. This being so, they may henceforward be left out of account.

For the monists, i.e. for the Eleatic monists, there is more to be said, inasmuch as, so far from ignoring Being, they take it for their single element. But their principle, strictly interpreted on the lines laid down by Zeno[1], is a denial of all

[1] I add these words because it seems to me that—despite the (obviously mythical) reference to the founders of the system at 242 D, τὸ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν Ἐλε-

plurality and all predication. Starting from the *ὑπόθεσις*[1] that the One alone is, *ἓν μόνον εἶναι*, the Stranger shows that in that case *ἕν* is not *ὅλον*, nor *σφαίρης ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκῳ* (because the sphere has a centre and extremities, while the *ἕν* is *ἀμερές*), and neither *ἔστι* nor *γίγνεται*. Thus the logic which Zeno propounded as a corroboration of the metaphysic of Parmenides, excludes every significant statement which Parmenides had made about his fundamental unity, leaving unimpugned at most the identical proposition 'One is One'.

Now the hypothesis here investigated is identical with the first hypothesis of the *Parmenides*, *ἓν εἰ ἔστιν*, that is to say, as it is explained at 142 C, *εἰ ἓν ἕν*; and the results which are obtained in the *sophist* are some of those which are obtained in the *Parmenides* by the like arguments. In the last named dialogue it is shown, amongst other things, that if One is One and not Many, One is not *ὅλον*, nor *στρογγύλον* (because that is *στρογγύλον* which has its extremities equally distant from the centre, while the One has no parts), and neither *ἔστι* nor *γίγνεται*: and, as we have seen already, the same conclusions emerge in the passage before us.

ατικὸν ἔθνος, ἀπὸ Ξενοφάνους τε καὶ ἔτι πρόσθεν · ἀρξάμενον—the Eleaticism which Plato criticizes here and elsewhere, is the logical monism to which Zeno was led in the course of his crusade against plurality, rather than the physical monism to which Parmenides was brought by the study of the Ionians. The physical monism of Parmenides, though it carefully distinguished physical plurality, the object of opinion, from physical unity, the object of knowledge, did not exclude either the attribution to the Ent of a plurality of epithets, or the recognition of the seeming plurality of things. But when Zeno devised his paradox of predication, and turned it against the belief in the plurality of things, his arguments, if valid against his ordinary antagonists, were fatal, not only to the recognition of the seeming plurality of things, but also to the attribution to the Ent of a plurality of epithets. In other words, this disproof of the theory of plurality was in effect destructive of the theory of unity also, though it is not to be supposed that Zeno, who was occupied rather with the denial of the Many than with the assertion of the One, was conscious of this result. Accordingly Plato in the *sophist* and elsewhere turns the Zenonian logic against the Parmenidean ontology, so as to shew that, whilst the Parmenidean system was incomplete inasmuch as it had no logic, the Zenonian system was a failure inasmuch as it had a logic which was self-destructive.

[1] The phrase *τῷ ταύτην τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ὑποθεμένῳ* 244 C recals the terminology of the *Parmenides*.

Thus, of the διακριβολογούμενοι, the pluralists do not provide us with any theory of Being; i.e. they do not explain what they mean by attributing existence to the two or more elements which they postulate: while the monists of Elea, though they do not ignore Being, are by their own principles precluded from bringing it into relation with things, and from giving any account of it whatsoever.

Having thus disposed of the διακριβολογούμενοι, the Eleate proceeds to deal with τοὺς ἄλλως λέγοντας, who are divided into two hosts waging over οὐσία a sort of γιγαντομαχία. Those who range themselves on the one side, maintain that that only exists which can be felt and handled, and scoff at the notion of incorporeal Being. Those who range themselves on the other side, hold that certain intelligible, incorporeal, forms are alone truly existent, and, breaking up small the bodies in which their opponents recognize reality, attribute to these corporeals, not Being, but Becoming. The two parties are now called upon to give an account of their respective theories of Being.

For this purpose, it is necessary that the corporealists should relax something of the severity of their doctrine; or rather that they should be supposed to do so, for in fact they will do nothing of the sort. Answering for the corporealists thus hypothetically reformed, Theaetetus acknowledges that there is such a thing as a mortal animal, that the mortal animal has a soul, that one soul is just, and another unjust, that one soul is wise, and another foolish, and that, as soul, justice, injustice, wisdom, folly, and the like, may be present or absent, they are existences. Asked further whether they are visible, tangible, and corporeal, or not, he allows on the part of his clients that they are invisible, but distinguishes in regard to the rest of the question: soul, they conceive, is corporeal; as for justice, injustice, &c, shame forbids them to say either that they are not existences, or that they have bodies. It will be sufficient, the Stranger remarks, if they admit that anything incorporeal whatsoever exists. He will then call upon them to say what that common property is which justifies us in attributing existence both to the corporeal and to the incorporeal: and if they should not have an answer ready, he will propose to define ὄντως ὄν as that which has any power, that which is capable, either of acting upon anything

else, or of being acted upon by anything else. This definition is provisionally accepted.

We now turn to the *εἰδῶν φίλοι*, who distinguish *γένεσις*, which is perpetually changing, from *οὐσία*, which is eternally the same, and hold that we have communion with the former by the body through sensation, and with the latter by the soul through reasoning. Is not this communion a *πάθημα* or a *ποίημα* originating in the two correlatives, subject and object, by virtue of powers which they respectively possess? (*Ἆρ' οὐ τὸ νῦν δὴ παρ' ἡμῶν ῥηθέν;* Θ. *Τὸ ποῖον;* Ξ. *Πάθημα ἢ ποίημα ἐκ δυνάμεώς τινος ἀπὸ τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα ξυνιόντων γιγνόμενον.* 248 B) So it would seem: but the Stranger, being familiar with the idealists (*διὰ συνήθειαν*), perceives that they will demur to his theory. Whereas it is now proposed to define *ὄν* as anything which has the power of acting or being acted upon, and to regard object and subject, both in sensation and in thought, as such, the idealists hold, that, though *γένεσις* has the power of acting and being acted upon, *οὐσία* has it not. Nevertheless they allow that soul knows, and *οὐσία* is known, an admission which is clearly inconsistent with their theory of the *ἠρεμία* of Being. And when we proceed to consider that theory on its merits, it is difficult to believe that the absolutely existent has neither motion nor life nor soul nor thought, *ἀλλὰ σεμνὸν καὶ ἅγιον νοῦν οὐκ ἔχον ἀκίνητον ἑστὸς εἶναι.* No: *ὄν* must be intelligent, and it would seem that, if it is intelligent, it should have both motion and rest, a result which separates us both from the Eleatics and from the Heracliteans.

At this point however we are liable to be asked the question which we ourselves addressed to the dualists of the old school: 'If in *κίνησις* and *στάσις* you recognize two opposing principles, what do you mean by saying that they exist?' You do not mean, either that they both move, or that they both rest. Nor do you mean that *ὄν* is the sum of *κίνησις* and *στάσις*. Rather, Being is a third thing, which of its own nature neither moves nor rests. But how can this be? If a thing is not in motion, surely it is at rest: if a thing is not at rest, surely it is in motion. Thus it appears that *ὄν* is not less perplexing than *μὴ ὄν*.

In that part of the dialogue which has been summarized in the preceding paragraphs, the Eleate brings together three theories, which may be called respectively the doctrine of the corporeal-

ists, the doctrine of the idealists, and the doctrine of δύναμις. I propose to submit all three to examination.

Of the corporealists we are told that they attribute existence only to that which can be felt and handled, thus making Being coextensive with body. As they are ranked with the ἄλλως λέγοντες, they do not represent the earlier physicists, who are διακριβολογούμενοι. It is therefore commonly supposed that the reference is either to the Cynics or to the Atomists. In favour of the former of these hypotheses, it is urged (1) that, whereas the Atomists attributed existence to void as well as to matter, the Cynics on logical grounds were thorough-going materialists; (2) that while the corporealists would appear to credit the evidence of the senses, the Atomists plainly discredit it; (3) that the Cynics were notoriously hostile to the theory of εἴδη; (4) that the unmistakable reference to the Cynics in 251 B makes the allusion in the passage before us the more probable; (5) that the corporealists of the *sophist* are apparently identical with the materialists of *Theaetetus* 155 E, while the phrase ἀντιτύπους ἀνθρώπους in that place would seem to be a play upon the name of Antisthenes[1]. On the other side it is argued that the corporealists of the *sophist* would seem to be rather physicists than logicians, while it is pointed out that the ethical references apply to Democritus just as well as to the rival claimants. Plainly the arguments on either side are far from being conclusive against one another: and accordingly Campbell conjectures that "Plato has here idealized, if such a paradox may be allowed, the materialistic tendency in contemporary thought". (Introduction to the Sophist, p. lxxiv.)

For myself, I incline to Campbell's view; and most certainly I cannot allow that the Atomists are not included in the reference. Democritus' recognition of the existence of void may be a sufficient reason for supposing that the passage before us does not refer to him exclusively, but it is hardly a sufficient reason for denying to him a place in a group of materialists.

[1] In this sentence I have attempted to represent the careful argument of Thompson, *Transactions of the Cambridge Philosophical Society* x 158, 165 = *J. of Ph.* VIII 310, 321.

Granted that the Atomists discredited the evidence of the senses, it is by no means clear that the corporealists were less sceptical. The hostility between the Idealists and the Atomists was as deep as the hostility between the Idealists and the Cynics: indeed Plato, though notoriously he never names Democritus, has in his writings, especially in the *Timaeus*, many obvious and bitter references to him. The unmistakable reference to the Cynics in 251 BC does not prove that they have been previously referred to. The epithet *ἀντιτύπους* in *Theaetetus* 155 E cannot be accounted decisive. In short I see no precise evidence to enable us to exclude from the scope of the reference either of the two schools: and it seems to me natural that Plato should include both of them in his retrospect[1].

The precise identification of the *εἰδῶν φίλοι* is a matter of far greater importance, since, on the strength of the present passage, a whole chapter has been added to the Megarian system, and many paragraphs to the literature of Platonism. It has been maintained (1) that the *εἰδῶν φίλοι* are the Megarians (Schleiermacher, Thompson, Zeller); (2) that they represent Plato himself in an earlier stage of his philosophical development (Grote)[2]; (3) that they are "Platonists who have imperfectly understood Plato" (see Campbell's note on 248 A); (4) that "Plato at a late period of his course directs this argument against those amongst his disciples in the Academy who, resting in their imperfect realization of an earlier phase of his own teaching and reverting to Pythagorean and Eleatic elements, held the doctrine of ideas in the form in which it is often controverted by Aristotle" (Campbell p. lxxv and, to the

[1] It may be noted that the psychological teaching of the corporealists agrees with that of Democritus. When the Eleate asks whether the corporealists attribute body to *ψυχή, δικαιοσύνη, φρόνησις*, Theaetetus replies—*Τοῦτο οὐκέτι κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἀποκρίνονται πᾶν, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν αὐτὴν δοκεῖν σφίσι σῶμά τι κεκτῆσθαι, φρόνησιν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον ὧν ἠρώτηκας, αἰσχύνονται τὸ τολμᾶν ἢ μηδὲν τῶν ὄντων αὐτὰ ὁμολογεῖν ἢ πάντ' εἶναι σώματα διισχυρίζεσθαι.* 247 B. That Democritus supposed the soul to consist of fine, smooth, round, atoms, in other words, of fire, is notorious. (For the authorities, see Zeller, *Ph. d. Gr.* I 807: "Die Seele kann unter den Voraussetzungen der Atomenlehre nicht anders als körperlich gedacht werden," &c.)

[2] Grote *Plato* &c II 457 ff.

same effect, Ueberweg[1]); (5) that the doctrine of the εἰδῶν φίλοι is orthodox Platonism, and that accordingly the *sophist* is a hostile critique, written not by Plato, but by a Megarian opponent (Socher).

The first of these theories, which may still be regarded as the received hypothesis, is arrived at by a process of exhaustion: 'The εἰδῶν φίλοι are clearly Socratics; now they are not Cynics, nor Cyrenaics; whence it follows that they are Megarians.' And accordingly a doctrine of incommunicable εἴδη, of which there is elsewhere no evidence whatsoever, is by Zeller and others attributed to the Megarian school[2]. But plainly, if it can be shown

[1] "An sich beweist nun zwar dieser Gang der Argumentation keineswegs, dass Plato auch genetisch denselben Weg genommen habe; da dies aber doch in Folge der Beziehung der Idee zum Begriff wahrscheinlich ist, so dürfen wir in der Ansicht der εἰδῶν φίλοι (*soph.* 248 c) Plato's eigene frühere Auffassung erkennen, und es möchte am richtigsten sein, unter diesen Ideenfreunden diejenigen von Plato's eigenen Anhängern zu verstehen, die noch in der früheren Form seiner Lehre standen, über welche er selbst im eigenen Denken bereits hinausgeschritten war." Ueberweg *Untersuchungen*, 1861, p. 277.

[2] When Zeller attributes to Euclides, and possibly to Stilpo (II i 219, 233), a theory of incorporeal kinds, he rests his case upon (1) the passage before us, read in the light of Schleiermacher's interpretation, (2) an argument of Stilpo's *in refutation of the theory of ideas*, quoted by Diogenes Laertius, II 119, to prove his eristical ingenuity. With Hegel, *Gesch. d. Ph.* II 123, Zeller admits, as of course he must, that the meaning which, not without violence, he extracts from the text, is not that which Diogenes put upon it. For my own part, I think that the text is, as it stands, capable of a simple interpretation of the sort indicated by Diogenes: but in any case the passage is no proof that Stilpo entertained a theory of εἴδη.

Further, it is to be observed that the doctrine thus conjecturally introduced into the Megarian system suits ill with its surroundings. It may indeed be argued, as Zeller argues, *Ph. d. Gr.* II i 217, that a theory of a plurality of εἴδη is not inconsistent with the belief in a One, the Good, in which they culminate. But how are we to reconcile the position attributed to Euclides with what we know about the subsequent development of the school? The immediate successors of Euclides, ignoring, as it would seem, the supposed theory of εἴδη, gave themselves unreservedly to eristic: and before the end of the century we find Stilpo following the Cynic Antisthenes in the denial of predication,—in other words, we find the successor of the supposed εἰδῶν φίλοι allying himself with the corporealists of the γιγαντομαχία. In effect, we are asked to believe that, whereas Euclides was an idealist and not an eristic, his successors were eristics and not idealists. If so, in what sense can Euclides be regarded as the founder of the Megarian school?

that there was another Socratic school,—for example, the school of Plato,—which maintained precisely the doctrine here criticized, the Megarian hypothesis loses the solitary argument which has been urged in defence of it. Further, if positive arguments can be adduced in favour of Grote's hypothesis, it will not be necessary to institute a detailed examination of the other three: for, as the anonymous theory, that Plato is thinking of "Platonists who have imperfectly understood him", has no basis except the assumption that Plato never entertained the doctrine of the εἰδῶν φίλοι, and Socher's theory, that the *sophist* is a hostile critique written by a Megarian opponent, has no basis except the assumption that Plato never entertained any doctrine except that of the εἰδῶν φίλοι, these theories immediately fall to the ground; while the supplementary hypothesis of Ueberweg and Campbell, that there were amongst Plato's followers some who "held tenaciously to a conception of the εἴδη, based on immature statements of his own", though probable enough, is hardly relevant to the present inquiry. What then is the evidence in favour of Grote's view?

That Plato's teaching underwent an important transformation, and that, in certain dialogues, from the stand-point of the later doctrine, he submits the earlier to direct and careful criticism, I have endeavoured to show in my papers upon the *Philebus* and the *Parmenides*. Hence I am already prepared to accept Grote's hypothesis: and on a close scrutiny I think I see,

And here, I would say a word about Euclides' relations to Plato. According to Zeller, Euclides and Plato occupied common ground, and are possibly to be regarded as joint authors of the theory of ideas: "Er steht demnach im allgemeinen auf demselben Boden mit Plato, und es ist möglich, dass sich diese Ansicht den beiden Philosophen gemeinschaftlich in ihrem wissenschaftlichen Verkehr gebildet hat." *Ph. d. Gr.* II i 218. If so, how is it that neither Aristotle nor any other authority notices this manifestly important fact? The remark of Zeller,—"Diejenige Ideenlehre, von welcher Aristoteles redet, die platonische, hatte jedenfalls Plato zuerst aufgestellt, gesetzt auch, Euklides sei in der allgemeinen Voraussetzung, dass nur das εἶδος das wahrhaft Wirkliche an den Dingen sei, mit ihm einverstanden gewesen,"—is no answer to this question. For, if Euclides had invented a theory of εἴδη independently of Plato, he must have been mentioned, one would think, in *metaphysics* M, and, if he had been joint author with Plato of such a system, he must have been mentioned in *metaphysics* A 6.

not only that the doctrine of the *εἰδῶν φίλοι* is the Platonism of the *republic* and the *Phaedo*, but also that the exposition of the doctrine of the *εἰδῶν φίλοι* contains unmistakable echoes of those dialogues.

The principal statements about the *εἰδῶν φίλοι* are contained in the following sentences:

Ξ. *Τοιγαροῦν οἱ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀμφισβητοῦντες μάλα εὐλαβῶς ἄνωθεν ἐξ ἀοράτου ποθὲν ἀμύνονται, νοητὰ ἄττα καὶ ἀσώματα εἴδη βιαζόμενοι τὴν ἀληθινὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι· τὰ δὲ ἐκείνων σώματα καὶ τὴν λεγομένην ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἀλήθειαν κατὰ σμικρὰ διαθραύοντες ἐν τοῖς λόγοις γένεσιν ἀντ' οὐσίας φερομένην τινὰ προσαγορεύουσιν.* 246 B.

Ξ. *Γένεσιν, τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν χωρίς που διελόμενοι λέγετε; ἦ γάρ;* Θ. *Ναί.* Ξ. *Καὶ σώματι μὲν ἡμᾶς γενέσει δι' αἰσθήσεως κοινωνεῖν, διὰ λογισμοῦ δὲ ψυχῇ πρὸς τὴν ὄντως οὐσίαν, ἣν ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχειν φατέ, γένεσιν δὲ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως.* 248 A.

Ξ. *Πρὸς δὴ ταῦτα τόδε λέγουσιν, ὅτι γενέσει μὲν μέτεστι τοῦ πάσχειν καὶ ποιεῖν δυνάμεως, πρὸς δὲ οὐσίαν τούτων οὐδετέρου τὴν δύναμιν ἁρμόττειν φασίν.* Θ. *Οὐκοῦν λέγουσί τι;* Ξ. *Πρὸς ὅ γε λεκτέον ἡμῖν, ὅτι δεόμεθα παρ' αὐτῶν ἔτι πυθέσθαι σαφέστερον, εἰ προσομολογοῦσι τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν γιγνώσκειν, τὴν δ' οὐσίαν γιγνώσκεσθαι.* Θ. *Φασὶ μὴν τοῦτό γε.* 248 C.

From the first and second of these three extracts we learn, (1) that the philosophers in question oppose *οὐσία* to *γένεσις*, placing under the head of *ἡ ἀληθινὴ οὐσία* certain *εἴδη* which are *νοητά, ἀσώματα, ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα*, and under the head of *φερομένη γένεσις*, the *σώματα* of the corporealists, which are *αἰσθητά, ἄλλοτε ἄλλως ἔχοντα*; and (2) that they break up small (*διαθραύουσι κατὰ σμικρά*) the latter. Further, from the second and third of the extracts we learn, (3) that the teaching of the idealists is inconsistent, inasmuch as they assume their *εἴδη* to be incommunicable, i.e. incapable either of acting or of being acted upon, and nevertheless assert *τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν γιγνώσκειν, τὴν δ' οὐσίαν γιγνώσκεσθαι.* On all three points, (1) *οὐσία* and *γένεσις*, (2) the *διάθραυσις σωμάτων*, (3) the *ἀκοινωνησία τῶν εἰδῶν*, I shall now have something to say.

(1) The antithesis of *οὐσία* and *γένεσις*, not only is the antithesis of *οὐσία* and *γένεσις* which appears in the *Phaedo*, but also is described in precisely the language of that dialogue. The *οὐσία* of the *Phaedo* consists of *εἴδη*, which are *ἀειδῆ*, *νοητά*, apprehended *διὰ λογισμοῦ*, *ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα*; and the *γένεσις* which is opposed to it, consists of *σώματα*, which are *αἰσθητά*, *ἄλλοτ' ἄλλως ἔχοντα*[1]. Surely if Plato were describing an idealism which was not his own, he would not have selected precisely those phrases which recal, not only his characteristic theory, but also his exposition of it.

(2) The *γιγνόμενα* of the *Phaedo* are *σύνθετα*, and therefore *διαιρετά*, divisible, not only into parts, but also into ideas, inasmuch as, in that stage of doctrine which is represented by the *Phaedo*, the attributes of a thing are ideas congregated within it. Thus the statement made about the *εἰδῶν φίλοι*, that they *διαθραύουσι κατὰ σμικρὰ* the *σώματα* of the corporealists, is true of Plato when he wrote the *Phaedo*[2].

(3) The *εἶδος* of the *Phaedo* is *μονοειδές*, *αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό*, *ὡσαύτως κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχον*, *καὶ οὐδέποτε οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς ἀλλοίωσιν οὐδεμίαν ἐνδεχόμενον* 78 D, and *therefore* cannot be perceived by sense. Now if the immutability of the idea

[1] *αὐτὴ ἡ οὐσία ἧς λόγον δίδομεν τοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἀποκρινόμενοι, πότερον ὡσαύτως ἀεὶ ἔχει κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἢ ἄλλοτ' ἄλλως; αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον, αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, αὐτὸ ἕκαστον ὃ ἔστι, τὸ ὄν, μή ποτε μεταβολὴν καὶ ἠντινοῦν ἐνδέχεται; ἢ ἀεὶ αὐτῶν ἕκαστον ὃ ἔστι, μονοειδὲς ὂν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό, ὡσαύτως κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχει καὶ οὐδέποτε οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς ἀλλοίωσιν οὐδεμίαν ἐνδέχεται; Ὡσαύτως, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη, ὁ Κέβης, κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχειν, ὦ Σώκρατες. Τί δὲ τῶν πολλῶν [καλῶν], οἷον ἀνθρώπων ἢ ἵππων ἢ ἱματίων ἢ ἄλλων ὧντινωνοῦν τοιούτων, ἢ ἴσων ἢ καλῶν ἢ πάντων τῶν ἐκείνοις ὁμωνύμων; ἆρα κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχει, ἢ πᾶν τοὐναντίον ἐκείνοις οὔτε αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς οὔτε ἀλλήλοις οὐδέποτε, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, οὐδαμῶς κατὰ ταὐτά ἐστιν; Οὔτως αὖ, ἔφη, ταῦτα, ὁ Κέβης· οὐδέποτε ὡσαύτως ἔχει. Οὐκοῦν τούτων μὲν κἂν ἅψαιο κἂν ἴδοις κἂν ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεσιν αἴσθοιο, τῶν δὲ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἐχόντων οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτῳ ποτ' ἂν ἄλλῳ ἐπιλάβοιο ἢ τῷ τῆς διανοίας λογισμῷ, ἀλλ' ἐστὶν ἀειδῆ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ οὐχ ὁρατά; *Phaedo* 78 D.* This passage will suffice for the proof of the statement made in the text: but the reader will do well to turn to 65 D, 79 C, 80 B, 81 B (where compare *ὥστε μηδὲν ἄλλο δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀληθὲς ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ σωματοειδές* with *τὴν λεγομένην ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἀλήθειαν* *sophist* 246 B), 83 B, for further instances.

[2] It will be observed that, whilst the first, and in a manner the third, of these philosophemes, appear in the later Platonism as well as in the earlier, the second belongs exclusively to the earlier system.

precludes perception, it must also, one would think, preclude knowledge: yet both in the *republic* and in the *Phaedo*,—indeed in the very passage which I have quoted,—the idea is supposed to be capable of being known. Thus the theory of the *Phaedo* is open to the accusation of inconsistency which is urged against the εἰδῶν φίλοι in 248 C.

Now some of the supporters of the Megarian hypothesis, relying upon the fact that in this very dialogue Plato insists upon the intercommunicability of the ideas, have seen in the doctrine of ἀκοινωνησία a proof that the ideas here spoken of are not the ideas of Plato. On consideration however it will appear, that, according to the Plato of the *Phaedo*, incommunicability is implied in the immutability of the idea, and is indeed one of the idea's most important characteristics. Incommunicability is implied in the idea's immutability, because without change there can be no μετάληψις, i.e. participation in the physical sense of the word, and, according to the Plato of this period, without μετάληψις there can be no predication. Incommunicability is one of the idea's most important characteristics, because, if the idea were not incommunicable, the paradox of predication, which Plato tries to meet in the case of the particular by means of the theory of the immanent idea, would immediately recur in the case of the idea itself.

I hold then that the ἀκοινωνησία τῶν εἰδῶν here spoken of, so far from being a proof that the idealism in question is not Platonic, rather, in conjunction with the antithesis of οὐσία and γένεσις and the διάθρανσις of material things, goes to show that the doctrine of the εἰδῶν φίλοι is the doctrine maintained by Plato in the *republic* and the *Phaedo*, which doctrine he now sees to be faulty, if for no other reason, at any rate for this, that it precludes the intercommunion of εἴδη, while the communion of the εἶδος of οὐσία, if of no other, with the other εἴδη, is plainly indispensable. Accordingly we shall find that the κοινωνία of εἴδη, or, rather, of certain εἴδη, is insisted upon in the immediate sequel[1].

[1] To the hypothesis that the doctrine of the εἰδῶν φίλοι is an early form of Platonism, Zeller objects—"Aber sollte wohl Plato eine Theorie, die er selbst aufgestellt hat, mit der Ironie behandelt haben, mit welcher S. 246, A B

But what are we to say to the theory of *δύναμις*, which the Eleate propounds upon his own authority, and forces both upon the corporealists and upon the idealists?

The passages in which the theory is enunciated are the following:

Ξ. Λέγω δὴ τὸ καὶ ὁποιανοῦν κεκτημένον δύναμιν εἴτ' εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν ἕτερον ὁτιοῦν πεφυκός, εἴτ' εἰς τὸ παθεῖν καὶ σμικρότατον ὑπὸ τοῦ φαυλοτάτου, κἂν εἰ μόνον εἰσάπαξ, πᾶν τοῦτο ὄντως εἶναι· τίθεμαι γὰρ ὅρον ὁρίζειν τὰ ὄντα, ὡς ἔστιν οὐκ ἄλλο τι πλὴν δύναμις. Θ. Ἀλλ' ἐπείπερ αὐτοί γε οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἐν τῷ παρόντι τούτου βέλτιον λέγειν, δέχονται τοῦτο. Ξ. Καλῶς· ἴσως γὰρ ἂν εἰσύστερον ἡμῖν τε καὶ τούτοις ἕτερον ἂν φανείη. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τούτους τοῦτο ἡμῖν ἐνταῦθα μενέτω ξυνομολογηθέν. 247 D.

Ξ. Τὸ δὲ δὴ κοινωνεῖν, ὦ πάντων ἄριστοι, τί τοῦθ' ὑμᾶς ἐπ' ἀμφοῖν λέγειν φῶμεν; ἆρ' οὐ τὸ νῦν δὴ παρ' ἡμῶν ῥηθέν; Θ. Τὸ ποῖον; Ξ. Πάθημα ἢ ποίημα ἐκ δυνάμεώς τινος ἀπὸ τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα ξυνιόντων γιγνόμενον. 248 B.

Ξ. Ἱκανὸν ἔθεμεν ὅρον που τῶν ὄντων, ὅταν τῳ παρῇ ἡ τοῦ πάσχειν ἢ δρᾶν καὶ πρὸς τὸ σμικρότατον δύναμις; Θ. Ναί. 248 C.

Ξ. Τί δὲ πρὸς Διός; ὡς ἀληθῶς κίνησιν καὶ ζωὴν καὶ ψυχὴν καὶ φρόνησιν ἢ ῥᾳδίως πεισθησόμεθα τῷ παντελῶς ὄντι μὴ παρεῖναι, μηδὲ ζῆν αὐτὸ μηδὲ φρονεῖν, ἀλλὰ σεμνὸν καὶ

die *εἰδῶν φίλοι* behandelt werden? Ist das Plato's Lehre, oder haben wir Grund zu der Vermuthung, es sei jemals seine Lehre gewesen, was S. 248, C als Behauptung der 'Ideenfreunde' angeführt wird, dass die *δύναμις τοῦ ποιεῖν* nicht dem Seienden, sondern nur dem Werdenden zukommen könne? In seinem uns bekannten System kommt sie doch der Idee des Guten, dem weltschöpferischen *Νοῦς* des Timäus, der *αἰτία* des Philebus, welche man jedenfalls zur *οὐσία*, nicht zur *γένεσις* zu rechnen hat, und nach Phädo 95, E ff. den Ideen überhaupt zu." *Ph. d. Gr.* II i 216. It will be seen that from my point of view it is not difficult to answer Zeller's questions. If in the *Philebus*, the *Parmenides*, and the *Theaetetus*, Plato criticizes himself, it will not surprise us that he should criticize himself in the *sophist*. If again the *Timaeus* and the *Philebus* are, like the *sophist*, dialogues of the later period, it will not surprise us that the teaching of the two dialogues first named should accord, not with the doctrine criticized in the last named dialogue, but with the doctrine preferred. Finally, if Plato at 248 C taxes the *εἰδῶν φίλοι* with inconsistency, the quotation from the *Phaedo* proves no more than that Plato's criticism is well founded.

ἅγιον, νοῦν οὐκ ἔχον, ἀκίνητον ἑστὸς εἶναι; Θ. Δεινὸν μέντ' ἄν, ὦ ξένε, λόγον συγχωροῖμεν. 248 E. (In the sentences which follow, from the axiom that τὸ παντελῶς ὄν has νοῦς, it is inferred that it possesses also ζωή and ψυχή, and is capable of motion.)

Ξ. Τὰ[1] κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ δοκεῖ σοι χωρὶς στάσεως γενέσθαι ποτ' ἄν; Θ. Οὐδαμῶς. Ξ. Τί δ'; ἄνευ τούτων νοῦν καθορᾷς ὄντα ἢ γενόμενον ἂν καὶ ὁπουοῦν; Θ. Ἥκιστα. 249 B.

From these extracts I gather that, according to the Eleate, whose doctrine, though possibly incomplete (cf. 247 E), is plainly offered in all seriousness,

(1) everything which has power, either of acting or of being acted upon, is ὄντως ὄν,

(2) τὸ παντελῶς ὄν is νοῦς; which, having ζωή and ψυχή, κινεῖται, and, having τὰ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ περὶ τὸ αὐτό, ἕστηκεν.

Further, in 248 B it appears that the ποιεῖν and πάσχειν here spoken of are appropriate to object and subject respectively. Hence the object of knowledge, being possessed of δύναμις, is, by (1), ὄντως ὄν, and therefore, by (2), not inanimate and external to νοῦς, but, like the subject, animate and intelligent. This being so, it would seem, that, according to the doctrine which Plato puts into the mouth of the Eleate, νοῦς as subject has for object its own invariable and immutable thoughts (τὰ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ περὶ τὸ αὐτό); and accordingly, that, so long as mind is universal and eternal, pluralized neither in space nor in time, these its thoughts are all of them ever present to it in their integrity and their perfection. But how is it, if mind ceases to be universal and eternal, and is pluralized in space and in time?

Now at 156 A of the *Theaetetus* we read, that, according to the κομψότεροι,—who, as I conceive, represent Plato himself, see *J. of Ph.* XIII 256, 268,—object and subject, having respectively the power of acting and the power of being acted upon, when they come into combination, but not otherwise,

[1] On the substitution of τὰ, for τὸ, the reading of the books, see *J. of Ph.* XIII 220.

generate quality on the one part, and sensation on the other, and thereby themselves pass into a phenomenal existence, which, being momentary and transient, is more properly regarded, not as *οὐσία*, but as *γένεσις*. Here the description of object and subject, as having respectively the power of acting and the power of being acted upon, immediately recals the *sophist*; and the agreement of the two passages in this particular would seem to warrant us in using the theory of the Eleate to supplement the theory of the *κομψότεροι*. Let us then suppose, that, in the theory of sensation, mind being the subject, thought is the object. But, whereas in the *sophist* mind was universal and eternal, pluralized neither in space nor in time, and consequently its thoughts were all of them ever present to it in their integrity and their perfection, in the *Theaetetus*, as appears from the whole tenour of the exposition, we are concerned, not with mind, but with minds, not with thoughts simultaneously, but with thoughts successively: in other words, mind is pluralized both in space and in time, pluralized in space, so that one mind differs from another mind, pluralized in time, so that the thought of each mind at one moment differs from its thought at another moment. Consequently, although all minds have the same element of fixity, the immutable thoughts are diversely presented to the same mind at different times, and to different minds at the same time. These same fixities of thought then, which, to mind which is one, i.e. universal and eternal, are all of them ever present in their integrity and perfection, to minds which are many, i.e. different and mutable, present themselves, not as eternal, immutable, thoughts, but as various and variable phenomena. Now this theory of sensation,—which regards what we call a thing as an imaginary object postulated to account at once for the likeness and the unlikeness of the objects which are common to different minds,—is precisely what is wanted to complete the theory of knowledge indicated in the *sophist*; and the two theories, the theory of knowledge and the theory of sensation, together make up that doctrine of knowledge and sensation which I have elicited from the *Timaeus*.

Further, the doctrine of *δύναμις* falls in with the teaching of

the *Timaeus*. In my paper upon that dialogue, regarding the number as an eternal potentiality[1] of thought not yet localized in time and space, and the particular as the number localized in time and space and therefore pluralized, I conceived the number to be ὄν and the particular to be γιγνόμενον. Now this conception of the number as ὄν and the particular as γιγνόμενον exactly accords with the Eleate's definition of existence. The number is, according to the Eleate, an ὄντως ὄν, (as is also in a manner the ὑποδοχὴ τῆς γενέσεως, time and space, comp. *Timaeus* 51 A, 52 B,) because it has the power of acting and being acted upon. But what we call a thing is, in fact, no more than a series of localizations of the number in time and space, each localization being distinct from every other, so that the thing, as opposed to the number of which it is the localization, has no power of acting or being acted upon, and consequently, according to the Eleate, is, not an ὄντως ὄν, but a γιγνόμενον[2].

Thus, in this section of the dialogue, rapidly reviewing previous speculation, the Eleate shows, that the earlier physicists make no attempt to explain the attribution of existence to the one, two, or three elements which they postulate; that Eleati-

[1] It will, I hope, be understood, that by 'potentiality' I mean, not 'potentiality of *being*', but 'potentiality of *becoming*': so that, when I speak of the number as an 'eternal potentiality', I in no wise impugn, but rather, in accordance with the Eleate's definition —Ἱκανὸν ἔθεμεν ὅρον που τῶν ὄντων, ὅταν τῳ παρῇ ἡ τοῦ πάσχειν ἢ δρᾶν δύναμις. 248 C—affirm, its existence or reality.

[2] In this paragraph, distinguishing the number, i.e. the eternal potentiality of thought not yet localized in time and space, not only from the particular, i.e. the eternal potentiality of thought localized in time and space and therefore pluralized, but also from the idea, i.e. the eternal potentiality of thought localized in time and space without loss of unity, and conceiving that, since entrance into time and space necessarily involves pluralization, the idea, as distinguished from the number on the one hand and the particular on the other, is only hypothetically existent, I have been careful to identify ὄν, not with the idea, but with the number. But, inasmuch as the distinction between idea and number disappears when the idea is understood to be out of time and out of space,—in other words, inasmuch as the number is the idea when the idea is out of time and out of space,—ignoring the distinction, I might have said that the idea is truly existent. I write this in view of the objection which has been taken to my exposition of the *Timaeus*, that it deprives the idea of its reality.

cism, so far as it has a logic, is inconsistent and futile, since the logic of Zeno conflicts with the metaphysic of Parmenides, and precludes all propositions, admitting no other utterance save only the identity "One One"; that the corporealists escape from the difficulty only by denying everything other than sensible particulars, a position which is plainly untenable; and that the idealists, in consequence of their doctrine of the *ἀκοινωνησία εἰδῶν*, are unable to predicate Being of any other *εἶδος*, or any other *εἶδος* of Being. In short, all previous thinkers are reduced to a position resembling that of the Cynics, who, as we shall presently see, deny all except identical predication. And when we turn to the doctrine of *δύναμις*, which the Eleate offers in place of the system reviewed and rejected, the necessity of a theory of the *κοινωνία εἰδῶν* once more forces itself upon our notice, inasmuch as we find that that doctrine involves the *κοινωνία* of *ὄν* both with *κίνησις* and with *στάσις*.

In other words, the ancients had no logic, and were unconscious of those difficulties in regard to predication which were afterwards to arise: Zeno invented a logic, but his logic, not only was fatal to the metaphysic with which he associated it, but also made speech impossible: consequently, philosophy was at a stand still, until a new and better logic should be devised, and thus arose the philosophical agnosticism of the sophists and Socrates: then came Plato, who, in order to meet the Zenonian paradox of predication, invented the theory of the immanent idea: but this was a failure, not only because, as shown in the *Philebus* and the *Parmenides*, it was inconsistent with itself, but also because, as now appears in the *sophist*, since it did not, and could not, recognize the *κοινωνία εἰδῶν*, it left one half of the problem of predication untouched. Disappointed in his first venture, Plato next conceived that there are two sorts of *εἴδη*, *εἴδη* which are *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ* and therefore are not communicable, and *εἴδη* which are not *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ* and therefore are communicable. Of this new theory we have had glimpses elsewhere: but hitherto we have been chiefly concerned with its ontological aspect. Studying it from the logical side, we have now to satisfy ourselves that it makes adequate provision for the *κοινωνία εἰδῶν*.

§ 4 *ὄν and μὴ ὄν.* 250 E—259 E.

Thus far Plato's purpose has been, not so much to make positive contributions to the new system, as rather to prepare the way; not so much to propound a theory of *κοινωνία*, as rather to prove the need of it, by showing that previous speculations, his own earlier doctrine included, have failed to explain, not only the attribution of non-existence, but also the attribution of existence. He now proceeds to enunciate a theory of the *κοινωνία εἰδῶν*, or, to be more precise, a theory of the *κοινωνία* of certain *εἴδη*.

The study of previous systems having shown that *ὄν* needs to be investigated no less than *μὴ ὄν*, the Eleate proposes to "beat off the argument with such grace as he may, taking *ὄν* and *μὴ ὄν* together," and, in fact, to consider the whole question of predication. What, he asks, do we mean, when we call the same thing by a plurality of names? for example, when we attribute to the same human being colours, shapes, sizes, vices, virtues, &c? This problem has offered a rich feast both to young and to old, and especially to certain *ὀψιμαθεῖς*, deficient in intelligence, [namely, Antisthenes and the Cynics,] who deny all predication which is not identical, urging *ὡς ἀδύνατον τά τε πολλὰ ἓν καὶ τὸ ἓν πολλὰ εἶναι.* In order that our remarks may be of general application, we will address our interrogatory at once to these persons, and to those others with whom we were conversing before. We ask them then—Are all things incapable of intercommunion? or, are all things capable of intercommunion? or, are some things capable of intercommunion, others incapable?

First, let us suppose that no one thing communicates with any other. On this hypothesis *κίνησις* and *στάσις* will not participate in *οὐσία*, and, consequently, will not exist. This result is fatal to the systems of flux, of rest, and of ideas[1], as well as to those which, whether contemporaneously or successively, combine unity and plurality. In particular, those who deny all predication which is not identical, come off ill: for, when they say 'every thing exists by

[1] *ὅσοι κατ' εἴδη τὰ ὄντα κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα εἶναί φασιν ἀεί.* 252 A. It will be observed that here, as before, the Eleate, in describing the *εἰδῶν φίλοι*, uses precisely the phrases which are characteristic of the Platonism of the *Phaedo*.

itself apart from others[1],' this sentence is a practical violation of their own precept.

Secondly, let us suppose that all things are capable of intercommunion. This hypothesis may be immediately rejected, as it would oblige us to attribute rest to *κίνησις*, motion to *στάσις*: which is impossible.

The rejection of these hypotheses compels us to accept the third, which alone remains, namely, that some things communicate, others do not. Just so, consonants are incommunicable, vowels communicable, combination of consonants being possible only when vowels intervene to unite them. Further, as there is an art of grammar which decides what letters can be combined, and as there is another art, music, which decides what musical notes can be combined, so there must be an art or science to determine what *γένη* harmonize, and what *γένη* do not, as well as whether this or that *γένος* is generally available to unite or to disunite the rest. Now this is precisely the function of the science of dialectic, so that we have unexpectedly stumbled upon the philosopher.

It would appear then, that some *γένη* communicate, others do not, and that, of those which communicate, some communicate within narrow limits, others more widely, and others again universally: *τὰ μὲν ἡμῖν τῶν γενῶν ὡμολόγηται κοινωνεῖν ἐθέλειν ἀλλήλοις, τὰ δὲ μή, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐπ' ὀλίγον, τὰ δ' ἐπὶ πολλά, τὰ δὲ καὶ διὰ πάντων οὐδὲν κωλύειν τοῖς πᾶσι κεκοινωνηκέναι.* 254 B. Let us apply this doctrine to the three important *γένη*, *ὄν*, *στάσις*, and *κίνησις*, in the hope of satisfying ourselves that *ὄν* and *μὴ ὄν* are intercommunicable.

We have already seen that *στάσις* and *κίνησις* do not combine with one another. We now note that *ὄν* combines with both. Further, each of the three is the same as itself, and different from the other two: whence it follows that *ταὐτόν* and *θάτερον* are two *γένη*, other than the original three, but of necessity always combining with them. Thus our three selected *γένη* grow into five[2].

[1] *Τῷ τε εἶναί που περὶ πάντα ἀναγκάζονται χρῆσθαι καὶ τῷ χωρὶς καὶ τῷ ἄλλων καὶ τῷ καθ' αὑτὸ καὶ μυρίοις ἑτέροις, ὧν ἀκρατεῖς ὄντες εἴργεσθαι καὶ μὴ συνάπτειν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, κτλ.* 252 C. Would it not seem that Antisthenes had actually written *πᾶν ἐστὶ χωρὶς ἄλλων καθ' αὑτό?*

[2] It may be worth while to comment upon the sentence *Ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ταὐτὸν μηδὲν διάφορον σημαίνετον, κίνησιν αὖ πάλιν καὶ στάσιν ἀμφότερα εἶναι λέγοντες ἀμφότερα οὕτως αὐτὰ ταὐτὸν ὡς ὄντα προσεροῦμεν.* 255 BC, to which I have often heard it objected that Plato here confuses the copula with the verb "to exist." This is not so. The Eleate wishes to show that *ταὐτόν* and

Beginning with κίνησις, we observe that it is wholly different from στάσις, and thus not στάσις: that it participates in ὄν, and thus is ὄν: that it is different from ταὐτόν, and thus is not ταὐτόν: that it is the same as itself, and thus is ταὐτόν[1]: that it is different from θάτερον, and thus is both ἕτερον and οὐκ ἕτερον: that it is different from ὄν, and thus is not ὄν, whereas we have already seen that it is ὄν. Thus κίνησις is at once ὄν and οὐκ ὄν, and the same proposition holds of στάσις, ταὐτόν, θάτερον, and ὄν itself. Further, as each γένος or εἶδος differs, not only from ὄν, but also from all other participants in ὄν, the μὴ ὄν in respect of a given γένος or εἶδος is ἄπειρον πλήθει, since for once that the γένος or εἶδος is ὄν, it is οὐκ ὄν an infinite number of times.

Next we will regard the matter from another point of view. By μὴ ὄν we understand, not the ἐναντίον of ὄν, but only that which is different from it: for example, μὴ μέγα includes ἴσον as well as σμικρόν. Now just as ἐπιστήμη is divided into branches, so, that which is other than ὄν may be divided into sections, such as μὴ καλόν; and μὴ καλόν, inasmuch as it is an ὄν defined by its opposition to καλόν, is as truly existent as καλόν, and similarly μὴ μέγα as truly existent as μέγα, μὴ δίκαιον as truly existent as δίκαιον, μὴ καλόν, μὴ μέγα, μὴ δίκαιον being parts or particular instances of θάτερον, which, as we have seen, is existent. This being so, the opposition between θάτερον (μόριον) and the correlative ὄν, which opposition is,

ὄν are not names of the same γένος, but γένη, distinct, though intercommunicable. In order to prove this by a reductio ad absurdum, he supposes that there is no difference of meaning between ὄν and ταὐτόν, so that ταὐτόν may be substituted at pleasure for ὄν. Now it is admitted that κίνησις and στάσις are ὄντα, i.e. that they partake of existence. But, if ὄν and ταὐτόν are no more than two names of the same γένος, the assertion that κίνησις and στάσις are ὄντα, i.e. that they partake of existence, is equivalent to the assertion that they are ταὐτόν, i.e. that they partake of sameness. But there is no such equivalence. For, when we say that κίνησις and στάσις exist we plainly mean something other than what we should mean if we were to say, either that κίνησις and στάσις are the same as one another, or that they are severally the same as themselves.

[1] In this statement, that κίνησις is both ταὐτόν and οὐ ταὐτόν, there is, the Eleate remarks, nothing paradoxical, because what we mean is no more than that κίνησις participates in ταὐτόν in relation to itself, and in θάτερον in relation to ταὐτόν: Τὴν κίνησιν δὴ ταὐτόν τ' εἶναι καὶ μὴ ταὐτὸν ὁμολογητέον καὶ οὐ δυσχεραντέον. οὐ γὰρ ὅταν εἴπωμεν αὐτὴν ταὐτὸν καὶ μὴ ταὐτόν, ὁμοίως εἰρήκαμεν, ἀλλ' ὁπόταν μὲν ταὐτόν, διὰ τὴν μέθεξιν ταὐτοῦ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν οὕτω λέγωμεν, ὅταν δὲ μὴ ταὐτόν, διὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν αὖ θατέρου, δι' ἣν ἀποχωριζομένη ταὐτοῦ γέγονεν οὐκ ἐκεῖνο ἀλλ' ἕτερον, ὥστε ὀρθῶς αὖ λέγεται πάλιν οὐ ταὐτόν. 256 A.

as before, not contrariety, but only otherness, is no less *οὐσία* than *ὄν* itself. Now this opposition, i. e. the otherness which separates the several parts of *θάτερον* from the correlative parts of *ὄν*, is the *μὴ ὄν* required. Thus whereas Parmenides forbade us to seek the *μὴ ὄν*, we have succeeded in discovering it. In fact, so far from bowing to the futile theory that kinds do not communicate and to the worthless logic which has been associated with it, we hold that *ὄν* and *μὴ ὄν* are intercommunicable, *μὴ ὄν* being *ὄν* by participation, and *ὄν* being *μὴ ὄν* in the like manner, and we are prepared to apply the same doctrine to *θάτερον* and *ταὐτόν*, *μέγα* and *σμικρόν*, *ὅμοιον* and *ἀνόμοιον*, &c.[1]

---

[1] *τὸ δὲ ταὐτὸν ἕτερον ἀποφαίνειν ἀμῇ γέ πῃ καὶ τὸ θάτερον ταὐτὸν καὶ τὸ μέγα σμικρὸν καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον ἀνόμοιον, καὶ χαίρειν οὕτω τἀναντία ἀεὶ προφέροντα ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, οὔτε τις ἔλεγχος οὗτος ἀληθινὸς ἅρτι τε τῶν ὄντων τινὸς ἐφαπτομένου δῆλος νεογενὴς ὤν.* Θ. *Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.* Ξ. *Καὶ γάρ, ὦ 'γαθέ, τό γε πᾶν ἀπὸ παντὸς ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποχωρίζειν ἄλλως τε οὐκ ἐμμελὲς καὶ δὴ καὶ παντάπασιν ἀμούσου τινὸς καὶ ἀφιλοσόφου.* Θ. *Τί δή;* Ξ. *Τελεωτάτη πάντων λόγων ἐστὶν ἀφάνισις τὸ διαλύειν ἕκαστον ἀπὸ πάντων· διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀλλήλων τῶν εἰδῶν συμπλοκὴν ὁ λόγος γέγονεν ἡμῖν.* 259 D. It will be perceived that, by this application of the doctrine of communicability to *ὅμοιον ἀνόμοιον*, &c, Plato disposes of that first argument of Zeno's first book which is the starting-point of the *Parmenides*. It must be remembered however that the Eleate has in view, not merely *οἱ τὸ πᾶν ὡς ἓν ἱστάντες*, but others also, and that amongst them are included *ὅσοι κατ' εἴδη τὰ ὄντα κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα εἶναί φασιν ἀεί*: compare 251 BD, 252 AB. Accordingly in the words *χαίρειν οὕτω τἀναντία ἀεὶ προφέροντα ἐν τοῖς λόγοις* I think I see a significant reference to the *Phaedo*, in which dialogue the doctrine of the incommunicability of *ἐναντία* bears the stress of the argument: see especially 102 D ff *ἐμοὶ γὰρ φαίνεται οὐ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ μέγεθος οὐδέποτ' ἐθέλειν ἅμα μέγα καὶ σμικρὸν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν μέγεθος οὐδέποτε προσδέχεσθαι τὸ σμικρὸν οὐδ' ἐθέλειν ὑπερέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ δυοῖν τὸ ἕτερον, ἢ φεύγειν καὶ ὑπεκχωρεῖν, ὅταν αὐτῷ προσίῃ τὸ ἐναντίον, τὸ σμικρόν, ἢ προσελθόντος ἐκείνου ἀπολωλέναι· ὑπομένον δὲ καὶ δεξάμενον τὴν σμικρότητα οὐκ ἐθέλειν εἶναι ἕτερον ἢ ὅπερ ἦν. ὥσπερ ἐγὼ δεξάμενος καὶ ὑπομείνας τὴν σμικρότητα, καὶ ἔτι ὢν ὅσπερ εἰμί, οὗτος ὁ αὐτὸς σμικρός εἰμι· ἐκεῖνο δὲ οὐ τετόλμηκε μέγα ὂν σμικρὸν εἶναι· ὡς δ' αὕτως καὶ τὸ σμικρὸν τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν οὐκ ἐθέλει ποτὲ μέγα γίγνεσθαι οὐδὲ εἶναι, οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν ἐναντίων ἔτι ὃν ὅπερ ἦν ἅμα τοὐναντίον γίγνεσθαί τε καὶ εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἤτοι ἀπέρχεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἐν τούτῳ τῷ παθήματι.....τότε μὲν γὰρ ἐλέγετο ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου πράγματος τὸ ἐναντίον πρᾶγμα γίγνεσθαι, νῦν δὲ ὅτι αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον ἑαυτῷ ἐναντίον οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο, οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν οὔτε τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει.* There can be no doubt, I apprehend, that in this matter the teaching of the *sophist* is later than that of the *Phaedo*. Further, comparing the Eleate's emphatic declaration, that the doctrine of incommunicability is utterly unphilosophical, the communion of kinds being the very foundation of discourse, with the challenge thrown

The passage here summarized falls into two portions, (1) 250 E—257 A, (2) 257 B—259 E, which portions it will be convenient to deal with separately. In the former, the Eleate constructs a theory of the *κοινωνία εἰδῶν*, and applies it to certain forms selected for the purpose. He conceives that *ὄντα* may be divided into (*a*) *ὄντα* which *κοινωνεῖ*, i.e. may be attributed to other *ὄντα*, and (*b*) *ὄντα* which *οὐ κοινωνεῖ*, i.e. cannot be attributed to other *ὄντα*, and that the *ὄντα* which *κοινωνεῖ* serve as intermediaries between the *ὄντα* which *οὐ κοινωνεῖ*. Thus the two classes may be respectively compared to consonants which cannot stand together without the intervention of vowels, and vowels which serve as links to connect the incommunicable consonants. Further, of those *ὄντα* which *κοινωνεῖ*, some are universally communicable, others partially communicable, and of these latter some are more widely communicable than others.

These principles are illustrated by particular reference to five *γένη*[1], selected as specimens; namely, *ὄν*, *ταὐτόν*, *θάτερον*,

out by Socrates at the beginning of the *Parmenides*, 129 D, I infer, that, though both dialogues belong to the same stage of development, the *sophist* was intended to be studied after the *Parmenides* had been mastered, and not vice versa. Finally, I would invite a comparison between the present passage and *Philebus* 15 D, where Socrates, declaring the identification of the One and the Many to pervade all discourse, proceeds—*ὁ δὲ πρῶτον αὐτοῦ γενσάμενος ἑκάστοτε τῶν νέων, ἡσθεὶς ὡς τινα σοφίας εὑρηκὼς θησαυρόν, ὑφ' ἡδονῆς ἐνθουσιᾷ τε καὶ πάντα κινεῖ λόγον ἅσμενος, τοτὲ μὲν ἐπὶ θάτερα κυκλῶν καὶ συμφύρων εἰς ἕν, τοτὲ δὲ πάλιν ἀνειλίττων καὶ διαμερίζων, εἰς ἀπορίαν αὐτὸν μὲν πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα καταβάλλων, δεύτεραν δ' ἀεὶ τὸν ἐχόμενον, ἄν τε νεώτερος ἄν τε πρεσβύτερος ἄν τε ἡλιξ ὢν τυγχάνῃ, φειδόμενος οὔτε πατρὸς οὔτε μητρὸς οὔτε ἄλλου τῶν ἀκουόντων οὐδενός, ὀλίγου δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων, οὐ μόνον τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἐπεὶ βαρβάρων γε οὐδενὸς ἂν φείσαιτο, εἴπερ μόνον ἑρμηνέα ποθὲν ἔχοι.* In both places, as I understand Plato, he makes frank confession of the insufficiency of the logic of the *republic* and the *Phaedo*.

[1] It is a mistake to assume that the five *γένη* take precedence of all others. Three of them, no doubt, *ὄν*, *ταὐτόν*, and *θάτερον*, being of universal application, are prior to the rest, and, bearing in mind the teaching of the *Timaeus*, we shall be prepared to allow that no other *εἶδος* is entitled to rank with them. But *στάσις* and *κίνησις*, even if they hold foremost places among those *εἴδη* which are of general, but not universal, application, are plainly inferior to *ὄν*, *ταὐτόν*, and *θάτερον*. Accordingly, when the Eleate introduces the investigation, he speaks of "selecting some of the kinds which are accounted greatest," *προελόμενοι τῶν μεγίστων λεγομένων ἄττα*, and when *ὄν*, *στάσις*, and *κίνησις* are specified, he

στάσις, and κίνησις: but the illustration is in a manner incomplete, inasmuch as all the selected γένη are taken from the class of ὄντα which κοινωνεῖ; ὄν, ταὐτόν, and θάτερον being universally, and στάσις and κίνησις generally, communicable. Nevertheless the illustration will serve our purpose: for, as στάσις and κίνησις οὐ κοινωνοῦσιν ἀλλήλοις, they adequately represent, so long as we confine our attention to the five γένη selected, the case of those ὄντα which οὐ κοινωνεῖ οὐδενί.

Starting from στάσις and κίνησις, which are ἀμίκτω πρὸς ἀλλήλω, the Eleate ascertains that the existence of these γένη implies, not only ὄν, but also ταὐτόν and θάτερον, in which they of necessity always participate; and further that ὄν, ταὐτόν, and θάτερον similarly participate in one another.

Two questions now arise—(1) does this theory of κοινωνία accord with the Platonism of the *republic* and the *Phaedo*? (2) does it accord with the system which I have endeavoured to elicit from the *Philebus*, the *Parmenides*, and the *Timaeus*?

In regard to the former of these questions, it is sufficient to point out, that, whereas according to the theory of the *republic* and the *Phaedo* all εἴδη are χωριστά, incapable of multiplication, and yet, by an inconsistency carefully noted in the *Philebus* and the *Parmenides*, at the same time all of them capable of multiplication, the theory presented in the *sophist* distinguishes εἴδη which κοινωνεῖ, either universally or partially, and thus are capable of multiplication, from εἴδη which οὐ κοινωνεῖ, and thus are incapable of multiplication. Plainly the view that all εἴδη are at once incapable and capable of multiplication is irreconcilable with the view that certain εἴδη are capable of multiplication, and certain others incapable.

I turn then to the other question—Does this theory of

describes them, not as τὰ μέγιστα τῶν γενῶν, but as μέγιστα τῶν γενῶν ἃ νῦν δὴ διῆμεν. Hence I ought perhaps to have avoided the phrase "the μέγιστα γένη of the *sophist*," which I employed in my paper upon the *Parmenides*, *J. of Ph.* XI 322, and it would certainly have been better, if in the same place I had spoken of like, unlike, &c, not as "universal," but as "general," predicates. For, though in that stage of the argument, the phrases in question were convenient, and created no confusion, now that I come to the *sophist*, where τὰ ἐπ' ὀλίγον, τὰ ἐπὶ πολλά, and τὰ διὰ πάντων, are distinguished, a stricter terminology becomes necessary.

κοινωνία accord with the Platonism of the *Philebus*, the *Parmenides*, and the *Timaeus*? Now I have tried to show, that, according to those dialogues, (*a*) the συνώνυμα of an αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ εἶδος are connected with it, not by the idea's immanence in the particular, but by the particular's imitation of, or approximation to, the idea, and (*b*) ὄν, ταὐτόν, θάτερον, ὅμοιον, ἀνόμοιον, μέγα, σμικρόν, ἴσον, &c, are not αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ εἴδη, but rather relations subsisting between εἴδη which are αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά. In other words, whereas, according to the theory propounded in the *republic* and the *Phaedo* and criticized at the beginning of the *Parmenides*, all εἴδη,—not only man, horse, but also equal, like, great,—are unities, and yet multiplied by immanence, the later theory, by way of escaping from this inconsistency, distinguishes τὰ αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ εἴδη, such as man, horse, which are of necessity unities, from εἴδη which are not αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά, such as equal, like, great, which are under no such obligation, and accordingly makes the relation of the particular to the αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ εἶδος one, not of μέθεξις, but of μίμησις, μέθεξις being however retained in the case of the εἶδος which is not αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό[1].

Thus, on the one hand, the αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ εἴδη of the three dialogues are in the language of the *sophist* μὴ κοινωνοῦντα; i.e. they are not attributable to one another, (for example, the idea of dog is not attributable to the idea of man,) nor to the εἴδη which are not αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά, (for example, the idea of dog is not attributable to the idea of like,) nor to their own synonymous particulars, (for example, the idea of dog is not attributable to particular dogs,) the synonymous particulars being various and varying imitations of the idea; and, on the other hand, those εἴδη,—such as ὄν, ταὐτόν, θάτερον, ὅμοιον, ἀνόμοιον, &c,—which, according to the doctrine of the three dialogues, are not αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά, are in the language of the *sophist* κοινωνοῦντα, i.e. they are attributable, if to nothing else, at any rate to the μὴ κοινωνοῦντα, which, being a plurality, of necessity participate in being, sameness, difference, likeness, un-

[1] That ὅμοιον ἀνόμοιον, μέγα σμικρόν, &c, are capable of indefinite multiplication, and that μέθεξις is not superseded in the case of τὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα, is made quite plain in the *Parmenides*.

likeness, &c. In fact, *ὄν, ταὐτόν, θάτερον, ὅμοιον, ἀνόμοιον*, &c, are the relations in which the eternal, immutable, *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ εἴδη*, by themselves incapable of intercommunion, stand to one another; so that the analogy to the vowels and the consonants is complete. It would seem then that the distinction drawn in the *Parmenides*, between *εἴδη* which are *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά*, and *εἴδη* which, being relations, are not *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά*, reappears in the *sophist* as the distinction between the *μὴ κοινωνοῦντα* and the *κοινωνοῦντα εἴδη*.

The *sophist* however contains what may perhaps be regarded as an extension of the doctrine. The analogy of the vowels and the consonants plainly indicates that the *κοινωνοῦντα* serve to combine and to separate the *μὴ κοινωνοῦντα*: but the Eleate, when he proceeds to apply his theory, selects for particular investigation, not certain *κοινωνοῦντα* and certain *μὴ κοινωνοῦντα*, but the universal *κοινωνοῦντα* and certain general (though not universal) *κοινωνοῦντα*. In this way, he shows that the *κοινωνοῦντα* intervene, not only, as already indicated, between *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά*, or *μὴ κοινωνοῦντα εἴδη*, but also between *εἴδη* which are themselves *κοινωνοῦντα* and not *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά*. For example, Being is the same as itself by participation in Sameness, and different from Sameness by participation in Difference. Thus, Being, Sameness, Difference, communicate with Being, Sameness, Difference, Rest, Motion, &c, as well as with Man, Horse, Dog[1].

[1] It is worth while to note, that, though subsequently at 260 E there appears to be a certain laxity in the use of the words *κοινωνία* and *κοινωνεῖν*, in that section of the dialogue upon which I am now commenting the words *κοινωνεῖν* and *μετέχειν* are precisely and consistently distinguished. The subject is said to 'participate' (*μετέχειν*) in the attribute, the attribute is said to 'communicate' (*κοινωνεῖν*) with the subject. The *μὴ κοινωνοῦντα* are then subjects which cannot serve as attributes: while the very purpose of the present inquiry is to show that the *κοινωνοῦντα* have intercommunion, i. e. that the attributes may serve as subjects to one another. Hence the *μὴ κοινωνοῦντα*, (that is, the *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ εἴδη*), though they do not 'communicate' (*οὐ κοινωνεῖ*), either with one another or with the *κοινωνοῦντα*, nevertheless 'participate' (*μετέχει*) in the *κοινωνοῦντα*: while the *κοινωνοῦντα*, (that is, the *εἴδη* which are not *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά*), 'communicate' with the *μὴ κοινωνοῦντα*, and both 'communicate' with, and 'participate' in, one another.

But, it may be asked—Although the *αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ εἶδος*, such as Man, plainly cannot be attributed to, and

But, though it is in the *sophist* that the doctrine of the intercommunion of the *κοινωνοῦντα εἴδη* is for the first time explicitly stated, we do not come to it wholly unprepared. So far as particulars are concerned, the unregenerate Socrates of the *Parmenides*[1] finds no difficulty in disposing of the Zenonian paradox by means of the theory of the immanence of ideas. Yet it would be strange indeed, he thinks, if *αὐτὰ τὰ ὅμοια* became *ἀνόμοια*, or *αὐτὰ τὰ ἀνόμοια* became *ὅμοια*, if the *αὐτὸ τὸ ἕν* became *πολλά*, or the *αὐτὰ τὰ πολλά* became *ἕν*, and, generally, if *γένη* and *εἴδη* were simultaneously like and unlike, one and many, &c: *εἰ αὐτὰ τὰ γένη τε καὶ εἴδη ἐν αὑτοῖς* [sc. *τις*] *ἀποφαίνοι τἀναντία ταῦτα πάθη πάσχοντα, ἄξιον θαυμάζειν.* 129 C. And, as he proceeds, he becomes still more emphatic: *ἐὰν δέ τις, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, πρῶτον μὲν διαιρῆται χωρὶς αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ τὰ εἴδη, οἷον ὁμοιότητά τε καὶ ἀνομοιότητα καὶ πλῆθος καὶ τὸ ἓν καὶ στάσιν καὶ κίνησιν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, εἶτα ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ταῦτα δυνάμενα συγκεράννυσθαι καὶ*

therefore does not 'communicate' with, either other *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ εἴδη*, such as Horse, Dog, or the *εἴδη* which are not *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά*, such as Same, Different, would it not seem that it is attributed to, and therefore 'communicates' with, its own synonymous particulars? A moment's consideration will however show that this is not so, because the particular no longer 'participates' (*μετέχει*) in the idea, but, as has abundantly appeared in the *Philebus* and the *Timaeus* 'imitates' (*μιμεῖται*) it.

[1] Four of the five destructive *ὑποθέσεις* of the *Parmenides*, namely i, vi, vii, viii, have their equivalents in the *sophist*. The Eleate echoes i (*ἕν ἕν*), when he convicts the Eleatics of inconsistency, 244 B ff, and when he shows that the *ἀκοινωνησία* of the *εἰδῶν φίλοι* precludes their admission that *οὐσία γιγνώσκεται*, 248 C ff: he echoes vi (*οὐσίας ἀπουσία*), when he shows that the Eleatic principle precludes, not only the assertion of *μὴ ὄν*, but also the denial of it, 238 D ff: he echoes vii (*ὄγκος*), when at the outset he shews practically that 'sophist' is not an eternal, immutable, natural, kind, but a various, variable, conventional, class: he echoes viii (*πολλὰ ἄνευ ἑνός*), when he calls attention to the carelessness of the pluralists who ignore predication, 243 D ff, and to the inconsistency of the corporealists and the Cynics who in effect deny it, 246 E ff, 252 B ff. The destructive *ὑπόθεσις* which remains, iv (*χωρὶς μὲν τὸ ἓν τῶν ἄλλων, χωρὶς δὲ τἄλλα τοῦ ἑνός*), does not appear in the *sophist*, for, though the *εἰδῶν φίλοι* posit just such a *ἕν* or *εἶδος* as is here described, the Eleate does not diverge to inquire into its relations to *τἄλλα*. Nor is the omission in any way surprizing, since, as we have already seen, the *sophist* has for its subject, not so much the relations of ideas to particulars, as rather the relations of ideas to ideas.

διακρίνεσθαι ἀποφαίνῃ, ἀγαίμην ἂν ἔγωγ', ἔφη, θαυμαστῶς. 129 D. Now on a former occasion I have shown, or tried to show, that the Socrates of the *Parmenides* represents the Platonism of the *republic* and the *Phaedo*, and that the several articles of his creed are, in the sequel, first criticized, and afterwards modified or superseded. (For example, in this very passage he regards *ὁμοιότης, ἀνομοιότης, πλῆθος, ἕν, στάσις, κίνησις* as *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ εἴδη*, whereas in the sequel it appears that these *εἴδη*, being relations, are not *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά*.) Hence the very warmth of Socrates' denial of the intercommunion of *εἴδη* to my mind indicates on Plato's part a consciousness that in this respect, as well as in others, the earlier system stood in need of revision.

Thus, while the *Parmenides* deals at length with the relations of *εἴδη* which are not *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά* to *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ εἴδη*, hinting in the phrases quoted above that the doctrine of the relations of *εἴδη* which are not *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά* to *τὰ αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά* is applicable also to the relations, to one another, of the *εἴδη* which are not *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά*, the *sophist* deals at length with the relations, to one another, of the *εἴδη* which are not *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά*, hinting in the analogy of the vowels and consonants that the doctrine of the relations, to one another, of the *εἴδη* which are not *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά* is applicable also to the relations of the *εἴδη* which are not *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά* to *τὰ αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά*. In fact, we find the *sophist* harmonizing with, and supplementing, the three dialogues, just as on former occasions we have found the three dialogues harmonizing with, and supplementing, one another.

Nor is the link wanting which should connect the *sophist* with the *Theaetetus*. In a weighty passage of that dialogue, 185 A—187 A, it is pointed out, that soul *αὐτὴ δι' αὑτῆς* observes *οὐσία, μὴ εἶναι, ὁμοιότης, ἀνομοιότης, ταὐτόν, ἕτερον, ἕν, ἀριθμός, ἄρτιον, περιττόν*, as well as *καλόν, αἰσχρόν, ἀγαθόν*, and *κακόν*; that in this way soul discovers, for example, that sound and colour are different from one another, and severally the same as themselves; that *οὐσία* is of universal occurrence—*τοῦτο μάλιστα ἐπὶ πάντων παρέπεται*; that, whereas it is through the sense of touch that soul perceives hardness and softness, it is

αὐτὴ δι' αὑτῆς that soul recognizes the οὐσία of those qualities, ὅ τι ἐστόν, their mutual ἐναντιότης, and the οὐσία of their ἐναντιότης. That the whole of this exposition recals the *sophist*, is immediately obvious. In particular, it is noteworthy that the recognition of the οὐσία of the ἐναντιότης of the two qualities implies the doctrine of the κοινωνία of the κοινωνοῦντα εἴδη, and justifies us in attaching to the phrase οὐσία ἐπὶ πάντων παρέπεται a special significance.

It would seem then, (1) that this part of the *sophist* provides a theory of the universal κοινωνία of ταὐτόν, θάτερον, and ὄν, and of the partial κοινωνία of such εἴδη as στάσις and κίνησις, certain other εἴδη being declared to be μὴ κοινωνοῦντα; (2) that, on the one hand, this theory of the intercommunion of the κοινωνοῦντα εἴδη is just what is required to supplement the teaching of the *Parmenides* in regard to εἴδη which are not αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά, while, on the other hand, the teaching of the *Parmenides* (and the dialogues which I have associated with it) in regard to εἴδη which are αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά, supplements what is said here about τὰ μὴ κοινωνοῦντα; (3) that, as in the *Parmenides*, so here, Plato's declared purpose is to supply the logical deficiencies of his predecessors, and to correct the logical errors of his own earlier system; (4) that the passage before us explains and expands the passage in the *Theaetetus*, 184 B—187 A, about οὐσία and μὴ εἶναι, ταὐτόν and ἕτερον, ἕν and ἀριθμός, ἄρτιον and περιττόν.

May I not claim that these harmonies and coincidences afford some corroboration, both of my provisional hypothesis that the dialogues named were intended by their author to be studied in conjunction, and generally of my interpretation of the system which they conjointly unfold?

At this point it will be convenient to recal the steps by which we were led to the statement of the theory of κοινωνία. When the Eleate is about to assign to the sophist either the one or the other of the two sorts of εἰδωλοποιική, that is to say, either εἰκαστική or φανταστική, he bethinks him, 236 E, of the difficulties which the conceptions of false opinion and false speech seem to involve. How can we say that there is such a

thing as falsity without breaking the commandment of Parmenides—'Thou shalt not say that things which are not are—*εἶναι μὴ ἐόντα*'? Thus it becomes necessary to investigate the relations of *ὄν* to *μὴ ὄν*. The inquiry, which is conducted on Eleatic principles, leads to no new conclusion. Hereupon the Eleate shifts his ground, 241 C, and proceeds to investigate the relations of *ὄν* to *ὄν*, with the result that the relations of *ὄν* to *ὄν*, as conceived by previous thinkers, are found to be no less obscure than those of *ὄν* to *μὴ ὄν*. Accordingly, at 251 A, the Eleate attacks the whole question anew, and in the paragraphs which I have discussed in the foregoing pages develops the theory of the *κοινωνία εἰδῶν*. We are then now in a position to take up once more the questions which we had left behind us unanswered. Accordingly, in 257 B—259 E, which pages remain to be dealt with in the present section, we revert to the consideration of the Eleatic precept; after which, as will appear in the next section of my paper, returning still further upon our steps, we may proceed to dispose of the difficulties seemingly involved in the conceptions of false opinion and false speech.

The purpose of 257 B—259 E is then, I apprehend, to bring the theory of *κοινωνία* face to face with the Eleaticism of Zeno, so as to show that the nonent of which Zeno argued is in a manner existent (*τὸ μὴ ὄν πως εἶναι*), and to explain the origin of his error. In order to this we must leave the *μέγιστα γένη*: for, as Zeno recognizes one *εἶδος* only, the *ὄν*, it follows that of *ταὐτόν*, *θάτερον*, *στάσις*, and *κίνησις* he knows nothing. Accordingly the Stranger proceeds to examine certain *μόρια τῆς θατέρου φύσεως*, namely, *μὴ μέγα*, *μὴ καλόν*, *μὴ δίκαιον*. Now in the course of our study of the five *γένη* we have learnt that by *μὴ ὄν* is meant, not *ἐναντίον τι τοῦ ὄντος*, but only *ἕτερον*. Similarly, by *μὴ καλόν* is meant that portion of *ὄν* which is opposed to, i.e. not, contrary to, but, other than, *καλόν*. But, thus regarded, *μὴ καλόν* is plainly no less existent than *καλόν*, *μὴ μέγα* no less existent than *μέγα*, *μὴ δίκαιον* no less existent than *δίκαιον*. We are then, the Stranger concludes, in a position to defy Parmenides' prohibition, and to attribute existence to *μὴ ὄν*, where by *μὴ ὄν* is meant that part of *θάτερον* which is opposed to a particular *ὄν*.

Now so far as the passage which I have freely paraphrased in the foregoing sentences is declaratory, it offers little difficulty: but it is not easy to determine exactly its bearing upon Eleaticism. For my own part, I suspect that one of Zeno's arguments against the existence of the Many ran somehow thus: 'The Many are not: for, if the Many are, they must be not-great, not-beautiful, not-just, &c: now what is not-great, not-beautiful, or not-just, is, in so far, non-existent: whence it follows, that, inasmuch as all qualities may be denied to the Many, the Many (otherwise called the Nonent) are non-existent.' In other words, I suppose that Zeno found in negative predication a special difficulty, and that he used this difficulty,—as he used the difficulty which he found in the attribution of likeness and unlikeness to the same thing,—as an argument to disprove the existence of the Many. My hypothesis will probably seem a bold one; because, in reality, positive predication was no less a mystery to Zeno than negative predication. But it must not be forgotten that this is precisely the observation which the Eleate makes at 243 C, *Τάχα τοίνυν ἴσως οὐχ ἧττον κατὰ τὸ ὄν ταὐτὸν τοῦτο πάθος εἰληφότες ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ περὶ μὲν τοῦτο εὐπορεῖν φαμὲν καὶ μανθάνειν ὁπόταν τις αὐτὸ φθέγξηται, περὶ δὲ θάτερον οὔ, πρὸς ἀμφότερα ὁμοίως ἔχοντες*: and that, however we may understand the sentences which are now in question, throughout the whole of the latter part of the dialogue the interpretation of the negative is treated as a matter of acknowledged importance[1].

[1] It will be seen that this passage echoes and expands hypotheses v and vi of the *Parmenides*, where *μὴ ὄν*, i. e. *ὄν* which is *ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων*, is contrasted with *μὴ ὄν* proper, which *οὐδαμῶς οὐδαμῇ ἔστιν οὐδέ πῃ μετέχει οὐσίας*.

I take this opportunity of noting an oversight in my paper upon the *Parmenides*. In discussing the fifth hypothesis, *J. of Ph.* XI 318, I wrote—"Thus a group which is negatively characterized may become knowable in connection with *πολλά* positively characterized, but is not knowable in virtue only of its negative characterization." This remark is erroneous. The *μὴ ὂν ἕν* becomes the subject of predication, not in virtue of its relations to other paradeigmatic ideas, but simply in virtue of its antithesis to the corresponding *ὂν ἕν*.

§ 5 τὸ ψεῦδος. 260 A—268 D.

Having by the study of the five γένη (and more particularly of θάτερον) ascertained that the μὴ ὄν, which the Eleatics deny, is in some sort existent,—being in fact a part of that which, though other than ὄν, participates in it, such part being determined by its difference from other parts,—the Eleate reverts to the investigation of τὸ ψεῦδος.

We have seen that the μὴ ὄν, i.e. that which is other than a particular form of existence, is existent. But we have still to inquire whether it is possible to opine, or to say, τὸ μὴ ὄν, so that there may be such things as δόξα ψευδής and λόγος ψευδής, answering [mutatis mutandis] to the provisional definitions suggested at 240 D and E, namely, δόξα ἡ τἀναντία τοῖς οὖσι δοξάζουσα, and λόγος ὁ τά τε ὄντα λέγων μὴ εἶναι καὶ τὰ μὴ ὄντα εἶναι. With a view to the settlement of this doubt, we will first examine λόγος.

To be significant, a combination of words must consist at the least of a noun and a verb, the verb denoting an act or a state, and the noun something which performs that act or is in that state. Accordingly we may take as instances of the significant combination of words, i.e. of the λόγος, Θεαίτητος καθῆται and Θεαίτητος πέτεται. Now there is an important difference between these two λόγοι: the one says of you what is the fact; the other says of you what is not the fact. Thus both are significant combinations of words, or λόγοι, but, whereas the one is true, the other is false.

Further, δόξα is the conclusion to which the soul is brought in a conversation with itself, and may therefore be regarded as an unspoken λόγος. Hence, not only λόγος, but also δόξα, may be ψευδής.

The doubt about the possibility of τὸ ψεῦδος having been thus disposed of, we are at liberty to assume that there are such things as εἰκών, εἴδωλον, φάντασμα, μίμημα, and to return to the long interrupted διαίρεσις. But, whereas in the former dichotomies, having divided τέχνη into ποιητική and κτητική, we assigned the art of the sophist to the latter, now, when he is regarded as a μιμητής, seeing that μίμησις is ποίησίς τις, though only a ποίησις εἰδώλων, we should rather look for his art under the head of ποιητική. Now ποιητική may be divided (*a*) into θεία and ἀνθρωπίνη, (*b*) into αὐτοποιητική and εἰδωλοποιική. In this way we have four sorts of ποιητά: (1) animals,

plants, metals, minerals, and the elements out of which the divine intelligence constructs them, (2) shadows, reflections, dreams, thereof, (3) the products of human intelligence, such as a house, (4) pictures of human products, such as the picture of a house. Plainly the sophist makes images of the last named sort. But we have already divided εἰδωλοποικὴ into εἰκαστικὴ and φανταστικὴ, and ascertained that it is to φανταστικὴ that the art of the sophist belongs. Again φανταστικὴ has two divisions, ἡ δι' ὀργάνων and μιμητικὴ, and of these μιμητικὴ is selected. Further, we find that the art of the sophist is a part, not of ἱστορικὴ μιμητικὴ, but of δοξομιμητικὴ, because by admission he is ἀγνοῶν. Next it is observed that his ignorance is conscious; and that consequently his art belongs, not to δοξομιμητικὴ ἁπλῆ, but to δοξομιμητικὴ εἰρωνική. Finally, it is distinguished from δημολογική, with the result that, whilst the δημολογικός is a conscious impostor, who, in public, by continuous discourse, imposes upon masses, in respect of classes of human invention, so that he is the counterfeit of the πολιτικός, the σοφιστής is a conscious impostor, who, in private, by discontinuous discourse, compels his interlocutor to contradict himself, in respect of similar classes, so that he is the counterfeit of the φιλόσοφος.

It has been already pointed out that at 236 D the Eleate interrupts his seventh and last διαίρεσις in order to consider three doctrines which seem to bar his further progress; namely, the doctrines, (1) that falsity of thought or speech is impossible, (2) that the μὴ ὄν is non-existent, (3) that εἴδη are incommunicable. Of these three doctrines, two, the third and the second, have been disposed of in the preceding section of the dialogue, and discussed in the preceding section of this paper. We now revert to the first. There is no such thing, it has been maintained, as falsity either of opinion or of speech. Unluckily, though this theory is not unfrequently mentioned by Plato, we know little or nothing, either about its authorship, or about the arguments urged in defence of it. But from the pains which Plato takes to refute it, it would seem to have found influential supporters; and from his reply in the present passage it may be conjectured, that, failing to distinguish between the significance of a proposition and its truth, they had declared the false proposition to be a non-significant collection

of words. However this may be, we now see that ψευδὴς λόγος may be defined as λόγος ὁ τά τε ὄντα λέγων μὴ εἶναι καὶ τὰ μὴ ὄντα εἶναι, and ψευδὴς δόξα, not indeed as δόξα ἡ τἀναντία τοῖς οὖσι δοξάζουσα, but as δόξα ἡ ἕτερα τῶν ὄντων δοξάζουσα, provided that by τὰ ὄντα are meant the facts which the proposition, thought or spoken, purports to represent, and by μὴ ὄντα facts other than these. The reply given to the paradox in the *Theaetetus* is to the same effect[1], though in that dialogue Plato addresses himself specially to the consideration of φαντασία and δόξα, whilst here he bestows his attention rather upon λόγος. And the short statement of the *Philebus*, 37 D ff, is in complete accord with the fuller investigations of the other two dialogues.

Plainly the paradox of the impossibility of error was one, which, however futile, Plato could not afford to ignore. But I suspect that he had a special reason for discussing it in so far as it affects μίμησις. According to his later teaching, particulars are μιμήματα, and it is therefore important that the possibility of μίμησις should be clearly recognized. The *sophist* has indeed no direct reference to this obvious application: but Plato's reticence will not surprize us, if we reflect, that, in so far as it is constructive, the dialogue deals, not with particulars, but with ideas, and, of the ideas, principally with those which are communicable.

And towards the end of the dialogue there is another passage which gains in point, if it is read in the light of what is said elsewhere about αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ εἴδη and their associated

[1] The remark made at 263 D, that "The misrepresentation of fact in a significant sentence is really and truly falsity of speech,"—Περὶ δὴ σοῦ λεγόμενα μέντοι θάτερα ὡς τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ὄντα, παντάπασιν ὡς ἔοικεν ἡ τοιαύτη σύνθεσις ἔκ τε ῥημάτων γιγνομένη καὶ ὀνομάτων ὄντως τε καὶ ἀληθῶς γίγνεσθαι λόγος ψευδής,—recalls *Theaetetus* 189 C, where Socrates questions the phrase ὡς ἀληθῶς δοξάζει ψευδῆ, and takes to himself some credit for his leniency in allowing the bull to pass. In my paper upon the *Theaetetus*, *J. of Ph.* XIII 258, I have noted that "every sentence in the paragraph 188 C—189 B betrays a consciousness that, though ψευδῆ δοξάζειν *is not* τὰ μὴ ὄντα δοξάζειν, if by τὰ μὴ ὄντα we mean 'what is non-existent', ψευδῆ δοξάζειν *is* τὰ μὴ ὄντα δοξάζειν, if by τὰ μὴ ὄντα we mean, as in the *sophist*, 'what is other than the fact.'"

particulars. Irrespective of the ideas, things in this world are, at 265 E ff, divided into—

(1) *θεῖα*, including (*a*) things, i.e. animals, plants, metals, minerals, and the elements out of which the divine intelligence constructs them, and (*b*) images, i.e. visions, shadows, and reflections of such things;

(2) *ἀνθρώπινα*, including (*a*) products of human art, and (*b*) pictures of such products. Manifestly the distinction here drawn between *θεῖα* and *ἀνθρώπινα*, between the products of divine intelligence and the products of human intelligence, is the distinction which has met us again and again, between the members of a natural *εἶδος* and the members of an artificial *ὄγκος*, though in this place the limitations of the inquiry preclude explicit mention of the *εἶδος* or *ἕν* itself.

Thus the concluding section of the dialogue, though it adds nothing to the Platonic system, would seem to harmonize with the results obtained elsewhere. Of the final *διαίρεσις* and its relations to its predecessors, I have already said something: of its bearing upon the principal argument, I shall have something to say hereafter, when I proceed to the examination of the *politicus*.

§ 6 *Results.*

The concluding paragraph of the *Theaetetus* is, I conceive, full of significance: 'Although all the theories propounded by the hero of the dialogue have been in turn rejected, the discussion', Socrates thinks, 'has not been without utility. If at some future time Theaetetus should conceive a new theory, it will be all the better for the inquiry which has just taken place: if he should remain barren, he will at any rate have been relieved of the vain conceit of knowledge. For himself, Socrates does not pretend to originate: his forte is criticism. But it is now time that he went to the office of the king-archon to answer to the indictment of Meletus. To-morrow he will meet Theodorus again'.

Thus the author of the dialogue contemplates a renewal of the conversation, at the same time hinting, not obscurely, that

Socrates, having played his part as critic, will not in the future take the lead which he has taken in the past. It is notorious that in the *sophist*, which opens with a reference to the appointment made on the preceding day, these anticipations are fulfilled. Now, although the agreement between the conclusion of the one dialogue and the beginning of the other does not in any way tend to prove that they were written at the same time, it certainly indicates an intimate connection between them. Indeed it might be urged, that, the further the two dialogues are removed from one another chronologically, the more necessary it becomes to explain why Plato attached the later dialogue to the earlier.

Now it is plain that, in making the *sophist* a sequel to the *Theaetetus*, Plato was not thinking of any advantage which there might be in employing the same dialogi personae: for in the *sophist* Socrates and Theodorus virtually cease to be interlocutors, and in the *politicus* we shall see Theaetetus also reduced to silence. It only remains then to suppose that the three dialogues, with their different interlocutors, have in some sense a common subject. But the subject of the *sophist* is suggested by the entrance of the new-comer, the Eleatic stranger, and is thus ostensibly, and even ostentatiously, different from that of the *Theaetetus*. In this way we are driven to the conclusion that the question discussed in the *Theaetetus* —'What is knowledge?'—covertly reappears in the succeeding dialogue. Accordingly I think I see a sort of answer to this question,—and, what is more, the sort of answer which previous inquiries have led me to expect,—at 253 D ff of the *sophist*, where the Eleate suggests that *τὸ κατὰ γένη διαιρεῖσθαι καὶ μήτε ταὐτὸν εἶδος ἕτερον ἡγήσασθαι μήτε ἕτερον ὂν ταὐτόν* is the function of dialectical science, so that in our search for the sophist we have stumbled upon the philosopher.

The *sophist* is however, like the *Theaetetus*, largely critical. But, whereas the *Theaetetus* deals with preceding theories of knowledge in their relations to physics, the *sophist* deals with such theories in their relations to logic. Thus the two dialogues complement one another, taking their departure respectively, from the Heraclitean theory of motion, which seems to underlie

the physical systems of the so-called philosophers, and from the Eleatic theory of rest, which, as interpreted by Zeno, seems to be the origin of the contemporary *ἀλογία*.

What then do we gather from the *sophist* about the earlier logic, and its relations to the theory of ideas?

Of the lost writings of ancient philosophers there are, I think, few which are so much to be regretted as that treatise of Zeno's which is quoted at the beginning of the *Parmenides*. Later writers who speak of Zeno are mainly concerned with certain special *ἀπορίαι* in regard to space and quantity which continued to have an interest for them as fallacies, if as nothing more. But the quotation in the *Parmenides* shows that he had other weapons of controversy, arguments of more general application, which were for the moment more perplexing, and are for the student of Greek philosophy of greater consequence. Plato tells us that the first hypothesis of Zeno's first book ran thus: 'if things are many, they must be both like and unlike; but this is impossible; for unlike things cannot be like, nor like things unlike': whence he inferred that 'the many are not'. It would seem then that the whole subject of predication was to Zeno a mystery, and that it was upon the theory of the impossibility of predication that he rested his denial of the nonent. Now in stirring this matter of predication Zeno broke new ground, neither the Ionians nor yet Parmenides having approached the problem of Being from the point of view of logic. The new departure necessarily brought about a crisis in the history of philosophy. For, when Parmenides, asserting that 'the ent is, the nonent is not', distinguished the fundamental unity, the object of knowledge, from the plurality of things, the object of opinion, he left himself free to study both the one and the other: but when Zeno declared the impossibility of predication, he virtually disallowed all knowledge, of the One as well as of the Many, all opinion, and all but all speech. Whereas he supposed himself to be justifying his master's teaching about the nonent, and consequently his teaching about the ent, Zeno not only sapped the

foundations of Parmenides' system, but also took from mankind the right to assert anything whatever. Accordingly we find that after Zeno philosophy sank for a time into nothingness, and that, when the great revival began, his *ἀλογία* still held its ground in the shape of the doctrine, entertained by Antisthenes, Stilpo, and possibly Menedemus, that identical predication is alone admissible.

Thus, once raised, Zeno's difficulty barred all progress in science and philosophy, and left the agnostics, i.e. the sophists and the Socratics, in possession of the field. Neither physics nor metaphysics could advance until some plausible theory of predication should be invented. Hence, when Plato addressed himself to the reconstruction of philosophy, he began with a theory of predication; that is to say, the theory of ideas; which, as stated in the *Phaedo*, and again, at the beginning of the *Parmenides*, is plainly thought to have a present value as an answer to the Zenonian paradox, whilst its value as the basis of scientific inquiry is only prospective. In short, Plato, in this stage of his development, held that, when a thing is said to be tall or short, just or unjust, it is so by reason of the immanence of corresponding unities called ideas. In this way the objection of Zeno, that a thing cannot be at once like and unlike, is evaded: for, though a thing cannot be at once like and unlike, it may contain at once likeness and unlikeness.

This doctrine however serves only to shift the difficulty one step backwards, to transfer the paradox of the One and the Many from the region of sensibles to the region of ideas. For, —to say nothing of the objection urged in the *Parmenides*, that this hypothesis involves the physical distribution of the idea amongst its synonymous particulars,—the ideas also are subjects of predication, so that the Zenonian paradox, which Plato had met by supposing each particular to be an aggregate of unities, recurs in regard to the unities themselves, and will continue to recur at each step of an infinite regress.

For this reason then, it was necessary that Plato should reconstitute his system: and accordingly we have discovered elsewhere traces of a plausible reconstruction. Whereas the

earlier system regarded all ideas as *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά*, i.e. independent unities, but nevertheless, by a glaring inconsistency, supposed these independent unities to be distributed amongst sensibles, the later system, as we have learnt from the *Parmenides*, discriminated ideas which are *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά* from ideas which are not *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά*, at the same time as we have gathered from the *Philebus*, substituting the theory of the particulars' *μίμησις* of the *αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἶδος* for the theory of their participation in it[1]. In this way Plato got rid of the unfortunate implication, that *εἴδη*, being *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά*, are notwithstanding multiplied amongst sensibles; since of the *αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτὰ εἴδη* there is no longer any such multiplication, whilst to the multiplication of the *εἴδη* which are not *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά*, as they are not independent unities, but relations, there is no objection whatsoever. Consequently, so far as the *αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτὰ εἴδη* and their associated particulars are concerned, predication no longer presents any difficulty. For, (*a*) it is plain that one *αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἶδος* cannot be predicated of another; for example, that the idea of horse cannot be predicated of the idea of dog; nor one particular, of another particular: (*b*) when we say that 'this is a dog', we mean, not, that this

[1] Thus, according to the earlier system, which recognizes an *αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἶδος* wherever there is a general term, and conceives every such *εἶδος* to be immanent, a particular is supposed to participate in a corresponding idea, to *μετέχειν τοῦ εἴδους*, whenever anything is predicated of it, whether accidentally or essentially. Further, there are certain phrases which have been thought to show that the particular might also be said to imitate (*μιμεῖσθαι*) any such idea. For myself, though I have doubts whether *μιμεῖσθαι* is, in the stage represented by the *republic* and the *Phaedo*, a technical term, I am not careful to deny this use of the word, provided that the immanence of the idea in the particular is acknowledged. The later system however, recognizing two grades of ideas, *εἴδη* which are *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά*, and *εἴδη* which are not *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά*, made the particular imitate (*μιμεῖσθαι*) the single *αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἶδος*, but participate (*μετέχειν*) in those *εἴδη* which are not *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά*, i.e. in those relations, many and various, in which it stands to other entities. In short, in the earlier system the relation of the particular to any *εἶδος* is *μέθεξις*, the term *μίμησις* being possibly available as an equivalent for *μέθεξις*, but in the later system, while the relation of the particular to its *αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἶδος* is *μίμησις*, the particular's relation to the *εἴδη* which are not *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά* is *μέθεξις*, and the relation of such *εἴδη* to the particular is *κοινωνία*.

particular is, or has in it, the idea of dog, but, that this particular belongs to the natural group which has the idea of dog for its type, or, according to the more profound analysis of the *Timaeus*, that this particular is the eternal unity 'dog' brought into imperfect existence, transient and phenomenal, in the region of time and space; so that the *αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ εἶδος* is not predicated of its particulars: (*c*) the recognition of a plurality, whether of *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ εἴδη* or of particulars, implies relations between its members; these relations, not being separate sensible impressions, but the results of the mind's reflection thereupon, are *εἴδη*, but they are not *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ εἴδη*; there is therefore no difficulty, either in supposing the same relation to subsist simultaneously between the respective members of two pairs of *εἴδη* or of particulars, or in supposing the same *εἶδος* or the same particular to stand in different relations to two different things; so that on the one hand the objection which was valid against the theory of immanence falls to the ground, and on the other hand the paradox of Zeno.

It remains then to inquire,—and this is the principal matter of the *sophist*,—whether the relations, the *εἴδη* which are not *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά*, are themselves related to one another; for example, whether as the *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ εἴδη* of horse and dog are each of them the same as itself, and other than the other, so the *εἴδη* of Same and Other, which are not *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά*, are each of them the same as itself and other than the other. In replying to this question the *sophist* gives no uncertain sound. The *εἴδη* which are not *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά* communicate, we are told, some of them universally, others partially, and, of those which communicate partially, some communicate more widely than others: and this dogmatic statement, that there are *εἴδη* which communicate universally and *εἴδη* which communicate partially, is tested and proved by the examination of five *εἴδη* which are not *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά*. Now, whatever the limits which the philosopher may assign to the intercommunion of the partially communicable *εἴδη*, wherever there is communion, predication is in no wise paradoxical. For, here as before, *εἴδη* which are not *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά* may simultaneously occur each of them in a variety of

instances, and, according as the correlation of the subject is varied, two or more may occur together in a single instance.

In short, whereas the *Parmenides* considers the *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ εἴδη* and their relations to *εἴδη* which are not *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά*, the *sophist* investigates the *εἴδη* which are not *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά* and their relations to one another.

HENRY JACKSON.

July 1885.

ΕΠΕΙΝ AND ΕΠΕΣΘΑΙ.

Of all branches of philology there is perhaps none which makes larger assumptions—at least in the present embryonic stage of comparative psychology—than the attempt to discover the processes of metaphor and association by which the simple idea expressed by a given root has been developed by primitive man into the Protean senses with which the full-grown verb is clothed upon. While endeavouring to trace this process for a single Greek verb, I am fully conscious of the tentative nature of the task; but I am equally convinced of the unsatisfactory treatment which ἔπειν receives in our lexicons. At all events I hope that the following pages will be found to contain complete materials for the history of the verb, at least down to the end of the fifth century B.C., after which it lost vitality; so that I may at any rate have given some assistance to a more satisfactory theory in the future[1].

The assumptions made by lexicologists in the treatment of the active forms of the verb seem roughly to be as follows; firstly, that ἔπειν means "to busy oneself with." This seems to be a mere abstraction from the frequent use of the compounds with ἀμφί and περί, and has attained the vague generality required by the great variety of this use. Secondly, that as ἕπομαι means "to accompany," ἔπειν means "to go" in the widest sense: and therefore that any use, let us say of ἐφέπειν,

[1] The verb seems to have received very little discussion. The fullest account which I have been able to find is in Savelsberg's dissertation "De Digammo," pp. 43—4, but his treatment is very far from exhaustive, and his results are generally unsatisfactory.

may be at once explained by a similar use of the Latin *obire*. The chief rubrics under ἐφέπειν in L. and S. are as follows: "to go after, follow, pursue. To drive on, urge on. To follow a pursuit, busy oneself about it. *C. acc. loci*, to search, explore, traverse, Lat. *obire*. To come suddenly upon, encounter, Lat. *obire*."

It is impossible to prove a negative, and say that all this is wrong; but it is clear that it is founded upon a wrong assumption. The idea is this; that as ἕπομαι means to accompany, and when we accompany any one we generally go somewhere,—therefore ἕπειν may mean "to go" in the vaguest and most flexible sense; an "easy transition" like that by which, in the old story, νεωκόρος means "a town-clerk." To this theory I propose to offer an alternative which has I think the merit of a more consistent development from a primary idea; and I would leave it to those who feel an interest in the subject to compare it with the lexica, and judge between them; merely pausing for a moment to insist at some little length on one statement which I have made.

The fact that ἕπομαι means something quite different from "going" is already recognised in theory. Curtius, for instance, remarks (*Grundz.* no. 621, p. 460, ed. 5), "ἕπομαι bedeutet ursprünglich, bei Homer ausschliesslich, mitgehen, daher ἅμ' ἕπεσθαι, nicht *später* kommen." The remark is true, but the limitation is, I believe, wrong. ἕπομαι through the whole of Greek literature means "to associate oneself with, accompany." It always indicates immediate proximity, as often collateral as consecutive; it is never used of following at a distance, and hence can never have the sense of going in quest of, which seems so natural to us from the connotation which our word "follow" has acquired.

The extent to which this is true in Homer may be illustrated by a few facts. Ebeling's lexicon gives 190 passages where ἕπεσθαι is used in Homer[1]; in no less than 89 of these the verb is joined with ἅμα, in three others with μετά, (once with acc. N 492, with dat. Σ 234, without a case Ψ 133), and in two with

[1] Not including Λ 474, for which see below.

σύν. In 52 more[1] it is used with the dative, which here beyond a doubt represents the "sociative" or "comitative" use of the instrumental[2]. These therefore come under the same head. In 37 cases it is used without case or preposition, and in all cases indicates association only. In Λ 154, 165, 754 and similar passages it is applied to a warrior pursuing a flying foe, and here it does not simply mean to "go after" the foe, it means to "keep up with" them, "hang on their heels" "stick to them" as we say. So in Ξ 521, *οὐ γάρ οἵ τις ὅμοιος ἐπισπέσθαι ποσὶν ἦεν ἀνδρῶν τρεσσάντων* may mean either "none was his match so as to be able by speed of foot to keep at his side," or "none could match him in hanging on the heels of the foe." Again in η 304, *ἣ μὲν γάρ μ' ἐκέλευε σὺν ἀμφιπόλοισιν ἕπεσθαι* means not "she bade me follow *her* (at a distance) with the handmaidens" but "she bade me keep in the company of the handmaidens." The idea of going *after* is absolutely excluded in such a passage as Π 154, *ὃς καὶ θνητὸς ἐὼν ἕπετ' ἴπποις ἀθανάτοισιν*, where the three horses are of course yoked side by side. It is not worth while to insist further upon this, as all the other Homeric passages, with the possible exception of Δ 314, ν 237, φ 202, to which we shall recur, will be found to admit the same explanation without the least difficulty.

With regard to later Greek it is not easy to speak with the same confidence, as the lexical materials are less complete; but an examination of the apparent exceptions given by Liddell and Scott shews that they all fall within the rule. For instance, we find Plato, *Phil.* 17 D quoted as an instance of *οἱ ἑπόμενοι* in the sense of "succeeding generations." But a reference to the passage will shew at once that *ἡμῖν τοῖς ἑπομένοις ἐκείνοις* means "we who follow them, *agree with* them, in their nomenclature." In Herod. 4, 10 *ὁ ἑπόμενος* means "the next;" the next that is of three sons *born at one birth.* Xenophon, *Anab.* 7, 3, 43 *ἕπεσθαι τῷ στιβῷ τῶν ἵππων* is "*not to diverge from* the trail." *Cyn.* 6, 19 *ἕπεσθε, ὦ κύνες* "stick to them." So the verb when used of a logical consequence, or an effect, implies an immediate association with the antecedent or cause: *τὰ ἑπό-*

[1] Not including Δ 314.

[2] See Monro, *Homeric Grammar*, 144; Delbrück, *Ablativus Locativus Instrumentalis*, p. 55.

μενά τινος are the concomitants or immediate consequents of anything; e.g. Herod. 2, 25.

The compounds of ἕπεσθαι are very few, whether in Homer or later Greek. We have ἐφέπεσθαι meaning to accompany in N 495, ω 338, π 426 (Liddell and Scott make a strange mistake in attributing to the word a hostile sense in this passage). Ξ 521 has been already mentioned; an exact parallel to it is Herod. 1 103, ἐπισπόμενοι φεύγουσι, "hanging on the heels of the fugitives." ἐφέπεσθαι is also used in the sense of obeying an impulse (ξ 362, ο 431, ω 183) or a divine command (γ 215, π 96, cf. μ 349) and in later Greek. It will be observed that so far as Homer is concerned this metaphorical sense, which is not found at all with the simple verb, is peculiar to the Odyssey. ἀμφιέπεσθαι is found once in Quintus Smyrnaeus, who was no doubt misled by the wrong reading ἕπονθ' in Λ 473: διέπεσθαι in a doubtful passage in Eurip. *El.* 146. We have μετασπόμενος in N 567, μεθέψομαι Soph. *El.* 146. There are no other Homeric compounds. περιέπεσθαι occurs in Herodotos only as the passive of περιέπειν, παρέπεσθαι and συνέπεσθαι occur in Attic with the same range of meanings as the simple verb. There seem to be no other compounds in use excepting προσεφέπομαι quoted by L. and S. as "Byzantine." The only derivatives seem to be ἑπέτης in Pind. *Pyth.* v. 4, and the fem. ἑπέτις in Apoll. Rhod.

It appears then that ἕπεσθαι is a word of singularly narrow range of meaning, and singularly barren, in proportion to the frequency with which it is used, of derivatives and compounds. So far from passing into the vague general idea of "going" as the lexicons would lead us to suppose, it does not even mean "to go after" without qualification, but "to accompany," to go with, or after, *without an interval.* Thus the series of steps by which L. and S. deduce the different meanings of the active ἐφέπειν is wrong at the outset, and we must take a fresh start. ἕπειν, unlike the middle form, has a very wide range of derived meanings, which cannot all be forced out of the meaning "to accompany." It must therefore be explained from itself. The most logical course seems to be to start from the simple form, and see if it suggests a primary meaning which will by a

rational sequence evolve the different significations of the compounds. Such a fundamental meaning is to be found in the idea of "handling."

(1) This simple physical sense is suggested by Z 321,

τὸν δ' εὗρ' ἐν θαλάμῳ περικάλλεα τεύχε' ἕποντα,
ἀσπίδα καὶ θώρηκα, καὶ ἀγκύλα τόξ' ἀφόωντα.

Paris is thinking of battle, and turning over his armour in an objectless, irresolute manner. This is the only passage where *ἕπειν* is used without a preposition, either in composition or separated only by tmesis. Hence Bekker conjectured *περὶ κάλλιμα*. But this is quite gratuitous. It is hard to conceive any verb which is incapable of being used except in composition with a preposition; and in the case of *ἕπειν* the assumption is rendered additionally improbable from the frequency with which tmesis occurs. Moreover—and I do not know that this has been previously remarked—the very next line by a curious coincidence contains the word *ἀφόωντα*, which also occurs nowhere else except in composition with *ἀμφί*: *ἀμφαφᾶν* being not uncommon in Homer and Attic Greek. Yet I do not suppose that anyone will care to emend this line also on that ground; if they wish to do so, they are at perfect liberty to accept the emendation *ἀμφὶ ἃ τόξ' ἀφόωντα*, to which I hereby resign my claim. The difficulty about the absence of the preposition is in fact only caused by the habit of translating *ἀμφιέπειν* and similar compounds by such expressions as "to busy oneself about." It is a far more reasonable thing to take the text as it stands, and to regard the only use of the simple form as a valuable index to the simple meaning of the verb.

(2) The next instance is very similar; O 555,

οὐχ ὁράας οἷον Δόλοπος περὶ τεύχε' ἕπουσι;

"How they are pulling about the armour of Dolops" would be a literal translation, and, I submit, more picturesque and vigorous than the traditional "how they are busying themselves."

(3) The same sense is found in *ἀμφέπειν* when it is used of preparing a slain animal for roasting; *τὸν δέρον ἀμφί θ'*

ἕπον, H 316, θ 61, τ 421; σφῶι μὲν ἀμφὶ βοὸς ἕπετον κρέα, Λ 776 and so ἄμφεπον Σ 559, Ψ 167, Ω 622. Here, as in many places which we shall come upon, the verb may be literally translated "treat," as this representative of *tractare* happens to have followed a very similar development to the verb under consideration. The "treating" in question of course indicates generally the various operations, such as taking out the entrails and cutting off the superfluous parts, which preceded the actual cutting up and spitting of that which had to be cooked.

(4) So in T 392, ἵππους ἀμφιέποντες ζεύγνυον, of the sundry minor operations which accompany the yoking of horses.

(5) E 667, τοῖον ἔχον πόνον ἀμφιέποντες, of tending a wounded man. Here again the metaphor is precisely the same as that which we use when we speak of medical "treatment."

(6) Ω 804, ὣς οἵ γ' ἀμφίεπον τάφον Ἕκτορος ἱπποδάμοιο hardly differs from the preceding, except that the literal use of the hands is not quite so prominent.

(7) ξ 195, ἄλλοι δ' ἐπὶ ἔργον ἔποιεν, we might almost translate "had the work in hand." ἐπί perhaps gives the idea of carrying it on to a certain end.

(8) The word is specially used of guiding horses;

Π 724 ἀλλ' ἄγε, Πατρόκλῳ ἕφεπε κρατερώνυχας ἵππους.
Π 732 αὐτὰρ ὁ Πατρόκλῳ ἕφεπε κρατερώνυχας ἵππους.
Ω 326 ἵπποι τοὺς ὁ γέρων ἐφέπων μάστιγι κέλευεν.
Ε 329 αἶψά τε Τυδεΐδην μέθεπεν κρατερώνυχας ἵππους.

(Nauck in the first two passages reads ἔπεχε, and in the last suggests Τυδεΐδῃ ἔπεχε: quite needlessly, and with little or no authority, though it is satisfactory to see that he has been struck by the inadequacy of the ordinary explanation of the verb.) That the word is here used in the primary sense is clear enough from the analogy of ἔχειν, which of course is in Homer the regular word for "to drive." How the sense was derived from that of "holding" or handling is seen in our colloquial phrases "handling a team" and "keeping horses well in hand."

A yet closer analogy may be found in the word "manage," which is derived from the Latin *manus*, and has a special application to the driving of horses. The accus. Τυδεΐδην in the last line need cause no difficulty, as it is obviously, by a common idiom, dependent upon the preposition, while ἵππους is the direct object of the verb. Under this head we have also to place another passage which must surely have caused some misgivings to commentators; Θ 126,

ὁ δ' ἡνίοχον μέθεπε θρασύν.

The traditional rendering here is "Hector busied himself about a fresh charioteer, that is, went to seek one," or, still worse, "followed with the eyes, i.e. sought or strove after." Clearly, what it really means is "Hector drove after, in quest of, a fresh charioteer." The direct object of the verb is ἵππους, which is omitted, as continually with ἔχειν.

(9) The exact idiom is not so clear in K 516, but it should perhaps be placed in this connexion;

ὡς ἴδ' Ἀθηναίην μετὰ Τυδέος υἱὸν ἔπουσαν.

"When he saw Athene guiding Tydeus' son," or perhaps quite literally "taking him in hand, managing him." We may perhaps compare, for a similar expression used of a god, I 419, μάλα γὰρ ἔθεν εὐρυόπα Ζεὺς χεῖρα ἐὴν ὑπερέσχε.

(10) We certainly find the idea of management and control in general in such passages as A 166,

τὸ μὲν πλεῖον πολυάϊκος πολέμοιο
χεῖρες ἐμαὶ διέπουσι.

Here the specific mention of hands is significant of the origin of the phrase, which is hardly felt as a metaphor.

B 207 ὣς ὅ γε κοιρανέων δίεπε στρατόν.

Here again the sort of control exercised was eminently manual (σκήπτρῳ ἐλάσασκε, 199). The same remark may be made on Ω 247,

ἦ, καὶ σκηπανίῳ δίεπ' ἀνέρας.

This however is not prominently the case in B 525,

οἳ μὲν Φωκήων στίχας ἔστασαν ἀμφιέποντες.

The difference between the two compounds seems to be that *ἀμφιέπειν* expresses the action of the commander who handles his battalion from outside, while *διέπειν* is appropriate to one who disposes from the midst. So in Λ 706,

ἡμεῖς μὲν τὰ ἕκαστα διείπομεν

"We managed, settled every question," *omnia diiudicavimus*. There is no ground for the difficulties which some commentators have found. The phrase recurs in *μ* 16, of the performance of funeral rites, and is thus parallel to Ω 804 already mentioned.

(11) Similarly *ἐφέπειν* is used to indicate the exercise of control from above, by one who has a general oversight. Aesch. *Persae* 38, *τὰς ὠγυγίας Θήβας ἐφέπων Ἀριόμαρδος*, 552 *Ξέρξης δὲ πάντ' ἐπέσπε δυσφρόνως βαρίδεσσι ποντίαις*. Under this head we may bring two Homeric phrases, both included in Υ 356—359

ἀργαλέον δέ μοί ἐστι, καὶ ἰφθίμῳ περ ἐόντι,
τόσσουσδ' ἀνθρώπους ἐφέπειν καὶ πᾶσι μάχεσθαι.
οὐδέ κ' Ἄρης, ὅς περ θεὸς ἄμβροτος, οὐδέ κ' Ἀθήνη
τοσσῆσδ' ὑσμίνης ἐφέποι στόμα καὶ μαχέοιτο.

Here the metaphor evidently is "to have the battle under control, to preside over the fight." The curious and unique metaphor *στόμα* in the last line must be dealt with apart from the verb; but after what has been said it is natural to fancy that the idea suggested is that of "managing" a horse's mouth with a bridle.

(12) Hence we pass to the passages where the word is used of a warrior pressing a flying foe, as though domineering over them, or driving them like horses.

Ο 742	*μαιμώων ἔφεπ' ἔγχεϊ ὀξυόεντι.*
Φ 542	*φεῦγον, ὁ δὲ σφεδανὸν ἔφεπ' ἔγχεϊ.*
Λ 177	*τοὺς Ἀτρεΐδης ἔφεπε κρείων Ἀγαμέμνων*
	αἰὲν ἀποκτείνων τὸν ὀπίστατον.
Χ 188	*Ἕκτορα δ' ἀσπερχὲς κλονέων ἔφεπ' ὠκὺς Ἀχιλλεύς.*
Υ 493	*ὡς ὅ γε πάντῃ θῦνε σὺν ἔγχεϊ δαίμονι ἶσος,*
	κτείνομένους ἐφέπων.

Λ 496 *ὡς ἔφεπε κλονέων πεδίον τότε φαίδιμος Αἴας,*
δηιόων ἵππους τε καὶ ἀνέρας.

The last passage is peculiar in having an inanimate object; unless we can take *κλονέων πεδίον* together, and refer *ἐφέπων* to *ἵππους* and *ἀνέρας* in the next line. But the analogy of X 188 is against this, so that we must, it seems, accept the bold metaphor "lorded it over the plain, driving it in confusion," the plain standing for the men and horses of which it is full. It will then be analogous to *ἐφέπειν στόμα ὑσμίνης* above.

(13) When the enemy is surrounded instead of being followed, the word used is *ἀμφέπειν*.

Λ 483 *ὥς ῥα τότ' ἀμφ' Ὀδυσῆα...Τρῶες ἕπον*
473 *ἀμφὶ δ' ἄρ' αὐτὸν*
Τρῶες ἕπον ὡς εἴ τε δαφοινοὶ θῶες ὄρεσφιν.

In the latter passage the MS. reading is *ἕπονθ'*: but the occurrence of the active only four lines later, and indeed the unvarying Homeric usage, leave not the slightest doubt that La Roche is right in reading *ἕπον*: the vulgate is due to the entirely mistaken idea that a final consonant is needed for the sake of the metre.

γ 118 *εἰνάετες γάρ σφιν κακὰ ῥάπτομεν ἀμφιέποντες,*

i.e. "beleaguering them," not as is generally supposed "busying ourselves about them," an expression which seems somewhat lacking in vigour when applied to the siege of Troy.

(14) The idea of hostility does not of itself belong to the verb, but to the context, and is entirely absent in the thrice recurring formula *πῦρ ἄμφεπεν*.

Π 124 *ὡς τὴν μὲν πῦρ ἄμφεπεν.* Σ 348,
θ 437 *γάστρην μὲν τρίποδος πῦρ ἄμφεπε, θέρμετο δ' ὕδωρ.*

The fire here is personified; for this is the only case in Homer where the verb is used with any other than a personal subject. Fire is of course particularly prone to personification; just as we talk of "tongues of fire," "devouring flames" and

so forth, the metaphor here is from hands of flame embracing the cauldron.

(15) It is only a single step from the idea of driving the enemy (12) to that of driving game; we have in μ 330,

καὶ δὴ ἄγρην ἐφέπεσκον ἀλητεύοντες ἀνάγκῃ.

But the word has been generalised, and thus receded to a certain extent from its original meaning; for it is applied not to the larger animals which are hunted with spears—in that case the present passage might have been at once classed under (12)—but to fishes and birds, as we see from the following line. It must be noticed however that we have no approximation to the use of *ἕπομαι*, which as has been shewn never means following in the sense of "going in quest of."

(16) ι 121 *κυνηγέται οἵ τε καθ' ὕλην*
ἄγρεα πάσχουσιν, κορυφὰς ὀρέων ἐφέποντες.

This use seems to be connected with the preceding, as it includes the idea of chasing game; but the local inanimate object reminds us of Λ 496, *ἕφεπε κλονέων πεδίον*. It would seem that we have here a curious analogy to our own idiom, by which we speak of "driving a wood" or hill-side when we mean driving the game found there. Whatever be the exact shade of meaning, it is not to be explained from any known use of the middle voice.

(17) α 175 *ἦε νέον μεθέπεις, ἢ καὶ πατρῴιος ἐσσί.*

Commentators translate "whether art thou but newly come as a visitor," but do not so far as I can see make any attempt to explain the word *μεθέπεις*, the use of which appears to have no parallel in Homer. The solution of the difficulty is I think found in the reading of the Harleianus, the best, or at least one of the three best, of the MSS. of the Odyssey. We there find *μεθέπῃ*. The middle gives exactly the sense required, "art thou now for the first time associating thyself with us?" compare 387, *ἕπεο προτέρω*, "come in and join us." The form of *μεθέπῃ* is however wrong, according to the tradition; it should either be *μεθέπει*, on the analogy of *ὄψει* in Ψ 620,

μ 201, or *μεθέπεαι* with synizesis. The hiatus, which is not really of any consequence in the main caesura, sufficiently explains the change to *μεθέπεις*.

(18) The remaining passages are somewhat difficult to bring into the main line of development which we have hitherto followed; and it is remarkable that in all of them a different part of the verb is found from any with which we have hitherto met; it will be observed that as yet we have had only presents and imperfects.

P 189 *θέων δ' ἐκίχανεν ἑταίρους*
ὦκα μάλ', οὔ πω τῆλε, ποσὶ κραιπνοῖσι μετασπών.
ξ 33 *ἀλλὰ συβώτης ὦκα, ποσὶ κραιπνοῖσι μετασπών,*
ἔσσυτ' ἀνὰ πρόθυρον.

The second of these may without difficulty be brought under (12), as a compound of *ἔπειν* used of driving an enemy. And this I believe to be the real explanation; "driving away" the dogs with nimble feet, in other words kicking them off, is a far more rational mode of proceeding than attempting to pursue them, and the picture becomes at once more vigorous and more true, if this explanation be adopted. With regard to the passage in P, however, this is not possible; the verb there is evidently meant to express "following" or "catching them up." But the passage in which the line occurs has been very generally recognised as one of late origin. The grounds for this supposition, which to me appear convincing, will be found summarized by Hentze with his usual good sense, in his appendix to Ameis's Iliad, Heft 6, pp. 70—71. Nauck, without giving his reasons, marks this particular line as "spurius?" no doubt because he considers it to be made up of reminiscences of τ 301 and ξ 33. This I believe to be the true explanation; the interpolation must have been made at a time when *μεθέπειν* was already an archaic word, and the distinction between the active and middle voices had been lost sight of, so that *μετασπών* could be regarded as equivalent to *μετασπόμενος* in N 567, *μετασπόμενος βάλε δουρί*.

(19) In the discussion of *ἕπεσθαι* three passages were reserved for future consideration:

Δ 313—4

ὦ γέρον, εἴθ' ὡς θυμὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσι φίλοισιν,
ὥς τοι γούναθ' ἕποιτο, βίη δέ τοι ἔμπεδος εἴη.

υ 237, *φ* 202

γνοίης χ' οἵη ἐμὴ δύναμις καὶ χεῖρες ἔπονται.

These passages can be explained from the other uses of *ἕπεσθαι*, "would that thy knees obeyed thee," "how my hands obey me." But there is surely something forced in this, and as has already been remarked, *ἕπεσθαι* in the uncompounded form has nowhere else in Homer a metaphorical signification. May not the word here be a proper passive of *ἕπειν*, meaning "to be wielded"? It is from this sense that *ὅπλον*, "the thing wielded," which cannot be separated from *ἕπειν*, comes: and to my mind the lines themselves thus gain something in force and naturalness.

(20) Finally we have a number of variations of a single phrase, which is marked off by the use of aorist forms, with the exception of two futures; a tense of this verb not elsewhere found in Homer. The commonest form is *πότμον ἐπισπεῖν* (*ἐπέσπον, ἐπέσπεν, ἐπισπῇ -σπῇς -σποι*): B 359 Z 412 H 52 Θ 495 Υ 337 Χ 39 *β* 250 *γ* 16, 134 *δ* 196, 562, 714 *ε* 308 *λ* 197, 372, 389 *μ* 342 *ξ* 274 *χ* 317, 416 *ω* 22, 31 *ἐφέψεις* Φ 588, *ἐφέψειν ω* 471, *ὀλέθριον ἦμαρ ἐπέσπον* Τ 294, *ἐπισπεῖν αἴσιμον ἦμαρ* Φ 100. This idiom cannot, I think, be brought at once into harmony with the uses of *ἕπειν* hitherto discussed, and we must therefore postpone consideration of it till we have examined more thoroughly into the nature of the verb.

The above list, I think, includes every instance of *ἕπειν* and its compounds in Homer, with the exception of *μ* 209, where some editors and a few MSS. read

οὐ μὲν δὴ τόδε μεῖζον ἕπει κακόν.

In spite of the authority of La Roche and Ameis, there can be little doubt that the old vulgate *ἔπι* is right, and has been altered from a mistaken idea of metrical necessity (see Merry and Riddell ad loc). If we read *ἕπει*, we must assume a very violent personification of *κακόν* (see under 14), and though we

might possibly arrive, starting from the idea "no greater evil is handling us," at the translation "no greater evil is upon us," yet this is only the meaning which is given at once by the unobjectionable text of the best authorities, ἔπι.

Before going on to discuss the later development of the verb, one or two results of what has preceded may be mentioned which seem to confirm the course of evolution which has been assumed. Out of ten cases where the verb is not in actual composition with a preposition, seven occur under the first seven heads, and it is precisely in these that we should expect, seeing that the close connexion of verb and preposition is of later growth, to find the oldest uses of the word.

Further, these earliest uses are almost peculiar to the Iliad; excluding mere repetitions, the Odyssey has only one case (ξ 195) of the verb and preposition separated by tmesis. On the other hand, the uses which seemed most difficult to bring under the primitive idea are almost exclusively in the Odyssey; see ξ 33, ι 121, μ 330, (*a* 175). The phrase πότμον ἐπισπεῖν has in the Odyssey the large preponderance of 17 instances against 9.

After Homer the compounds of ἔπειν in ordinary use are not numerous or frequent. In Hesiod we have, *Theog.* 365

ὠκεανῖναι
αἵ ῥα πολυσπερέες γαῖαν καὶ βένθεα λίμνης
πάντῃ ὅμως ἐφέπουσι.

The meaning here is "rule" as in (11). This application of ἐφέπειν to divine persons as presiding deities is a common post-Homeric use. Cf. Simon. fr. 142, 2 Bgk. πόλιας (al. πόλεμον) θνητῶν θοῦρος Ἄρης ἐφέπει. So Theognis 220 (Μοῖραι)

ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε παραιβασίας ἐφέπουσαι.

"Presiding over" as goddesses of punishment. In Theog. 696

ἄμφεπε θερμὸς ἀϋτμὴ
Τιτῆνας χθονίους

the verb seems to be used on the model of πῦρ ἄμφεπε (14) with the hostile sense of (13).

The only instance in the Hymns is in H. Merc. 67

> ὁρμαίνων δόλον αἰπὺν ἐνὶ φρεσίν, οἷά τε φῶτες
> φηληταὶ διέπουσιν μελαίνης νυκτὸς ἐν ὥρῃ.

Here the sense seems to be "dispose, arrange".

Pindar of all post-Homeric poets is fondest of the word and uses it with the greatest freedom. His favourite compound is *ἀμφέπειν*. We have *Ol.* i. 12

> θεμιστεῖον ὃς ἀμφέπει σκᾶπτον

which might mean "handles the sceptre" in accordance with the primitive signification. More probably however it is used in the derived sense, "presides over" as a guardian deity. As compared with *ἐφέπειν*, which we have found employed in the same way, *ἀμφί* gives the notion of protection rather than supremacy; cf. *ἀμφιβέβηκας* in A 37, etc. So it is said of Apollo, *P.* v. 68, *μυχὸν ἀμφέπει μαντῆιον* (compare *χῶρον ἁγνὸν ἀμφέπειν*, Simon. frag. 58, 3 Bergk, and *παννυχίδας θ' ἱερὰς θηλεῖς χοροὶ ἀμφιέπουσιν*, Critias, frag. 7, 8 Bergk; *χαίρετον, εὖ δὲ τάνδ' ἀμφέπετον πόλιν*, Skolia 3, 4, Bergk, p. 1288). In *Ol.* vi. 95 Hiero *φοινικόπεζαν ἀμφέπει Δάματρα*, that is, protects her worship; *P.* iv. 268 the pillar *μόχθον ἀμφέπει δύστανον*, "has in charge" a servile task. *P.* iii. 108 *τὸν ἀμφέποντ' ἀεὶ φρασὶν δαίμον' ἀσκήσω* "the fate that has me in charge". *Isth.* iv. (iii.) 59, Herakles *κάλλιστον ὄλβον ἀμφέπων ναίει*, "Lord of a supreme happiness". *Isth.* viii. (vii.) 26 *στονόεντ' ἀμφέπειν ὅμαδον*, to be "lord of the ringing mellay". *Nem.* iii. 78 *κιρναμένα δ' ἔερσ' ἀμφέπει*, "the dew enfolds it" with evident reminiscence of *πῦρ ἄμφεπεν* in Homer. In *P.* iii. 51 *ἀμφέπειν* has the Homeric meaning of "treating" as a leech, and in *Nem.* vii. 10, 91 the idea of "tending, training" the mind is closely allied.

ἐφέπειν: *P.* vi. 33 *ὃ δ' ἔφεπεν κραταιὸν ἔγχος*, "wielded against him", an immediate derivative from the primitive sense of handling, though not found in Homer. *P.* i. 30 *Ζεῦ ὃς τοῦτ' ἐφέπεις ὄρος* (of the presiding deity): iv. 294 *συμποσίας ἐφέπων*, haunting, presiding over, as in Archil. frag. 13 Bergk *τερπωλὰς καὶ θαλίας ἐφέπων*. *Ol.* ii. 10 *αἰὼν ἔφεπε μόρσιμος*, good luck presided over their way, cf. the *δαίμων ἀμφέπων* above. (L. and

S. class the last passage under *πότμον ἐπισπεῖν*, "reversely", whatever that may mean.) In *Pyth.* i. 50 we have the phrase *τὰν Φιλοκτήταο δίκαν ἐφέπων ἐστρατεύθη*. This is traditionally interpreted "following the fashion, imitating the example" of Philoktetes: but no parallel has been adduced either for this sense of *ἐφέπειν* or for the use of *δίκην*, when it means manner, governed by a verb. It seems perfectly certain, in view of the uses of *ἐφέπειν* which have been given and those which have yet to follow, that the participle is to be taken with *ἐστρατεύθη*, "commanded, supervised the campaign", *δίκην* being the ordinary independent accusative "after the fashion of Philoktetes". If an object after *ἐφέπων* is needed, it is perfectly simple to supply *στρατόν* from the verb, and to translate "commanding the army after the fashion of P."

μεθέπειν in Pindar does not diverge far from the primary signification; *P.* ii. 37 *ψεῦδος γλυκὺ μεθέπων*, taking into his hands, cherishing. *N.* vi. 13 *ταύταν μεθέπων διόθεν αἶσαν*, taking to himself, making his own, this (hereditary) fortune. *Ibid.* 57 *νώτῳ μεθέπων δίδυμον ἄχθος*, taking upon my back, cf. *μόχθον ἀμφέπειν* in *P.* iv. 268. *O.* iii. 31 *τὰν* (*ἔλαφον*) *μεθέπων* "driving" like the Homeric *ἐφέπων*: or perhaps rather, on the analogy of the other passages, "while getting into his possession". Here again it may be pointed out that the use of *ἕπεσθαι* does not support what at first sight seems to be the most natural interpretation, "following in quest of".

The only other compound of *ἕπειν* in Pindar is in *O.* vi. 93, *τὰν Ἱέρων καθαρῷ σκάπτῳ διέπων*, "disposing, ruling with stainless sceptre," which almost looks like a reminiscence of the *σκηπανίῳ δίεπε* of Ω 247; the epithet *καθαρῷ* sufficiently marks the contrast of sense in which it is used. With this compare also *πόλιν διέπειν* in Theognis 893; *ἄστυ διέπειν*, Anakreon, frag. 16, Bergk. So also Xenophanes frag. i. 21 *μάχας διέπει Τιτήνων*, where Bergk rightly says "*διέπει* est regit, tamquam imperator."

As no writer after Pindar uses the word *ἕπειν* with any frequency, it will now be more convenient to trace the history of each compound by itself.

ἐφέπειν...; Herod. vii. 8 1 *αὐτοῖσιν ἡμῖν πολλὰ ἐπέπουσιν*

συμφέρεται ἐς τὸ ἄμεινον, "in the many undertakings over which we preside[1]." Aristoph. *Aves* 1376 ἀφόβῳ φρενὶ σώματί τε νέαν ἐφέπων, a presumably familiar passage which breaks off in the middle, so that we cannot translate it, as we do not know the substantive with which νέαν agrees. If however it be ὁδόν, we may perhaps understand "Lord of a new path of song". *Thesm.* 675 ἐφέποντας ὅσια καὶ νόμιμα "guarding righteousness and law" cf. Pind. *Ol.* i. 12.

ἀμφέπειν... Soph. *El.* 651 σκῆπτρα ἄμφεπεν τάδε, as Pind. *O.* i. 12. *Antig.* 1118 κλυτὰν ὃς ἀμφέπεις Ἰταλίαν "art the guardian deity of Italy", as in Pindar. Eurip. *I. T.* 1248 ἄμφεπε μαντεῖον χθόνιον, as Pind. *P.* v. 68. *Phoen.* 149 ὄχλος νιν πάνοπλος ἀμφέπει, cf. the passages under (14). *Ibid.* 339 ξένον κῆδος ἀμφέπειν., "cherish". *Med.* 480 πάγχρυσον ἀμφέπων δέρας, "guarding".

διέπειν...Aesch. *Persae* 106 "array". *Eum.* 931 "control". So Herod. iii. 53, v. 22, vi. 107, ix. 76; Arist. *de Mundo*, ὁ τὸ σύμπαν διέπων θεός, and as late as Plutarch. This compound has not diverged from the Homeric use.

περιέπειν is the commonest of all the prose forms; it is not found, apparently, in poetry nor in Thucydides. In use it remains very close to the primary, and exactly corresponds to our word *treat* (tractare); *e.g.* we find in Xen. *Symp.* 8, 38 περιέπειν τιμαῖς, to treat with honour; Herod. i. 115 ἀεικίῃ περισπεῖν; Xen. *Cyrop.* 4, 4, 12 π. ὡς εὐεργέτην: and frequently π. εὖ, τρηχέως, etc. In later Greek it came to be used chiefly in a good sense, to respect, honour, without any adverb or modal case; and here again our "treat" has followed a somewhat similar course. A transitional step towards this use will be found in Xen. *Mem.* 2, 9, 5, where μάλα περιεῖπεν means "made much of, cultivated the friendship of". This compound, like διέπειν, preserved its vitality through the whole of Greek literature. It is peculiar in the fact that it alone produced a passive, which is found in Herod., in the aorist περιεφθῆναι and in the future

[1] It is tempting to fancy that these words, put into the mouth of Xerxes before the invasion of Greece, contain an ironical reference to those already quoted from Aesch. *Pers.* 552, Ξέρξης δὲ πάντ' ἐπέσπε δυσφρόνως βαρίδεσσι πορτίαις.

περιέψεσθαι: it is quite inconsistent with all the usage of ἕπειν to regard the latter as a transitive middle, while the passive exactly suits both the passages where it occurs, ii. 115, vii. 149. L. and S. say of περισπεῖν that the aor. is "only poetical and in Ionic prose". But they do not quote a single instance from a poet, nor have I been able to find any.

We have now, I believe, examined every case in which ἕπειν and its compounds are found in classical writers, at least down to the middle of the fourth century[1], and it may be fairly claimed that a consistent genealogy from a simple primitive has been found which explains every use—with the exception of the phrase πότμον ἐπισπεῖν which is expressly reserved—by perfectly natural and intelligible transitions of thought, in contrast with the mixture of the ideas of going, busying oneself, and *obire*, which have previously had to do the work between them as best they could. The points I have tried to establish are (1) that the use of ἕπομαι is very definite indeed, never going far from the primitive sense of "accompanying". (2) that the uses of ἕπω cannot all be explained by any derivation from those of ἕπομαι. (3) That ἕπω and ἕπομαι are in effect two distinct verbs, so sharply marked off from one another that περιέπειν, the only compound which has a passive, is the very one which has no corresponding middle form περιέπομαι. In some cases ἐφέπειν and μεθέπειν approximate closely to uses of ἐφέπομαι and μεθέπομαι, but to assume this connexion to be real does not help us to explain the other cases of the same words where the relation is not obvious; whereas on the other hand all uses alike can be explained from the fundamental sense which we have adopted. Thus Homer, who so constantly uses ἐφέπειν of "driving" an enemy never uses ἐπισπέσθαι in this sense, whereas Herodotos, who often has ἐπισπέσθαι of hanging on the rear of a flying foe, never uses the active form to imply hostile action. These phenomena can hardly be accounted for

[1] In Alkman frag. 42, Bergk, we have τίς ποκα ῥᾷ ἄλλω νόον ἀνδρὸς ἐπίσποι, but in the absence of context this can hardly be explained. As it stands it must mean "who can well govern the mind of another man." Bergk however suggests ἐνίσποι.

unless the feeling of the distinction between ἔπειν and ἕπεσθαι was vividly felt to be a real one.

Still, the identity of stem strongly suggests an identity of root. To settle this question we must have recourse to the kindred languages; I confine myself to a few suggestions made with all reserve, while leaving the matter in the hands of Sanskrit scholars.

ἑπ is commonly connected with the two Sanskrit roots *sak'* and *sap*. The relation of these two however appears to be very doubtful. Labialisation is an unknown phenomenon in Sanskrit, and the resemblance in the uses of the two words is certainly, to judge from the best authorities, not close enough to force us to regard this as an isolated instance. Prof. Monier Williams, it is true, gives a long list of meanings in his dictionary under *sap*, some of which might be brought into connexion with *sak*; but he gives no authorities, and the accounts of Böthlingk and Roth, of Grassmann, and of Bopp, are very different. The root *sap* in fact seems to be entirely restricted to religious meanings, such as worshipping and performing rites, and is therefore probably akin rather to the Greek σέβω than to ἔπω. Until Sanskrit scholars have decided the real connexions of this root, it is therefore better to leave it aside altogether[1]. We will then restrict ourselves to *sak'*.

All the senses of this root can be explained by the assumption that it originally meant "to join"; and that at a very early period this meaning generated as a secondary idea that of "laying hold" of a thing. The immediate connexion of the two ideas is perhaps not very clear to us; but that it is a natural one is shewn by the Greek ἅπτω, where the two are expressed by the active and middle voices respectively. From the sense "joining oneself to" comes at once the Greek ἕπομαι, and the middle form is explained; and from "laying hand to" come all the ideas which we have deduced from the assumed

[1] At one time it appeared to me that ἔπω belonged to *sap*, and ἕπομαι to *sak'*, an idea which, as I subsequently found, seems to have occurred also to A. Kuhn (*Zeitsch.* ii. 131): but unless the senses given by M. Williams can be established, this now seems untenable.

meaning "to handle"[1]. Grassmann gives a list of the meanings in Sanskrit in his *Wörterbuch zum Rigveda*, of which the following evidently belong to the first sense; "*hülfreich* oder *schützend geleiten, begünstigen, fördern,* und weiter, *verehren* und *wozu verhelfen;* ferner mit instr. *sich zu jemand gesellen, sich womit vereinen...verfolgen* (Feind oder Weg), *befolgen* (Gebot)...mit dat. *jemandem zu Wille stehen.*" To the second meaning belong "*eine Sache erstreben oder betreiben*" (he says "einer Sache nachgehen, d. h. sie erstreben oder betreiben" because he is trying to deduce some of the senses from the idea of going after, having no doubt the ordinary treatment of ἕπειν before his eyes[2]). Finally, the Sanskrit verb has developed the sense of "attaining an end" whether good or bad, no doubt originally in the sense "to lay the hand upon". Here we have at last the explanation of the phrase πότμον ἐπισπεῖν, which may be compared with the instances given by Grassmann under his headings (11) and (23). This meaning, though proethnic, must have died out in Greek at a very early date, as it survives only in this single petrified expression. The restriction to the aorist is an obvious corollary from the meaning of that tense[3].

This completes our survey, but one or two collateral points may be suggested for consideration. Among the senses of the Sanskrit root *sak'* Grassmann gives "fördern, kräftigen", in

[1] If this is right, it seems to follow that ἔχω itself is from the same root *sa*, with a different determinative. The primary sense of joining actually survives both in Sanskrit and Zend, as is shown by Benfey, *Wurzellexikon*, from the existence of the derivatives *sam-sakta*, "connected," *sam-sakti*, "Verbindung, Nähe," and the Zend *hak'*, which in the middle means "to attach oneself to," and thus answers exactly to ἕπομαι. It is a confirmation of this view that the middle voice is universal in Latin, predominant in Sanskrit and Greek, and at least not unknown in old Irish (see Curtius *Grundz.* p. 460).

[2] As he himself remarks in his Preface, about the lists which he gives to shew the evolution of ideas in the principal roots, "hier spielt die subjective Fassung eine grosse Rolle."

[3] It might be thought possible to bring under this head the difficult ποσὶ κραιπνοῖσι μετασπών of P 190, and the use of the aorist certainly favours the sense "catching up." But such an assumption appears to me excessively hazardous, especially in a passage so gravely suspected of late origin, and I have therefore preferred the hypothesis of a false analogy already put forward.

which the verb takes the accusative. This is precisely the sense which is required in the only passage in extant Greek literature where ἕπομαι takes an accusative; Pind. *Nem.* x. 37

> ἕπεται δέ, Θεαῖε, ματρώων πολυγνώτων γένος ὑμετέρων εὐάγων τιμά.

"The honour of victorious conflict advances, ennobles, thy race." But it is not clear to me how this sense is arrived at; it seems to come from that of "accompanying" as a supporter.

It is now impossible to separate ἕπειν from ἅπτω and the connected forms, one of which, ἀφόωντα, is in such close relation with ἕποντα in the passage, Z 321, with which we started. The natural suggestion is that both *sak* and *san-k* are extensions of the well-known pair *sa, sam,* meaning "together". We cannot derive ἅπτω directly from *sak,* because the *a* implies the presence at some time of a nasal, which may possibly be the reason for the affection by which ἀπ has become ἀφ. Curtius, it is true, connects ἅπτω with Lat. *ap-ere, ap-isci* (*Grundz.* p. 510). But it is surely in the last degree unlikely that the initial aspirate should be hysterogen in a case where it is immediately followed by an aspirated consonant. The familiar facts of Greek phonology, as seen in words like ἔχω, decisively forbid such an assumption. Again, in the form ἄαπτος[1] we have a clear trace of an initial consonant; and finally the connexion of sense between ἅπτω and *apisci* is of the vaguest, whereas ἅπτω and ἅπτομαι, as we have seen, in their double sense, exactly correspond with the two allied meanings of the root *sak* from which we found it possible to deduce the genealogy of ἕπεσθαι and ἕπειν.

Finally it may be mentioned that both Benfey (*Wurzell.* i. 431) and Savelsberg (*de digammo,* 44) propose, the former hesitatingly, the latter with confidence, to deduce ἕπω (not ἕπομαι) from a root *vap,* whose existence however they are hardly successful in establishing. The Greek word shews no trace of ϝ;

[1] For which by the way Aristophanes read ἄεπτος, which is now easily to be explained, for it will mean "not to be handled or dealt with," ruthless, ἀμήχανος. In fact the two forms become virtually identical both in origin and meaning.

the hiatus in the few instances of *ἀμφιέπω* (cf. also *ἐπιέψω ἐπιτελέσω*, Hesych.) is what we might reasonably expect from a lost sigma. The connexion of *ὅπλον* with Goth. *vêpan*, Ahd. *wafan* is very improbable, on account of the violation of Grimm's law; and *ὅπλον* itself means in Homer "tool, gear", and only rarely "weapon": while in this sense, as "a thing wielded" it suits perfectly the derivation already suggested from the root *ἑπ* meaning "to handle".

WALTER LEAF.

ON THREE CORRUPT PASSAGES IN CATULLUS.

ADOPTING the usual notation for the two best MSS. of this Author, it is to be observed that in

(1) c. XXV. 5.

the reading of O is

Cum diua ml'r aries ondet offiftantes

and that of G

al' aues al' aries i
Cum diua mulier alios ostendet oſcitantes

where the *o* of alios and the *ci* of oscitantes are written over an erasure, and the spaces shew that alites and ossistantes were the original readings of G. This line was characterized by the late Mr Munro, in Vol. v. p. 306 of the Journal, as 'one of the most desperate in Catullus'; so that some hesitation may naturally be felt in adding another to the 'fifty or more conjectures', all of which he has there pronounced to be unsatisfactory. I feel persuaded however that under the corruption aries lurks the word oria or horia, used by Plautus Rud. IV. 2. 5 in the sense of a fishing-boat, and I propose to read,

Cum diua mater horias ostendit aestuantes,

understanding an allusion to the tossing of small craft in a rough sea, which has this at least in its favour, that it keeps up the figure of the preceding line, and that the two verses

Idemque Thalle turbida rapacior procella
Cum diua mater horias ostendit *aestuantes*

give additional point to the concluding verses

Et insolenter *aestues* uelut minuta magno
Deprensa nauis in mari uesaniente uento.

Such a correspondence between two parts of the same poem, with a play upon the same words, is very much in Catullus' manner and may be seen in cc. 6, 7, 16, 24, 36. What appears to me the weakest part of the proposed emendation is the substitution of mater for mulier; not because of any palaeographical objection, for the contractions of these two words might easily be confused, but because I have no better illustration to offer for my supposition that diua mater may mean Tethys than the Homeric

Ὠκεανόν τε θεῶν γένεσιν καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν.

The interchange of e with o is perhaps the commonest of all errors in our MSS. of Catullus, and ae must have been consistently written e in that exemplar of which O and G are most probably direct transcripts; also the long shape of the ſ points to a confusion between st and ss rather than between sc and ss.

It may be remarked that the correction horias derives some slight confirmation from the consideration that its obvious gloss naues, if the *n* became indistinct, would give a clue to the variants aues, alites, which are found in G as well as in many later MSS. The existence of such glosses in the Archetype is shewn by the readings at c. XXIII. 2, Nec cimex aīal. G. Nec cimex al'. O. where animal has plainly been written at some time as a gloss to cimex and afterwards incorporated into the text; and there are other cases, of which I select two as having an especial interest. In c. XXIX. 24 opulentissime is the reading of all MSS. and has given occasion to much ingenious speculation. I venture to suggest that it is a corruption of o pientissime misread into opl'entissime. Pientissime is a very natural gloss to piissime, which is Lachmann's emendation, and which appears to me right. Most editors have considered Cicero's condemnation of the form piissimus to be decisive, but it is found on one of the tombs of the Scipios, Orelli Inscr. 579. Again in c. LXIII. 5 the MSS. give

Deuoluit iletas acuto sibi pondere silices

the reading of O being pondē, which may stand of course for pondera. The necessary correction has been made by Schwabe, Baehrens and Munro; though, 'pace tantorum uirorum', I prefer to retain with the older commentators deuoluit, in the sense of amputando deiecit, which is confirmed by the imitation in Nonnus XXV. 311

ῥῖψεν ἀνυμφεύτων φιλοτήσιον ὄγκον ἀρότρων.

The corruptions have probably been introduced by the gloss of a Grammarian who preferred the feminine use of silex, thus

Deuoluit ilei (a. f.) acuto sibi pondē (f) silice

s and f being confused as in sui for fui at v. 64 of this poem and elsewhere in our MSS.

The same cause, as it appears to me, will account for the corruption in

(2) c. LXVI. 59

where all the MSS. give

Hi dii uen ibi uario ne solum in numine celi.

[Here, guided by the frequent confusions between d and cl, I regard ibi as a gloss to hic and propose to read]

Hic (lumen uario ne solum in numine caeli
Ex Ariadneis aurea temporibus
Fixa corona foret sed nos quoque fulgeremus
Deuotae flaui uerticis exuuiae)
Uuidulam a fluctu cedentem ad templa deum me
Sidus in antiquis diua nouum posuit.

a correction which keeps rather nearer to the MSS. than any other which has been offered. I prefer to retain numine, both here and in v. 7 caelesti numine, taking numen in its proper force of the 'divinity which doth hedge a celestial'. This is the sense in which Catullus elsewhere uses it, c. LXIV. 134, 204; LXXVI. 4.

A third passage is

(3) c. LXVII. 32

where all the MSS. give

Brixia chinea suppositum specula.

For chinea I propose to read Tyrrhena, comparing Liv. v. 33. Tuscorum ante Romanum imperium late terra marique opes patuere . . . . Ii in utrumque mare uergentes incoluere urbibus duodenis terras; prius cis Apenninum ad inferum mare; postea trans Apenninum, totidem quot capita originis erant coloniis missis; quae trans Padum omnia loca, excepto Venetorum angulo qui sinum circumcolunt maris, usque ad Alpes tenuere. It is true that at the time of the Gallic invasion the 'ager Brixianus' was held by the Libui, Liv. v. 35, but the extract given above shews that there was the tradition at some time of a Tuscan occupation. It is a moral certainty that the scribe who put Theleamaco for Telemacho LXI. 225, Thetis for Tethys LXIV. 29, LXVI. 20, LXXXVIII. 5, Retheo for Rhoeteo LXV. 7, Termophilis for Thermopylis LXVIII. 54, would for Tyrrhena write Thirrena, the change of which, transcribed possibly thīeā, into chinea, is quite in keeping with a large number of existing corruptions. The passage might thus stand

Atqui non solum hoc dicit se cognitum habere
Brixia, Tyrrhena suppositum in specula,

where suppositum is an extension of cognitum and is to be understood of what the Brescians might see at their feet, if they stood on the old Tuscan watch-tower which I assume to have crowned the neighbouring hill.

I may add that in v. 12 of this poem, the objection against accepting Scaliger's simple emendation of Quinte for qui te, which proceeds on the fact that Catullus' praenomen was not Quintus but Gaius, may be obviated by taking the words 'Janua Quinte facit' as addressed not to Catullus at all, but to the Master of the house Quintus Caecilius Balbus. This occurred to me some years since; as also for uerum istius populi to read uerum est uox populi (comparing Martial x. 6. 8. populi uox erit una 'uenit') which I see is the correction proposed by

M. Baehrens in his very careful edition. On mentioning these views to my friend, the late Mr VanSittart, he at once acceded to them so far as Quintus was concerned, but suggested uerbum istuc as keeping nearer to the MSS. and corresponding with v. 15

Non istuc satis est uno te dicere uerbo.

Subsequently he had some conversation with Mr Munro on the point, and as anything which came from these two distinguished scholars, whose loss the University of Cambridge will not soon cease to deplore, can hardly fail to have an interest for all readers of the poet, I append the note which was written by Mr Munro after that conversation as a fitting conclusion to these few remarks.

J. MOWAT.

I have been thinking over your 'Verbum istuc' which I think is very likely right.

But I don't understand quite how you connect it with what precedes, and with Quinte (of Caecilius Balbus). I wish you would at your leisure send me a statement of your views on these and other points. Perhaps I may trouble you with mine. Of course Quintus is an exceedingly probable praenomen for a Caecilius; and I see Q. Caecilius, with many different cognomina, occurs again and again in the Inscriptions of Gallia Cisalpina.

H. A. J. MUNRO.

A. A. VanSittart, Esq.

THE SEASON AND EXTENT OF THE TRAVELS OF HERODOTOS IN EGYPT.

THERE was a time when I fondly hoped that the autograph of Herodotos might yet be found engraved on the walls of one of the ruined temples of Egypt. The Greeks of the classical epoch were as fond of writing their names on the monuments they visited as are the Greeks of to-day. In the temple of Seti at Abydos I have copied several hundreds of Greek *graffiti* ranging in date from the beginning of the 6th century before our era to the third or fourth century after it. It would seem to be a moral certainty that Herodotos also followed the fashion of his countrymen and helped to deface the monuments of Egypt like the British tourist of modern times. But it is only at Abydos that I have succeeded in finding Greek *graffiti* which go back to his age. It is in vain that I have searched for them elsewhere among the temples and tombs that lie between Cairo and the First Cataract. There are few now that I have not visited both in the valley of the Nile and in the Fayûm; but always with the same result. Apart from the inscriptions of Abydos and the famous texts of Abu-Simbel no research has as yet brought to light any Greek *graffiti* older than the age of Alexander.

I have thoroughly explored the monuments of Thebes and its neighbourhood, including of course the Tombs of the Kings; I have copied all the *graffiti* that are legible in the grottoes of Tel el-Amarna, and I have found a few Greek scrawls in a number of lesser known places like the quarries of Turra, the

tombs of Dêr-er-Rîfa south of Siût, the rocks of Negadîyeh opposite Girgeh, and the temple-walls of El-Ḳâb. But like my predecessors whose labours have been published by Letronne I have failed to discover anything in Central and Upper Egypt—apart, as I have said, from the texts of Abydos—which is earlier than the period of the Lagidæ. It is the same with the Greek *graffiti* scratched on the sphinxes of Sakkârah and the temple of the sphinx at Gîzeh. South of Cairo the only early Greek inscriptions that exist are at Abydos and Abu-Simbel, and in neither place is the autograph of Herodotos to be seen.

It is almost hopeless to look for it in the Delta. In the Delta stone is scarce and there is no friendly sand to cover and protect a ruined and deserted building. The temples of the Delta, accordingly, have long since perished; as soon as Christianity was triumphant they became the quarries of the neighbourhood, or else the stones of which they were composed were burnt into lime. It is only by a rare chance that cut blocks or stone figures have survived in the Delta to our time. It must be remembered, moreover, that in the Delta the temples alone were built of stone; all other structures, not excluding tombs, were composed of crude brick.

If, however, we can no longer expect to find the name of Herodotos written by his own hand, it is yet possible to determine from the words of his narrative the route he followed in Egypt and the extent of his travels there. That the attempt has not been previously made in a detailed way is due to the fact that Herodotean critics have not usually been Egyptian travellers, while Egyptian travellers have not been Herodotean critics.

But before we make the attempt ourselves it is necessary to ascertain the season of the year at which Herodotos paid his visit to the ancient kingdom of the Pharaohs. This is indicated in pretty clear language in II. 97. Here Herodotos describes the appearance of the Delta at the time of the inundation in words which none but an eye-witness could have used. The towns, he tells us, appear above the surface of the water like the islands in the Ægean, while the traveller sails not along the river but through the plain. At this season

when "sailing through the plain" he leaves the sea and Kanôbos (now Abu Kîr) behind him, and after passing the Greek settlements of Anthylla and Arkhandria reaches Naukratis. In going from Naukratis to Memphis he has to pass by the pyramids instead of the apex of the Delta.

The discovery of the site of Naukratis by Mr Flinders Petrie has cleared up the difficulties of this description. Naukratis stood at Tel en-Nebîreh, about four miles to the west of Teh el-Barûd, a station on the line between Alexandria and Cairo and 54 miles from Alexandria. The canal which passed it ran from Lake Mareotis to the Kanopic arm of the Nile which it joined south of the modern Kafr ez-Zaiyât, while a high-road went in a pretty direct line from the Greek town to the city of Sais. In going from Naukratis to Memphis when the inundation was out the shortest course would be along the edge of the Libyan desert, which would necessarily take the voyager by the pyramids. It is noticeable therefore that the city of Kerkasôros at the apex of the Delta does not seem to have been visited by Herodotos himself, since in ch. 15 his reference to it is stated to have been derived from "the Ionians."

But though the statement of Herodotos about Naukratis in II. 97 is strictly consonant with facts, as has been shown by Mr Petrie's discovery of the site, it is not consonant with the natural interpretation of another statement made by him about Naukratis in II. 179. Here he tells us that before the time of Amasis a Greek captain who was driven by contrary winds into any mouth of the Nile other than the Kanôpic, had "to sail ship and all to the Kanôpic; or if he could not sail against the wind, he had to carry his freight in Nile-boats round the Delta until he reached Naukratis." As Naukratis was more than 50 miles from the sea, and not on the Kanôpic arm of the Nile, this would have been an impossible feat. The only explanation of Herodotos's inconsistency must be that in ch. 179 he is quoting, and misunderstanding, the statement of some other author. He is referring to a period much before his own time, and his misconception of his author's meaning must be due to the fact that he had never seen the country about Naukratis

in its normal condition, that is when the inundation had subsided. Had he done so he could never have made the statement he has made in the text. During the inundation, however, the channel of the Kanôpic arm was obliterated as well as the distinction between the sea which washed the shores of the Delta and the water that covered the land.

Let us now pass from the Delta to the country above Memphis. In II. 18 Herodotos states that the Nile overflows not only the Delta but also "some parts" of the western and eastern banks of the river to the south of the Delta for "a distance of two days' journey on either side more or less." Now there is only one part of the course of the river of which this statement is true. It is only where the Bahr Yûsuf unites the Fayûm to the ancient "island" of Hêraklêopolis and the Nile that a traveller could have taken two days, or anything like two days, in sailing from west to east. Consequently in using the word ἐνιαχῇ Herodotos is speaking incorrectly. It is in one part of its course alone, and not "in some parts," that the overflow of the river could be said to extend for a distance of two days' journey. It seems clear that Herodotos must be here writing from his own experience. He had visited the Fayûm when the valley of the Nile was under water to the extent specified, and he assumed that what was true of one part of its course might be true of other parts. Had he derived his information from natives and not from his own experience he could hardly have employed such a term as ἐνιαχῇ, which is not consistent with fact.

The extreme interest taken by Herodotos in the origin of the inundation will further be explained if we suppose him to have had ocular evidence of it, as well as his ready belief in the assertion (II. 4, 5) that before the time of Menes the whole country between the sea and lake Moeris was a marsh—an assertion, by the way, inconsistent with the fact recorded in ch. 99 of the construction of the great dyke of Kafr el'Ayât by Menes. We shall also have an explanation of the extraordinary mistake he twice commits (chh. 124, 127) in supposing that there were vaults under the pyramid of Khcôps in an island formed by a canal the builder had introduced from the Nile.

I think therefore we may conclude that the visit of Herodotos to Egypt took place during the period of the inundation. At the First Cataract the Nile begins to rise towards the end of May, but in the neighbourhood of Memphis the rise takes place a month later. Towards the end of September the rise ceases for about a fortnight, when there is a fresh increase for a short time, after which the water subsides with accelerating rapidity. If, then, Herodotos visited Egypt during the inundation he must have been there between the months of June and October, or if he was at the First Cataract when the rise took place between May and September. As, however, he tells us in ch. 19 that the rise of the water commences with the summer solstice and continues for a hundred days, his visit must have fallen between the end of June and the beginning of October. Since the Delta was already under water when he sailed over it we should not be far wrong in placing his arrival at Naukratis about the 20th of July. It is during the preceding five days of that month that the rise of the water usually becomes most rapid.

As we have just seen, the inundation begins in Upper Egypt at the end of May, nearly a month before the summer solstice, the period fixed for its commencement by Herodotos. This raises a suspicion that Herodotos did not visit Upper Egypt, where the information given him about the season of the rise of the Nile would have been different from that which he actually records. The suspicion is increased when we remember the great heat of Upper Egypt during the summer months and the unsuitableness of the time of year for travelling there. This brings me to the question of the extent of Herodotos's travels in Egypt and the route or routes which he followed.

Two results are involved in the conclusion that he arrived in the country after the Nile had begun to rise. In the first place he must always have travelled by water; and secondly he had no need of following the windings of the river or the angles of the canals. In going from Naukratis to Memphis, for example, he could take a straight course, as indeed he implies he did, while a voyage over the plain from Naukratis to Sais was at once short and simple.

Let us first enumerate the places which it is *certain* from his language that he must have visited. These are Kanôpos (97, ch. 113), Anthylla, Arkhandria, Naukratis, Sais, Memphis and the Pyramids of Gîzeh, the Fayûm, Hêliopolis, Butô and Khemmis (75, 155, 156), Bubastis, and Paprêmis (III. 12). No one who has visited the site of Bubastis can doubt for a moment that the description given of it by Herodotos is that of an eye-witness; it is even possible to trace the line of sculptured wall which surrounded the temple and over which the Greek traveller looked down into the temple-enclosure from the mounds on which the city was built (ch. 138), just as it is possible to look down upon the great mosque of Hebron from the hill which rises above it.

It is further highly probable that Herodotos visited Busiris, as he couples the festival held there with those of Bubastis, Sais, Hêliopolis, Butô and Paprêmis, all which places it is certain that he saw (59, 61),—as well as Hermopolis Magna, the modern Damanhûr,—which is coupled with Bubastis and Butô (67),—the island of Prosôpitis (41), and Pelusium (154, III. 10). He may have also seen other places besides in the Delta, but there is no clear indication that he did so.

South of the Delta he visited Memphis and the Fayûm; did he penetrate further south? Greek scholars who have not been in Egypt answer "yes"; Egyptian travellers answer "no". Let us consider why they do so.

(*a*) Had Herodotos sailed up the Nile south of the Fayûm, it would have been with the object of visiting Thebes. From the time of Homer "hundred-gated Thebes" had been known by fame to the Greeks; its buildings were indeed, as they still are, among the wonders of the world. By the side of the temples of Thebes, the capital of the Middle and New Empires, the temples of Memphis, the capital of the Old Empire, faded into insignificance. The two colossi of the temple of Amenôphis, in one of whom the Greeks of a later day saw the vocal Memnôn, would alone have been worthy of comparison with anything the Greek traveller saw at Memphis. Herodotos was specially concerned to describe the great monuments of Egypt, and a writer who bestows such extravagant admiration upon the

Labyrinth would have been still more ecstatic over the wonders of Thebes. The recent uncovering of the temple of Luxor by M. Maspero has revealed to us its magnificence even in its present state of ruin; in the time of Herodotos it must have been still more striking to the passer-by. And the voyager by the river was obliged not only to pass, but to moor, under its very walls; he could not help observing and admiring it. This was also the case with the other great buildings of Thebes during the period of inundation;—Karnak with its lofty obelisks and hall of gigantic columns, the Ramesseum with its monstrous image of Ramses, shattered by earthquake, Medînet Abu not yet buried under the mounds of a Coptic village, all alike would have stood at the edge of the water and forced themselves on the attention of the most incurious traveller. The colossi themselves, then as now, would have risen out of the flood in grim majesty, inviting the dragoman to narrate the story of Memnôn who went to the Trojan war. No one who has seen the ruins of Thebes, even as they now are, can have any doubt that had Herodotos also seen them the extravagance of his admiration would not have been reserved for the Labyrinth alone.

But those who have not seen Thebes may find several indications in the text of Herodotos that the Greek historian was not more fortunate than themselves. (1) None of the kings mentioned by Herodotos are connected by him with Thebes. The stories told of them, like the monuments they are said to have erected, all refer to the Fayûm and the country north of it; none to the country to the south. Most of the kings belonged to dynasties which were essentially northern, and when we come to a monarch like Ramses-Sesostris who ruled at Thebes rather than at Memphis and whose name was specially attached to Thebes and its temples, we find that all Herodotos knows of his multitudinous monuments are the two statues in front of the temple of Ptah at Memphis. Had Herodotos been at Thebes we should have heard of Theban kings as well as of Memphite and Saite kings, and the great Theban monuments would have been described with which their names were connected by the guides.

(2) With the reign of Psammetikhos I. the information of Herodotos about the kings of Egypt ceases to be legendary and becomes fairly historical. He describes with some detail the architectural works of Amasis during the Saitic revival of Egyptian art and power. But while he tells us of all that Amasis did at Sais and Memphis, not a word is said of his restorations at Karnak, much less of his building at Abydos. And yet the *graffiti* I have copied show that Abydos was visited by the Greeks long before the time of Herodotos, while the Greek inscriptions of Abu-Simbel prove that Greeks had penetrated far to the south of Thebes as early as the age of Psammetikhos II. Hekatæos had visited Thebes before the travels of Herodotos, and we must therefore suppose that he had either found Greek-speaking guides there or had brought one with him. Indeed the Greek traveller who went up the Nile and did not know Egyptian was obliged to take a dragoman with him even more imperatively than the modern traveller who does not know Arabic. The latter would find it difficult to manage in these days of posts and steamers, of guide-books and donkey-boys who chatter English and French; in the age of Herodotos it would have been impossible. Consequently had Herodotos really visited Thebes he would have been accompanied by an interpreter who could have replied like the dragomen of Memphis to the questions put by the inquisitive Greek regarding the marvellous monuments he saw around him.

(3) Herodotos informs us that the hippopotamus was "sacred in the nome of Paprêmis, but not elsewhere in Egypt" (II. 71). It so happened, however, that it was also worshipped at Thebes. But Paprêmis was in the Delta, and had been visited by Herodotos; had he visited Thebes he would doubtless have been as well informed about the cult he saw going on there as he was about the cult he saw going on at Paprêmis.

(*β*) A visit to Thebes implies a double voyage through the greater part of Upper Egypt, and those who have sailed up the Nile in a dahabiah know well what an enforced acquaintance this means with the country. Every night the boat has to moor under the bank; often it is impossible to sail for days

together when the wind is contrary; while at other times a slow progress can be made only by towing the boat along. The traveller is perforce made acquainted with the towns and villages he passes, and the sailors generally take good care that a large town shall not be passed even when the wind is fair. If Herodotos really reached Thebes, it is plain that he must show some acquaintance at least with Upper Egypt. The evidence, however, all points the other way.

(1) The only Egyptian festivals known to Herodotos, of which he has left us an account, were held exclusively in the towns of the Delta. The festivals of Bubastis, of Busiris, of Sais, of Hêliopolis, of Butô, of Paprêmis are described and referred to; of the festivals of Upper Egypt not a word is said. The gymnastic contests which took place at Khemmis were only reported to Herodotos by natives of Ekhmîm (91) and not witnessed by him on the spot.

(2) Herodotos took a particular interest in oracles. He discovered oracles in Egypt (83, 57—58), where they never existed in the Greek sense, except when imported by the Greeks. Yet he never once refers to the oracle at Abydos, which the *graffiti* there prove to have been an oracle of the genuine Hellenic kind established in the ruined temple and enjoying a wide-spread fame among the Greek and Karian visitors to Egypt from the 7th century B.C. downwards. His silence on the subject is inexplicable if he was ever actually in the neighbourhood of the holy city of Osiris.

(3) In II. 67 he states that the cats were embalmed and buried at Bubastis, the hawks and mice at Butô and the ibises at Hermopolis or Damanhûr. Now, though it is conceivable that the corpses of these creatures might all have been conveyed from different parts of the Delta to the cities mentioned by Herodotos, it is inconceivable that they should have been conveyed to them from so distant a locality as Upper Egypt. And, as a matter of fact, exploration has shown that they were not. Apart from the mice, of which I shall speak presently, there were various places in Upper Egypt in which they were entombed. Thus the mummies of the sacred cats are found at Beni Hassan, in the cliffs of Gebel Abu Fêda, and at Thebes

itself, those of the sacred hawks at Ekhmîm and elsewhere. Herodotos could not have made two voyages in Upper Egypt without having experiences which would have corrected his statement about the burial-places of the sacred beasts[1].

(4) In II. 165—6 he gives a list of the nomes which furnished soldiers to the Egyptian army. Six of them furnished Hermotybies, and 12 of them Kalasiries. All the six are nomes in the Delta, since the position of Khemmis in the enumeration, between Sais and Paprêmis, shows that Khemmis near Butô (155) is referred to, and not Ekhmîm; while of the 12 all belong to the Delta except Thebes. That is to say, out of 18 nomes providing troops Thebes alone is in Upper Egypt. Such a statement is, of course, defective; troops were furnished for both divisions of the Egyptian army by other nomes of Upper Egypt besides the Theban, and the only explanation there can be for the omission of their names in the list of Herodotos is that he was unacquainted with them. Thebes however was well-known to every educated Greek, whether he had visited it or not, and was naturally, therefore, inserted in the catalogue. The other nomes were omitted because the author did not know them. There can be no other reason for the remarkable nature of the list.

(5) In ch. 12 he declares that the plateau on which the pyramids stand "above Memphis" is "the only sandy hill in Egypt." No one could have said this who had travelled south

[1] The same holds good of his statement in ch. 41 regarding the burial of the oxen in the island of Prosôpitis. He there maintains that the carcases of cows, which were "sacred to Isis," or more correctly Hat-hor, were thrown into the Nile, while the bones of the bulls were brought in boats to the island of Prosôpitis and there entombed. It is obvious that Herodotos must have been mistaken in supposing that the sacred river of the Nile, which was itself identical with the bull-god Hapi or Apis, was ever polluted by the corpse of an animal, more especially of one which was consecrated to the goddess Hat-hor, and it is difficult to imagine that the Egyptians would have been perpetually occupying themselves with conveying the bones of dead bulls from Upper Egypt to an island in the Delta. As a matter of fact, however, apart from the Apis-bulls whose mummies were enshrined at Sakkârah, mummified bulls are found at Thebes and other places in Upper Egypt. Nor was it the bones only which were preserved; different parts of the body, including the head, were dried and folded up in the shape of the animal.

of the Fayûm. In many places the sand-drifts come to the very edge of the river and must have been particularly observable to a voyager in the time of the inundation. The hills in the neighbourhood of Tel el-Amarna, for instance, where later Greek travellers left their names on the walls of the old tombs, are much more sandy than those in the neighbourhood of Memphis; and as the voyager proceeds further to the south the sand-hills become still more numerous and noticeable. This statement of Herodotos is consequently one more proof that he could never have been as far as Thebes, or indeed further south than the vicinity of the Fayûm.

(6) In chapter 74 we are informed that snakes existed at Thebes which were sacred and harmless. The description shows that the cerastes is meant. Now the cerastes was not only not sacred—the sacred snake of Khnum being the poisonous asp—but it is extremely venomous, and the terror of the natives during the summer months. No one who had been in Upper Egypt between April and October could have believed in its harmless character.

(7) When we come to examine the description of the country south of the Fayûm given by Herodotos, we shall find that it bears out the conclusion suggested by the facts I have already enumerated. As far as the Fayûm and the Hêraklêopolitan nome the geography of Herodotos is exact; from this point southward it is not only more or less vague, but inconsistent with such facts as an eye-witness would have observed. It has often been noticed that whereas Herodotos is full of information about the Delta and the Fayûm, his references to Upper Egypt are scanty and meagre, and the only towns he mentions south of the Fayûm are Khemmis (Ekhmîm), Neapolis (Ḳeneh), Thebes and Elephantinê. Now in chap. 91 he tells us that Khemmis was "a great city of the Theban nome near Neapolis," and distinct, of course, from the "island of Khemmis" at Butô in the Delta, which is described in ch. 156. In making this statement Herodotos must have been led astray by that foreshortening of distances which is inevitable in geographical information derived at second-hand. Had he actually gone up the Nile he would never have described Khemmis by its vicinity

to Neapolis, a place from which it is separated by a voyage of about three days with an ordinarily good wind[1]. Ekhmim, in fact, is 84 miles north of Keneh, while Thebes itself was only 40 miles further on. The nearest large city to Khemmis was This (Girgeh) with its adjunct, the holy city of Abydos. In the eyes, at all events of Egyptian sailors and dragomen, This was a far more important place than Neapolis, and the *graffiti* I have copied at Abydos and on the cliff opposite Girgeh show that Greek travellers also took pretty much the same view.

(8) The description given of the temple of "Perseus" at Khemmis in ch. 91 must be due to the imagination of the natives of Khemmis whom Herodotos seems to have met at Memphis or in the Delta: it certainly never corresponded to fact. The propylæa of an Egyptian temple were lofty and solidly-built towers, which could be used as places of defence in cases of necessity and guarded the entrance to the temple. Statues never stood upon them: to have put them there would have contravened the primary rules of Egyptian sacred architecture. Had they done so, however, they would have been visible far and near, so that in affirming their existence Herodotos implies that his account of them was taken at second-hand and not from personal inspection. The only alternative would be to suppose that he tells a deliberate falsehood about a place he visited, and this supposition can be admitted by no one who has compared his descriptions of places in Egypt he really saw with the sites themselves.

(9) In ch. 69 he states that the crocodile was considered a sacred animal by the inhabitants of Thebes and the Fayûm, but was eaten at Elephantinè. As regards the Fayûm this was strictly the case; the crocodile-god Sebek was held in the highest veneration there. At Thebes, however, Sebek occupied a subordinate place: no crocodile mummies have been found in its tombs, and it is even questionable whether the crocodile was not treated there as it was at Denderah and Elephantinè.

[1] This agrees with one of the estimates given by Herodotos for the length of a day's voyage. According to the other estimate the voyage would have required nearly two days. For these inconsistent estimates see further on.

But in other parts of Upper Egypt and in the neighbourhood of Thebes itself, there were nomes in which the creature received as much respect as in the Fayûm. Ombos more especially was a seat of its worship, and tombs containing the mummies of crocodiles are found in abundance at El-Ḳab. The crocodile was also worshipped to the north of Thebes at Koptos (Ḳoft) and Krokodilopolis, and the vast crocodile mummy pits of Maabdeh, opposite Manfalût, a little to the north of Siût, still remain but half explored. In saying, therefore, that the crocodile was worshipped by "those who live about Thebes," Herodotos is again guilty of that geographical foreshortening which personal experience and a knowledge of Ombos and Koptos would have corrected. Ombos is 106 miles from Thebes by river and Koptos 50, while the distance from Ombos to Elephantinê is only 27 miles.

(10) At the beginning of the second book (chh. 4, 5) we find Herodotos assigning all Egypt south of the Fayûm to "the Theban nome." This, of course, is strictly speaking incorrect, but it was a convenient way of referring to the southern part of the country, just as it is now-a-days convenient to include Fostâni or Middle Egypt in Saîd or Upper Egypt, as indeed I have done in this Paper. But Herodotos goes on to say that north of the Theban nome and Lake Mœris "Egypt, into which Greeks sail," is, as can be plainly seen by the "eye-witness" a made land, the gift, in fact, of the river. Here the Egypt which is seen by the eye-witness, that is, by the writer himself, is confined to the Delta and the country "below" the Fayûm, and Herodotos implies,—what indeed we know from other sources,—that Greek ships in his age did not sail to the south of it. He adds, however, that "the country above the Fayûm for a distance of three days' voyage is similar to that below it." As he reckons it a voyage of 7 days from the sea to the Fayûm, a distance of about 190 miles, three more days of sailing would bring us to Samalût and the Gebel et-Tayr, 80 miles distant. Now no one who had actually sailed south of Beni-Sûef and the Hêraklêopolitan nome (65 miles north of Samalût) could have said that the country resembled the Delta in any respect, even in the time of inundation.

After leaving Beni-Sûef the valley of the Nile becomes contracted; cliffs rise on the eastern side above the normal bank of the river, and sand-banks begin to abound. The "eye-witness" must have stopped short at Beni-Sûef.

(11) The same conclusion must be drawn from ch. 8. According to this, the traveller who goes southward finds the country "narrow" for four days after leaving Hêliopolis. After that it becomes "broad" again. Now four days mean 108 miles, which bring us to Feshun, 19 miles south of Beni-Sûef. At this point the Nile-valley, which had broadened out in the neighbourhood of the Hêraklêopolitan nome, again becomes narrow, and remains so for the rest of its course throughout Egypt and Nubia, only widening out a little in the plains of Gau el-Kebîr, Abydos and Thebes. The accuracy of Herodotos is in no way assisted by Dietsch's conjectural insertion of the words καὶ δέκα after τεσσέρων, since a voyage of 14 days would bring us to Ḳeneh or Neapolis, from which point onwards the valley certainly does not become "broad" again.

(12) In ch. 9 we are told that the voyage from Hêliopolis to Thebes required only nine days. Now the distance from the one place to the other by river is 455 miles: and this at the rate of 27 miles given by Herodotos as the extent of a day's voyage in that part of Egypt which we know him to have traversed would mean a journey of nearly 17 days and not nine. Nine days would imply an average rate of 50 miles a day, which in *ascending* the river is far too high, and would bring the voyager in four days not to Feshun, as I have calculated above, but to Tel el-Amarna, where the Gebel Abu Fêda begins and the Nile-valley becomes extremely narrow. Of course no argument can be drawn from the incorrectness of the distances in stadia given in the chapter by Herodotos. Neither he nor his Greek predecessors were able to use the measuring-rod and survey the country, so that their estimates must be founded to a large extent on conjecture.

(13) In ch. 18, however, Herodotos states that at the period of the inundation the Nile overflows not only the Delta, but also some parts of the Libyan and Arabian banks for a distance of two days' journey on either side, "more or less."

Though he does not express himself very clearly, he must here be referring to the Libyan and Arabian banks of the river south of the Delta, since the desert on either side of the Delta was not inundated, while the context requires a contrast to be drawn between the Delta and the Nile-valley. South of the Delta, however, there is only one part of the Nile-valley where the inundation extended to anything like a distance of two days' journey, reckoning this at 54 miles. This was the district of the Fayûm and the Hêrakleôpolitan nome. Consequently Herodotos was wrong in supposing that it took place "in some parts" (*ἐνιαχῇ*), and the statement hangs together with that which makes the Nile-valley become broad again at a distance of four days' journey from Hêliopolis. It is another indication that the writer's personal observation did not extend so far.

(γ) When it is thus clear that the journey of Herodotos in Egypt never reached as far south as Minieh, much less to Thebes, it might seem superfluous to show by internal evidence that Elephantinê, 133 miles above Thebes, was also unvisited by him. For a reason to be stated presently, however, it is as well to bring this evidence forward.

(1) Herodotos invariably calls Elephantinê a "city" (chh. 9, 17, 29, 69, 175; III. 19). Now it is true that there was a city on the island of Elephantinê, but its proper name was Kebh, the city of "fresh water," and not Abu "the elephant-island." Moreover it was as an island rather than as a city that it was known to the Egyptians, the important city of the neighbourhood being Syênê or Assuân on the mainland opposite. In most of the passages in which Elephantinê is mentioned by Herodotos, it is the island rather than the city that ought to be referred to (see especially ch. 69), and anyone who had actually ascended the Nile so far would naturally speak of it as an island.

(2) In ch. 175 Herodotos describes a monolithic shrine of granite which had been brought to Sais by Amasis "from the city of Elephantinê." Of course it really came from the granite quarries on the mainland above Assuân, and we should have expected a visitor to the spot to dilate upon the quarries and

the half-hewn obelisk lying in them which is still the admiration of travellers. Herodotos, however, knows nothing about them, and avers instead that the stone came from "the city of Elephantinê." Had he said "the island of Elephantinê" his statement might have passed, since boats from the Syênê quarries would sail along it, and Ramses II. himself speaks of bringing an obelisk to Thebes from "the island of Abu." So, too, in the time of the VIth dynasty Una was sent to "the island of Elephantinê" to bring a granite doorway for the pyramid of Pepi.

(3) In ch. 28 Herodotos reports the famous account of the sources of the Nile which the sacred scribe at Sais invented for the benefit of the inquisitive foreigner. According to this two mountains with pointed summits called Krôphi and Môphi rise "between the city of Syênê and Elephantinê"—which latter, it will be observed, the scribe does not qualify with the title of "city." Herodotos had a half-suspicion that the Egyptian was making fun of him; had he been as far as Elephantinê his suspicion would have been a certainty, and we should have lost the delicious story of Krôphi and Môphi. Between Elephantinê and Syênê there was only the channel of the river.

(4) The rest of the story, that the fountains of the Nile are two bottomless springs which flow down the slopes between those two mountains, one into Ethiopia and the other into Egypt, would also have been assessed at its right valuation by a traveller who had actually been at Elephantinê.

(5) In the next chapter (29) Herodotos gives a different account of the geography of the Nile-valley south of Elephantinê, but even this account is full of inaccuracies (see my notes on the passage in my *Herodotos*). Most of these inaccuracies, however, prove nothing as regards the extent of the travels of Herodotos, since no one claims that he went further than Elephantinê. It is otherwise with the words with which the account begins. These are that "on starting from the city of Elephantinê to ascend the river the country is uphill;" and the uphill portion is then explained to be the First Cataract through which the boat has to be towed for four days. Instead of four days the shooting of the Cataract does not

ordinarily take more than five hours, and no one who had been at Elephantinê could have imagined that the country immediately south of it was "uphill." This much at all events Herodotos would have known if he had ever visited the "Elephant-island," however misinformed he might have been about the length of the voyage through the Cataract and the course of the Nile in Nubia.

An examination of the text of Herodotos, then, leads to the same conclusion as that suggested by the remarkable silence of the Greek writer in regard to the monuments of Egypt south of the Fayûm. The Fayûm and the Hêraklêopolitan nome were the extreme southern point of his Egyptian tour.

(δ) But, it will be objected: what in this case can we make of the passages in which Herodotos implies or asserts a longer continuance of his voyage? Let us see what they are.

(1) Thebes is mentioned in 11 passages (I. 182; II. 3, 15, 42, 54, 56, 74, 143, 166; III. 10; IV. 181); Elephantinê in about as many; and Khemmis (Ekhmîm), Neapolis and Syênê in three (II. 91, 91, 28). The other great cities of Upper Egypt are not referred to. The mention of Syênê occurs in the story of the fountains of the Nile invented by the sacred scribe at Sais, and the designation of it as "a city of the Thebais" and not "of the Theban nome," which Herodotos elsewhere incorrectly uses as the equivalent of Upper Egypt, goes to show that the scribe's words are reported with fair accuracy. Neapolis is named as being near Khemmis, and of Khemmis Herodotos does not say that he had actually seen the place but only that he had conversed with certain of its inhabitants. The conversation might have been carried on anywhere, and the knowledge displayed by his informants of Greek habits and Greek heroes suggests that they were not stay-at-home inhabitants of a town which lay far beyond the limits of Greek trade in Egypt, but merchants who came to the Delta and had there mixed with the Greeks (comp. ch. 15).

(2) The case is different as regards Thebes. In II. 3 the present text of Herodotos makes him positively assert that he visited Thebes, in 54, 55 he states that he conversed with "the priests in Thebes," while in ch. 143 he implies that

he had seen the same statues at Thebes as his predecessor Hekatæos. In my *Herodotos* I have pointed out that the last passage is merely an adroit piece of verbal legerdemain, which has succeeded in deceiving readers, editors and commentators up to the present time. Herodotos has cleverly mixed together his account of the 345 royal statues Hekatæos had seen at Thebes two generations previously with an account of 341 other statues which he himself saw (as the context shows) at Memphis. In the first passage it is possible that the words ἐς Θήβας τε καὶ are an interpolation. At all events they interrupt the context where not another word is said of the visit of Herodotos to Thebes. Herodotos states that after having been told at Memphis of the linguistic experiment made by Psammetikhos he "turned into" (ἐτραπόμην ἐς) Hêliopolis to make further enquiries about the matter, "for the Heliopolitans—not the Thebans, be it noticed—are said to be the best informed of the Egyptians." Thebes was too far away from Memphis for the traveller to "turn into" it for information, nor in enumerating the places he visited after Memphis would he have mentioned it first in order, before the nearer Hêliopolis. The explanatory clause which follows, moreover, confines the visit to Hêliopolis.

The second passage (chh. 54, 55), stands on a different footing. Here we learn that "the priests of the Theban Zeus" informed him that the Phœnicians had carried two priestesses away from Thebes, one to Libya and the other to Greece. This he "heard from the priests in Thebes," and he gave ready credence to the tale because the priestesses and people of Dôdôna averred that the oracle there had been founded by a black dove from Egyptian Thebes, whose companion had founded the oracle of Ammon in Libya, while "the divination practised at Thebes and Dôdôna is pretty much the same." Two points must be noticed here. First of all the close resemblance of the two tales precludes their independent origin, and since they relate to the foundation of a Greek oracle their origin must be Greek rather than Egyptian. Secondly, as Wiedemann has pointed out, the Egyptian "priests" referred to by Herodotos were really the "beadles" or guides who

showed travellers and their dragomen over the temples. A real Egyptian priest would not have contaminated himself by intercourse with "the vile" stranger whose language he despised to learn and for whom he would never have condescended to act as guide. "The priests of the Theban Zeus," therefore, resolve themselves into *ciceroni*, who might be found in any of the parts of Egypt—and they were many—where Amun of Thebes was worshipped. It is true that the expression *τῶν ἐν Θήβῃσι ἱερέων ἤκουον* implies that Herodotos conversed with them in Thebes itself, and the impartial reader can have little doubt that this is what Herodotos meant it to imply. It might, however, be strained so as to be nothing more than an equivalent of the expression already made use of *οἱ ἱερεῖς τοῦ Θηβαιέος Διὸς*, "the priests of the Theban Zeus" being "priests in Thebes"—when they were there. Herodotos carefully avoids saying that he "heard in Thebes" what "the priests" said. Indeed his narrative contains fairly clear indications that he could not have done so. (1) Thebes was far beyond the region which was acquainted with Greeks and kidnapping Phœnicians. This was the Delta, not Upper Egypt. (2) The Greek oracle was a peculiar institution and was unknown to the Egyptians except in places to which it was brought by the Greeks. In the time of Herodotos there was no Greek oracle at Thebes, such as existed at Abydos; indeed, as I have stated above, no Greek inscriptions earlier than the period of the Lagidæ are to be found there, and the first Theban oracle was that of the vocal Memnôn, which began after the earthquake of B.C. 27. Consequently the assertion that "divination at Thebes and Dôdôna is pretty nearly the same" cannot be founded on personal observation. The true history of the whole passage seems to be this. Herodotos, full of interest in oracles which he believed to have been of Egyptian origin and remembering the story told him at Dôdôna, put certain leading questions to some "priests" of the Theban Zeus whom he met with in the Delta and presumed to have come from Thebes. The answer he received was just such as might have been expected under the circumstances. This view of the occurrence is supported by another passage (ch. 42), where he says that "All

those who build a temple to the Theban Zeus or belong to the Theban nome spare sheep and sacrifice goats," while those "who have a temple of Mendês or belong to the Mendêsian nome spare goats and sacrifice sheep." The "Theban Zeus" is the ram-headed Amun-Min (or Knem) and his worshippers who were spread all over Egypt are distinguished from the inhabitants of the Theban nome itself. The fact that they are mentioned before the inhabitants of the Theban nome suggests that the temple where Herodotos saw the image of the ram-headed Amun was situated elsewhere than at Thebes. Indeed a traveller who had once seen the marvellous structure of Karnak and the long avenue of ram-headed sphinxes which led to it could hardly have refrained from alluding to them in connection with the festival of Min. After, however, thus placing the inhabitants of the Theban nome second in the list of the worshippers of the Theban Zeus, Herodotos goes on to place them first,—an instructive parallel to his usage in chh. 54, 55[1].

(3) We now come to a passage which is extremely startling. In ch. 29 he declares that he went "as an eye-witness as far as the city of Elephantinê, but from this point southward he could speak only from hearsay." I have suggested in my *Herodotos* that the words are possibly an interpolation, as they are in part omitted in one MS. But it has been pointed out to me that they are more probably a *verbatim* quotation from another author, embodied in the text of the Greek historian without acknowledgment after the fashion of his age and race, and so producing the impression in the mind of the reader that Herodotos himself actually went as far as the First Cataract. Certainly such a supposition would not only explain the want of an apodosis to the μὲν after τοσόνδε, but also the inconsistency of what follows with the general and comprehensive character of the statement immediately preceding: "from no one else [besides the sacred scribe at Sais] was I able to learn

[1] Ch. 42:—

(1) Ὅσοι μὲν δὴ Διὸς Θηβαιέος ἵδρυνται ἱερὸν ἢ νομοῦ τοῦ Θηβαίου εἰσὶ...

(2) Θηβαῖοι μὲν νῦν καὶ ὅσοι διὰ τούτους οἴων ἀπέχονται.

Chh. 54, 55:—

(1) οἱ ἱερεῖς τοῦ Θηβαιέος Διός...

(2) τῶν ἐν Θήβῃσι ἱερέων.

anything." The contents of chapters 29—34 show that the statement must be understood in a limited sense as referring only to "the sources" of the Nile (chh. 28 and 34), but it looks as if Herodotos when first writing it intended it to be interpreted literally, the account of the course of the Nile which follows being a subsequent addition. It is certainly noticeable that he uses the word *αὐτόπτης* elsewhere (III. 115), not of himself but of others whom he consulted.

Whether or not, however, Herodotos can be acquitted of saying in so many words that he ascended the Nile above the Fayûm, it cannot be denied that he has conveyed to his readers the impression that he did so and that his account of things and places in Upper Egypt was the result of his own experience. Indeed so successful has he been in producing this impression that it still imposes on the minds of untravelled scholars. As we have seen, however, the internal evidence of his work proves with as much certainty as is attainable upon such subjects that the impression is a false one. The Egyptian voyage of Herodotos ended with the Fayûm and the Hêraklêopolitan nome. It seems to me, therefore, that the judgment I have passed in my *Herodotos* on the amount of credibility to be assigned to the statements of the Greek historian, where otherwise unsupported, is fully justified, and that it becomes a profitable task to investigate the sources of the information of Herodotos and to determine the authors he has used and the extent to which he has used them. I have indicated a mode of carrying out this enquiry in a part of my book which has not been noticed, so far as I am aware, by any reviewer: the enquiry will at any rate show that Herodotos was not the bookless man he has often been supposed to be, and will throw light on the problems which still beset his commentators[1].

[1] As an example of what may be done in this direction, I may mention the Assyrian chronology of Herodotos which has hitherto caused so much perplexity. I hope to work out the subject in detail on another occasion; here I will only give the main results of my investigation into it. Herodotos's Assyrian history and chronology are alike derived from a Græco-Lydian source. The Greeks first became acquainted with the Assyrians through Lydia, Gyges having sent tribute to Assur-bani-pal or Sardanapallos, who tells us that the Assyrians had previously never even heard of the

Let me now return to the main question of this Paper, the route followed by Herodotos in Egypt. He arrived in the country during the inundation and he did not travel further south than the neighbourhood of the Fayûm. These are the two facts which I believe I have established. In order to trace his journey in detail we must have recourse to his account of Egyptian history from the time of Menes the first king of the united monarchy to the rise of the 26th (Saitic) dynasty under Psammetikhos I.

name of Lydia. Hence the Greek tales about the wealth of Sardanapallos (Hdt. II. 150). Semiramis was a Lydian goddess; and consequently though her attributes were those of the Assyrian Istar, her name is not found on the Assyrian monuments. The 520 years of Assyrian rule over "Upper Asia" (I. 96) correspond with the 505 years of the rule of the Herakleidæ in Lydia or "Lower Asia" west of the Halys (see I. 103, 177), the Herakleidæ being descended from Ninos the son of Bêlos (I. 7). As Herodotos counts 30 years for a generation as well as for a reign (II. 142, &c.), his chronological scheme was as follows:—

Lower Asia.

	yrs.	
Ninos one generation ...	30	(B.C. 1250)
Agrôn and his successors	505	
The Mermnadæ	170	(B.C. 715)
Conquest of Kyros B.C.	545	
Total number of yrs.	705	

Upper Asia.

	yrs.	
Ninos	30	(B.C. 1250)
His successors (520—30=)	490	
The Median revolt followed by a generation of autonomy (ch. 96)	30	(B.C. 730)
The Median kings	150	
Conquest of Kyros B.C.	550	
Total number of yrs.	700	

The date of the overthrow of Astyages and the Median Empire by Kyros is derived from the cuneiform documents. It will be noticed that the fall of the Herakleidæ is placed 15 years, i.e. half a generation, after the Median revolt in harmony with the statement that the Medes "first" revolted from Assyria and "the other nations" not till a little later (I. 96). Sardanapallos is consequently assigned to B.C. 700, and the erroneous date given for the overthrow of Nineveh by Ktêsias is due to a confusion of Sardanapallos with the last king of Nineveh. The Semiramis of Herodotos is also assigned to B.C. 700 (five generations before Nitôkris the mother of Nabonidos, I. 184; see my note on the passage in my *Herodotos*); this is natural, if Semiramis is the Lydian name of the Assyro-Babylonian Istar who first became known to the Lydians in the time of Gyges. She has been confounded with the wife (or mother) of Assur-bani-pal whose father Esarhaddon rebuilt Babylon.

He begins by telling us (ch. 99) that the great temple of Hêphæstos or Ptah at Memphis was built by Menes; next that the priests read to him from a papyrus the names of 330 other princes, the successors of Menes, one of whom was a queen, Nitôkris, and the last of whom was Mœris, the builder of the propylæa and pyramids on the north side of the temple. Then we are told of Sesostris (102—110) who set up the colossi in front of the temple; he was followed by his son Pherôn or Pharaoh, whom (Greek) legend connected with the *oracle* of Butô and a "Red Mound" or Kôm el-Aḥmar, of which there are so many in Egypt, and to whom it also ascribed the two great obelisks at Hêliopolis—the erection, really, of Usertesen I. of the 12th dynasty (ch. 111). Next we have the Greek god Prôteus, whose name is attached to the Tyrian camp at Memphis, on the south side of the temple of Ptah; Rhampsinitos, the builder of the propylæa and the two colossi on the west side of the temple of Ptah (ch. 121); and then come the builders of the three great pyramids of Gîzeh, Kheôps, Khephrên and Mykerinos, the last of whom dedicated a cow at Sais (ch. 129). They were followed by Asykhis who constructed the eastern propylæa of the temple of Ptah, and the brick pyramid of Dahshûr; Anysis who came from "the city of Anysis" and fled before the Ethiopian invaders to the island of Elbô; Sabakôs the Ethiopian who raised the sites of the Egyptian cities, more especially Bubastis; Sethôs the priest of Ptah who routed the "Arabian" host of Sennacherib at Pêlusion; and lastly the Dodekarkhy who built the Labyrinth. The Dodekarkhy were overthrown by Psammetikhos I., with whom the Greek history of Egypt begins. Furthermore, according to "the Egyptians and the priests" there were 341 kings and 341 generations from Menes to Sethôs (ch. 142), i.e. 330 kings ending with Mœris in addition to the 11 princes subsequently mentioned by Herodotos.

Now there are two facts which strike us at once in regard to these 11 princes; they are each connected with a particular monument or a particular locality, and the localities follow in geographical order from north to south. But it is observable that except in the case of Anysis and Sabakôs—who is stated in ch. 152 to have

driven Psammetikhos into exile and who was therefore connected with the Greek history of Egypt—all the eleven kings are associated with the great temple of Ptah at Memphis and the chief monuments west and south of it as far as the Fayûm. Anysis, however, is the name not of a king but of a city[1]—which may or may not be the same as Anytis in ch. 166—and the presumption arises that this city also is to be sought in the neighbourhood of Memphis. Sesostris or Ramses II., who has left his gigantic monuments in all parts of Egypt and Nubia, and who was specially a Theban monarch and builder, is known only by the colossi he erected at Memphis; the "Red Mound" of his son Pheron "the Pharaoh" is probably to be found in one of the old mounds on the eastern bank of the Nile a little above Memphis, while the obelisks of Usertesen which Herodotos ascribes to him stood at Hêliopolis within an easy drive northwards from Memphis. We have already seen that after conversing with "the priests" of the temple of Ptah at Memphis Herodotos "turned into" Hêliopolis (ch. 3). The "Memphite" Prôteus comes from a Greek source and has taken the place of some Egyptian or Phœnician deity. Rhampsinitos is again a Theban prince and his historical prototype was probably Ramses III. of the 20th dynasty, but he also is celebrated not on account of his palace and temple at Medinet-Abu (Thebes) but because of a couple of statues which he set up in Memphis. The pyramid builders, who are made to follow Rhampsinitos, belong really to the 4th dynasty and carry us back some 3000 years before the time of the Ramses of the 20th dynasty. Asykhis is Aseskaf the 3rd successor of Mykerinos (Men-ka-Ra)[2], and his brick pyramid is one of those at Dahshûr south of Gîzeh. From Asykhis another chronological jump is made to Anysis and Sabakôs (B. C. 720). It is plain that such a list of kings could not have been derived from any Egyptian source, and conse-

[1] Herodotos has made a similar mistake in the names of his goddesses Bubastis and Butô. Bubastis is Pa-Pasht "the temple of Pasht" (or perhaps Bu-Pasht "the place of Pasht"), and Butô is Pa-Uats "the temple of Uats."

[2] The tablet of Abydos makes him the immediate successor of Men-ka-Ra. The Greek name shows that the old reading Aseskaf instead of Shepseskaf must be adhered to.

quently the statement that there were 341 kings from Menes to Sethôs was not given, as Herodotos asserts, on the authority of the Egyptian priests, or even on that of the guides, but was a calculation of his own.

There is only one way in which he could have arrived at it. He must have given the names of the Egyptian kings, or what he believed to be Egyptian kings, in the order in which they occurred in his note-book, and this order was determined by the order of his visits to the various monuments, to which the names were attached by the guides. At Memphis the temple of Ptah was naturally the first object a traveller would go to see. Here the names of a number of Egyptian kings were recited to him, beginning with Menes—or Mina as the Greek-speaking dragomen seem to have pronounced the name, in memory of Minôs—and ending with a king who built the northern propylæa of the temple. The document from which the names were read might have resembled the Turin papyrus; more probably it contained only the names of the kings specially connected with Memphis, like the Theban document used by Eratosthenês. In any case as Herodotos did not speak Egyptian he could not have understood a word of what was read to him, and experience teaches us to distrust the interpretation which must have emanated from his guides both as regards the numeral (330) and the name of the last king, which indeed is demonstrably false. We may, perhaps, gather, however, that the scribe's chamber where the document was read was on the north side of the temple. At all events the next monuments described by Herodotos, the two colossi of Ramses II., were on the north, as has been shown by Mariette's excavations. The legend of Sesostris associated with him his son "the Pharaoh," and the latter was therefore necessarily made to follow him in the account of Herodotos. It is not needful to suppose that Herodotos made his excursion to Hêliopolis immediately after his visit to the northern entrance of the temple of Ptah. He might have gone there at any time during his stay in Memphis.

Herodotos would appear to have walked round the temple along its eastern wall, where the propylæa had been built by Asykhis; but as the story told to him about Asykhis related

not to these propylæa but to one of the pyramids of Dahshûr the mention of his name and his work at Memphis is postponed. We are accordingly next taken to the southern side of the temple and the Tyrian camp, and then to the western side. This was of course the starting-point for a visit to the pyramids of Gîzeh which lay to the north-west of Memphis. During the period of the inundation Herodotos would have sailed along the canal, whose channel can still be traced from Gîzeh to a point between the ruins of the temple of Ptah and Sakkârah, the chief necropolis of Memphis, and would have landed on the rocky ledge on which the pyramids stand. This explains the impression made upon him by the causeway to the Great Pyramid, which would have been a striking object in the water, as well as his extraordinary statement that the pyramid or its subterranean vaults stood in an island formed by a canal (ch. 124). His equally extraordinary statement that inscriptions were written on the pyramid may be due to his having noticed inscriptions on the tombs or *mastabas* surrounding the pyramids, and omitting to record in his notes that they were not on the pyramid itself. That no notice should be taken of the Sphinx—that wonder of Greek travellers of a later day—is easily explicable when we remember that he reached Gîzeh by water. He would have landed just below the small pyramid which he ascribes to the daughter of Kheôps and have walked round the northern side of the great pyramid, thus making his way to the second and third, and returning to his boat either by the same road or round the southern side of the second pyramid. In either case he would not have observed the Sphinx.

On leaving Memphis for the Fayûm in the time of the inundation, Herodotos would have first passed under the pyramids of Dahshûr, on the south-west of the old city, and the fact that some of them are of brick would naturally have excited his curiosity and induced him to question his dragoman about them. It is immediately after his reference to Dahshûr, but before any mention of the Labyrinth, that the city of Anysis is named. Anysis ought therefore to lie between Dahshûr and the Fayûm, and to have been a place of such importance as to have a legend attached to it by the guides.

Now between Dahshûr and what in the time of Herodotos, before the construction of the modern railway, would have been the natural entrance to the Fayûm, the only monument which strikes the traveller is the curious pyramid of Mêdûm. No notice, however, is taken of it by Herodotos, and we must therefore seek the city of Anysis nearer the Fayûm. The Fayûm was approached through the Hêraklêopolitan nome and by the great canal (the modern Baḥr Yûsuf) on which Hêraklêopolis, the capital of the nome, stood. Strabo calls the nome an island, as indeed it was, being surrounded by canals which opened into the Nile. Hêraklêopolis was a city of considerable importance: it had been the seat of two dynasties; and its mounds, now called Anasîyeh or Ahnas el-Medîneh, "Ahnas the city," by the Arabs, cover a large area of ground. It is termed Khininsu in the cuneiform texts of Assur-bani-pal, which shows that its hieroglyphic name must be read Khenen-su and not Su(ten)-khenen as has sometimes been proposed. According to a well-known rule of Semitic (and Egyptian) phonetics Khininsu would tend to be pronounced Khinissu, which would be written in Hebrew characters חנס, that is to say the Hanes (Khânês) of Is. xxx. 4, which Gesenius long ago identified with the Coptic Hnes or Hêraklêopolis. Now Hanes is manifestly Anysis, the strong guttural at the beginning, which was avoided by the Greeks in their reproduction of foreign names, being softened as in the Coptic or Later Egyptian Hnes and the Arabic Ahnas. Geography and philology thus agree in determining the position of the most southerly point attained by Herodotos in Egypt, and in showing what a valuable clue is afforded by his list of Egyptian kings to the geography of his travels in the country. If the Anytis of ch. 166 is really Anysis we should have a further illustration of the way in which the statements of Herodotos are conditioned by his travelling experiences, since the name of Anytis is here immediately followed by that of an "island" in front of Bubastis, just as in ch. 137 "king" Anysis is immediately followed by Sabakôs, the raiser of the site of Bubastis.

Between Anysis and the Labyrinth Herodotos interposes two kings, Sabakôs and Sethôs. Sabakôs, the first of the Ethiopian dynasty, here represents the whole dynasty, and as he

is made to drive both Anysis and Psammetikhos to the marshes of the Delta and Syria he becomes the connecting link between the two and necessarily follows Anysis. The position of the priest-king Sethôs is more difficult to explain, and (as we may gather from ch. 147) must have to do with one of the legends current among the Greek settlers in Egypt in regard to the rise of Psammetikhos I. The fact, however, that in the story told of Sethôs Sennacherib is called "king of the Arabs and Assyrians," while his army is called "Arabian," proves that the legend must be of an Egyptian origin. Arab was the Greek equivalent of the Egyptian Shasu or Beduin, and we accordingly find some of the expounders of Manetho designating the Hyksôs as Arabs (Joseph. *c. Ap.* I. 14. Compare also Herod. II. 30 where Psammetikhos is said to have established a garrison in the Pelusiac Daphnê (Tel ed-Defenneh) to protect the country from "the Arabians and Assyrians.") The legend of Sethôs must therefore have been derived from an Egyptian source, and as it is associated with a statue in the temple of Ptah at Memphis it would seem to have been heard by Herodotos when at Memphis.

Herodotos does not say in what precise part of the temple the statue stood. But since the inscription which he states was upon it was one which never existed on any Egyptian monument and was simply due to the imagination of his dragomen, the hieroglyphics composing it must have been seen by Herodotos himself. Had he heard of them from the Egyptians, their meaning would have been more correctly reported. A Greek stranger, however, was not admitted within the sacred precincts of an Egyptian temple, and the statue must therefore have stood at one of the entrances of the temple of Ptah or at most in one of its outer courts. The statue was doubtless one of Horos to whom the field-mouse was dedicated, the only other deity with whom that animal was associated being Uatsit (Uats) or Butô, the nurse of Horos (see Ant. Liberal. *fab.* 28). The twin deities honoured at Butô were known as "Horos of Pe and Uatsit of Tep," and the Mayer collection of Egyptian antiquities at Liverpool possesses two bronze figures of shrew-mice (from Athribis) placed side by side on a single stand.

The key to the position occupied by Sethôs is given in the opening words of ch. 142. He was the last of the kings of whom Herodotos heard from his guides only, and the place he occupies would lead us to infer that Herodotos did not hear of him until after his return to Memphis from the Fayûm. However this may be, from this point onwards the Greek historian records what is stated not only by "the Egyptian" dragomen but also by "other men," that is to say, by Greek writers and the traders of Naukratis (ch. 147). The legend of the Labyrinth alone is out of its place; but as it was connected with the rise of Psammetikhos it was necessarily transferred from the position it should properly have occupied to what may be called the Greek section of the narrative of Herodotos. Strictly speaking the story of the Dodekarkhy should have preceded the story of Sethôs had Herodotos adhered to the geographical order of his notes; this, however, was impossible since Sethôs was asserted to have been the last of the Memphite kings, while the legend of the Dodekarkhy was bound up with the history of Psammetikhos. Herodotos, consequently, had no choice in the matter.

We can now, therefore, give a fairly accurate sketch of the tour of Herodotos in Egypt. He arrived like other Greeks of his age at the mouth of the Kanôpic arm of the Nile, and there found the country covered with the waters of the inundation. He first made his way to the Greek capital, Naukratis, where he doubtless hired a dragoman. Under his guidance he made an excursion to Sais, and subsequently took his way in a direct line, under the lee of the Libyan desert, to Memphis, passing the pyramids of Gîzeh on his right. After inspecting the great temple of Ptah there, first visiting its northern entrance and then walking round it from east to west, he went by water to Gîzeh in order to see the Pyramids. The expedition would not have occupied more than a day, and was followed by a voyage southwards, past Dahshûr, to Anysis or Hêraklêopolis, and from thence to the Fayûm. Herodotos then returned to Memphis, and either now—or more probably on the occasion of his first visit[1]—made an excursion to Hêliopolis. On

[1] The statements made in chh. 7—9 seem to imply that Herodotos visited Hêliopolis before ascending the Nile above Memphis, and the same in-

leaving Memphis he must have passed Hêliopolis again on his way to Bubastis (Tel Basta, near Zagazig) and Butô, the site of which latter place is unfortunately uncertain; while here he made a short expedition into the Arabian desert in order to see the bones of the winged serpents (ch. 73[1]). Eventually he found himself, in all probability, at Pêlusion (III. 10), but it is impossible to say whether he arrived there from Bubastis by the Pelusiac arm of the Nile or whether he made his way back to Naukratis and the Kanôpic mouth, and from thence coasted along the Delta, touching at Pêlusion, in a ship which finally brought him to Tyre (ch. 44). His reference to the Pelusiac Daphnê in ch. 141 may be an indication of his having followed the first-mentioned route. Such a question, however, can only be decided when exploration in the Delta has settled the ancient geography of the country and determined the sites of Paprêmis, of Butô, of Busiris and of Prosôpitis. Hermopolis Magna or Damanhûr, which he probably saw, could easily have been visited by him on his way to Naukratis from the sea; whether this was also the case as regards Paprêmis, Busiris and Prosôpitis must be left to future research to decide. Our knowledge of the ancient geography of the Delta is still in a most unsatisfactory state, and excavation alone can enable us to settle it. The discovery of Naukratis however is a cheering illustration of what may be done at a comparatively small outlay, and it may therefore be hoped that it will arouse classical scholars as well as Egyptologists to take a practical interest in the archæological exploration of the Delta.

A. H. SAYCE.

ference may be drawn from the words he uses in ch. 3 on which I have commented above.

[1] In the list of nomes Butô is named between Bubastis and Pharbæthos, which is usually identified with Horbêt near Abu Kebîr, 15 miles N.E. of Zagazig. In this case Butô ought to be near Mehîyeh, 8 miles N. of Zagazig.

LEXICOGRAPHICAL NOTES.

The following words are wanting in the last edition of Georges *Handwörterbuch:*

accumulatim: Mai Thes. nou. p. 141, concretim: accumulatim, globatim, congestim, stipatim, spissim. The Thesaurus is particularly full of adverbs in -im, but most of them have authority in late Latin, which employed the forms very widely. Georges, however, omits *stipatim* and *spissim.*

acerus: Fragm. Bob. de Nom. Keil 5. 559. 13, acer, quando arborem significat, licet quibusdam haec acerus nominatiuo dici debere placeat. Cf. Mai Thes. p. 15, acer acri pro quodam ligno. De Vit quotes 'acri' as genitive from "Seruius" but I cannot trace the ref.

adfabrim: artificiose, gloss in Mai 6. 503.

antiphora: Iul. Exc. Keil 5. 320. 11, per metaphoram et antiphoram, id est per interrogationem et responsionem. De Vit (Glossarium) quotes a gloss, Antiphora: tantae quaestionis responsio and wrongly suggests antiphora or antiphona. For tantae read tacitae (cf. Du Cange s. v. antiphora).

antistichon: Pomp. K. 5. 194. 34, antistichon (so mss) dicitur quando altera littera pro altera ponitur (arcubus, -ibus). The word should probably be restored to Seruius, A. 1. 304, 421, 726 (where Thilo reads antistoechon, in each case against the mss) and Ecl. 1. 2, G. 1. 186, A. 7. 169, where also the older edd. give antistoechon.

boethema: Aug. K. 5. 501. 24, apparently a "Greek translation" word; see Sittl in Wölfflin's Archiv, 1. 284.

calculatim: Mai Thes. pp. 89, 139, =numeratim.

cals: i.q. calx., Dub. Nom. K. 5. 574. 10, ut Varro 'cals circumfusa aqua' (but the writer de Dub. Nom. seems to give wrong sources for his quotations); Caper K. 7. 98. 10, cals dicendum, ubi materia, per s (De Vit quotes the old text 'calcs'); ars Bern. in Hagen's suppl. 120. 32, hic cals, huius calsis, ex quo lapidum maceries dealbatur (cf. 121. 2). Mai Thes. p. 89 calcaneus, qui et cals dicitur, and Du Cange (s. v.) cals: durities pedis, contradict this, and probably both words

were once pronounced with s, if the words calsaterius, calsolarius, &c. in Du Cange, are of any value. Labbé (gl. O) gives "calcx : ἄσβεστος" ; Mai Thes. p. 89 &c. 'calcis' as nom.

caepum : Cons. Keil 5, 345. 13. caepum caepae, porrum porri.

compilatim : Pomp. Keil. 5. 243. 16, ostiatim totum oppidum compilatim. The first three words are from Cicero Verr. 4. 53, who goes on compilauerit, &c. and hence the text may be wrong. Compilatim is, however, given by Du Cange from elsewhere.

circumflexilis : t. t. in Macr. Exc. Bob. Keil 5. 634. 12, = circumflexibilis or circumflexus. Compounds of circum abound in late Latin.

crabatum : this spelling in Dub. Nom. Keil 5. 573. 19, crabatum antiqui, nunc grabatum, &c.

dialyton : t. t. in Pomp. K. 5. 300. 22; Hagen Suppl. xlii. Isid I. 36. 20 (and hence in glossaries e.g. Balliol). Cf. De Vit.

epizeuxis : t. t. in Pomp. K. 5. 300. 32 ; Hagen Suppl. xlix. 4 ; Isid. I. 35. 20 (and in glossaries). Cf. De Vit.

fontius : Pomp. K. 5. 144. 13, quoted without ref.

frondicare : Eutych. K. 5. 462. 8, quoted without ref.

giber : not gibber, Fr. Bob. de N. K. 5. 559. 12, without ref. For the value of such variations cp. Gröber in Wölfflin's *Archiv,* 1. 204.

glutinatim : Mai thes. p. 264.

las : Pomp. K. 5. 138. 5, nominatius later non dicitur, quamuis apud Probum inuenimus hic later ; ib. 187. 5, plerique dicunt hic las, sed falsum est, ita enim facit, later. Ita legimus in Probo et in antiquis (*sic*).

latifundus : late possidens, Ball. Gloss.

ludum : Dub. Nom. K. 5. 581. 23, generis neutri, ut Prudentius (Steph. 9. 41, ludum discipulis uolupe est, according to Dressel's text and mss.)

manes, -iorum : Pomp. K. 5. 196. 11, dicebant (maiores) et horum maniorum et horum manium.

mappalia : so mss in Phocas K. 5. 428. 13.

mentio, mentiui : the perfect occurs in Iul. Exc. K. 5. 318. 11 mentiui de illo priore.

F. HAVERFIELD.

PROPERTIUS I. xxi.

To his "Critical Notes on Plautus" in the last number of the Journal of Philology Mr J. H. Onions adds a cursory note upon the above well-known crux. The first four lines which he quotes appear as follows in the MSS.

> Tu qui consortem properas evadere cursum,
> miles, ab Etruscis saucius aggeribus,
> quid nostro gemitu turgentia lumina torques?
> pars ego sum uestrae proxima militiae.

"With this reading," says Mr Onions, "the only possible translation seems to me to be 'Why turnest thou thine eyes from our tale of woe?'" He proceeds however: "But would *torques nostro gemitu* be used for *torques a nostro gemitu?*" Certainly not, we must reply. The difficulty however does not reside in the construction of *nostro gemitu* but in the apparent futility of the question 'Why dost thou turn thine eyes at my moaning?'; which is hardly excused by Hertzberg's defence 'commotum militis animum haec interrogatio decet.' Mr Onions suggests that we should read *quin*... ?, "*quid* being an extremely frequent corruption for *quin* in cursive MSS.... *Nostro gemitu* then will be either the contracted form of the dative equivalent to *ad nostrum gemitum* or, perhaps more probably, a causal ablative meaning either '*Why turnest thou not thy tear-laden eyes to listen to our tale of woe*' or '*at our tale of woe?*'" On this it must be remarked: (1) that *nostro gemitu* means 'at my moaning,' not 'at our *tale of woe*' which Mr Onions seems to prefer, still less 'to listen to our tale of woe' which he also suggests. (2) *turgentia lumina* are not 'tear-laden eyes' but eyes '*swollen*' with crying (cf. Tib. I. 8, 68 fletu lumina fessa tument). (3)

the proposed *quin*, which—valeat quantum—though frequent in Propertius is not found in this sense, is out of place here. As one of the strongest imperatives in the Latin language, it should be rendered, not as by Mr Onions '*Why turnest thou not*,' but 'Why don't you turn?' or 'Turn at once.' For examples see Roby, Lat. Gr. § 1615, and esp. Livy I. 45. There is another reading *qui*, a correction of the 'Italians of the renaissance', which Mr Onions rejects as not being 'of much benefit to the sense'. I am of the opposite opinion. But as we take different views of the situation of the poem, this is not surprising[1]. I understand it as follows: A soldier from the garrison of Perusia is flying with all the speed he can from the death that has overtaken his comrades. He has been severely wounded, and his eyes have swollen from the effects of his wounds. He is not likely to stop to listen to a narrative or to heed much by the way; nor his eyes to fill with the tears of pity for other people. But a groan suddenly strikes his ear, and he involuntarily turns his head. This gives the dying man his chance. He charges the fugitive as his fellow-soldier to do his last bidding and to see that his bones have burial. (The dying man's speech only extends to seven lines, as the first three are simply put into his mouth by the poet to avoid the introductory mention which would have been necessary in prose.) Mr Onions' view can only be given in his own words:

"The picture indeed seems to be this: *A dead soldier, seeing a wounded comrade hastening from the field of battle, first implores him as a comrade to stay and listen to his mournful tale; and then adjures him, as he hopes for his own safety, to carry to his sister the news of his death.*"

J. P. POSTGATE.

[1] It may be added that we apparently differ also on the interpretation of the latter part of the poem; but that does not affect the explanation of the former part.

CAMBRIDGE: PRINTED BY C. J. CLAY, M.A., & SON, AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS.

BIBL. LONDIN UNIV.

Vol. XIII. No. 25.

The Journal

OF

PHILOLOGY.

EDITED BY

W. ALDIS WRIGHT, M.A.

INGRAM BYWATER, M.A.

AND

HENRY JACKSON, M.A.

London and Cambridge:
MACMILLAN AND CO.
DEIGHTON, BELL AND CO. CAMBRIDGE.
1884

Price 4s. 6d.

Messrs MACMILLAN AND CO.'S PUBLICATIONS.

By Professors Westcott and Hort.

THE NEW TESTAMENT IN THE ORIGINAL GREEK. 2 vols. Crown 8vo. 10*s.* 6*d.* each. Vol. I. Revised Text. Vol. II. Introduction and Appendix.

By Professor Jebb, M.A.

THE ATTIC ORATORS FROM ANTIPHON TO ISAEOS. 2 vols. 8vo. 25*s.*

SELECTIONS FROM THE ATTIC ORATORS, ANTIPHON, ANDOKIDES, LYSIAS, ISOKRATES, AND ISAEOS. Edited, with Notes. Being a companion volume to the preceding work. 8vo. 12*s.* 6*d.*

PRIMER OF GREEK LITERATURE. 18mo. 1*s.*

By Dr G. Autenreith.

AN HOMERIC DICTIONARY. Translated by R. P. KEEP, Ph.D. Cr. 8vo. 6*s.*

By James Reid, M.L.

CICERO. ACADEMICA. Edited with Introduction and Notes. New and revised Edition, with Translation. 8vo. [*In the Press.*

THE ACADEMICS. Translated. 8vo. 5*s.* 6*d.*

By Professor Mahaffy, M.A.

SOCIAL LIFE IN GREECE, FROM HOMER TO MENANDER. Fifth Edition, enlarged. Crown 8vo. 9*s.*

RAMBLES AND STUDIES IN GREECE. Illustrated. Second Edition, enlarged. Crown 8vo. 10*s.* 6*d.*

EURIPIDES. HIPPOLYTUS. Edited by J. P. MAHAFFY, M.A., and J. B. BURY. Fcp. 8vo. 3*s.* 6*d.*

By Professor John E. B. Mayor, M.A.

THIRTEEN SATIRES OF JUVENAL. With Commentary. 2 vols. Crown 8vo. Vol. I. 7*s.* 6*d.* Vol. II. 10*s.* 6*d.*

CICERO'S SECOND PHILIPPIC ORATION. After HALM. With Additions and Corrections. Fcp. 8vo. 5*s.*

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL CLUE TO LATIN LITERATURE. After HÜBNER. Crown 8vo. 10*s.* 6*d.*

HOMER. ODYSSEY. Book IX. Fcap. 8vo. 2*s.* 6*d.*

PLINY'S LETTERS. Book III. The Text of H. KEIL. And a Life of Pliny, by G. H. RENDALL, M.A. Fcap. 8vo. 5*s.*

By Professor A. H. Sayce, M.A.

HERODOTUS I—III. The Empires of the East. Edited with Notes, and Appendices on Egypt, Babylonia and Assyria, the Phoenicians, Lydia, the Persian Empire, etc. 8vo. 16*s.*

By A. W. Verrall, M.A.

EURIPIDES. MEDEA. With Introduction and Commentary. 8vo. 7*s.* 6*d.*

By W. Gunion Rutherford, M.A.

THE NEW PHRYNICHUS. Being a revised Text of the Ecloga of the Grammarian Phrynichus, with Introduction and Commentary. 8vo. 18*s.*

BABRIUS. Edited with Introductory Dissertations, Critical Notes, Commentary and Lexicon. 8vo. 12*s.* 6*d.*

By Professor J. P. Postgate, M.A.

SELECT ELEGIES OF PROPERTIUS. Edited with Notes and an Introduction to the Study of Propertius. Fcap. 8vo. 6*s.*

By W. H. Lowe, M.A.

THE HEBREW STUDENT'S COMMENTARY ON ZECHARIAH, HEBREW AND LXX., with Excursus on several Grammatical Subjects. 8vo. 10*s.* 6*d.*

By H. J. Roby, M.A.—A GRAMMAR OF THE LATIN LANGUAGE FROM PLAUTUS TO SUETONIUS. Vol. I. 8*s.* 6*d.* Vol. II. 10*s.* 6*d.*

A LATIN GRAMMAR FOR SCHOOLS. Crown 8vo. 5*s.*

By D. S. Margoliouth, M.A.

STUDIA SCENICA. Part I., Section I. Introductory Study on the Text of the Greek Dramas. The Text of SOPHOCLES' TRACHINIAE, 1—300. Demy 8vo. 2*s.* 6*d.*

AESCHYLI AGAMEMNO. A Revised Text. 8vo. 2*s.* 6*d.*

By Professor W. W. Goodwin.

SYNTAX OF THE GREEK MOODS AND TENSES. Crown 8vo. *6s. 6d.*

A GREEK GRAMMAR. New Edition. Thoroughly Revised. Crown 8vo. *6s.*
"The best Greek Grammar of its size in the English Language."—*Athenæum.*

A SCHOOL GREEK GRAMMAR. Crown 8vo. *3s. 6d.*

By Professor A. S. Wilkins, M.A.

CICERO. CATILINE ORATIONS. Edited, after HALM, with additions. Fcap. 8vo. *3s. 6d.*

CICERO. PRO LEGE MANILIA. Edited, after HALM, with additions. Fcap. 8vo. *3s. 6d.*

HORACE. EPISTLES AND ARS POETICA. Edited, with Introduction and Notes. Fcap. 8vo. [*In the Press.*

By R. D. Archer-Hind, M.A.

THE PHAEDO OF PLATO. Ed. with Introduction and Notes. 8vo. *8s. 6d.*

By Messrs. J. H. Pratt and Walter Leaf.

HOMER'S ILIAD. Books I., IX., XI., XVI.—XXIV. Edited by the late J. H. PRATT, M.A., and WALTER LEAF, M.A.: Fellows of Trinity College, Cambridge. *6s.*

By W. Aldis Wright, M.A.

THE BIBLE WORD-BOOK: a Glossary of Archaic Words and Phrases in the Authorised Version of the Bible and the Book of Common Prayer. By W. ALDIS WRIGHT, M.A., Fellow and Senior Bursar of Trinity College, Cambridge. Second Edition, Revised and Enlarged. Crown 8vo. *7s. 6d.*

TRANSLATIONS FROM THE CLASSICS.

ARISTOTLE. THE POLITICS. Translated by J. E. C. WELLDON, M.A., Fellow of King's College, Cambridge, and Master of Dulwich College. Crown 8vo. *10s. 6d.*

JUVENAL. THIRTEEN SATIRES. Translated into English after the Text of J. E. B. MAYOR, by Prof. HERBERT A. STRONG and ALEX. LEEPER, M.A., of the University of Melbourne. Crown 8vo. *3s. 6d.*

PINDAR. THE ODES. Translated by ERNEST MYERS, M.A. Second Edition. Crown 8vo. *5s.*

PLATO. THE EUTHYPHRON, APOLOGY, CRITO, AND PHAEDO of Plato. Translated into English by F. J. CHURCH. Crown 8vo. *4s. 6d.*

HOMER. THE ODYSSEY. Done into English by S. H. BUTCHER, M.A., Professor of Greek in the University of Edinburgh, and ANDREW LANG, M.A., late Fellow of Merton College, Oxford. Fourth Edition, revised and corrected, with new Introduction, additional Notes and Illustrations. Crown 8vo. *10s. 6d.*

HOMER. THE ILIAD. Translated into English Prose. By ANDREW LANG, M.A., WALTER LEAF, M.A., and ERNEST MYERS, M.A. Crown 8vo. *12s. 6d.*

LIVY. Books XXI—XXV. Translated by A. J. CHURCH, M.A., and W. J. BRODRIBB, M.A. With Maps. Crown 8vo. *7s. 6d.*

SALLUST. THE CONSPIRACY OF CATILINE AND THE JUGURTHINE WAR. Translated into English, with Introduction and Notes, by A. W. POLLARD, B.A., Scholar of St John's College, Oxford. Crown 8vo. *6s.*

MACMILLAN'S CLASSICAL SERIES. New Volumes.

CICERO. PRO P. SESTIO. Edited by Rev. H. A. HOLDEN, LL.D. *5s.*

EURIPIDES. IPHIGENIA IN TAURIS. Edited by E. B. ENGLAND, M.A. *4s. 6d.*

HORACE. THE SATIRES. Edited by ARTHUR PALMER, M.A. *6s.*

HORACE. THE ODES. Edited by T. E. PAGE, M.A. *6s.*

JUVENAL. Edited for the use of Schools by E. G. HARDY, M.A. *5s.*

LIVY. Books II. and III. Edited by H. M. STEPHENSON, M.A. *5s.*

OVID. METAMORPHOSES. Books XIII. and XIV. Edited by C. SIMMONS, M.A. [*In the Press.*

SALLUST. BELLUM CATULINAE. Edited by A. M. COOK, M.A. *4s. 6d.*

THUCYDIDES. Book IV. Edited by C. E. GRAVES, M.A. *5s.*

XENOPHON. HIERO. Edited by Rev. H. A. HOLDEN, LL.D. *3s. 6d.*

XENOPHON. OECONOMICUS. By the same Editor. With Lexicon. [*Nearly ready.*

CONTENTS.

No. XXV.

	PAGE
PLATO'S LATER THEORY OF IDEAS. III THE *TIMAEUS*. HENRY JACKSON	1
ON THE PROBABLE ORDER OF COMPOSITION OF CERTAIN PARTS OF THE *NICOMACHEAN ETHICS*. T. L. HEATH	41
STARE IN HORAT. *SAT.* I. 9. 39. A. W. VERRALL	56
PLATO *THEAETETUS* 190 C. HENRY JACKSON	59
OLD TESTAMENT NOTES. W. ROBERTSON SMITH	61
NOTES ON LATIN LEXICOGRAPHY. I. HENRY NETTLESHIP. II. F. HAVERFIELD	67
CICERO'S OPINION OF LUCRETIUS. H. NETTLESHIP	85
PROFESSOR BÜCHELER ON THE PETRONIANUM OF PHILLIPPS MS 9672. R. ELLIS	86
ON SOME PASSAGES OF STATIUS' SILVAE. R. ELLIS	88
EMENDATIONS. HERBERT RICHARDS	98
ON A PASSAGE OF THEOCRITUS (XVIII. 26—28). E. L. HICKS	101
PLATO, *THEAET.* 190 C. L. CAMPBELL	104
ON DIOGENES LAERT. IX. 1, 7. I. BYWATER	105
ON A POINT OF NOTATION IN THE *ARITHMETICS* OF DIOPHANTOS. T. L. HEATH	107
NOTE ON JEREMIAH VIII. 22. F. FIELD	114
NOTE ON JOSHUA. XXII. 10, 11. W. A. W.	117
PLATO, *PHAEDO* 95 A. H. JACKSON	121
BENTLEIANA. NOTES ON HOMER, *IL.* I—VI.	122

Just published, upwards of 600 pages, price 5s. ("Weale's Series") or 6s. cloth boards.

A DICTIONARY OF THE PORTUGUESE LANGUAGE,

IN TWO PARTS. I. PORTUGUESE-ENGLISH. II. ENGLISH-PORTUGUESE; including a large number of Technical Terms used in Mining, Engineering, &c. With the Proper Accents, and the Gender of every Noun. By ALFRED ELWES, Author of the Portuguese, Italian, and Spanish Grammars; Compiler of the French, Spanish, and Italian Dictionaries of "Weale's Educational Series."

*** The above may also be had, with the same Author's PORTUGUESE GRAMMAR, price 7s., cloth boards.

CROSBY, LOCKWOOD & CO., 7, STATIONERS' HALL COURT, LONDON, E.C.

Now ready, No. XVI., Demy 8vo. price 4s. 6d.

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.

EDITED BY

BASIL L. GILDERSLEEVE.

MACMILLAN & CO., LONDON.